

“What Remains” in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness

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Meditation has occupied a position of cardinal importance in Buddhism throughout its history. From the very beginning, it has been generally accepted that the higher reach of wisdom (prajñā) is attained either through or accompanied by meditation (dhyāna, samādhi, and so on). Examples of this idea can be seen in various formulae such as “the pairing of quietude and insight” (*śamatha-vipaśyanā-yuganaddha*), and in the last two of the “three disciplines” (*śīla-samādhi-paññā*), the “five faculties” (*śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā*), and the “six perfections” (*dāna-śīla-kṣānti-vīrya-dhyāna-prajñā*).

Various things were adopted as objects of meditation, such as “impurity,” “respiration,” the “fourfold truth,” and the “three dharma-marks,” but later on, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, śūnyatā, or “emptiness,” also came to be recognized as an object of this sort. The “three doors to enlightenment” (*trivimokṣamukha*), which are also called the “three concentrations” (*trisamādhi*), and which comprehend “the empty,” “the signless,” and “the wishless” as its members, were widely recommended as objects of practice. Among these three, emptiness may be regarded as the most fundamental, embodying the other two. In this way, although “emptiness” is

usually regarded as “nonexistence,” it is not merely an ontological or metaphysical concept, but also a decidedly practical one. “Emptiness has far-reaching consequences for the religious life,” as Richard Robinson has said.¹

It was Nāgārjuna who established the concept of “emptiness” with a highly philosophical shading, but to him, too, the concept seems to have been significant not only in a philosophical and logical context but also in a religious-practical sense. The Yogācāras, who, as the name suggests, were greatly concerned with yoga-praxis, inherited the Nāgārjunian notion of “emptiness,” and, when they elucidated features of yoga-praxis such as the six pāramitās, the ten *bhūmis*, and so on, “emptiness” seems to have been the basis of their theories. The Yogācāra treatises enumerate “ten kinds of mental distractions” (*vikṣepavikalpa*) as obstacles to right meditation; however, many passages of the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* are introduced which act as antidotes to these obstacles and which also convey the full meaning of śūnyatā.² Also, the “sixteen kinds of emptiness,” which were originally expounded in the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, are important in the Yogācāra school, where the idea is elaborately expatiated.³ In their interpretation of “emptiness,” however, there are many features peculiar to their own school.

“Emptiness” was not the monopoly of Mahāyāna, for it appears in earlier Buddhism, too; it is not difficult to find the word “empty” in the Nikāyas and Āgamas. Among the Āgamas and Nikāyas, the *Cūlasuññata-sutta* (“Lesser Discourse on Emptiness”)⁴ invites our special attention.

In this sutta, the Lord Bhagavān expounds for Ānanda the meditation on emptiness, saying: “I . . . through abiding in [the concept of] emptiness, am now abiding in the fulness thereof,” and he goes on to say that, when the monks are gathered in a hall in which there is no elephant, no cow, and so on, the hall “is empty of elephants, cows, etc.,” and yet, “there is only this that is not empty, that is to say the one thing [which is not empty but] grounded on the Order of monks.” Likewise, when a monk practices meditation in a

forest, he perceives no village, no villager, and attends only to one thing that is not empty and grounded in the perception of the forest. His mind being pleased with and freed in the quietness of the forest, he comprehends thus: "The disturbances that might arise from the perception of a village do not exist here . . ." and yet, "there is only this degree of disturbance, that is to say, one thing grounded in the perception of a forest." That is, by practicing "emptiness," he acquires freedom from the disturbances (*daratha*) of villages and villagers, but the loneliness of the forest itself becomes to him a new disturbance, which should be negated through further meditation. By recourse to such meditation and negation, he travels through a number of stages, including the highest stage of trance in the "formless world," to reach, finally, "the concentration of mind that is signless" (*animit-taṃ cetosamādhim*). In this final stage, he is freed from every canker of "outflowing impurities" (*āśava*) and obtains Arhatship; and yet there remains the disturbance (*daratha*) of "the six sensory fields that, conditioned by life, are grounded in this body itself."⁸ Thus, his corporeal being, which even the Arhat can never nullify, is his ultimate disturbance. At every stage of the progress just described, the following statement is added:

It is perceived that when something does not exist there, the latter [the place] is empty with regard to the former. Further it is comprehended that something that remains there does exist as a real existent.⁹

The sutta repeats this sentence eight times in all. It states that "emptiness" is nonbeing on one hand but that there is, on the other, something remaining therein which, being reality, cannot be negated. Emptiness includes both being and nonbeing, both negation and affirmation. This is the true definition of emptiness, as the sutta goes on to say:

Thus, Ānanda, this comes to be for him a true, not mistaken, utterly purified and incomparably sublime realization of [the concept of] emptiness.⁷

The *Cūlasuññata-sutta* does not seem to have attracted the attention of the Mādhyamikas, but it is given a special significance in the treatises of the Yogācāra school.

First, the *Mādhyānta-vibhāga*⁸ expounds the relationship between the "unreal notion" (*abhūtaparikalpa*) and "emptiness" (*śūnyatā*) in verse I.1. The actualities of daily life are here summed up as "unreal notions," which are a discrimination between, and attachment to, two things—the subject grasping and the object grasped (*grāhaka, grāhya*). This twoness, though indispensable for discrimination or conceptualization, does not have any reality at all; here, emptiness is found to belong to the "unreal notion" or "imagination." (The adjective "unreal" is used to qualify the notions or imagination which singles out as existents things that are "non-reals," i.e., "empty.") At the same time, however, this "unreal imagination," in spite of emptiness, is constantly operative. Hence, "unreal imagination" again arises in "emptiness."⁹

This rather tortuous argument is repeated in the next verse, I.2, from a slightly different perspective:

All entities, therefore, are neither exclusively empty nor exclusively nonempty. This is so because of the existence [of the "unreal imagination"], because of the nonexistence [of the duality of the subject and object], and again because of the existence [of the emptiness of the "unreal imagination"], as well as the existence [of the "unreal imagination" as the *locus* of emptiness]. This whole schema is named the Middle Path.¹⁰

When Vasubandhu comments on verse I.1, he states:

Thus [in this verse] the characteristic of emptiness has been shown in an unperverted way as stated: "It is perceived as it really is that, when anything does not exist in something, the latter is empty with regard to the former; and further it is understood as it really is that, when, in this place, something remains, it exists here as a real existent."¹¹

The words "as stated" suggest that the passage enclosed in quotation marks is a quotation from some scriptural authori-

ty; and, if this is the case, the quotation has to be nothing other than the idea of the *Cūḷasuññata-sutta*, the similarity between the sutta and this passage being quite clear.¹² Vāsubandhu also observes that, in accordance with this sutta passage, emptiness can be “shown without perversion.” And the interpretation of emptiness by the Yogācāras seems actually to be in basic agreement with the point of view of this sutta.¹³

The expression, “something remains” (*avaśiṣṭa*), however, is enigmatic indeed, for śūnyatā is generally accepted as non-being, negative in character, while “something remains” positively asserts the existence of something. Perhaps one should understand this as an ultimate reality which is never denied, not even at the extremity of radical negation; it is, for instance, similar to the situation in which one cannot negate the fact that he is negating. It is affirmation found in the midst of negation, and it is true existence because it is found in negation.

Madhyānta I.13, presumably in keeping with the idea stated earlier, expounds a definition of śūnyatā that says:

Truly, the characteristic of emptiness is the nonexistence of the duality [of subject and object], and the existence of [that] nonexistence.¹⁴

Emptiness, thus, comprehends not only the “nonexistence” but also the “existence of nonexistence,” which turns out to be a special feature of the Yogācāra interpretation. The idea of adding the “existence of nonexistence” was, however, severely attacked by the later Mādhyamikas,¹⁵ according to them, the true meaning of śūnyatā is “nonexistence,” i.e., “nonexistence” through and through; to add the “existence of nonexistence” is not only superfluous but also absurd because of the resulting internal contradiction.

In later Chinese Buddhism, however, one encounters the saying: “Truly empty, [hence] unfathomable existence,” which is to be understood as the identity of nonbeing and being, negation and affirmation, or as the recovery of existence from nonexistence. Actually, in the *Prajñāpāramitā-*

sūtra, too, one reads: “Form is emptiness, the very emptiness is form.”¹⁶ The passage “the very emptiness is form” is not redundant and superfluous, nor a repetition of the preceding passage, for it opens up a new horizon of true existence in the wake of negativism of “form is emptiness.” Nāgārjuna, too, is said to have established the true significance of worldly phenomena in his *Mūla-madhyamakakārikā*, chapter xxiv.¹⁷ Especially in verse eighteen, he equates śūnyatā, originally identical with *prattiyasamutpāda* (“dependent origination”), with yet another notion, viz. that of “*upādāya prajñaptiḥ*” (“designation having recourse to materials”), and finally with the Middle Path. The whole scheme of this verse looks like a prototype of *Madhyānta* I.1-2, given earlier; the notion of *abhūtaparikalpa* in the latter stands for *upādāya prajñaptiḥ*¹⁸ here, in which all human endeavors, including religious practical ones, are duly affirmed.

The Yogācāras, on the other hand, in their elucidation of the notions of being and nonbeing, often have recourse to the theory of *trisvabhāva* (the three natures: the imputed, the dependent, and the completely perfected). On certain occasions,¹⁹ śūnyatā is analyzed into three: *abhāva-śūnyatā* (“emptiness as nonbeing”), *tathā-bhāva*-(or *tathā-śūnyatā*) (“as thus-being” or “as not-thus-being”), and *prakṛti-śūnyatā* (“essential emptiness”), which three are then related to the imputed nature (*parikalpita*), the dependent (*paratantra*), and the perfected (*pariniṣpanna*), respectively. Thus, “emptiness” synthesizes all three natures (which together represent all states of entities without exception), especially those of “non-being” and “being” in terms of *parikalpita* and *paratantra*, respectively. “Something remains,” mentioned earlier, corresponds exactly to this idea of *paratantra* (thus-being but empty, or not-thus-being, hence empty, as seen before), which was equally a target of attack on the part of the Mādhyamikas.²⁰

A statement similar to that of the *Cūḷasuññata-sutta* also appears in other Yogācāra treatises. In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, for example, “emptiness rightly understood” (*suḡrhitā śūnyatā*) is explained.²¹ Here, though

there is no evidence of citation, there occurs a passage²² almost identical with the one quoted in the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*—a passage in which it is emphasized that the unperverted, true view of emptiness is taught. The basic idea is further exemplified by the term *rūpa* ("form"): *rūpa*, which is accepted as real in Abhidharma philosophy, is empty, insofar as it is an entity constructed by thought. But there is still something remaining, which, though itself unfathomable, has reality insofar as it provides a *locus* (*āśraya*) for the designation *prajñapti-vāda* of *rūpa*. The interpretation here is different from that of the *Madhyānta*, but there seems to be no essential difference between the ideas of these two treatises.

The passage in question appears also in the *Abhidharmaśāstramuccaya* of Asaṅga, which has been preserved entire in Chinese and Tibetan but only in fragments in the original Sanskrit.²³ It is here closer to the version of the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* than to that of the *Madhyānta*, perhaps indicating that the *Abhidharmaśāstramuccaya* is quoting from the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* (?). This similarity is obvious when the Tibetan (as well as Chinese) versions of these treatises are compared.²⁴ According to the latter interpretation, what is negated is *ātma-ātmīyatva* ("selfhood and possession"), and what remains as real is *anātmakatva* ("selflessness"). Non-self is cognizable within entities such as skandhas, *dhātus*, and *āyatanas*—the categories maintained by Abhidharma philosophy—but therein does exist "nonself." The process of the argument is identical with that of the "nonexistence and existence of nonexistence" in the *Madhyānta*.

A most interesting exposition of śūnyatā, in this connection, is found in the *Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun* (or *Āryadeśanā-vikhyāpana*) of Asaṅga, which survives only in Chinese, not in Sanskrit or Tibetan. At the beginning of chapter 6, "Establishment of Emptiness," there is a verse that runs as follows:

When [it is realized that] nothing exists here, and yet something of it remains—then the nonduality of emptiness is explained in accordance with twofold reasoning.²⁵

In the prose commentary, the "twofold reasoning" (*yukti*) is explained in this way: (1) the two kinds of selfhood, that of person (*pudgala-ātman*) and that of things (*dharmā-ātman*), do not exist, but (2) the two kinds of nonself (*nairātmya*) do exist. Thus, emptiness is explained as neither eternally existing nor eternally nonexisting. The wording of this reasoning is very close to that of the *Abhidharmaśāstramuccaya*, and the process is again completely identical with the idea of "nonexistence and existence of nonexistence" in the *Madhyānta*.

The verse was most probably composed by Asaṅga himself, and its most interesting feature is that, although in this verse "something remaining" appears in a manner very similar to that of the texts just discussed, it is stated almost as if it were a thought originating with Asaṅga himself. But it is already clear that the idea of "something remains" can be traced, through these Yogācāra treatises, back to the *Cūlasūnāta-sūtra*. This may indicate that this particular sūtra was very familiar to the Yogācāra school.

When Asaṅga wrote a commentary, the *Kārikāsaptati*,²⁶ to the *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā*, he employed the same idea of "nonexistence and existence of nonexistence" in several verses.²⁷ In the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, contradictory expressions (*vyatyasta-pada*)²⁸ are very often seen, such as:

The Buddha's own and special dharmas . . . just as not the Buddha's own and special dharmas have they been taught by the Tathāgata. Therefore they are called "the Buddha's own and special dharmas."²⁹

Or:

That which is true perception, that is indeed no true perception. Therefore the Tathāgata teaches, "true perception, true perception."³⁰

In these statements, what is first negated is next affirmed; the word "therefore" is used even to connect the negation with its succeeding affirmation. The principle of "nonexistence

and existence of nonexistence" will be found to be a convenient and wholly suitable basis for interpreting these contradictory expressions.

Indeed, in all the Yogācāra treatises mentioned, the idea of "nonexistence" *cum* "existence of nonexistence" is given as the basic principle for the interpretation of emptiness in this school. And it may be said that the addition of "existence of nonexistence," though an object of controversy, has come from "what remains" as stated in the *Cūlasuññata*. "What remains," of course, conveys the real meaning of śūnyatā in this school and never implies any "realism" whatever, substantialism being rejected by all Mahāyānists.³¹

A different application of the passage containing the expression "something remains" occurs also in the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*. The tenets of the *Ratnagoṭra* are regarded as rather close to those of the Yogācāras;³² however, to the extent that the *Ratnagoṭra* is a treatise expounding the theory of *tathāgatagarbha* ("matrix of the *tathāgata*"), its understanding of the passage concerned seems to be fairly different from that of the Yogācāras. This point shall now be discussed.

The passage under consideration appears in the prose commentary to verses I.154–155 in which "the emptiness of the *tathāgatagarbha*" is explained.³³ The *tathāgatagarbha*, which may also be called *tathāgata-dhātu* ("element of the *tathāgata*"), *buddhatva* ("Buddhahood"), and so on, is perfectly pure in terms of its primary nature; therefore, there is no contamination to be removed from it, nor any purity to be added to it. As stated in the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra*, the *tathāgatagarbha* is empty in respect to contaminations, but by no means empty in respect to the virtues of Buddhahood, which are inconceivable, and far beyond the sands of the River Ganges in number. After these statements, the passage that contains "what remains" is introduced,³⁴ without any evidence as to whether or not it is a citation.

The differences between the *Ratnagoṭra*, on the one hand, and the *Madhyānta* and other Yogācāra treatises, on the other, with regard to the understanding of this passage, can be summarized in two points.

1. The theory that the *tathāgatagarbha* is empty as well as nonempty is established on the authority of the *Śrīmālādevī*; but here the items negated are contaminations only, while the *tathāgatagarbha* itself is never negated. Contaminations or defilements are always accidental or adventitious (*āgantukakleśa*), not essential to the *tathāgatagarbha*, and therefore to be counteracted by the practice of meditation, and so on. But the essence of the *tathāgatagarbha* comprises the immeasurable virtues of Buddhahood, and they are by no means empty.

In this case, the subject of "is not" (negation) and the subject of "is" (affirmation) are different from each other, the former being defilement and the latter virtue. In the *Madhyānta*, however, one and the same entity is the subject of both "is not" and "is," both of nonexistence and of existence. Duality of subject and object, which is essential to the existing *abhūtaparikalpa*, is negated, hence śūnyatā; and the emptiness of what is empty is never negated, never nonexistent, and the *abhūtaparikalpa* takes its shape anew within this sphere of śūnyatā, hence "existence of nonexistence." In such a case, one and the same thing possesses a sort of "double structure" of being and nonbeing. This "double structure" will be seen both in *abhūtaparikalpa* and in śūnyatā; in its aspect of "nonbeing," the *abhūtaparikalpa* necessarily turns out to be śūnyatā, while in that of "being," śūnyatā itself naturally becomes *abhūtaparikalpa*.

But such a "double structure" is not conceivable in the case of the *tathāgatagarbha*; there is no link between the glorious virtues of Buddhahood and mundane defilements. In the *Ratnagoṭra* and its authority, the *Śrīmālādevī*, the subject of "is not" is defilement, and that of "is" is Buddhahood. Buddhahood, the essence of the *tathāgatagarbha*, cannot be simultaneously being and nonbeing—it is "being" through and through, purely, eternally, and absolutely.³⁵

2. The understanding of "what remains" in the *Ratnagoṭra* is also quite opposed to that of the Yogācāra treatises. In the context of the *Ratnagoṭra*, "what remains" necessarily becomes something remaining after every defilement is

destroyed; that is, what remains is the tathāgatagarbha in terms of the Buddha's virtues, which are never empty. This is just the opposite of the *Cūlasuññata* and the *Madhyānta* and other treatises, because in the *Cūlasuññata* "what remains" is ultimately the corporeal being, the strongest hindrance for human spiritual endeavors, and in the *Madhyānta* it is "unreal imagination," which likewise represents the world of delusion. Both of these are mundane entities and disturbances (*daratha*), far removed from the tathāgatagarbha, which is characterized only by the highest qualities. These latter texts seem to suggest that defilement is very difficult, almost impossible, to erase—it remains even after a sort of enlightenment is obtained. In other words, enlightenment is deepened only to reveal that disturbance cannot be banished even at the final stage. In contrast to this, the *Ratnagoṭra* seems rather optimistic about the possibility of annihilating defilements.

In the *Ratnagoṭra*, "what remains" is literally understood simply as an arithmetical remainder; one subtracts defilements from the tathāgatagarbha and the remaining difference is Buddhahood. This arithmetical subtraction³⁶ involves no error at all. But, given this simple subtraction, the fact that after the annihilation of defilements there always remains a new defilement cannot be adequately explained. In such subtraction, one cannot see the dialectical double character that is fundamentally the character of "emptiness," and whose basic meaning is expressed in the concept of "emptiness."

Or, one might put it in this way: the *Ratnagoṭra*, although it proposes to discuss "the emptiness of the tathāgatagarbha," does not state explicitly that the tathāgatagarbha is empty, but actually emphasizes, instead, its "nonemptiness"; it tells us that defilement is empty, but that the tathāgatagarbha has no negative qualities. When one is left with this understanding, it is natural to apply the model of arithmetical subtraction to the idea of "emptiness," which was, however, originally dialectical.

Thus, one cannot but have doubts concerning the *Rat-*

nagoṭra's usage of this expression. Since there is no evidence of quotation, does the passage represent an independent idea original to the author of the *Ratnagoṭra* commentary? If not, and if its source is the sutta, is the passage not being misapplied? What can have been the purpose of the *Ratnagoṭra* in introducing this passage into its scheme? If the purpose really was to prove "the emptiness of the tathāgatagarbha," should it not have stated that the tathāgatagarbha is "empty," instead of maintaining its "being" throughout?

Generally speaking, "what remains" is encountered by the practitioner when he is awakened; when consciousness is converted (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*) by training and becomes an entirely pure faith, the truth of tathāgatagarbha will be realized as "what remains." In the tathāgatagarbha doctrine, however, it is generally accepted that the tathāgatagarbha has always existed, so that it is actually not "what remains," but rather "what has existed from the beginning." In the śūnyatā doctrine, on the other hand, the situation is quite the opposite: after śūnyatā is realized through *abhūtaparikalpa*, *abhūtaparikalpa* itself is re-realized as having always existed in "emptiness" and as remaining forever, again in "emptiness." Only when such realization and re-realization of disturbance are combined is Buddhahood manifested, only then is the "perfected" (*pariniṣpanna*), or the "Middle Path," achieved.

With its double character of being and nonbeing, "emptiness" is the principle that underlies those old Mahāyānic sayings: "Defilement is identical with *bodhi*," "Birth and death are equal to nirvāṇa," "Without destroying defilements one enters into the nirvāṇa," and so on. The double structure found in the relationship between *abhūtaparikalpa* and śūnyatā represents the identity or the nonuality of *samsāra* and nirvāṇa. Unless the double structure of the world, which is characterized as "empty," is apprehended, these Mahāyānic sayings remain meaningless paradoxes.

If, in the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha, these sayings are still held to be true,³⁷ it must follow that the tathāgatagarbha, which is often regarded as a supreme *Being*, as stated

above, is "empty as well as nonempty," and also that "defilement is the tathāgatagarbha, and the tathāgatagarbha is defilement." In fact, while in the *Ratnagoṭra* the "mind" is discussed, not in its defiled aspect, but only insofar as it is regarded as "essentially pure" (*citta-vīśuddhi, citta-prakṛti*), and so equated with the tathāgatagarbha, in the later *Awakening of Faith* (Chinese version by Paramartha) the tathāgatagarbha is found within the "ordinary human mind," which exactly corresponds to the "unreal imagination" of the *Madhyānta*. This "unreal imagination" also has the character of "essentially transparent lucidity,"³⁸ as in the *Ratnagoṭra* and the *Awakening*. But the "unreal imagination" can be pure and lucid only because it is "empty" through its double character of *abhūtaparikalpa* and *śūnyatā*—a double character which is not conceivable in the case of the tathāgatagarbha.

NOTES

1. Richard Robinson, *The Buddhist Religion* (California: Dickenson, 1970), p. 53.
2. Sylvain Lévi, ed., *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (Paris: H. Champion, 1907), p. 76, XI.77; Étienne Lamotte, ed. and trans., *La somme du grand véhicule d'Asaṅga (Mahāyānasamgraha)* (Louvain: Bureaux du Musée, 1938), vol. II, pp. 115-18; Dignāga, *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasamgraha*, vv. 19-54, in E. Frauwallner, ed., "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* III (1959): 141-43.
3. Gadjin M. Nagao, ed., *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya* (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), pp. 24-26; Frauwallner, "Dignāga," p. 141, vv. 8-18.
4. *Majjhima Nikāya*, sutta no. 121. See Horner, *Middle Length Sayings*, vol. III, pp. 147 ff. The translation of quotations from this sutta as it appears in this essay is mine.
5. . . . *imam eva kāyaṃ paṭicca salāyatanīkam jvītapaccayā.*
6. *Iti yaṃ hi kho tattha na hoti, tena taṃ suññaṃ samanupassati; yaṃ pana tattha avosijhāṃ hoti, taṃ santaṃ idam atthīti pajānāti.*
7. The *Cūlasuññata sutta (Majjhimanikāya)*, sutta no. 121) is discussed by Ruegg in connection with the idea of the tathāgatagarbha. See David Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du goṭra* (Paris: École

française d'extrême-orient, 1969), pp. 319 ff. Some of the texts to be discussed later are also referred to extensively in this study.

8. Other editions of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* besides my own (note 3) are: Susumu Yamaguchi, *Sthiramati: Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* (Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku, 1934; reprinted Tokyo, 1966); V. Bhattacharya and G. Tucci, *Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā of Sthiramati*, Part I (London: Luzac, Calcutta Oriental Series No. 24, 1932); and R. C. Pandeya, *Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971). English translations have been published by F. T. Stecherbatsky, "Madhyāntavibhāgasūtra," Bibliotheca Buddhica XXX (1936); and by D. L. Friedmann, *Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, Analysis of the Middle Path and the Extremes* (Utrecht: 1937).
9. *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.1: *abhūtaparikalpo 'sti, dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate / śūnyatā vidyate tv atra, tasyāṃ api sa vidyate* / cf. Ruegg, *La théorie*, pp. 323 ff.
10. *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.2: *na śūnyam nāpi cāśūnyam tasmāt sarvaṃ vidhyate / satvād asatvāt satvāc ca, madhyamā pratipac ca sā /*
11. *evam 'yad yatra nāsti tat tena śūnyam iti yathābhūtaṃ samanupāsyaṃti yat punar atravāsiṣṭam bhavati tat sad ihāsīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti' ty aviparītam śūnyatālakṣaṇam udbhāvitaṃ bhavati.*
12. The translation from the *Madhyāntavibhāga* is mine. Compare the Sanskrit original with the Pāli text.
13. There must have existed a version of the *Cūlasuññata-sutta* in Sanskrit, of which the author of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* had knowledge. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, edited by B. Nanjio (Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923), p. 75, expounds *itaratara-śūnyatā* (mutual emptiness) as follows: *itaratara-śūnyatā punar mahāmate katamā, yad uta 'yad yatra nāsti tat tena śūnyam' ity ucyate . . . aśūnyam ca bhikṣubhir iti bhāṣitaṃ mayā, sa [= prāsāda] ca taiḥ [= hastigavaiḍakādī] śūnya ity ucyate . . .* This passage seems to include some quotations from the *Cūlasuññata-sutta*; at least the sentence enclosed within single quotation marks is the same as the first part of the passage quoted in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, which expounds the doctrines of both the Yogācāra and the tathāgatagarbha, declares the *śūnyatā* taught in the *Cūlasuññata-sutta* (or the *itaratara-śūnyatā*, as the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* calls it) to be of inferior character, while the Yogācāras evaluate it as an "unperverted" interpretation. Also cf. Ruegg, *La théorie*, pp. 321, 325.
14. *dvayābhāvto hy abhāvasya bhāvāc śūnyasya lakṣaṇam.*
15. For instance, Bhāvaviveka's attack is found in his *Madhyama-karḍḍaya*, chapter V, vv. 10-16 (Peking reprint edition, vol. 96, pp. 11). Cf. Susumu Yamaguchi, *Bukkyō ni okeru Mu to U tonno Tairon (Controversy between the Theories of Nonbeing and Being in Buddhism)* (Tokyo: Kyōto: Kōbundō-shobō, 1941), pp. 178-210 and Appendix, pp. 6-8.

16. Edward Conze, *Buddhist Wisdom Books* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 81: *rūpaṃ śūnyatā, śūnyatāiva rūpaṃ*.

17. In quoting Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, Tsong-kha-pa argues to this effect in his *Lam-rim chen-mo* (Peking reprint edition, vol. 152, no. 6001), p. 133-2. Cf. my Japanese translation, *Chibetto Bukkyō Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1954), pp. 124 ff.

18. As for the term *upādāya prajñāptih*, see Jacques May, trans., *Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1959), p. 161, n. 494; pp. 237-38, n. 840; etc.

19. Lévi, *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* XIV.34; *Madhyāntavibhāga* III.3, III.7, etc.

20. For instance, Candrakīrti criticizes the notion of paratantra in his *Madhyamakāvātāra*, (VI. 72-83), Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed., (St. Petersburg: Biblioteca Buddhica IX, 1912), pp. 166-81.

21. U. Wogihara, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Tokyo: Seigo Kenkyukai, 1930-1936), pp. 47-48; N. Dutt, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Institute, Tibetan Sanscrit Works Series vol. VII, 1966), p. 32. Cf. Ruegg, *La théorie*, pp. 322 ff.

22. *yataś ca 'yad yatna na bhavati. tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati. yat punar atrāvaśīṣṭam bhavati. tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtam prajānāti.* *iyam ucyate śūnyatāvākṛntir yathābhūta aviparītā.* For the Tibetan translation, see note 24.

23. Chinese versions: Taishō no. 1605, vol. 31, p. 675a;²¹ no. 1606, vol. 31, p. 720c.¹⁷ Tibetan versions: Peking reprint edition no. 5550, vol. 112, p. 252-3-1; no. 5555, vol. 113, p. 172-1-6. In Sanskrit, V. V. Gokhale, "Fragments from the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of Asaṅga," *Journal of the Bombay Branch, Royal Asiatic Society*, NS 23 (1957); Pralhad Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaṅga* (Santimiketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950), p. 40. Cf. Ruegg, *La Théorie*, pp. 321 f.

24. As this portion is lacking in the original Sanskrit published by Gokhale, Pradhan tried in his book to fill in the lacunae by his "retranslation." But because of his misunderstanding of the passage, and also his ignorance about the relationship between the texts mentioned earlier, the passage in question appears here with entirely different features and must be revised thoroughly. The Tibetan versions follow:

(*Bodhisattvabhūmi*) *gang gi phyir "gang la gang med pa de ni des stong par yang dag par mthong ta / 'di la lhag ma gang yin pa de ni 'di na yang dag par yod do zhes yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes pa" de ni stong pa nyid la yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du phyin ci ma log par zhugs pa zhes bya ste /*

(*Abhidharmasamuccaya*) *"gang la gang med pa de ni des stong par yang dag par rjes su mthong ba ste / 'di la lhag ma gang yin pa de ni 'dir yod pa' o // zhes yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes so" / /*

'di ni stong pa nyid la 'jug pa yang dag pa ji lta ba ste / phyin ci ma log pa zhes bya 'o /

25. Taishō no. 1602, vol. 31, p. 553b.

26. G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Serie Orientale Roma IX, Part I (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1956), pp. 53 ff.

27. E.g., *sarvābhāvād, abhāvasya sabbhāvān* . . . (v. 11). Also see v. 46 and the commentary on v. 15 (Taishō no. 1513, vol. 25, p. 877a).

28. So called in the *Vimalakīrtimirdśa*; cf. Étienne Lamotte, *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti* (Louvain: Bibliothèque du Muséon, vol. 51, 1962), p. 34.

29. See Edward Conze, ed. and trans., *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā*, Serie Orientale Roma XIII (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1957), p. 70 (8).

30. *Ibid.*, p. 76 (14a).

31. The passage which includes "what remains" also appears in the *Madhyamakāvātāra* (la Vallée Poussin, p. 139, ad VI.57), but this is introduced by Candrakīrti to demonstrate the position of the rival Vijñāna school. This passage is close to one found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

Jayānanda comments on this passage as follows (Peking reprint edition, vol. 99, p. 147-5): "yatna [in something whatsoever] means 'in the paratantra; 'yan nāsti [what does not exist] means 'the duality of subject and object does not; tat means 'the paratantra; tena śūnyam means 'śūnya with regard to duality; avāśīṣṭam bhavati [what remains] means 'knowledge which is śūnya with regard to duality' (gzung ba dang 'dsin pas stong pa'i shes pa)." Jayānanda also comments that the passage is used to introduce the testimony of the Āgamas (suttas). We can notice in this commentary that the interpretation is fairly different from that of the treatises mentioned above; that the opponent here attacked by Candrakīrti is the later Vijñānavāda (as distinguished from the earlier Yogācāras), probably the sākāra-vāda, which holds a view of "Idealistic Realism," i.e., the Realism of vijñāna (knowing) or of paratantra.

32. For one thing, the authorship is ascribed to Maitreya-nātha, the founder of the Yogācāra school, in the Tibetan tradition.

33. E. H. Johnston, ed., *The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* (Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950), p. 76. Jikidō Takasaki, *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga*, Serie Orientale Roma XXXIII (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1966), pp. 300-302. Cf. Ruegg, *La Théorie*, pp. 319 ff.

34. . . . *evam 'yad yatna nāsti tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati / yat punar atrāvaśīṣṭam bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtam prajānāti' /*

35. The tathāgatagarbha seems to me to occupy a supreme position—a position akin to that of Brahman or Ātman, or other "Absolute Being," in Brahmanical philosophy. If this is the case, it is difficult for the

tathagatagarbha to include within itself elements of contamination as entities to be negated, or to possess the "double structure" of *abhūtaparikalpa* = *sūnyata*.

36. The "iaretara-sūnyatā" of the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* (note 13 above) and the idea of "gzhan-stong" in the Jo-nang-pa school have been studied minutely by Ruegg. *La Théorie*, pp. 325 ff., 337. Though I am not quite sure of these ideas, what I have tried to suggest with the phrase "arithmetical subtraction" seems to be applicable to these ideas.

37. Johnston, *Ratnagotravibhāga*, p. 35: '... *paramārthataḥ samsāra eva nirvāṇam* ity uktam.

38. *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.22.

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