

# **The Treasury of Knowledge**

*Book Six, Part Three:*

## **Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy**

*A Systematic Presentation of  
the Cause-Based Philosophical Vehicles*

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Supplementary Topics

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[This chapter is a continuation of the discussion of the Shrāvakayāna by way of six topics.] Presented here is the sixth topic, the classifications of the Shrāvakayāna. This section has three main parts: the classifications of its philosophical tenet systems; the classifications of its orders; and the classifications of its results.

### **The Classifications of Its Philosophical Tenet Systems [aa]**

This has two parts: the actual classifications; and a description of their assertions.

### **The Actual Classifications [1']**

**[The Shrāvakayāna's] philosophical tenet systems are either  
Vaibhāṣhika or Sautrāntika.**

The Shrāvakayāna contains numerous philosophical tenets with many subtle distinctions, having been formulated [on the basis of] the specific philosophical positions [taken by various] individuals. Nevertheless, for simplicity's sake, two divisions are made: Vaibhāṣhika and Sautrāntika.<sup>284</sup> [In his *Commentary on the "Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom,"*] the elder (*sthavira*) Bodhibhadra<sup>285</sup> says:

Because they state that [the phenomena] of the three times exist as discrete particular substances (*rdzas kyi bye brag*),<sup>286</sup> they are referred to as such [that is, as Vaibhāṣhikas, Proponents of Particular (Substances)]. Alternatively, because they make statements in accord with the *Great Detailed Exposition*,<sup>287</sup> they are

referred to by that [name: Vaibhāṣhikas, Proponents of the *Great Detailed Exposition*].

Among the orders (*nikāya, sde pa*), they are a subdivision of the Mūla-sarvāstivādins.<sup>288</sup> From the same source:<sup>289</sup>

Since they accept sūtras such as the *Six Doors* and *Excellent Conduct*<sup>290</sup> as literal and follow those sūtras, they are Sautrāntikas (Sūtra-followers). They are also known by the name of Dārṣhṭāntikas (Exemplifiers),<sup>291</sup> since they are skilled in teaching through examples.

## A Description of Their Assertions [2']

This is discussed in two sections: their similar assertions; and their dissimilar assertions.

### Their Similar Assertions [a']

**They agree in not accepting the teachings of the Mahāyāna scriptures.**

**They reject a permanent, single self and state that karma is the creator.**

Both Shrāvaka schools agree that the Mahāyāna scriptures, which comprise the middle and final teachings of the wheel of dharma, are not the words of the Victorious One, and thus they do not accept them. They say that the Mahāyāna scriptures contradict the four principles of the dharma<sup>292</sup> for the following four reasons: The Mahāyāna teaches (1) that the sambhogakāya is always present; (2) that bodhisattvas proceed to happiness; (3) that there is a supreme self, as in such statements as, “the supreme self, which is no-self, is attained”; and (4) that after shrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have entered [nirvāṇa] without remainder, they must be roused [from that state] to then become buddhas.

Shrāvakas say that the Mahāyāna is not found within the eighteen orders of the Buddha’s teachings and, therefore, is not a part of [the Buddha’s teachings]. Also, the Mahāyāna teachings are not part of the three collections of scripture (*tripiṭaka, sde snod gsum*), because they do not appear in

the common vinaya, do not fit within the sūtras, and contradict dharmatā [reality].

- Since the Shrāvaka schools do not consider the self-entity of phenomena or cognitive obscurations, they do not discuss the two types of absence of self-entity or the two obscurations.<sup>293</sup>
- Since they do not posit an *ālaya*<sup>294</sup> or an afflictive mind, they do not speak of eight modes of consciousness.
- Since they do not accept the extensive collection of the Mahāyāna sūtras, they do not assert the ten *bhūmis*,<sup>295</sup> which appear in the Mahāyāna sūtras.
- They believe that the bhūmi of a buddha has a remainder of karma and suffering and do not accept that all flaws are exhausted [in that state]; thus, they do not assert a transformation.<sup>296</sup>
- Since they do not accept that the sambhogakāya [forms of buddhas dwell] in Akaniṣṭha, they do not assert or accept the three kāyas, four primordial wisdoms,<sup>297</sup> and so forth.

In the context of the bases (*mūla*, *gzhī*), neither school accepts, even on a conventional level, the self [of persons] imagined by non-Buddhists as being permanent, single, independent, and so forth, just as [they would not accept that] a striped rope is a snake. They assert that the environment and beings have no external creator, such as Cha or Īshvara;<sup>298</sup> they state that karma is the creator, as is said:<sup>299</sup>

The myriad worlds arise from karma.

They concur in their presentations of the categories of the five aggregates, the eighteen constituents, the twelve sense spheres, the four modes of birth, the five kinds of beings, and the four kinds of food (coarse, of contact, mental, and of consciousness).<sup>300</sup>

### [PHENOMENA AND THE TWO TRUTHS]

**Observed objects either increase defilements or do not.**

**Thus conditioned phenomena are defiled phenomena; and the phenomena of the truth of the path and unconditioned phenomena are undefiled phenomena.**

**[Conventional reality] is whatever halts its perceiver when it is destroyed or eliminated.**

**[Gross] entities and continuities are conventionally existent  
and ultimately do not perform functions.**

**Partless particles and instants of mind, which do not so halt,  
are ultimately existent and perform functions.**

[The Shrāvaka schools] also agree on the main points regarding knowable objects, which are bases (*gzhi'i shes bya*): the way of positing defiled and undefiled phenomena<sup>301</sup> and the way of positing the two truths.

[Defiled phenomena] are what cause [mental] defilements (*āsrava, zag pa*), or mental afflictions, to increase and endure when a mind with desire cognizes and observes the nature of those phenomena. [Defiled phenomena cause mental defilements] by way of being observed objects (*dmigs pa*) or being [the mind and mental events, which] are congruent in five ways.<sup>302</sup> [Undefiled phenomena,] when observed, are what do not cause [mental defilements] to increase. Thus all conditioned phenomena, other than those included in the truth of the path, are illustrations (*mtshan gzhi*) of defiled phenomena; and the phenomena of the truth of the path and unconditioned phenomena are illustrations of undefiled phenomena.

The way of presenting the two truths<sup>303</sup> is given in the *Treasury [of Abhidharma]*:<sup>304</sup>

Something that is no longer engaged by a mind  
when physically destroyed or mentally broken down  
exists conventionally, like vases or water.  
Everything else exists ultimately.

Conventional reality [is defined as] any phenomenon which is such that if it is physically destroyed or broken down into different parts by an eliminating mind (*sel byed kyi blo*), the mind perceiving it is halted.<sup>305</sup> Gross entities (such as the environment and its inhabitants) are false because they involve directional parts and because the mind can eliminate them [by separating them] into different parts. [Temporal] continuities (such as years, months, and days), which are imagined [to exist] in the three times, are not real since they can be divided into parts. All conventionally existent [phenomena] (*kun rdzob yod pa*) are ultimately unable to perform functions.

Ultimate reality is that which does not halt the mind perceiving it

[even] when it is broken down into parts.<sup>306</sup> It consists of (1) minute particles that truly exist (*bden par grub pa*) as the building blocks of things since they have no directional parts; and (2) the instants of the inner perceiving mind that exist as the building blocks of the temporal continuity [of mind]. All ultimately existent phenomena are capable of performing functions ultimately.<sup>307</sup>

The reason vases and so forth are conventionalities is that ultimately they are unable to perform functions. This is because, if one's position is that an object ultimately able to perform a function from its own side is a phenomenon, or referent, that intrinsically (*rang gi mtshan nyid la*) produces an unmistakable perceiver of itself, then those vases and so forth are conventionalities since the mind [perceiving them] relies upon inner contributory aspects, such as symbols, [to perceive them]. Thus it is said.

**They agree for the most part about the way conditioned phenomena arise and about the paths and results.**

Generally, [Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas] agree that the definition of mind is that which apprehends simply the essential nature of an object, and mental events are what apprehend just the distinctive features [of an object]. They also are in agreement about the way conditioned phenomena arise, about which they state the following:

- The element-derivatives<sup>308</sup> of forms arise from the elements.
- The substances of cognitions (*shes rig gi rdzas*) arise in conjunction with the five congruent aspects.<sup>309</sup>
- The entities of [the formative forces] not associated [with forms or mind]<sup>310</sup> arise from forms or minds, which are “that which bear a state”<sup>311</sup> (*gnas skabs can*).

In terms of the paths and their results, they agree

- on the main points of the illustrations and defining characteristics of the four truths, which are either objects to be adopted or to be rejected;<sup>312</sup>
- that, in terms of the subjective agent, there are five paths—accumulation, junction, seeing, meditation, and beyond training;
- on the enumeration of four pairs of beings, also called eight kinds of individuals;<sup>313</sup> and

- on most aspects of relinquishment and realization.

They are in agreement about the way [the Buddha] first developed bodhi-chitta, in the middle phase increased his stores [of merit and wisdom], and in the end became a buddha. They agree that in his last lifetime in cyclic existence when, as a prince, he was to accomplish his aim, he was an ordinary being on the path of accumulation and fully fettered (*'ching ba kun ldan*), even though he had perfected his stores of merit and wisdom during three incalculable [aeons].<sup>314</sup>

They do not assert that the Buddha awakened in Akanishṭha, but rather that this occurred in front of the bodhi tree. At dusk, he tamed the thirty-seven million hordes of Māra. Then, on the same seat, at dawn he attained all the relinquishments and realizations—having progressed from the path of junction to the attainment of the knowledge of the exhaustion [of defilements] and their [subsequent] nonarising<sup>315</sup>—solely by means of the path of realizing the sixteen aspects of the four truths (impermanence and the others).

Prior to his awakening, the Buddha received key instructions on the worldly meditative concentrations from Arāḍha-kālāma and Udrako-rāmaputra,<sup>316</sup> and through his practice of the absorptions of the sphere of Nothingness and the sphere of Neither Discrimination Nor Nondiscrimination, he became separated from passion. Thus the Buddha was free from passion prior to becoming a buddha.

They mostly agree on the presentation of the relinquishments and realizations for the twenty types of saṅgha<sup>317</sup> and on the way someone can regress from the attainment of relinquishments and realizations, with a few minor exceptions.<sup>318</sup> Their presentations of the excellent qualities of the four samādhis, the four formless states, and the four immeasurables are the same. They assert that the truth of suffering is [experienced] on the bhūmi of a buddha, meaning that the Buddha had matured aggregates that were impelled by previous karma and that he had a remainder of defiled karma.<sup>319</sup> They share the belief that the three types of nirvāṇa without remainder—which are [the fruitions attained by] shrāvakas, by pratyekabuddhas, and by buddhas—are the severing of the continuity of cognition (*rig pa rgyun chad pa*), just like [the extinction of] a fire when its wood is exhausted.

### Their Dissimilar Assertions [b']

This has two parts: Vaibhāṣikas' assertions; and Sautrāntikas' assertions.

### Vaibhāṣikas' Assertions [i']

Points of dissimilarity are that the Vaibhāṣikas assert that  
 the seven [abhidharma] texts are [the Buddha's] words;  
 that there are partless, discrete particles with interstices  
 between them;  
 that when of similar types, [such particles] perform the same  
 activity, and that they are like [grasses in] a meadow;  
 that sense faculties see referents, and consciousnesses  
 apprehend those [referents];  
 and that in most cases, percepts and perceivers, as causes  
 and results, arise simultaneously.

Specific points of disagreements between the Vaibhāṣikas' and Sautrāntikas' systems of philosophical tenets are found in abundance throughout the *Treasury [of Abhidharma]*. I will now summarize the Vaibhāṣikas' positions in a general way.

Vaibhāṣikas make the following assertions:

- The seven abhidharma texts<sup>320</sup> are compilations of teachings actually contained in sūtras that were extracted by individual arhats, just as was done with the *Collection of Meaningful Expressions*.<sup>321</sup> Thus, the seven abhidharma treatises are [the Buddha's] words (*vachana*, *bka'*).
- Since the collection of dharma—the scriptures and so forth—is a series of words, it is included within the category of non-associated formative forces.<sup>322</sup>
- Everything included with the category of forms is either an element or an element-derivative, or is composed of minute particles.
- When minute particles form gross phenomena, a middle particle is surrounded by particles of the six directions; and yet, partless discrete particles (*rdul phran cha med sil bu*) have interstices, or empty spaces, between them. Minute particles are substantially established (*dravya-siddha*, *rdzas su grub pa*). [When they are] of similar types, they perform the same activity. They are like [the hairs in] a yak's tail or [grasses in]



a meadow. Although discrete minute particles remain separate, they do not disintegrate because they are held together by karma or wind. Coarse phenomena are also drawn together in one direction by the wind that holds those [partless particles] together.<sup>323</sup>

- As for the way consciousnesses apprehend objects: sense consciousnesses apprehend their respective objects nakedly and immediately without an [intermediary] image,<sup>324</sup> like pliers [taking hold of] a lump of iron. Once a sense faculty sees the actual object (*don gyi rang mtshan*), a consciousness apprehends it. Vaibhāṣhikas assert that in most cases percepts and their perceivers, as causes and results, arise simultaneously, because a consciousness cannot be produced by something past or future.

**[Vaibhāṣhikas] maintain that the five bases, [the phenomena of] the three times, and nirvāṇa exist substantially; that unconditioned phenomena are permanent, and the truth of cessation is an entity; that consciousnesses are aware of what is other; and other points. The basis [of their system] was delineated by the four great ones and others in reliance upon scriptures.**

- The five bases of objects of knowledge,<sup>325</sup> [the phenomena of] the three times, nirvāṇa, and, particularly, non-associated formative forces—which are referents (*don*) that are other than “that which bear a state” to which states are ascribed<sup>326</sup>—are substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient (*rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod*).<sup>327</sup>
- They assert the three kinds of unconditioned phenomena<sup>328</sup> to be permanent. Furthermore, since they are incapable of positing knowable objects that are not established by way of their essence (*ngo bos ma grub pa*), they assert that [unconditioned phenomena] are substances or entities that are [positive] determinations.<sup>329</sup> Although they consider unconditioned phenomena to be entities, they never assert them to be conditioned entities able to perform functions.<sup>330</sup> This is because they state that [unconditioned phenomena] have neither cause nor result, as is said [in the *Treasury of Abhidharma*]:<sup>331</sup>

Unconditioned phenomena do not have those [that is, causes and results].

- They state that arhats can regress to the state of a once returner (*phyir 'ong*) and so forth.
- They say that the truth of cessation is something attained through the five faculties,<sup>332</sup> is the supreme of all phenomena, is the substance of separation (*bral ba'i rdzas*), and so forth; thus they consider the truth of cessation to be an entity.
- Citing the example of the way a sword cannot cut itself, they do not believe that consciousness (*shes pa*) can be a reflexive awareness [i.e., a consciousness aware of itself] (*rang rig*), or that it can experience itself. They state that every consciousness is an other-awareness [i.e., a consciousness aware of what is “other,” meaning outer objects] (*gzhan rig*).

The phrase “and other points” in this root verse refers to other of their numerous unique positions, such as that they are not able to posit that the nonimplicative negation that is the simple negation of the self of persons is thusness.<sup>333</sup>

It is well known that the four great venerable ones,<sup>334</sup> the Kashmiri Saṅghabhadra,<sup>335</sup> the venerable Anantavarman,<sup>336</sup> and others, in reliance upon teachings found in scriptures [of the Buddha], clearly delineated the basis of this system of philosophical tenets.

### Sautrāntikas' Assertions [ii']

**Dārṣṭāntikas mostly state the opposite of that.**

**Particles touch but do not join, like [the pages of] a book.**

**The sense faculties are matter; external referents are hidden phenomena.**

**The consciousnesses do not see these: they experience images as their referents.**

Dārṣṭāntikas (Exemplifiers), or Sautrāntikas,<sup>337</sup> mostly state the opposite of the Vaibhāṣikas, meaning Sautrāntikas do not make the same assertions as the Vaibhāṣikas on the topics just explained. It is said:

*Jñānaprasthāna (Entering Primordial Wisdom)*<sup>338</sup> was composed by

Kātāyanīputra;

*Prakaraṇapāda (Correct Analysis)*<sup>339</sup> by Vasumitra;

*Dharmaskandha* (*Dharma Aggregate*)<sup>340</sup> by Shāriputra;  
*Prajñāptishāstra*<sup>341</sup> (*Treatise on Designations*)<sup>342</sup> by Maudgalyāyana;  
*Vijñānakāya* (*Collection of Consciousnesses*)<sup>343</sup> by Devasharman;<sup>344</sup>  
*Saṅgītiparyāya* (*Enumerations of Persons*)<sup>345</sup> by Mahākauṣṭhila; and  
*Dhātukāya* (*Collection of Constituents*)<sup>346</sup> by Pūrṇa.

Sautrāntikas believe that these seven abhidharma texts<sup>347</sup> are treatises (*śāstras*, *bstan bcos*) [and not the words of the Buddha] because they were composed independently by those arhats.

- They assert that the collection of scriptural dharma—which has the characteristics of terms, and covers all that is contained in the scriptural tradition—is included within the aggregate of forms.
- As for forms, like [the Vaibhāṣikas] above, they say that there are two types: minute particles, which are building blocks; and gross phenomena, which are constructed with those. Sautrāntikas, however, say that minute particles circle [each other] and do not join, but they also have no interstices between them. Hence, they are perceived as touching, like [the pages of] a bound book.<sup>348</sup>
- Sense faculties are matter (*bem po*) and, therefore, they are not what sees referents.
- External referents (*phyi don*) are considered to be hidden.<sup>349</sup> Because [external referents objects] are past [when a consciousness arises], they are not what a consciousness sees. Thus, [Sautrāntikas posit] what is called “an image,”<sup>350</sup> which is an appearance of consciousness that has been cast by the referent. Although the referent has ceased, the image that is consciousness set by that [referent] is experienced as the likeness of the referent. This is designated as the experience [of the referent]. A consciousness apprehending an object perceives by means of an image [acting] as an intermediary (*bar du chod pa*).
- Sautrāntikas state that percepts and their perceivers, as causes and results, arise sequentially, not simultaneously.

Given the Sautrāntikas’ position that external referents are hidden [phenomena], they are similar to Chittamātra Proponents of Real Images in considering dualistic appearances to be cognition (*shes pa*). Nevertheless, these systems differ as to whether “what casts [images]” (*gtod byed*) is an external referent or not: [for Sautrāntikas, it is an external referent that casts the image; for Chittamātra Proponents of Real Images, it is not].

**Forms, mind, feelings, discriminations, and intentions exist substantially.**

**Everything else is imputedly existent; space and the others are nonimplicative negations.**

**They assert that [consciousness is both] a reflexive-awareness and an other-awareness; that [the phenomena of] the three times are imputed entities; and other points.**

**This is [the system] asserted by Saṅgharakṣita, Shrilāta, and others.**

- Among the five bases (which are knowable objects), forms, mind, and either two or three of the mental events—feelings, discriminations, and, [in some cases,] intentions—exist substantially.<sup>351</sup> Everything else is asserted to be imputedly existent entities—meaning that they are designated [as entities simply] in relation to [having some] aspects [of entities]<sup>352</sup>—or to be imputedly existent nonentities (*dngos med*).
- They consider the three types of unconditioned phenomena (space and the others) to be permanent, but [simply] as nonimplicative negations that just refute their impermanence. In terms of what is determined,<sup>353</sup> this means that they assert [unconditioned phenomena] simply to be knowable objects that have no established essence, like the horns of a rabbit.
- Using the analogy that if something does not illuminate itself, it cannot illuminate something that is other than itself, they say that consciousness is twofold: it is reflexive awareness (*rang rig*), which is an inwards-facing experiencer, and it is other-awareness (*gzhan rig*), which is an outwards-facing experiencer. [The relationship between a consciousness and the objects it cognizes is like that of a crystal and the colors that appear within it:] colors appearing in a clear crystal are of the nature of that crystal. Thus, since a consciousness is that which is aware of referents that are of the same nature as itself, it is an authentic reflexive awareness (*rang rig mtshan nyid pa*) and a nominal referent-awareness (*don rig btags pa ba*).
- They maintain that [the phenomena of] the three times are not substantially established, that they are mentally imputed entities.

The phrase “and other points” in this root verse includes the following:

- Sautrāntikas assert that both nirvāṇa with remainder and without remainder are nonimplicative negations, which negate the factors that are to be abandoned by remedies; that is, they are a mere nothingness.
- They say that arhats regress just from the meditative concentration of resting at ease in the present life,<sup>354</sup> and these arhats are called “those who regress.”<sup>355</sup> They do not accept, however, that arhats regress from their result.
- They assert that the truth of cessation is a nonentity for the following reasons: It cannot be observed by a valid cognizer<sup>356</sup> to be an entity, the way a form or feeling can be, or to be a potential (*nus pa*), the way the eyes can be. Also the sūtras refer to it as “separation,” “exhaustion,” “disappearance,” and “cessation.”
- Sautrāntikas are able to posit that the nonimplicative negation that is the mere negation of a self of persons is thusness.<sup>357</sup>

The basis of this system of philosophical tenets relies upon the sūtra section of the Victor’s scriptures and is explained by the venerable Saṅgharakṣita,<sup>358</sup> Shrilāta,<sup>359</sup> and others. The details of the Sautrāntika philosophy can be understood from the *Treasury of Abhidharma’s Auto-Commentary* [that is, the *Explanation of the “Treasury of Abhidharma”*].<sup>360</sup>

## The Classifications of Its Orders [bb]

This has three parts: the four main orders; the eighteen divisions; and the twofold summation.

### The Four Main Orders [1']

**The main orders are the four: Sarvāstivādins,  
Mahāsāṅghikas, Sthaviras, and Saṃmitīyas.**

Although there are many descriptions by different masters of the way the Shrāvaka orders (*nikāya*, *sde pa*) are divided—such as that there was one [root order], two, three, and so on<sup>361</sup>—the presentation of four main orders is the most well-known.<sup>362</sup> The four are [Mūla]sarvāstivādins;<sup>363</sup> Mahāsāṅghikas; Sthaviras; and Saṃmitīyas.<sup>364</sup>

# The Mahayana Schools of Philosophy

## by Longchen Rabjam

The following condensations of the Buddhist schools of thought in the greater vehicle are extracted from the Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle (theg mchog mdzod), a well-accepted work by the great non-sectarian master Longchen Rabjam who was both a close Dharma friend as well as a student of the third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje.

### THE TWO TRUTHS

All phenomena comprised of appearance and existence, samsara and nirvana, are included within the nature of the two truths.

**Superficial truth** is everything that can appear as an object of the intellect, all which appears as attributes having characteristics.

Superficial truth can be divided into two types: false and correct superficial truth.

**False superficial truth** is all of appearance and existence, the world and the beings, all phenomena that have been mentally constructed, because they are objects of deluded perception appearing as an identity of false cognition. Moreover, these imputed appearances are perceived in conformity with a confused mind, they can perform functions, and when examined they are devoid of an essence. In the manner of the eight analogies of illusion, they appear as a nonexistent vivid presence.

**Correct superficial truth** is that which, although appearing in confusion, serves as the cause for the happy states and for liberation: the positive actions of the ten virtues, the accumulation of merit of generosity etc, the concentrations of the mind on the four paths of accumulation, joining, seeing, and cultivation, - all within the domain of mind that are included under the truth of the path and which are causes for wisdom.

**Ultimate truth** is the knowledge fathoming the essence of emptiness, the inherently present nature of things, endowed with a form that is the subsiding of fabrications. When divided, there are two types: the categorized ultimate of concepts and words, and the the uncategorized ultimate of the true innate essence.

**The categorized ultimate of concepts and words** is the arising of knowledge, in conformity with the innate essence, that realizes when dissecting and analyzing through reasoning, that everything from the very first is the nature of things which cannot be established as anything whatsoever.

**The uncategorized ultimate of the true innate essence** is that all phenomena from the very first are the naturally pure space (dharmadhatu) which transcends the fabrications of existence and nonexistence.

## THE CITTAMATRA - MIND ONLY SCHOOL

The mind Only School has two divisions: the True Image Mind Only School which asserts that all the various multicolored appearances as well as the mind are true in being mental images, and the False Image Mind Only School which asserts that these are false in being mental images.

**The True Image Mind Only School** asserts that what appears as objects is only images of one's own mind appearing as being outside just like a jewel tied to a branch and held over a pond and the reflection of the jewel appears on the surface of the water, the image of the jewel appears as being external. This school has three subdivisions: The first school asserts that the number of images has an equal number of cognitions. The second school asserts that the image and its cognition are like an egg split in half. The third school asserts the various images and their cognitions are nondual.

**The Mind Only School of Equal Number Perceiver and Perceived** asserts that when hearing a sound only the cognition that perceives the sound arises and not cognitions perceiving visible form etc. Similarly, the cognition which perceives a particular object arises and any other and so the number of images corresponds to the number of cognitions.

**The Mind Only School of Split Egg** asserts that what appears as external variegated objects are coming from the mind while the cognition perceiving them also come from mind. Just like an egg split into halves, the image and its cognition, the object and the subject, arise within one mind. When perceiving objects in this way, a mind of the external image and a mind of the inner perceiver arise and although that may appear as a duality due to beginningless habitual tendencies, they have no other existence that simply self-cognizance (rang rig) and are therefore like a split egg. The following question may then be raised, "If that is so, will there not be two conceptual minds simultaneously when a mind that perceives arises at the same time as a mind of the external image?" The reply is that there will not be two conceptual minds because the mind of the image is nonconceptual.

**The Mind Only School of Nondual Variety** asserts that what appears as a variety of external images of objects are cognized by a single inner perceiving mind. Just like a monkey within a house due to its swift movement can rapidly look out through the four windows, a single mind perceives through the five sense doors and cognizes objects. At the time of cognizing objects, the image and its cognition are not different in that they both are of the nature of a single mind, just like dream appearances and the perceiver are not different in that they both are the single mind of the sleeping state.

**The False Image Mind Only School** asserts that the images of the external objects are false habitual tendencies which appear mistakenly to the mind and are not true in being mind. The mind that examines this is falsely examining and is not examining through true experience. Hence, object and its cognition are held to be only mistaken experience of a false nature. This school has two subdivisions: The school asserting the defiled to be false and the school asserting the undefiled to be pure.

**The False Image Mind Only School asserting the defiled to be false** holds that the present images appearing in various ways and their discerning cognition are both mere appearance of a defiled mind. Ultimately, they are nothing but a nondual wisdom endowed with the qualities of the buddha nature and not as a consciousness (rang shes). The dharmakaya of buddhahood free from residual is that very same nondual wisdom which is undefiled suchness while at the state with residual there is a slight presence of latent defilement. Therefore, there is perception of mistaken appearances as well as a corpse and sickness.

The present mind is false, the defiled aspect of disturbing emotion in which wisdom and disturbing emotions are mixed together while the wisdom free from residual is the realization of the pure state.

**The False Image Mind Only School asserting the undefiled to be pure** holds also that the image and its cognition is a mere falsity, just like passionate persons through habituation in bringing a maiden to mind can at some point, even without having to think of her, experience the nonexistent vivid presence of the appearance of her face. Therefore, the images of objects appearing in variegated ways and the discerning mind are both nonexistent and yet apparent just like a reflection.

## **THE SVATANTRIKA MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL**

**The Svatantrika Madhyamaka School** asserts that not only are the variously appearing images and their discerning just a nonexistent vivid presence but in the ultimate also the individual self-cognizant wisdom is naturally devoid of an essence. It is divided into two schools: The Svatantrika School Asserting Ultimate Illusion, and the Svatantrika School of Complete Nondwelling.

**The Svatantrika School Asserting Ultimate Illusion** holds that the subject and object cannot be established while an unestablished awareness wisdom which is merely unutterable, inconceivable and indescribable does have ultimate existence in an illusory way. For this reason, having attained the illusory paths and bhumis as the virtues of practicing as well as the wisdoms of buddhahood as the fruition of reaching perfection, the benefit of beings is accomplished out of the state of dharmakaya in an illusory way. This school is also called the Lower Svatantrika School.

**The Svatantrika School of Complete Nondwelling** holds that in the ultimate nothing abides even in an illusory way. Since the object and its image do not exist, the individual self-cognizance experiencing their nonexistent does also not exist. Just as when the child of a barren woman is nonexistent it follows that the cognition discerning it is also nonexistent. The superficial is devoid of true existence and therefore nothing whatsoever dwells in the ultimate; just like the appearances of horses and elephant cease when awakening from a dream while in fact that which ceases cannot be established since it was nonexistent in the first place. This school is also called the Higher Svatantrika School.

## **THE PRASANGIKA MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL**

The Prasangika Madhyamaka School asserts that after refuting all such statements as 'not ultimately established' and 'superficially mere appearance is established as illusory,' the nature transcending the limitations of existence and nonexistence is totally free from any claims about it. It is free from any intellectually created philosophy, because mental constructs have subsided. Although the manifold mere appearances are posited as aspects of communication exactly in the same way as mundane people posit them, this school is still free from claims since what appears as phenomena are beyond truth and falsity and so free from the limitations of existence and nonexistence as well as the time of the present. This school is the pinnacle of all the philosophies of Buddhism.