

# **RADICAL REJECTION**

## **PARTING FROM EXTREME VIEWS ABOUT REALITY**

*A Graduate Level Course  
Based upon the Madhyamakavatara by Chandrakirti  
With Commentary by Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche  
And Jamgon Mipham Rinpoche*

**WHAT AM I?  
THINGS ARE NOT WHAT THEY SEEM  
NOR ARE THEY OTHERWISE**

### **PART FOUR SOURCEBOOK**



***Radical Rejection***  
***Parting from Extreme Views about Reality***  
***Part Four***

*What am I?*  
*Things are not as They Seem*  
*Nor are They Otherwise*

**Sourcebook Table of Contents**

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**Manjushri Supplication**

Through the blessings of awareness-emptiness, Prince Manjushri,  
Open the eight treasures of courage\*, which descend from the expanse of wisdom,  
So I may become the commander of the ocean  
Of the dharma treasury of scripture and realization.  
I supplicate Mipham, the melody of gentleness (Manjughosha).  
Om Arapachana Dhi Hum

\* *The Eight Great Treasures of Confidence/Courage:*

1. *Not forgetting is the treasury of memory*
2. *Discriminating well is the treasure of intelligence*
3. *Internalizing the meaning of all the sutras is the treasure of realization*
4. *Retaining everything one has heard is the treasure of perfect recall*
5. *Satisfying everyone with valuable instructions is the treasure of confidence*
6. *Guarding the noble dharma is the treasure of the dharma*
7. *Not letting the lineage of the three jewels be broken is the treasure of bodhicitta*
8. *Being able to remain in the unborn nature is the treasure of accomplishment*

**Dedication Song**

All you sentient beings I have a good or bad connection with  
As soon as you have left this confused dimension  
May you be born in the west in Sukhavati  
And once you're born there complete the bhumis and the paths.

*Composed by Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche. Translated by Jim Scott*

# **Radical Rejection: Parting from Extreme Views about Reality**

*A Graduate Level Course  
Based upon the Madhyamakavatara by Chandrakirti  
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## **Part Four: What am I? *Things are not as They Seem, nor are They Otherwise***

### **Overview**

We live our lives in a constant state of denial in that we continuously hold two contradictory views in our minds: that our self is one thing, and yet that it has many different aspects or parts. We know logically that the self must be either one thing or many things, yet we persist in holding these conflicting views. In this fourth segment of our five courses on the Introduction to the Middle Way by Chandrakirti, we will explore the innate view of the self as equivalent to the sum of the five skandhas. Our tools will be the detailed analysis of the self as found in the abhidharma tradition, the use of logical reasoning and the practice of analytical or vipashyana meditation. This segment of the series will be the most easily accessible one, and the one most conducive to contemplation.

#### **I. Threefold Logic:**

- A. Ground: A truly existing self must be -
  - 1. Either one or many
  - 2. The same as or different from its parts
  - 3. Produced from self or other, both or neither
- B. Path: Rejecting belief in truly existing persons using -
  - 1. The abhidharma analysis of the self of persons into the five skandhas
  - 2. The sevenfold analysis of the chariot as an example for analyzing the relationship between the self and the aggregates
- C. Fruition: Realizing the true nature of the self -
  - 1. The self is merely a dependent imputation
  - 2. All things are also dependent imputations
  - 3. Accepting mere arising on the relative level

#### **II. Primary Sources:**

- A. Chandrakirti, *The Introduction to the Middle Way*, Translated by Ari Goldfield, Chapter Six: The Section on the Selflessness of Persons, v. 6:120-178
- B. Mipham and Chandrakirti, *Introduction to the Middle Way: A Commentary on Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara*, Translated by Padmakara Translation Group, Shambhala, Boston, 2002, pp. 130-137 (outline) and 281-309
- C. Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse, *Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara With Commentary by Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche*, Edited by Alex Trisoglio, Khyentse Foundation, 2003, pp. x-xii, 246-296, 337-338 and 440-441
- D. Acharya Lama Tenpa Gyaltzen, *Analytical Meditation*, Nithartha Institute, 2002
- E. *Radical Rejection Course Four Sourcebook*
- F. *Radical Rejection Handouts*

# Radical Rejection

## Parting from Extreme Views about Reality

### Part Four: What am I?

*Things are not as they seem nor are they otherwise*

#### Syllabus

##### I. Intro, Review, Overview, Synopsis

###### A. In Class Reading:

1. *The Questions of King Milinda Part I*, Trs. T.W. Rhys Davids (Dover, New York 1963), Lakkana Panha, pp. 40-45 = 6
2. *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*, Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rinpoche, (Snow Lion, Valois, NY 1980) extract from the Introduction, pp. 26-27

##### II. The Self as Different from the Aggregates

###### A. Required Reading:

1. Root Text: Verses 6:120-125
2. Dzongsar Commentary: pp. 246 - 257 (top) = 11
3. *Analytical Meditation: The Self*, pp. 79-84 = 5
4. Total Reading: 16 + verses

###### B. Optional Reading:

1. Mipham Commentary: pp. 281(mid) - 285 (mid) = 4
2. *Analytical Meditation*:
  - a) The Buddha's Begging Bowl, pp. 1-6 = 6
  - b) Kanjung Manjung, pp. 133-138 = 6

##### III. The Functioning of the Aggregates & the Selflessness of the Person

###### A. Required Readings from the Sourcebook:

1. The Aggregates Chart
2. The Mental Factors Chart
3. Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, *Understanding Mind*, (Tharpa Publications, Ulster 1993 and 2002):
  - a) Primary Minds and Mental Factors, pp. 103-106 = 4
  - b) Deluded View and Extreme View, pp. 204-218 = 15
4. Total Reading: 19 + charts

##### IV. The Self as Identical with the Aggregates

###### A. Required Reading:

1. Root Text: Verses 6:126-137
2. Dzongsar Commentary: pp. 257 – 268 (bottom) = 12
3. *Analytical Meditation: Transcending Self and the Skandhas*, pp. 87-93 = 7
4. Total Reading: 19 + verses

###### B. Optional Reading:

1. Mipham Commentary: pp. 285-293 (middle) = 8

## V. The Self as an Imputation and as Indescribable

### A. Required Reading:

1. Root Text: Verses 6:138-149
2. Dzongsar Commentary: pp. 268 (bottom) – 278 (top) = 11
3. *Analytical Meditation:*
  - a) Transcending Self: The Form Skandha, pp. 95-101 = 7
  - b) Transcending Self: The Feeling and Discrimination Skandhas, pp. 103-107 = 5
4. Total Reading: 23 + verses

### B. Optional Reading:

1. Mipham Commentary: pp. 293 (mid) – 298 (top) = 5

## VI. The Self as Dependently Imputed like a Chariot

### A. Readings:

1. Root Text: Verses 6:150-164
2. Dzongsar Commentary: pp. 278-284 (top) = 8 + pp. 337-338 = 2 = 10

### 3. From Sourcebook:

- a) Joe Wilson, *Chandrakirti's Sevenfold Reasoning: Meditation on the Selflessness of Persons* (Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, Dharamsala 1980), The Actual meditation: The Sevenfold Reasoning, pp. 33-49 = 17
- b) The Sevenfold Reasoning Chart

4. Total Reading: 27 + verses and chart

### B. Optional Reading:

1. Mipham Commentary: pp. 298-304 (top) = 7

## VII. Phenomena as Mere Imputations

### A. Required Readings:

1. Root Text: Verses 6:165-178
2. Dzongsar Commentary: pp. 284 (top) – 296 (top) = 11
3. *Analytical Meditation: Transcending Self: The Formation and Consciousness Skandhas*, pp. 109-114 = 6
4. Total Reading: 17 + verses

### B. Optional Reading:

1. Mipham Commentary: pp. 304-309 (bottom) = 5

### Additional Recommended Sources:

1. Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, *Commentary on The Chariot of the Dakpo Kagyu Siddhas*, (Nitartha 1999), pp. 173-302
2. Chandrakirti and The Seventh Karmapa Chodrak Gyatso, *Moon of Wisdom: Chapter Six of Chandrakirti's Entering the Middle Way with Commentary from the Eighth Karmapa Mikyo Dorje's Chariot of the Kagyu Siddhas*, Trs. Ari Goldfield, Jules Levinson, Jim Scott and Birgit Scott (Snow Lion, Ithaca 2005), pp.? (not yet published)

## **Stages in the Analysis of the Emptiness of Self in Persons Chandrakirti's Seven-Fold Reasoning**

### **Preliminaries:**

- Ascertaining the object to be negated
- Ascertaining the pervasion of the options

### **The Seven Stages:**

1. Realizing that the self is not other than the skandhas
2. Realizing that the self is not the same as the skandhas
3. Realizing that the self does not possess the skandhas
4. Realizing that the self does not depend upon the skandhas
5. Realizing that the skandhas do not depend upon the self
6. Realizing that the self is not the mere collection of the skandhas
7. Realizing that the self is not the shape of its parts

# **The Madhyamakavatara By Chandrakirti**

## **Summary Outline Based Upon Jamgon Mipham Rinpoche's Commentary**

- I. Preamble (v. 1:1-4), pp. 143-147**
- II. The First Five Grounds (v. 1:4-5:4), pp. 148-160**
- III. The Sixth Ground, Clearly Manifest (v. 6:1-226), pp. 161-324**
  - A. Preamble (v. 6:1-7) pp. 161-165**
  - B. Using Reason to Disprove the Self of Phenomena (v. 6:8-119) pp. 165-281**
    - 1. Refutation of self-production (v. 6:9-13), pp. 183-187
    - 2. Refutation of other-production (v. 6:14-97), pp. 187-260
      - a) General refutation of other-production on the ultimate level (v. 6:14-33), pp. 187-221
      - b) No naturally existent other-production even conventionally (v. 6:34-44), pp. 221-228
      - c) **Refutation of the Chittamatra position (v. 6:45-97), pp. 228-260**
    - 3. Refutation of both self and other production (v. 6: 98), pp. 260-261
    - 4. Refutation of uncaused production (v. 6:99-103), pp. 261-266
    - 5. Conclusion and replies to the objections against the refutation of the four theories of production (v. 6:104-113), pp. 266-278
    - 6. A reasoned demonstration that production is no more than dependent arising (v. 6:114-115) pp. 278-279
  - C. Using Reason to Disprove the Self of Persons (v. 6:120-178) pp. 281-309**
    - 1. Refutation of the belief that the self is a concrete entity (v. 6:121-149) pp. 282-298
    - 2. The self is a mere dependent imputation (v. 6:150-179) pp. 298-309
  - D. The Categories of Emptiness Established by Reasoning (v. 6:179-226) pp. 309-324**
    - 1. Detailed Categorization - Sixteen Kinds of Emptinesses (v. 6:181-218), pp. 314-321
    - 2. Abridged Classification - Four Kinds of Emptinesses (v. 6:219-223), pp. 322-323
  - IV. The Final Four Grounds (v. 7:1-10:1) pp. 324-330**
  - V. The Qualities of the Ten Grounds (v. 11:1-9) pp. 331-333**
  - VI. The Ultimate Ground of Buddhahood (v. 11:10-51) pp. 334-348**
  - VII. Conclusion (v. 11:51-56) pp. 349-354**

**The Madhyamakavatara By Chandrakirti**  
**Jamgon Mipham's Commentary**  
**Detailed Outline for Course Four**

**I. Emptiness of Self and the Analysis into Parts (v. 6:120-178), p. 85-93**

**A. The need to refute what is grasped at (v. 6:120), p. 85**

**B. Refutation by reasoning (v. 6:121-150), pp. 85-89**

**1. Refuting the belief that the personal self is something substantial (v. 6:121-145)**

**a) The self as something different from the aggregates (v. 6:121-125), p. 85**

(1) Disproving the self as a permanent entity (v. 6:122)

**b) The self as identical with the aggregates (v. 126-141), pp. 85-88**

(1) The belief that the self is identical with the aggregates

(2) Reasoned demonstration that the aggregates cannot be the referent of the notion of "I"

(a) The contradiction inherent in this belief - showing the unwanted consequences of this belief

(i) The self would be a simple nonentity

(ii) It would be pointless to try to accomplish nirvana  
(iii)The karmic principle of cause and effect would be inadmissible

(b) The actual refutation

(i) Performed actions would have no effect

(ii) One would encounter the effect of actions that one had not performed

(iii)This belief contradicts scripture

(iv)This belief contradicts reason

(c) Absurd consequences

(i) If the aggregates were the referent of the notion of "I" upon the realization of no-self, existent phenomena would vanish

(ii) If the aggregates existed, the self could never be refuted and one could never overcome the afflictions

**(3) What the Buddha meant by saying the aggregates are the referent of the notion of the "I"**

(a) The belief that the aggregates constitute the self

(b) The sutra asserts the negation of an imputed, permanent self

(c) If the aggregates were the self, this could only mean the aggregates together, not individually

(d) The self is not the mere gathering of the aggregates

(e) The self is conceptually imputed in dependence upon the aggregates

(f) One must eradicate the referent of the innate ego-clinging in order to achieve the realization of the nonexistence of the self

- c) **Refutation of additional beliefs concerning the self and the aggregates (v. 6:142-143), p. 88**
    - (1) The idea that the aggregates and the self are related in the manner of container and its contents (v. 6:142)
    - (2) The idea that the self is the possessor of the aggregates (v. 6:143)
  - d) **Conclusion (v. 6:144-145), p. 88**
    - (1) Summary of the twenty views of the transitory collection
    - (2) They are all conceptual imputations
- 2. Refuting the person as something indescribable (v. 6:146-149), pp. 88-89**
- a) **The belief that the self is indescribable**
  - b) **Refutation of the Vatsiputriya position**
    - (1) If the self exists it is inexpressible
    - (2) If the self is inexpressible, it cannot be an existent thing
    - (3) If it lacks two properties common to all things it is not a real entity
- 3. Presentation of the person as dependently imputed (v. 6:150-165), pp. 89-91**
- a) **Using reasoning to establish it is imputed (v. 6:150), p. 89**
  - b) **Using the Simile of the Chariot to disprove the self (v. 6:151-165), pp. 89-91**
    - (1) The mere collection of parts is not the chariot (v. 6:152)
    - (2) The mere shape of the collection of parts is not the chariot (v. 6:153-157)
    - (3) The chariot merely exists according to empirical consensus when not subjected to the sevenfold reasoning (v. 6:158-159)
    - (4) The benefits of this understanding (v. 6:160-161)
  - c) **Applying the simile to the self of persons (v. 6:162-165), p. 90-91**
    - (1) The self is in harmony with conventional experience even though it lacks inherent reality (v. 6:162)
    - (2) By understanding this, one transcends eternalism and nihilism (v. 6:163)
    - (3) With this understanding one attains complete freedom (v. 6:164-165)
- 4. Using the same logic upon all existing things (v. 6:166-178), pp. 91-93**
- a) **The reasoning applied to all “wholes” and their parts (v. 6:166-167)**
  - b) **Examination of causes and effects (v. 6:168-170)**
  - c) **Objections and responses (v. 6:171-178):**
    - (1) Objections (v. 6:170-171)
      - (a) Problems involved with the contact or separation of cause and effect apply also to the Madhyamikas
      - (b) Such a consequence does not constitute an authentic argument
      - (c) The Madhyamikas only attack the position of others without asserting any position of their own
    - (2) Answers (v. 6:172-178)

## Middle Way Chants & Songs

### Friends

Friends are empty forms just like a water moon  
To think of them as being truly real  
Will only make you many sufferings increase

To know they're empty forms like a watermoon  
Will make illusion-like samadhi increase  
Compassion free of clinging will increase

And non-referential view will also increase  
And meditation that's fixation-free  
And conduct free of doer deed increase

Of all the many marvels, this by far the most marvelous  
Of all the many wonders, this the most wonderful

*Composed by Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche. Translated and arranged by Jim Scott.*

### All These Forms

All these forms – appearance emptiness  
Like a rainbow with its shining glow  
In the reaches of appearance emptiness  
Just let go and go where no mind goes

Every sound is sound and emptiness  
Like the sound of an echo's roll  
In the reaches of sound and emptiness  
Just let go and go where no mind goes

Every feeling is bliss and emptiness  
Way beyond what words can show  
In the reaches of bliss and emptiness  
Just let go and go where no mind goes

All awareness – awareness emptiness  
Way beyond what thoughts can know  
In the reaches of awareness and emptiness  
Let awareness go – oh, where no mind goes

*Composed by Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche; translated and arranged by Jim Scott*

### From Nagarjuna's Fundamentals of the Middle Way

Like a dream, like an illusion,  
Like a city of gandharvas,  
That's how birth, and that's how living,  
That's how dying are taught to be

### From the Sutra of the Noble Collection

Know the five skandhas are like an illusion  
Don't separate the illusion from the skandhas

Free of thinking that anything is real  
This is perfect wisdom's conduct at its best!

### **From Chandrakirti's Entering the Middle Way**

There are two ways of seeing every thing,  
The perfect way and the false way,  
So each and every thing that has ever been found  
Holds two natures within.

And what does perfect seeing see?  
It sees the suchness of all things.  
And false seeing sees the relative truth—  
This is what the perfect Buddha said.

### **From the King of Samadhi Sutra**

All the images conjured up by a magician  
The horses, elephants and chariots in his illusions  
Whatever may appear there, know that none of it is real  
And it's just like that with everything there is!

### **The Song of the Profound Definitive Meaning Sung on the Snowy Range**

Supreme guru, I bow down at your feet

The siddhis of blessings come straight from the dakinis  
Samaya's nectar is the most nourishing drink  
Your offering of faith has kept me so healthy  
This way of gathering merit - it works quite well

For the mind that masters view the emptiness dawns  
In the content seen not even an atom exists  
A seer and seen refined until they're gone  
This way of realizing view - it works quite well

When meditation is clear light river flow  
There is no need to confine it to sessions and breaks  
Meditator and object refined until they're gone  
This heart bone of meditation - it beats quite well

When you're sure that conduct's work is luminous light  
And you're sure that interdependence is emptiness  
A doer and deed refined until they're gone  
This way of working with conduct - it works quite well

When biased thinking has vanished into space  
No phony facades, eight dharmas, nor hopes and fears,  
A keeper and kept refined until they're gone  
This way of keeping samaya - it works quite well

When you've finally discovered your mind is dharmakaya  
And you're really doing yourself and others good  
A winner and won refined until they're gone  
This way of winning results - it works quite well

*Under the guidance of Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, translated and arranged by Jim Scott and Ari Goldfield*

**The Introduction to the Middle Way**  
By Chandrakirti

*Translated from the Tibetan by Ari Goldfield*

**Chapter Six**  
**The Section on the Selflessness of Persons**

Seeing that all faults and afflictions without exception  
Arise from the view of the transitory collection,  
And understanding that the object of that view is the “self,”  
Yogis refute the self. (120)

The self imagined by the tirthikas is an experiencer, is permanent, is not a creator,  
Has no qualities and performs no activities.  
Based on slight differences in how they classify this self,  
There are different sub-systems of tirthika views. (121)

Their self is unborn, like the son of a barren woman,  
And therefore it does not exist.  
That it could even be the support for apprehending “I” is unreasonable,  
So we do not even assert that it exists relatively. (122)

Whatever different kinds of self  
The tirthikas may describe in their treatises  
Their own assertion that it is unborn is the reason that invalidates their teachings,  
And therefore, none of their different kinds of self exist. (123)

Therefore, there is no self different from the aggregates,  
Because apart from the aggregates, nothing is perceived to be self.  
Furthermore, the self [asserted by the tirthikas] is not asserted to be the support for the mind  
thinking, “me,”  
Because worldly beings still have ego-clinging even though they are totally unaware of [that  
unborn self]. (124)

Even those who have spent many aeons as animals  
Have not seen this unborn, permanent self, either!  
Nevertheless, they still apprehend “me,”  
And therefore, there can be no self apart from the aggregates. (125)

Since no self exists apart from the aggregates,  
Only the aggregates are the focus of the view of self.  
Some posit all five aggregates as the basis of the view of self,  
And others say that only mind is the basis. (126)

If the aggregates were the self,  
Since there are many aggregates, there would be that many selves.

The self would exist as a substance,  
And the mind looking at it would perceive a substance and would therefore not be mistaken [in thinking that the self existed]. (127)

When nirvana was attained, the self's continuum would most certainly be cut,  
And in every instant before nirvana, the self would arise and cease.  
There would be no performer of karmic actions, and therefore no result of those actions.  
The one who sowed the seeds would be different from the one who experienced the result. (128)

[Should you say], "In reality there is a continuum, so there is no fault,"  
Earlier analysis has shown the faults of positing that a continuum exists.  
Therefore, it would be illogical for the self to be either the five aggregates or mind [alone].  
Furthermore, the Buddha did *not* teach that the universe will end, or will not end, and so forth,  
[for to do so would imply the existence of a self that would either end or not]. (129)

[Furthermore, if the self were the aggregates or mind], when your yogis saw selflessness,  
It is certain that all things would cease to exist.  
If you say that what is abandoned is belief in the *permanent* self,  
At that time self could not be the mind *or* the aggregates. (130)

When your yogis realized selflessness,  
They would not realize the suchness of form.  
Looking at form, thoughts would engage,  
And desire and so forth would arise because form's essential nature had not been realized. (131)

You say, "Since the Teacher said the aggregates are the self,  
We assert that the aggregates are the self."  
However, [the Buddha] said that to refute [the notion] that the self could be different from the aggregates,  
And we know this because other sutras teach, "Form is not the self," and so forth. (132)

Since other sutras teach "Form and feeling are not the self,  
Discrimination and formations are not it,  
And consciousness is not it, either,"  
In short, the Buddha did not assert the aggregates to be the self. (133)

When the aggregates are called "self," what is being referred to is the *collection* of the aggregates,  
And not the entities of the aggregates themselves.  
[Since the self is just a mere collection,] it is not a protector, tamer, or witness—  
Since the collection does not exist [as anything but a name], it cannot be [a real self]. (134)

[If the collection and the collection's possessor were the same],  
A mere collection of the chariot's parts would be the chariot, and the same goes for the [parts of] the self.  
The sutras teach that the self is imputed in dependence upon the aggregates,  
And therefore, the mere coming together of the aggregates is not the self. (135)

You may say, “The self is the shape” of the collection of its parts in proper order,  
And since forms are what have shape, they would be the self.  
However, the collection of mental [aggregates] would not be the self,  
Because mind has no shape! (136)

For the appropriator to be the same as the appropriated would be illogical.  
If they were, the actor and the object of its action would be the same.  
If you think, “there is no actor but there are objects of action,”  
That too is wrong, because without the former the latter cannot exist. (137)

The Mighty One taught that the self is imputed to exist in dependence upon  
The six elements: earth, water, fire, air, consciousness, and space,  
And the six supports for contact:  
The eye, [ear, nose], and so forth. (138)

At other times, we impute the self’s existence in dependence upon mind and mental events, the  
Buddha definitively taught.  
Therefore, the self is not different from the aggregates, nor is it the aggregates themselves, nor is  
it the collection of them,  
And therefore, no matter what its base of reference,  
The mind thinking “self” is illogical. (139)

“When selflessness is realized, clinging to a permanent self is abandoned,” you say.  
But even you do not assert that [the permanent self] is the basis for apprehending “I”.  
Therefore, for you to say, “Realizing selflessness completely eliminates the view of self”  
Is a fascinating statement, indeed. (140)

It would be like saying that someone who thought a hole in a wall was a snakes’ nest  
Could dispel their fear of snakes by saying,  
“No, no elephants in there!”  
Wow, would people laugh at that! (141)

The self does not exist with the aggregates as its support,  
Nor do the aggregates exist with the self as their support.  
If they were different from each other they could have such relationships  
But since they are not different, such relationships are mere fabrications. (142)

We do not assert that the self has a body  
Because there is no self, and therefore, there is nothing there to have anything!  
If self and form were different, having a body would be like Devadatta having a cow,  
And if they were the same, having a body would be like Devadatta having a body.  
However, self and body are neither the same nor different. (143)

The body is not the self and the self does not possess the body  
The body is not a support for the self and the self is not a support for the body.  
Know that these apply to all five aggregates,  
And so there are twenty views of the self. (144)

The vajra-like realization of selflessness  
Destroys the apprehension of “self,” and at the same time,  
The twenty lofty peaks of the mountainous view of the transitory collection  
Are completely destroyed as well. (145)

Some assert the substantial essence of an individual,  
Who is neither the same nor different from the aggregates, who is neither permanent nor  
impermanent.  
They assert that this individual is an object of knowledge perceived by the six consciousnesses  
And that it forms the basis for the apprehension of “I”. (146)

Just as mind is not understood to be inexpressible in relation to body,  
Things which exist are not inexpressible.  
Therefore, if the self existed as a thing,  
It, like mind, would not be inexpressible. (147)

For you, a “vase” does not exist as a thing.  
Its essence is inexpressible in relation to the form [that is its basis of imputation].  
Therefore, if the self were inexpressible in relation to the aggregates  
It would not be understood to be something existent. (148)

You do not assert your own consciousness to be different from itself,  
And you do assert it to be different from form and so forth.  
An entity can only be seen to exist in these two ways—[as the same as itself and as different  
from something else]—  
And therefore there is no self, because it does not have either of these qualities of an entity.  
(149)

Therefore, the basis for apprehending “I” is not a thing.  
It is not different from the aggregates, nor is it of the essence of the aggregates,  
It is neither the aggregates’ support, nor their possessor—  
It is only imputed to exist in dependence upon them. (150)

The chariot is not something different than its parts,  
It is not the same as its parts, it does not possess its parts,  
It does not depend on its parts, the parts do not depend on it,  
It is not the mere collection of its parts, nor is it the parts’ shape. (151)

If the mere collection of the parts were the chariot,  
A heap of disassembled parts would still be a chariot.  
And since there is no possessor of the parts, there can be no parts,  
So the mere shape of the parts cannot be the chariot, either! (152)

If you say the parts each have the same shape they had when they were separate,  
[Meaning that] when they are thought to be a chariot, their shape have not undergone any  
change,  
Then just as there was no chariot when they were disassembled,  
So when assembled there is no chariot, either. (153)

If at the time there is a chariot  
The wheels and so forth had different shapes than before they were assembled,  
That difference would be perceivable.  
Since it is not, the mere shape is not the chariot. (154)

Even in your tradition, the “collection” does not exist substantially at all,  
And therefore, the shape [of the parts] is not the shape of the parts’ collection.  
How could something like shape, suitable to be seen,  
Exist in dependence upon something that does not exist at all? (155)

Just as you assert the “collection” to be unreal, a mere imputation,  
So it is that in dependence upon unreal causes  
Appear the images of results that are unreal by nature.  
Know the arising of everything to be just like this. (156)

Thus it is illogical for the mind to [superimpose the existence of a] vase  
Onto the form abiding in that way.  
Since the form is unarisen, it does not exist.  
Therefore, the vase cannot be the form’s shape. (157)

Although it is true that both in terms of suchness and conventional reality,  
When analyzed, chariots and so forth can not be found to exist in any of the seven ways,  
In the world itself where there is no analysis,  
Things are imputed to exist in dependence upon their parts. (158)

Beings say, “That chariot has parts, it has sections,  
That chariot can do things.”  
Individuals, moreover, are known to be “appropriators”.  
Therefore, do not destroy the relative appearances commonly known in the world. (159)

How could that which does not exist in any of the seven ways be said to exist?  
The yogis find no such existence.  
Through this realization, they easily engage in suchness,  
And therefore, we must assert that the existence of things is only from the perspective of no  
analysis. (160)

If the chariot itself does not exist,  
Then since there is no possessor of the parts, the parts do not exist, either!  
Just as if fire burned the chariot, its parts would also cease to exist,  
So when the fire of knowledge burns the parts-possessor, it burns the parts as well. (161)

Similarly, the five aggregates, the six elements and the six sources of consciousnesses are  
renowned in the world,  
And in dependence upon them, the self is asserted to be their appropriator.  
What are appropriated are the aggregates and so forth,  
And the self is also asserted to be an agent of action. (162)

Since the self is not a thing, it is neither changing nor unchanging,  
It is not born and it does not die,  
It is neither permanent, impermanent, both, nor neither,  
And it is neither the same nor different from the aggregates. (163)

Wandering beings constantly cling to some basis as being “me”,  
And then conceive of other things as being “mine”.  
The self that they have imagined and that is renowned in the world  
Exists only when there is no analysis; the thought of it arises from bewilderment. (164)

If there is no actor, there is no object of action.  
Therefore, if there is no self, there is nothing that could be said to belong to the self.  
Seeing the emptiness of “me” and “mine”  
The yogis are completely liberated. (165)

Vases, blankets, tents, armies, forests, and garlands,  
Trees, homes, pony-carts, inns and so forth—  
Whatever things they may be, know that people claim them to exist in dependence upon their  
parts,  
[And do not examine people’s imputations], for even the Mighty One would not debate with the  
world. (166)

The parts, qualities, desire, defining characteristics, firewood and so forth,  
And the possessor of the parts, bearer of the qualities, desirous one, basis of characteristics, fire  
and so forth—  
When analyzed with the reasoning of the chariot, they are found not to exist in any of the seven  
ways.  
Only in a different way, through being renowned in the world, can they be said to exist at all.  
(167)

Only if the cause produces a result is it a cause.  
If no result is produced, there is no cause, because there is no reason for there to be one.  
The result as well will only arise if there is a cause there to produce it;  
So therefore, please tell me: which of these arises from which? Which one is present first, so that  
the other can arise from it? (168)

If, as you assert, the cause meets the result when it is produced,  
When meeting, they would be the same entity—cause and result would not be different.  
[If they did not meet] and therefore were distinct things, causes and non-causes would be  
equivalent.  
Besides the two [possibilities of cause and result meeting, or not], there is no other concept of  
how arising could happen. (169)

So how is it in your system? For if the cause does not produce a result, then there is no result,  
And a cause without a result has no reason to be a cause, so it does not exist either.  
Whereas we assert that both cause and result are illusory, and so,  
Our tradition cannot be faulted and all the things of the world can also exist. (170)

“[Chandrakirti], does your refutation refute its object by meeting it, or not?  
Whichever way you answer, will the same faults not apply to you?  
When you enunciate your refutation, you only defeat your own position,  
And so your refutation cannot refute anything. (171)

“[Chandrakirti], your specious reasoning defeats your very own words;  
Without any logic you simply deny the existence of anything,  
Therefore, you have spurned the assertions of the genuine ones,  
For since you have no views of your own, you nihilistically attack the views of others.” (172)

[When you ask], “Does the refutation refute through meeting what it refutes, or not?”  
The fault raised by your question definitely applies to your position [that things inherently exist]  
But since we do not take that position  
For such a consequence to come to us would be impossible. (173)

You will observe that all the particular circumstances of the sun, like an eclipse and so forth,  
Are clearly visible in its reflection,  
And while it is illogical that the reflection [arose through] the sun meeting it, or not,  
In dependence upon [causes and conditions], the reflection, a mere convention, appears. (174)

Even though reflections are not real, that we can use them to make our faces beautiful proves  
they have [a use].  
Similarly, we see we can use the [middle way] reasonings to clean the face of our precise  
knowledge.  
Know that they cause realization of [our] thesis  
Even though this function is actually untenable! (175)

For if the reason that causes understanding of the thesis actually existed,  
And if the entity of the thesis to be understood existed, too,  
The fault of the reasoning which asks, “Do they meet, or not?” would apply.  
However, since they do not exist, the accusation you make is mere unsubstantiated opinion.  
(176)

It is very easy to gain the understanding that entities do not inherently exist,  
But there is nothing that can cause others to understand that things do inherently exist.  
So why do you inferior logicians  
Ensnare the world with your web [of concepts about true existence]? (177)

Other refutations of cause and result have been presented above—  
They can also be employed as an answer to the opponent's question: “Does your refutation meet  
its object or not?”  
We do not have the fault of nihilistically attacking other views;  
Rather, [our reasonings] have been explained, and all other [opponents'] positions should be  
understood in their light. (178)

## BOOK II.

LAKKHANA PAÑHA.

THE DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF ETHICAL QUALITIES.

## CHAPTER 1.

1. [25] Now Milinda the king went up to where the venerable Nâgasena was, and addressed him with the greetings and compliments of friendship and courtesy, and took his seat respectfully apart. And Nâgasena reciprocated his courtesy, so that the heart of the king was propitiated.

And Milinda began by asking, 'How is your Reverence known, and what, Sir, is your name?' 'I am known as Nâgasena, O king, and it is by that name that my brethren in the faith address me. But although parents, O king, give such a name as Nâgasena, or Sûrasena, or Virasena, or Sihasena, yet this, Sire,—Nâgasena and so on—is only a generally understood term, a designation in common use. For there is no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter<sup>2</sup>'

<sup>1</sup> There is a free translation of the Sinhalese version of the following dialogues (down to the end of our § 4) in Spence Hardy's 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 424-429. But it is very unreliable as a reproduction of either the Sinhalese or the Pâli, and slurs over the doubtful passages.

<sup>2</sup> Na-puggalo upalabbhati. This thesis, that 'there is no individual,' is discussed at the opening of the Kathâ Vatthu (leaf ka of my MS.) Put into modern philosophical phraseology it amounts to saying that there is no permanent subject underlying the temporary phenomena visible in a man's individuality. But

Then Milinda called upon the Yonakas and the brethren to witness: 'This Nâgasena says there is no permanent individuality (no soul) implied in his name. Is it now even possible to approve him in that?' And turning to Nâgasena, he said: 'If, most reverend Nâgasena, there be no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter, who is it, pray, who gives to you members of the Order your robes and food and lodging and necessaries for the sick? Who is it who enjoys such things when given? Who is it who lives a life of righteousness? Who is it who devotes himself to meditation? Who is it who attains to the goal of the Excellent Way, to the Nirvâna of Arahatship? And who is it who destroys living creatures? who is it who takes what is not his own? who is it who lives an evil life of worldly lusts, who speaks lies, who drinks strong drink, who (in a word) commits any one of the five sins which work out their bitter fruit even in this life<sup>1</sup>? If that be so there is neither merit nor demerit; there is neither doer nor causer of good or evil deeds<sup>2</sup>; there is neither fruit nor result of good or evil Karma<sup>3</sup>. [26]—If, most reverend Nâgasena, we are to think that were a man

I doubt whether, even in our author's time, the conception 'subject' was common ground, or that the word puggala had acquired that special connotation.

<sup>1</sup> Pañkâranticaya-kammam karoti. See my note on Kullavagga VII, 3, 9 ('Vinaya Texts,' vol. iii, p. 246, in the Sacred Books of the East).

<sup>2</sup> This is no doubt said in these words with allusion to the opinion ascribed in the Sâmañña Phala (D. II, 17) to Purama Kassapa.

<sup>3</sup> This is the opinion ascribed in identical words in the Sâmañña Phala (D. II, 23) to Agita of the garment of hair.

to kill you there would be no murder<sup>1</sup>, then it follows that there are no real masters or teachers in your Order, and that your ordinations are void.—You tell me that your brethren in the Order are in the habit of addressing you as Nâgasena. Now what is that Nâgasena? Do you mean to say that the hair is Nâgasena?

'I don't say that, great king.'

'Or the hairs on the body, perhaps?'

'Certainly not.'

'Or is it the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh, the nerves, the bones, the marrow, the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the spleen, the lungs, the larger intestines, the lower intestines, the stomach, the faeces, the bile, the phlegm, the pus, the blood, the sweat, the fat, the tears, the serum, the saliva, the mucus, the oil that lubricates the joints, the urine, or the brain, or any or all of these, that is Nâgasena?<sup>2</sup>'

And to each of these he answered no.

'Is it the outward form then (Rûpa) that is Nâgasena, or the sensations (Vedanâ), or the ideas (Saññâ), or the confections (the constituent elements of character, Samkhâra), or the consciousness (Viññâna), that is Nâgasena?<sup>3</sup>'

And to each of these also he answered no.

'Then is it all these Skandhas combined that are Nâgasena?'

'No! great king.'

'But is there anything outside the five Skandhas that is Nâgasena?'

And still he answered no.

'Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no Nâgasena. Nâgasena is a mere empty sound. Who then is the Nâgasena that we see before us? It is a falsehood that your reverence has spoken, an untruth!'

And the venerable Nâgasena said to Milinda the king: 'You, Sire, have been brought up in great luxury, as beseems your noble birth. If you were to walk this dry weather on the hot and sandy ground, trampling under foot the gritty, gravelly grains of the hard sand, your feet would hurt you. And as your body would be in pain, your mind would be disturbed, and you would experience a sense of bodily suffering. How then did you come, on foot, or in a chariot?'

'I did not come, Sir, on foot [27]. I came in a carriage.'

'Then if you came, Sire, in a carriage, explain to me what that is. Is it the pole that is the chariot?'

'I did not say that.'

'Is it the axle that is the chariot?'

'Certainly not.'

'Is it the wheels, or the framework, or the ropes, or the yoke, or the spokes of the wheels, or the goad, that are the chariot?'

And to all these he still answered no.

'Then is it all these parts of it that are the chariot?'

<sup>1</sup> This is practically the same opinion as is ascribed in the Sâmañña Phala (D. II, 26) to Pakudha Kakkayana.

<sup>2</sup> This list of the thirty-two forms (âkâras) of organic matter in the human body occurs already in the Khuddaka Pâtha, §. 3. It is the standard list always used in similar connections; and is, no doubt, supposed to be exhaustive. There are sixteen (half as many) âkâras of the mind according to Dipavamsa I, 42.

<sup>3</sup> These are the five Skandhas, which include in them the whole bodily and mental constituents of any being. See p. 80.

'No, Sir.'

'But is there anything outside them that is the chariot?'

And still he answered no.

'Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no chariot. Chariot is a mere empty sound. What then is the chariot you say you came in? It is a falsehood that your Majesty has spoken, an untruth! There is no such thing as a chariot! You are king over all India, a mighty monarch. Of whom then are you afraid that you speak untruth? And he called upon the Yonakas and the brethren to witness, saying: 'Milinda the king here has said that he came by carriage. But when asked in that case to explain what the carriage was, he is unable to establish what he averred. Is it, forsooth, possible to approve him in that?'

When he had thus spoken the five hundred Yonakas shouted their applause, and said to the king: 'Now let your Majesty get out of that if you can!' And Milinda the king replied to Nâgasena, and said: 'I have spoken no untruth, reverend Sir. It is on account of its having all these things—the pole, and the axle, the wheels, and the framework, the ropes, the yoke, the spokes, and the goad—that it comes under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of "chariot".'

'Very good! Your Majesty has rightly grasped the meaning of "chariot." And just even so it is on account of all those things you questioned me about—[28] the thirty-two kinds of organic matter in a human body, and the five constituent elements of being—that I come under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of "Nâgasena."

For it was said, Sire, by our Sister Vâgîrâ in the presence of the Blessed One:

"Just as it is by the condition precedent of the co-existence of its various parts that the word 'chariot' is used, just so is it that when the Skandhas are there we talk of a 'being!'".

'Most wonderful, Nâgasena, and most strange. Well has the puzzle put to you, most difficult though it was, been solved. Were the Buddha himself here he would approve your answer. Well done, well done, Nâgasena!'

2. 'How many years seniority have you, Nâgasena?'

'Seven, your Majesty.'

'But how can you say it is your "seven?" Is it you who are "seven," or the number that is "seven?"'

Now that moment the figure of the king, decked in all the finery of his royal ornaments, cast its shadow on the ground, and was reflected in a vessel of water. And Nâgasena asked him: 'Your figure, O king, is now shadowed upon the ground, and reflected in the water, how now, are you the king, or is the reflection the king?'

'I am the king, Nâgasena, but the shadow comes into existence because of me.'

'Just even so, O king, the number of the years is seven, I am not seven. But it is because of me, O king, that the number seven has come into existence; and it is mine in the same sense as the shadow is yours?'

<sup>1</sup> From the Samyutta Nikâya V, 10, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Hardy (p. 427, § 4 of the first edition) has quite missed the point of this crux.

# *The Questions of King Milinda*

*Translated from the Pali  
by T. W. Rhys Davids*

## *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*

Oral Commentary on  
Ge-shay Jam-bel-sam-pel's  
*Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge*  
*Composite of All the Important Points*  
*Opener of the Eye of New Intelligence*

Lati Rinbochay

TRANSLATED, EDITED, AND INTRODUCED  
BY ELIZABETH NAPPER

*in two parts*

*Part I*

Dover Publications, Inc.  
New York New York

GABRIEL / Snow Lion  
Valois, New York, U.S.A.

One begins with a wrong view such as the idea that there is a substantially existent self. As long as this idea is held forcefully, it is a wrong consciousness. Then, through hearing teachings of selflessness one might begin to wonder whether in fact there is such a self. At this point one would have generated doubt; initially one's tendency could still be to think that most likely there was a self – this would be doubt not tending to the fact. Through repeated thought one would pass through the stage of equal doubt in which, wondering whether or not there is a substantially existent self, one reaches no conclusion either way, and would eventually develop doubt tending to the fact in which one feels that there probably is no self but is nonetheless still uncertain.

The next step in the development of the view of selflessness is to generate a correctly assuming consciousness, one which definitely decides that there is no substantially existent self. At this point one is holding the correct view. However, one has not yet realized selflessness, although the oral tradition describes the initial generation of correct assumption with regard to selflessness as a very powerful experience. It is now necessary to contemplate selflessness again and again, using reasoning, seeking to develop a certainty from which one cannot be shaken.

An inference is the end result of a specific process of reasoning. One establishes that if there were a substantially existent self, it would have to exist in one of a limited number of ways and that if it does not exist in any of those ways, it does not exist; through reasoned investigation one establishes that it does not exist in any of those ways and hence concludes that it does not exist. For this conclusion to have the force of reasoned conviction, one must go through the steps of this investigation over and over again, so that one is accustomed to it and thoroughly convinced of it. One's consciousnesses throughout this process of familiarization are correct assumptions; when this is brought to the point of unwavering certainty, one generates an inference.

With the generation of an inferential cognizer, one can be said to have realized selflessness and to have incontrovertible knowledge of it. However, this is not the end of the process, for at this point one's realization is still conceptual, is still getting at selflessness only by way of an image. The goal is to develop one's realization still more and to bring it finally to the point of direct perception in which all need for an image has disappeared and one's mental consciousness is able to contact its object directly; such direct perception of selflessness is the actual antidote which, upon extended cultivation, is able to eradicate for ever the conception of self as well as all the other wrong views and afflictions that conception brings with it, thereby making liberation from cyclic existence possible.

The way in which an inference is transformed into direct perception is just repeated familiarization with the object of meditation. One's initial inference was generated in dependence on a sign. Later moments of that realization are subsequent cognizers, no longer directly dependent on the reasoning. Through taking selflessness to mind again and again within the force of one's realization, the clarity of appearance gradually increases until finally the image of the object disappears and is replaced by just clear appearance of the object itself. When this occurs, one has generated direct perception of one's object of meditation. This initial direct perception of selflessness is able to eradicate completely and forever a portion of the apprehension of self, but is not able to get rid of all levels of that conception. Inasmuch as the conception of self is the root of cyclic existence – is that view which has bound countless beings in immeasurable suffering since beginningless time – it is deeply ingrained and its force is extremely great. Initial direct perception overcomes only the grossest level of it, those conceptions based on false reasoning and so forth. One must then continue to cultivate realization of selflessness, developing the force of one's direct perception; direct perceivers of increasing strength overcome more and more subtle levels of the conception of self until finally it is eradicated completely.

GESHE KELSANG GYATSO

## Understanding the Mind

LORIG  
AN EXPLANATION OF THE  
NATURE AND FUNCTIONS  
OF THE MIND



### Primary Minds and Mental Factors

From the point of view of function, mind can be divided into primary minds and mental factors. Primary mind, mentality, and consciousness are synonyms. The definition of primary mind is a cognizer that principally apprehends the mere entity of an object. The definition of mental factor is a cognizer that principally apprehends a particular attribute of an object. These definitions were given by Maitreya.

In the case of a pot for example, the pot itself is the mere entity of the pot, and the base, sides, shape, colour, size, and so forth are particular attributes of the pot. Because a distinction exists within the object, there is a corresponding distinction on the part of the mind that cognizes that object. Thus, the function of a primary mind is to apprehend the mere entity of the object, while the function of mental factors is to apprehend particular attributes of the object. As each object has only one general entity but many particular attributes, any one object has only one primary mind but many mental factors observing it. Thus, when an eye awareness perceives a pot, for example, the primary mind principally apprehends the general entity of the pot – the pot itself – and the mental factors associated with that primary mind principally apprehend the particular attributes of the pot – its various parts.

There are six types of primary mind: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mental consciousness. The Chittamatrins posit two more primary minds: a consciousness-basis-of-all and a deluded mentality. According to them the consciousness-basis-of-all is a stable consciousness that does not cease at death but maintains the continuity of the person from one life to the next. It is the repository of karmic

potentials and the source of all other consciousnesses. The deluded mentality observes the consciousness-basis-of-all and mistakenly apprehends it as a self-supporting, substantially existent self. The Madhyamika-Prasangikas conclusively refute both the consciousness-basis-of-all and the deluded mentality. There are only six types of primary mind because there are only six types of object – forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile objects, and phenomena. Here, ‘phenomena’ means phenomena that appear only to mental awareness.

The quality of a primary mind depends upon the mental factors that accompany it. If the mental factors are virtuous the primary mind is virtuous, but if the mental factors are non-virtuous or neutral the primary mind is non-virtuous or neutral. Non-virtuous mental factors cause suffering and virtuous mental factors cause peace and happiness. Thus, if we wish to experience lasting peace of mind we must make a determined effort to eliminate non-virtuous mental factors and cultivate virtuous ones.

Each primary mind is accompanied by at least five mental factors, without which it would be unable to function. These are feeling, discrimination, intention, contact, and attention. They are known as the ‘five all-accompanying mental factors’. Just as a car cannot function if any of its wheels is missing, so a primary mind cannot function if any of these five mental factors is absent. For example, all physical objects are composed of eight substances – the four elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) and the four transformed elements (forms, smells, tastes, and tactile objects) – and just as even the simplest physical object must have all eight substances, so even the most basic primary mind must have all five all-accompanying mental factors. Even very subtle primary minds have these five mental factors.

We should not think of a primary mind and its mental factors as being separate entities, like a leader and his subjects, because each mental factor is a part of a primary mind. However, although a mental factor is a part of a primary mind, it is not a primary mind, just as a hand is a part of the body but not the body.

The Tibetan word for mental factor is ‘sem jung’, which literally means ‘arisen from mind’. Thus, a primary mind can be likened to a candle flame and its mental factors to the rays of that flame. Just as a candle flame has many rays of light, so one primary mind has many mental factors; just as the rays of light come from the flame and exist simultaneously with it, so mental factors come from the primary mind and exist simultaneously with it; and just as the flame illuminates objects by depending upon the rays of light that emanate from it, so a primary mind knows its object by depending upon its mental factors.

A primary mind and its mental factors are the same entity and possess five similarities:

- 1 Basis – they have the same dominant condition
- 2 Object – their observed object is the same
- 3 Aspect – their engaged object is the same
- 4 Time – they arise, abide, and cease simultaneously
- 5 Substance – one primary mind has only one of each type of mental factor

For example, when a tongue awareness tastes tea, both the primary mind and the mental factor feeling associated with it develop from the same uncommon dominant condition, the tongue sense power, and so their basis is the same. Their observed objects are the same because they both focus on the same object – the taste of the tea; their engaged objects are the same because they both apprehend the taste of the tea; and their time, or duration, is the same because they both arise, abide, and cease simultaneously. They possess the fifth similarity, similarity of substance, because one primary mind can have only one mental factor feeling, one mental factor discrimination, one mental factor intention, and so forth. Similarly, one specific mental factor can be associated with only one primary mind. Sometimes we say that we have mixed feelings about something, and it may seem that in this case one primary mind has several feelings observing the same object, but this is impossible. Ordinary beings cannot have two different manifest minds observing one object at

the same time. What actually happens is that we have several primary minds, each with only one feeling. For example, if we have 'mixed feelings' about a house it can either be that at one time we like the house and at another time we dislike it, or that we simultaneously have two different minds relating to the house, each focusing on a different aspect of the house.

There are fifty-one mental factors, which are divided into six groups:

- 1 The five all-accompanying mental factors
- 2 The five object-ascertaining mental factors
- 3 The eleven virtuous mental factors
- 4 The six root delusions
- 5 The twenty secondary delusions
- 6 The four changeable mental factors

Each mental factor will now be explained under three headings: definition, function, and divisions. The first identifies the mental factor, the second shows the results of generating it, and the third deepens our understanding of it. Some of the fifty-one mental factors are quite similar, and so we need to study them carefully and discuss them with others until we have a clear generic image of each one. Although we develop these mental factors within our own mind, we still need to try to identify them precisely so that we know which ones to abandon and which ones to cultivate. Abandoning non-virtuous mental factors and cultivating virtuous ones is the essence of Dharma practice. Deluded mental factors are the cause of all negative actions and the source of all suffering and danger. By identifying them and eradicating them we solve all our problems. When I studied this subject in Tibet I was very young and, although I understood the subject intellectually, I did not fully appreciate how useful it is for training the mind. Now I understand this very clearly.

## *The Five All-accompanying Mental Factors*


The five all-accompanying mental factors are so called because they accompany every primary mind. If just one of them were missing, the primary mind would not be able to cognize its object. The five all-accompanying mental factors are:

- 1 Feeling
- 2 Discrimination
- 3 Intention
- 4 Contact
- 5 Attention

Feeling experiences an object as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral; discrimination functions to distinguish an object from other objects and thereby to identify it; intention enables the mind to move towards its object and become involved with it; contact perceives an object as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral and thereby serves as the basis for the development of feelings; and attention functions to focus the mind on a particular attribute of an object.

The need for all five of these mental factors to be present can be illustrated by considering a tongue consciousness tasting tea. Without the mental factor feeling, the tongue consciousness would not experience the taste of the tea as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. Without discrimination, it would not be able to distinguish the taste of the tea from other objects and so would not be able to recognize it. Without intention, an internal tongue consciousness could not become involved with the taste of the tea, which is an external object. Without contact, it could not perceive the taste of the tea as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral and so there would be no basis for developing pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral

# The Dharmas - Part I



## Fifty-one Mental Factors

### **Omnipresent factors (5) *kun 'gro***

Feeling	<i>tshor ba</i>	An entity of experience individually experiencing the fruitions of virtuous and non-virtuous actions. Its objects are pleasure, pain, and neutrality.
Discrimination	<i>'du shes</i>	Apprehends, upon the aggregation of an object, sense power, and a consciousness, the uncommon signs of an object.
Intention	<i>sems pa</i>	Moves and directs the mind that accompanies it to its object. It has the function of engaging the mind in the virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral. Intention is the most important of all mental factors because through its power minds and mental factors engage in objects.
Contact	<i>reg pa</i>	Distinguishes its object – upon the aggregation of object, sense power, and mind – as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral in accordance with subsequent feelings of pleasure, pain, or neutrality.
Mental engagement	<i>yid la byed pa</i>	Directs the mind accompanying it to a specific object of observation ( <i>dmigs pa</i> ). The difference between intention and mental engagement is that intention moves the mind to objects in general whereas mental engagement directs the mind to a specific object.

### **Determining factors (5) *yul nges***

Aspiration	<i>'dun pa</i>	Observes a contemplated phenomenon and seeks it.
Belief	<i>mos pa</i>	Holds an ascertained object to be just as it was ascertained. It has the function of keeping the mind from being captivated by another view.
Mindfulness	<i>dran pa</i>	Non-forgetfulness with respect to a familiar phenomenon. It has the function of causing non-distraction.
Stabilization	<i>ting nge 'dzin</i>	One-pointedness of mind with respect to an imputed object. It has the function of serving as the base of knowledge, that is, special insight.
Knowledge	<i>shes rab</i>	Knowledge or wisdom individually differentiates the faults and virtues of objects of analysis. It has the function of overcoming doubt.

### **Virtuous factors (11) *dge ba***

Faith	<i>dad pa</i>	Has the aspect of clarity, conviction, or a wish to attain with respect to the existent (such as actions and their effects), the possession of qualities (such as the Three Jewels), or powers (such as the powers of the path to actualize cessation).
Shame	<i>ngo tsha shes pa</i>	An avoidance of misconduct due to one's own disapproval. It has the function of restraining misconduct.
Embarrassment	<i>khrel yod pa</i>	An avoidance of misconduct due to others' disapproval. It has the function of restraining misconduct.
Non-attachment	<i>ma chags pa</i>	An emergence from and non-desire for cyclic existence and the articles of cyclic existence.
Non-hatred	<i>zhe sdang med pa</i>	A factor that, in observing either harmful sentient beings, sufferings, or sources of suffering, conquers the generation of hatred. It is an absence of the intent to harm.
Non-ignorance	<i>gti mug med pa</i>	A knowledge of individual analysis that can serve as an antidote to ignorance; it is either attained from birth through the fruition of actions in an earlier lifetime without depending on contributing causes in this lifetime or arises through application by way of hearing, thinking, or meditating.
Effort	<i>brtson 'grus</i>	A mental delight in virtue. It has the function of fulfilling and accomplishing virtues. Laziness is discordant with effort.
Pliancy	<i>shin tu sbyangs pa</i>	A serviceability of mind and body such that the mind can be set on a virtuous object of observation as long as one likes. It has the function of removing all obstructions.
Conscientiousness	<i>bag yod pa</i>	Conscientiousness keeps the mind from contaminations and causes the achievement of virtue while abiding in effort. It keeps the mind from coming under the influence of the afflictions.
Equanimity	<i>btang snyoms</i>	An evenness of mind, a dwelling in a neutral state, and a spontaneous abiding discordant with the afflictions.
Non-harmfulness	<i>rnam par mi 'tshe ba</i>	A compassionate attitude, included as part of non-hatred, which is patience devoid of intention to injure.

### **Root afflictions (6) *rtsa nyon***

Desire	<i>'dod chags</i>	Perceives an internal or external contaminated phenomenon to be pleasant from the point of view of its own entity and thereupon seeks it. It has the function of generating suffering.
Anger	<i>khong khro</i>	An intention to harm sentient beings, to harm sufferings in one's own continuum, or to harm phenomena that are sources of suffering (such as thorns).
Pride	<i>nga rgyal</i>	Pride depends on the view of the transitory collection as a real I and has the aspect of a puffing up of the mind upon observing one's own wealth, qualities, youth, and so forth.
Ignorance	<i>ma rig pa</i>	An absence of knowledge that involves obscuration with respect to the status of phenomena. Its principal antidote is the wisdom cognizing selflessness.
Doubt	<i>the tshom</i>	A two-pointedness of mind with respect to the four noble truths, actions and their effects, and so forth. It has the function of serving as a basis for non-engagement in virtues.
Afflicted view	<i>lta ba nyon mongs can</i>	There are five afflicted views: 1. View of the transitory collection, 2. View holding to an extreme, 3. Conception of a (bad) view as supreme, 4. Conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct as supreme, 5. Perverse view

### **Secondary afflictions (20) *nye nyon***

<b>Belligerence</b>	<i>khro ba</i>	An intention to harm another through striking and so forth when one is in any of the nine situations of harmful intent. It differs from the root affliction anger in that anger is an impatience and intent to harm that arises when a harmful sentient being, or one's own suffering, or sources of suffering appear to the mind.
<b>Resentment</b>	<i>'khon 'dzin</i>	A wish to harm or to answer harm, involving non-release of a continuum of anger. It has the function of serving as a basis for impatience.
<b>Concealment</b>	<i>'chab pa</i>	A wish, through the force of ignorance, to hide a fault when another person, such as a spiritual guide, points out that fault.
<b>Spite</b>	<i>'tshig pa</i>	A wish, through the force of belligerence and resentment, to speak harsh words out of ill-will to another who has pointed out a fault.
<b>Jealousy</b>	<i>phrag dog</i>	A disturbance of the mind from the depths that involves an inability to bear another's fortune due to being attached to goods and services. It involves hatred and has the function of causing discomfort of mind and not abiding in contact with happiness.
<b>Miserliness</b>	<i>ser sna</i>	A tight holding onto articles without letting them go through the power of attachment to goods and services.
<b>Deceit</b>	<i>sgyu</i>	A pretension of having good qualities, whereas one does not, through the force of strong attachment to goods and services.
<b>Dissimulation</b>	<i>g.yo</i>	A wish to hide one's faults from others through the force of desire for goods and services. Both dissimulation and deceit have the function of preventing the attainment of true preceptual instruction and cause one in this and future lifetimes not to meet with a Mahayana spiritual guide.
<b>Haughtiness</b>	<i>rgyags pa</i>	A puffing up of the mind through taking joy and comfort in observing one's own good health, youth, beauty, power, signs of long life, prosperity, and so forth.
<b>Harmfulness</b>	<i>rnam par 'tshe ba</i>	An unmerciful wish to harm other sentient beings. Involving anger, it is a lack of compassion as in wanting to harm or to cause others to harm, or in taking delight when seeing or hearing of harm to sentient beings.
<b>Non-shame</b>	<i>ngo tsha med pa</i>	A non-avoidance of faults from the viewpoint of one's own disapproval or of religious prohibition.
<b>Non-embarrassment</b>	<i>khrel med pa</i>	A non-avoidance of faults from the viewpoint of another's disapproval.
<b>Lethargy</b>	<i>rmugs pa</i>	A heaviness and unserviceability of body and mind.
<b>Excitement</b>	<i>rgod pa</i>	A scattering of the mind to attributes of the Desire Realm experienced previously and an engagement in them with attachment. Excitement is a non-peacefulness of mind that involves desirous engagement in the pleasant; it has the function of preventing calm abiding.
<b>Non-faith</b>	<i>ma dad pa</i>	Non-conviction, non-delight, and non-wishing with respect to virtuous phenomena. It involves ignorance and has the function of serving as a basis for laziness.
<b>Laziness</b>	<i>le lo</i>	A non-delight in virtue due to attachment to lying down and so forth.
<b>Non-conscientiousness</b>	<i>bag med pa</i>	Non-conscientiousness causes a looseness of mind, not keeping it from afflictions and faults and resulting in non-cultivation of virtuous phenomena.
<b>Forgetfulness</b>	<i>brjed nges pa</i>	An unclarity of mind and a forgetting of virtuous objects through mindfulness of objects of the afflictions.
<b>Non-introspection</b>	<i>shes bzhin ma yin pa</i>	An unknowing engagement in physical, verbal, and mental deeds. It has the function of serving as a basis for the infractions of codes of ethics.
<b>Distraction</b>	<i>rnam par g.yeng ba</i>	A scattering of the mind from its object of observation.
<b>Changeable factors (4) <i>gzhan 'gyur</i></b>		
<b>Sleep</b>	<i>gnyid</i>	A powerless withdrawal inside of the engagement by sense consciousnesses in objects. Sleep involves ignorance and has the function of serving as a basis for losing virtuous activities.
<b>Contrition</b>	<i>'gyod pa</i>	Remorse or regret for a deed done by oneself in accordance with one's own thought or upon pressure by someone else which one subsequently comes to dislike.
<b>Investigation</b>	<i>rtog pa</i>	An inquiry into the rough entities of objects as well as their names.
<b>Analysis</b>	<i>dpyod pa</i>	A fine discrimination of objects as well as their names.

but is not strong or stable; and if we later listen to incorrect instructions our understanding may change into doubt, or even into wrong awareness. Valid cognizers, on the other hand, know their object clearly and thoroughly with complete certainty. Even if we hear clever arguments that try to deny an object we know with a valid cognizer, we shall not develop any doubts and our valid cognizer will be unshaken. For these reasons we should strive to understand Dharma with valid cognizers.

### DELUDED VIEW

#### DEFINITION OF DELUDED VIEW

The definition of deluded view is a view that functions to obstruct the attainment of liberation.

In general there are three types of view: correct views, incorrect views, and neutral views. All deluded views are incorrect views. A correct view is a wisdom. A deluded view resembles a wisdom in that it discriminates its object thoroughly, but since its object does not exist it is not an actual wisdom.

#### DIVISIONS OF DELUDED VIEW

There are five types of deluded view:

- 1 View of the transitory collection
- 2 Extreme view
- 3 Holding false views as supreme
- 4 Holding wrong moral disciplines and conduct as supreme
- 5 Wrong view

Sometimes it is said that there are ten root delusions, the first five of the six root delusions being the 'five delusions that are non-views', and the five types of deluded view being the 'five deluded views'.

### VIEW OF THE TRANSITORY COLLECTION

#### DEFINITION OF VIEW OF THE TRANSITORY COLLECTION

The definition of view of the transitory collection is a type of self-grasping of persons that grasps one's own I as being an inherently existent I.

The view of the transitory collection is the root of samsara and the source of all delusions. In *Guide to the Middle Way* Chandrakirti says:

Wisdom sees that all delusions and all faults

Arise from the view of the transitory collection.

Because we grasp strongly at an inherently existent I we develop self-cherishing, attachment, anger, and all other delusions; and these cause us to engage in contaminated actions that in turn cause us to experience the sufferings of samsara. The view of the transitory collection pervades all delusions because it functions whenever a delusion is manifest. If we wish to escape from samsara we need to eradicate this view, but before we can do this we must learn to identify it. Even though the view of the transitory collection is always manifest in the minds of ordinary beings it is not easy to recognize at first.

To recognize the view of the transitory collection we need to understand the difference between its observed object and its conceived object. For example, in the case of mistaking a toy snake for a real snake the observed object is a toy snake and the conceived object is this toy snake as a real snake. Similarly, in the case of the view of the transitory collection the observed object is the conventionally existent I, which is the I that is merely imputed in dependence upon the aggregates, and the conceived object is this conventionally existent I as an inherently existent I. The observed object of the view of the transitory collection, the mere I, exists, but the conceived object, the inherently existent I, does not.


When we think of ourself we apprehend not an I that is merely imputed upon our aggregates but an I that appears

to be independent. For example, if we ask who is presently reading this book we do not think 'My body is reading this book', or 'My mind is reading this book'; we simply think 'I am reading this book', and this I appears to be independent of the body and mind. It is this independent I that is the conceived object of the view of the transitory collection, and that does not exist. Whatever exists does so in dependence upon other phenomena. The conventionally existent I, for example, exists in dependence upon the aggregates of body and mind. The conceived object of the view of the transitory collection, however, which is the I at which we habitually grasp and with which we usually identify, appears to be independent of the aggregates. Such an I could never exist.

What is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection, the conventionally existent I? Some non-Buddhist schools believe that the existent I is a permanent, indivisible entity that is a separate entity from the body and mind. Such a self is refuted by all Buddhist schools. Why is this? When our body is not healthy we say 'I am sick', and when our mind is not happy we say 'I am unhappy'; but if the I were a separate entity from the body and mind these statements would be nonsensical. If Peter becomes sick, John does not say 'I am sick', because John and Peter are separate entities. Similarly, if the I were a separate entity from the body and mind it would make no sense to say 'I am sick' just because our body was sick, or 'I am unhappy' just because our mind was unhappy.

Although no Buddhist school asserts an I that is a separate entity from the mental and physical aggregates, all the lower schools of Buddhism identify the I as existing somewhere within the aggregates. Some, such as the Vaibashikas and some Sauntanikas, assert that the collection of the five aggregates is the I, while other Sauntanikas identify the mental consciousness as the I. The Chittamatrins say that the I is the consciousness-basis-of-all, and the Madhyamika-Svatantrikas assert that it is the continuum of the subtle mental consciousness. However, according to the highest school of Buddhism, the Madhyamika-Prasangikas, all these assertions are incorrect.

*Shakyaprabha*



The Madhyamika-Prasangikas deny that the I can be found either within the aggregates or outside them. No matter how carefully we search among the mental and physical aggregates we shall never find the I. The I is just a label that is imputed in dependence upon the five aggregates. The collection of the five aggregates is the basis for imputing the I, but it is not the I itself. If we are satisfied with the I as the mere term or label 'I' that is imputed in dependence upon the aggregates we shall be able to establish an I that exists and functions (the conventionally existent I); but if we search for a real I that exists 'behind' the label we shall find nothing. It is very important to identify the view of the transitory collection from our own experience by identifying it within our own mind. At first the easiest way to do this is to cause the view of the transitory collection to manifest more strongly than usual by recalling or imagining situations in which we are falsely accused, afraid, praised, or embarrassed; and then to observe how the I appears at such times. We should direct most of our attention towards recreating or imagining the situation, but keep one part of our mind watching how the I appears. If we are not skilful and try to observe the I directly we shall probably fail. We need to practise watching the I out of the corner of our mind and try to catch a glimpse of it surreptitiously. This is an acquired skill that requires considerable practice. Eventually we shall see that the I is appearing independent of our body and mind. It seems as if our mind is 'this side' and the I is 'that side'. It is this independent I that is the conceived object of the view of the transitory collection.

By watching our mind in this way we shall gain a clear generic image of the inherently existent I. Even though this I does not exist we can nevertheless have a generic image of it. For example, unicorns do not exist but we can have an image of a unicorn in our mind. Once we are able to identify the view of the transitory collection operating in extreme circumstances, such as when we are afraid or embarrassed, we should then try to identify it in less extreme circumstances. For example, we can sit down to meditate and ask

ourselves 'Who is meditating?', and then try to observe the inherently existent I appearing as we think 'I am meditating.' It is very helpful to understand the etymology of the view of the transitory collection. According to the lower Buddhist school, the Sautrantika school, the view of the transitory collection is a deluded view that observes the aggregates and apprehends a self-supporting and substantially existent I. Thus, they say that the observed object of this view is the five aggregates. According to them it is the aggregates themselves that are the 'transitory collection'. They are 'transitory' because they are impermanent, and a 'collection' because there are several of them. Thus, they assert that the view of the transitory collection observes the aggregates and mistakenly apprehends a self-supporting substantially existent I within them.

According to the Madhyamika-Prasangika explanation the term 'transitory collection' refers not only to the aggregates themselves but also to the I that is imputed upon them. Buddha called the I a 'transitory collection' to counteract non-Buddhists such as the Samkhya who assert that the I is a permanent, indivisible, independent entity. The Samkhya say that the I is permanent because it is not destroyed at death. They believe that the I has existed since beginningless time and that in each life it takes on a different body and mind, rather as an actor puts on a different mask each time he appears on stage. Just as the actor changes appearance but remains essentially the same, so the I changes appearance from one life to the next but remains the same entity. The Samkhya believe that if the I were not permanent, and independent of the body and mind, there would be no rebirth because the I would cease when the body dies. Thus, they believe that the I of our previous life, which created the karma that caused this life, still exists; and will continue to exist forever. This indicates that they do not understand subtle impermanence. In reality we do not remain the same for one moment without changing, let alone for one life. Without the I of the previous moment ceasing, the I of the next moment could not arise. The I of one moment is the cause of the I of the next moment, and a cause and its effect cannot exist at

the same time. A sprout, for example, can develop only when its cause, the seed, disintegrates. It is precisely because the I disintegrates moment by moment that Buddha called the I 'transitory'. Since the I in one moment is a different entity from the I of the previous moment, it goes without saying that the I of one life is a different entity from the I of the previous life.

The Samkhyas also believe that the I is indivisible, or partless. They say that if it were not partless it could be broken down into its component parts and would therefore not be indestructible and immortal. All Buddhist schools deny this, and the Madhyamikas in particular refute such things as partless objects. It is easy to see that the body has parts, such as the limbs, the head, and the trunk. The mind also has parts, such as feelings, discriminations, experiences, knowledge, and appearances, as well as having past, present, and future moments. Similarly, persons or selves have parts. One person may be a teacher, a father, and a Dharma practitioner. These are all different parts of the same person. Similarly, one person has parts that look, listen, taste, feel, think, and so forth. If we are looking at a crowd of a hundred people, for example, we have a hundred parts, each observing a different person. We can also divide a person into the past, present, and future moments. From this we can see that each person has many parts, and so, rather than being a single indivisible entity, each person is the nature of a collection. It is for this reason that Buddha called the I a 'collection'.

From this explanation we can see that the term 'transitory collection' in the phrase 'view of the transitory collection' refers not only to the aggregates but also to the I. The view of the transitory collection, therefore, is a deluded view that observes the I, the transitory collection that is merely imputed in dependence upon the aggregates, and conceives it to be an inherently existent I.

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## DIVISIONS OF VIEW OF THE TRANSITORY COLLECTION

There are two types of view of the transitory collection:

- 1 View of the transitory collection conceiving I
- 2 View of the transitory collection conceiving mine

The first observes only the I within our continuum and conceives it to be inherently existent, and the second observes both the I and mine within our continuum and conceives mine to be inherently existent. It is important to identify the observed object of the latter view. The view of the transitory collection is necessarily a self-grasping of persons that conceives one's own I to be inherently existent, and it necessarily takes the I within one's own continuum as its observed object. The view of the transitory collection conceiving mine, therefore, must observe our own I and conceive it to be inherently existent. When we see the aspect of other things, such as our clothes or our body, we develop a sense of 'mine'. At such times we are observing our I as a possessor, as 'mine', and conceiving it to be inherently existent. Thus, 'mine' in this context refers not to the objects that are being held as mine, which is the normal use of the word, but to the subject who is being held as the possessor. If 'mine' referred to the objects, such as one's clothes or one's body, then the observed object would be a phenomenon other than persons, and the mind grasping them to be inherently existent would be a self-grasping of phenomena, not a self-grasping of persons. Even so, it is not incorrect to say that objects such as one's clothes or one's body are examples of mine.

There is another twofold division of view of the transitory collection:

- 1 Innate view of the transitory collection
- 2 Intellectually-formed view of the transitory collection

Both the view of the transitory collection conceiving I and the view of the transitory collection conceiving mine have innate and intellectually-formed types. We have had the innate view of the transitory collection since beginningless time. It arises naturally in our mind through the force of imprints, and it

is manifest in the minds of ordinary beings all the time, even during sleep. It is this innate view that is the root of samsara. Like the innate view, the intellectually-formed view of the transitory collection is also a mind that grasps at one's own I as being inherently existent, but whereas the innate view develops naturally through the force of the imprints of ignorance, the intellectually-formed view arises as a result of contemplating wrong reasons or receiving misleading teachings. We tend to fabricate such false views of the I because we are very accustomed to the innate view of the transitory collection. The innate view, therefore, is the source of all the intellectually-formed views.

In *Guide to the Middle Way* Chandrakirti lists twenty intellectually-formed views of the transitory collection, four in relation to each of the five aggregates:

- (1) The view holding our aggregate of form to be an inherently existent I
- (2) The view holding our aggregate of form to be possessed by an inherently existent I
- (3) The view holding our aggregate of form to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends
- (4) The view holding our aggregate of form to be dependent upon an inherently existent I
- (5) The view holding our aggregate of feeling to be an inherently existent I
- (6) The view holding our aggregate of feeling to be possessed by an inherently existent I
- (7) The view holding our aggregate of feeling to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends
- (8) The view holding our aggregate of feeling to be dependent upon an inherently existent I
- (9) The view holding our aggregate of discrimination to be an inherently existent I
- (10) The view holding our aggregate of discrimination to be possessed by an inherently existent I
- (11) The view holding our aggregate of discrimination to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends

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- (12) The view holding our aggregate of discrimination to be dependent upon an inherently existent I
  - (13) The view holding our aggregate of compositional factors to be an inherently existent I
  - (14) The view holding our aggregate of compositional factors to be possessed by an inherently existent I
  - (15) The view holding our aggregate of compositional factors to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends
  - (16) The view holding our aggregate of compositional factors to be dependent upon an inherently existent I
  - (17) The view holding our aggregate of consciousness to be an inherently existent I
  - (18) The view holding our aggregate of consciousness to be possessed by an inherently existent I
  - (19) The view holding our aggregate of consciousness to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends
  - (20) The view holding our aggregate of consciousness to be dependent upon an inherently existent I
- Our aggregate of form is not an inherently existent I, but the first view holds it to be so; an inherently existent I does not possess our aggregate of form, but the second view holds our aggregate of form to be possessed by an inherently existent I; an inherently existent I does not depend upon our aggregate of form, but the third view holds our aggregate of form to be the basis upon which an inherently existent I depends; our aggregate of form does not depend upon an inherently existent I, but the fourth view holds our aggregate of form to be dependent upon an inherently existent I. The remaining sixteen views can be understood in the same way.

#### HOW TO ABANDON THE VIEW OF THE TRANSITORY COLLECTION

First we need to identify correctly and precisely the view of the transitory collection in our own experience. Then we have

to realize that its conceived object, the inherently existent I, does not exist, and familiarize ourselves with this knowledge for a long time in meditation. Through progressing in this meditation, eventually we shall abandon this view completely.

If the inherently existent I existed we would be able to find it through investigation, but no matter how closely we investigate – whether we search within our aggregates of body and mind or elsewhere – we shall never find it. From this we can safely conclude that the inherently existent I does not exist. Where previously we perceived a vividly appearing I, we now perceive a vacuity, an emptiness. This emptiness is the non-existence of the inherently existent I. It is the ultimate nature of our I. By familiarizing ourselves with this absence, or non-existence, of the inherently existent I, we shall gradually reduce and eventually abandon altogether the view of the transitory collection grasping at such an I.

In *Commentary to Valid Cognition* Dharmakirti says:

Without its object being negated,  
Self-grasping cannot be abandoned.

This means that to abandon the view of the transitory collection we need to realize the non-existence of the inherently existent self. This is like removing the fear of a snake by realizing that there is no snake. However, we should not think that in negating the conceived object of the view of the transitory collection we are driving the inherently existent I out of existence, because such an I has never existed. In this case, negating the conceived object is simply realizing that something we previously held to exist does not in fact exist.

Suppose a child is named 'Buddha' by his parents. The child would grow up thinking 'I am Buddha', but when he discovered that Buddha was someone who was free from the two obstructions he would examine his body and mind and realize he was not an actual Buddha but just an ordinary person with the name 'Buddha'. Although he might continue to call himself 'Buddha', he would know that this was merely a name and that it did not imply that he was actually a Buddha. Our situation is similar in that we have always thought of

ourselves as I, and assumed that, corresponding to this name, there was a real I. Like the child we should now examine our body and mind to see if this assumption is correct. If we search for this I we shall not find it, either within our body and mind or outside our body and mind. Thus, we shall realize that 'I' is just a name. The truly existent I we expect to find 'behind' the name does not exist at all. Thus, although we may continue to refer to ourself as 'I', we can be certain that it is just a name and that it in no way implies an inherently existent I.

Buddha explained that there are two types of self-grasping: self-grasping of persons and self-grasping of phenomena. The former is any mind that conceives a self or person to be inherently existent, and the second is any mind that conceives phenomena other than persons to be inherently existent. As mentioned before, the view of the transitory collection is a type of self-grasping of persons. Self-grasping of persons has two types: grasping at our own self as inherently existent and grasping at other persons as inherently existent, and it is only the former that is the view of the transitory collection. Both types of self-grasping of persons are the same in that they grasp at an inherently existent self, but they differ in their observed object. The first observes the self within one's own continuum and conceives it to be inherently existent, and the second observes the self of others and conceives it to be inherently existent.

How does the view of the transitory collection arise? In *Precious Garland* Nagarjuna says:

For as long as there is grasping at the aggregates  
There is grasping at I.

This means that the view of the transitory collection grasping at an inherently existent I arises from grasping at our aggregates as inherently existent. When we observe our aggregates they appear as inherently existent, and we thereby develop a mind grasping at inherently existent aggregates. This is an instance of self-grasping of phenomena. In dependence upon grasping at our aggregates as inherently existent, we develop

a mind grasping at our I as inherently existent – the view of the transitory collection. This is an instance of self-grasping of persons. If we understand this we shall realize that to abandon the view of the transitory collection completely we must realize not only selflessness of persons but also selflessness of phenomena. For example, if a person walking through a field at dusk sees a piece of rope and mistakes it for a snake he will develop fear, but once he realizes that there is no snake his fear will subside. However, if he does not remove the piece of rope there will be a danger of making the same mistake again in the future. In the same way, in the darkness of our ignorance we observe our aggregates and mistakenly conceive an inherently existent I, and because we grasp at this I we experience all the fears and sufferings of samsara. To remove these fears and sufferings we need to remove grasping at an inherently existent I by realizing that the inherently existent I does not exist; but if we do not also remove grasping at the aggregates by realizing the emptiness of our aggregates there will be a danger of the view of the transitory collection arising again. Therefore, to attain liberation from samsara we need to realize both selflessness of persons and selflessness of phenomena.

In *Guide to the Middle Way* Chandrakirti says:

I bow down to that compassion for living beings  
Who from first conceiving 'I' with respect to the self,  
Then thinking 'This is mine' and generating  
attachment for things,

Are without self-control like the spinning of a well.

In this verse Chandrakirti shows how we can develop compassion for all living beings by contemplating how they are trapped in samsara by the two types of view of the transitory collection. Thus, from the view of the transitory collection conceiving I, sentient beings develop the view of the transitory collection conceiving mine. From this they develop a strong sense of 'my pleasure', 'my pain', and so forth; and in this way they develop attachment for the things that please them and hatred for the things that displease them. From these

develop all other delusions that cause them to create the karma to be reborn repeatedly in samsara. Once living beings take a samsaric rebirth they have to experience suffering without any choice, just as a bucket in a well swings uncontrollably from side to side and is thereby dented, scratched, and damaged. If we think deeply about this we shall develop renunciation for our own samsara and compassion for others. We shall see that to free ourself and others from the sufferings of samsara we must cut samsara at its root by eradicating the view of the transitory collection.

### EXTREME VIEW

#### DEFINITION OF EXTREME VIEW

The definition of extreme view is a deluded view that observes the I that is the conceived object of the view of the transitory collection and grasps it either as permanent or as completely ceasing at the time of death.

In general, there are two extremes: the extreme of existence (or the extreme of permanence) and the extreme of non-existence (or the extreme of nothingness); but neither exists because whatever exists is necessarily the middle way free from the two extremes. However, even though the two extremes do not exist, minds grasping at these extremes do. Extreme view is such a mind.


The extreme of existence is a falsely imagined mode of existence that is superimposed onto phenomena whereby phenomena are held to be more concrete than they actually are. For example, a mind grasping at an inherently existent I, or a mind grasping at a permanent I, is grasping at the extreme of existence, or the extreme of permanence. The extreme of non-existence is a falsely imagined non-existence of something that exists. For example, if we make an exhaustive analytical search for our I and fail to find it, we may wrongly conclude that the I does not exist at all. Such a mind conceiving the non-existence of the I is grasping at the extreme of non-existence,

or the extreme of nothingness. Although the I cannot be found under analysis, and therefore lacks inherent existence, it nevertheless exists conventionally. The I, therefore, is free from the extreme of existence in that it is not inherently existent, and free from the extreme of non-existence in that it is not completely non-existent. Moreover, the I is not a permanent unchanging entity that survives death unchanged, nor is it completely annihilated at death. Therefore, the I is free from the two extremes of permanence and nothingness, and so extreme view is mistaken.

To understand the view of the middle way we need sharp wisdom and clear and precise instructions. For example, we may understand that the body is not its parts, not the collection of its parts, and not separate from its parts; and from this conclude that the body is unfindable. However, to realize the emptiness of the body fully we must understand more than its unfindability. Through realizing the unfindability of the body we understand that the body is not inherently existent, and is therefore free from the extreme of existence; but to realize the emptiness of the body completely we must also understand how it is free from the extreme of non-existence by realizing that it is a mere imputation. Thus, even though the body lacks inherent existence and so cannot be found upon investigation, nevertheless it does exist conventionally. When we realize that there is no contradiction between the body being empty of inherent existence and the body existing conventionally, and when we understand how these two support each other, we shall have found the correct view of the middle way and then we shall have understood emptiness completely.

### HOLDING FALSE VIEWS AS SUPREME


**DEFINITION OF HOLDING FALSE VIEWS AS SUPREME**  
The definition of holding false views as supreme is a deluded view that holds a false view to be correct and superior to other views.



GESHE KELSANG GYATSO

# Understanding the Mind

LORIG  
AN EXPLANATION OF THE  
NATURE AND FUNCTIONS  
OF THE MIND



CHANDRAKĪRTI'S SEVEN FOLD REASONING  
MEDITATION ON THE SELFLESSNESS  
OF PERSONS

When analyzed it must exist either as the same entity as its bases of imputation or as a different entity from them.<sup>57</sup> These two positions cover all possibilities.

Nāgārjuna, in the twenty-second chapter of his *Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom"*, adds one more position to the above four:<sup>58</sup>

The Tathāgata is not the aggregates ; nor is he other than the aggregates.

The aggregates are not in him nor is he in them.

The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates.

What Tathāgata is there ?

As explained above, the conception of a self which is a different entity from the aggregates which are its bases of imputation is only artificial. In particular, this new position of unrelated difference is said not to arise except in the non-Buddhist philosophical systems.<sup>59</sup>

Chandrakīrti expands the fivefold reasoning to seven with the addition of refutations of the positions that a self is the mere collection of the aggregates which are its bases of imputation or is the shape of the form aggregates. The position that the self is not the mere collection of the aggregates is a refutation of the position held by the Sātanrikas and others that the mental consciousness, i.e., the continuum or collection of moments of the mental consciousness, is the self which takes rebirth. The position that the self is not the shape of the form aggregates is said by both Jang-kyā and Jam-yang-shay-ba to be a refutation of a position held by other Buddhist tenet systems.<sup>60</sup>

by  
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The Sevenfold Reasoning has nine essentials, or stages, in its practice. The first two must be done before the others, but the remaining seven may be done in any order that seems appropriate. In brief they are :

- (1) the essential of ascertaining the object to be negated\*,
- (2) the essential of ascertaining the pervasion\*,

- (3) the essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not the same as its bases of imputation\*,
- (4) the essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not different from its bases of imputation,
- (5) the essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not dependent on its bases of imputation,
- (6) the essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not the support upon which its bases of imputation are dependent,
- (7) the essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed does not possess its bases of imputation,
- (8) the essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not the mere collection of its bases of imputation,
- (9) the essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not the shape of its bases of imputation.

There is an implicit tenth essential which follows from the practice of the other nine, that of realizing the non-inherent existence of the phenomenon imputed.

In the case of the conventionally existent self, or mere-I, and the aggregates of its own continuum, the mere-I is the phenomenon imputed and the aggregates are its bases of imputation. In the case of the example which illustrates the Sevenfold Reasoning, the chariot is the phenomenon imputed and its parts are the bases of imputation.

### **1. The Essential of Ascertaining the Object to be Negated**

The Sevenfold Reasoning is an ultimate analysis. An ultimate analysis is of the reality of phenomena, the way they actually exist. The crux of any ultimate analysis is that phenomena appear to exist inherently but in reality do not. Thus, when phenomena are searched for with a mind which applies strict criteria of eligibility for this kind of existence, they cannot be found. What is being sought in ultimate analysis is a way for a phenomenon to exist inherently through meeting the criteria which are being set for it. These criteria are not intricate and difficult to understand logical traps; on

the whole, they involve merely the application of simple standards of logical consistency.

In order to search for an inherently existent phenomenon, it is necessary for a yogi to know what it is for which he is searching. It is said that everything that is seen in normal perception both appears to the subject to be inherently existent and is habitually affirmed by him to be so. (The latter is the innate conception of inherent existence.) In order for a yogi to work successfully against his conception of inherent existence, it is necessary for him first to cultivate the sense which he has of it so that he is fully aware of it. This implies a willful engagement in the appearance and conception of inherent existence; however, it is only in relation to some other possibility (*i.e.*, nominal existence) that the object of negation can become obvious.

Therefore, sometimes a yogi first cultivates an understanding of nominal existence. Tsong-ka-pa says:<sup>61</sup>

If you understand the way in which phenomena are established in this system, *i.e.*, merely by power of thought, then you will easily understand the conception which is the opposite of that, the conception of true existence.

The way in which phenomena are established merely through the power of thought is like the way in which a snake is imputed to a rope. Just as there is no snake which can be found among the parts of the rope, or as the collection of the parts of a rope, so with an I which is imputed to the aggregates or a chariot imputed to its parts. Neither the aggregates taken separately, nor the continuum of former and later moments of the aggregates, nor the collection of the aggregates are to be taken as an example of an I. The I exists merely imputed in dependence on the aggregates of his own continuum.<sup>62</sup>

The fifth Dalai Lama presents an explanation of the way in which the object of negation is to be ascertained in his *Sacred*

*Word of Mañjuśri:*<sup>63</sup>

Sometimes the I seems to be related with the body. Sometimes it seems to be related with the mind. Sometimes it seems to be related with the other individual aggregates (*i.e.*, feelings, discriminations and compositional factors). At the end of the arising of such a variety of appearance, we come to identify an I which exists in its own right, which exists inherently, which from the start is self-established, as if undifferentiated from the mind and body which are (also) mixed like milk and water.

This is the first essential, the ascertainment of the object which is negated in the theory of selflessness. We should analyze until deep experience of it arises. Having generated such in the mental continuum, we crystallize an identification of the I conceived by the innate conceiver of an I as a self-established (phenomenon). This I has a relation with one's own aggregates like that of water put into water.

This is the sense that there is an I which is self-established and which is blended with the aggregates which are its bases of imputation. The yogi can identify this feeling when he is accused wrongly of doing some misdeed. Another instance of it is the vivid feeling of an I which comes about when walking in the dark and becoming frightened by bumping into an unknown object. If, at the time he is meditating, the yogi has no vivid sense of an I, he can fabricate one by recalling such incidents where the sense of I was strong.

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There is a grosser feeling of substantial existence which is technically called the conception of self-sufficient or substantial existence. The subtle feeling discussed above nurtures this feeling. The conception of self-sufficient or substantial existence is the conception of a self which does not possess a character which accords with the character of the mental and physical aggregates; on this occasion the yogi would feel that he himself is there without depending on the aggregates. This

mode of conception can only arise with the person as an object. There is never an innate feeling of a chariot, for instance, which does not depend on the parts of the chariot which are its bases of imputation. The yogi nurtures this feeling of inherent existence both in the actual meditative session and in everyday pursuits until it becomes evident and even until it seems like the most plausible way for phenomena to exist. Without a strong feeling for this kind of thing-ness of phenomena, there can be no understanding of what it means for phenomena to be without such a quality. The lack of this inherent existence is their emptiness and the cognition of that emptiness is the purpose of this meditation.

## 2. The Essential of Ascertaining the Pervasion

At this point it is necessary to set up this series of meditations as a logical operation. In the Sevenfold Reasoning there are two logical subjects, a chariot, given as an example, and a person. Actually any phenomenon can be the subject, but it is normal to start with the person and an example such as a chariot and later apply the reasonings to other phenomena.

Stated in the form of a consequence\*, the Sevenfold Reasoning becomes:

Concerning the subject, a person, it follows that it is not inherently existent because it does not exist in any of these seven ways.

“These seven ways” are the seven ways of existence which are analyzed in the third through the ninth essentials. They are all ways in which a phenomenon could be seen to be inherently existent.

The pervasion\* that must be ascertained here is:

Whatever does not exist in any of these seven ways is necessarily non-inherently existent (*i.e.*, not inherently existent).

This means that any phenomenon which cannot be found to exist in one of these seven ways must not be inherently existent. Put another way, it means

that if a phenomenon were inherently existent, it would have to exist in one of these seven ways.

The yogi must ascertain, with conviction, that if there is a phenomenon that exists the way in which it appears to him to exist, it must exist in one of these seven ways; he must be convinced that all possibilities of inherent existence in this context (*i.e.*, looking at the phenomenon imputed and its bases of imputation) are subsumed in these seven options.

It is enough, here, to consider the first two reasonings, that the self is not the same as the aggregates and that the self is not different from the aggregates. If any two phenomena are taken as examples, it can be seen easily that there are but these two options. Either the first is the same phenomenon as the second, or it is different. There is no third possibility. The entire universe can be divided into some one particular phenomenon and everything else in the universe.

These two options cover every possibility for inherent existence. Either a chariot is inherently, naturally the same entity as its parts or it is in itself a different entity from them. Likewise, the self must either be one entity with the mental and physical aggregates or it must be a different entity. There can be no third possibility.

The remaining five aspects of the Sevenfold Reasoning are elaborations on either one or the other of these or both. They are included for the sake of letting the mind become thoroughly imbued with a sense of the unfindability of an inherently existent phenomenon.

The positions that the phenomenon imputed is not its bases of imputation and that the phenomenon imputed is not different from its bases of imputation are sufficient for a logical proof of the thesis that the phenomenon imputed has no inherent existence. However, the innate false view of a transitory collection is not logical; it does not analyze and determine that there is a relationship of sameness or difference.<sup>64</sup> Such an analysis is a function of an ultimate

analysis such as the Sevenfold Reasoning. Thus it is said that the seven aspects of the Sevenfold Reasoning are presented with a view towards the mode of operation of the false view of a transitory collection.<sup>65</sup>

### 3. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed is not the Same as its Bases of Imputation.

'Phenomenon imputed' and 'bases of imputation' is technical language for, in the example, a chariot and its parts. When an axle, two wheels, a body of a certain shape and so on arranged in a certain way are seen or thought of, immediately an image arises which is all ready to be called 'chariot'. It may be that only some of the parts are necessary for the thought "chariot", but whatever provides the necessary stimulus is the basis of imputation.

So, in more concrete language, this is the essential of realizing that the chariot is not the same as its parts or that the person is not the same as the mental and physical aggregates which are its bases of imputation. The way to realize this is first to produce the strong feeling that a person and its bases of imputation, the aggregates, are inherently one thing, that a person is there, appearing as if inseparably mixed with the aggregates or with some aggregate or aggregates that seem particularly important. Since this feeling has been cultivated in the first essential, it should come easily now.

Then the yogi thinks that if the person and the aggregates were the same, certain faults would arise. For example, if the person and the aggregates were naturally one entity, it would be absurd to assert a person or self, since person or self would merely be synonyms of aggregates or of one of the aggregates. (Then the yogi might think that this was indeed true, that the self is the mental consciousness, for instance. In this case he could apply analysis again and ask himself whether mental consciousness is not just a synonym of person. Or, he could ask himself whether the present moment of the mental consciousness is the self or the next moment, etc. Since there is only one self, there could not be a plurality of moments.)

Moreover, if the person and the aggregates were naturally one entity, then, just as there are many aggregates, there would have to be many selves. The yogi could ask himself which self should eat : should he let some go hungry and just feed one, or should he eat many meals ? This may sound ridiculous, but it is necessary to challenge some of the suppositions of ordinary thought just because ordinary thought is so imbedded in the conception of inherent existence. If the yogi can find himself a situation in which it would really make a difference to him that there were many persons (in his own continuum) and he sees this as a consequence of the way he views things, this reasoning will have an impact on him and start to break down his sense of the person as being inseparably mixed with the aggregates.

Another technique would be for him mentally to separate his aggregates, or even just the parts of his body, one from another and then visualize each one as being the person, as what he holds to be himself. At some point, if he searches long and hard enough for some unity among these, he will be faced with the inability to find a self like the self that originally appeared to him. At that point he has a cognition of an emptiness of the person's being the same as the aggregates.

Another fault which would arise if the person and the aggregates were naturally the same is that, since the aggregates have the attributes of production and disintegration, the person would have the attributes of production and disintegration also.<sup>66</sup> If this production and disintegration were only nominal (*i.e.*, conventionally existent), there would be no problem. However, if they were production and disintegration which naturally exist, several faults would follow, since being production and disintegration of this sort are characterized as complete cessation. Although the mind does not ordinarily enter into these distinctions, this is not some kind of complicated philosophical definition ; it is a consequence of the way that a mind dominated by the apprehension of inherent existence perceives these to be.

If the person had inherently existent production and disintegration, then it would be inherently different from the other persons in its own continuum. Since inherent difference means unrelated difference, the person of this life would then be unrelated to the persons of past lives and future lives. Chandraikirti says :<sup>67</sup>

The phenomena which are based on Maitreya and Upagupta  
Are different and thus not included within one continuum.  
Whatever are naturally separate  
Are not suitable to be included within one continuum.

Jang-kya mentions three faults that would arise from the unrelated difference of past and future lives in the same continuum : (1) it would be impossible to remember past lives, (2) actions done would be wasted, and (3) one would meet with the results of actions that one had not done.<sup>68</sup>

The remembrance of former lives is commonplace in the philosophical literature of India and Tibet. The ability to recall past lives, moreover, is not limited to Buddhas and advanced Bodhisattvas but is a power that can be attained by any yogi if he applies himself in meditation. Thus, the impossibility of remembering former lives contradicts an experience that is, or can be, common to yogis.

If the person were inherently produced at birth and inherently disintegrated at death then it would be inappropriate to speak of former and later lives in the continuum of that person. For, that person's continuum would only endure for one lifetime. It would follow from this that the predispositions\* which are the results of actions done would only be effective within the life in which they were produced. Thus, any merit done for the sake of attaining Buddhahood in the future, for example, would be completely destroyed at death and would thus be wasted. Similarly, birth in favourable circumstances, or in one of the hells, or in whatever circumstances,

stances obtain, would not be the result of actions done in past lives by a person in the same continuum as the subject.

#### 4. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is Not Inherently Different from its Bases of Imputation

This is the essential of realizing that the person is not a different entity from the aggregates which are its bases of imputation. There is no innate form of the conception of a self which corresponds to this. There is an artificial form of the conception of a self of persons which conceives its object to be different from its bases of imputation. Further, there is an innate form of the conception of self-sufficient or substantial existence which is similar to this conception : it differs in that it conceives the person as having merely a different character from the aggregates, not as being a different entity from them.

The object of negation proper of the Sevenfold Analysis is the inherent existence of a person. This is the object of negation which is what is non-existent in the theory of selflessness. There is also an existent object of negation of the Sevenfold Reasoning ; it is the innate conception of an inherently existent person. It exists because it is a consciousness. The innate conception is necessary in order to have the artificial conception —when it is destroyed, the artificial conception is also destroyed. Conversely, it is a principle of Tsong-ka-pa's that when an analysis is done following the artificial mode of conception of true existence, this analysis serves as a branch of refuting the innate form.<sup>69</sup> The reason is that the artificial forms represent possible forms of the mode of existence of the I and the aggregates if the I inherently existed.

In order to practice the fourth essential (or, in the enumeration of seven aspects, the second aspect), the yogi first generates a strong sense of an inherently existent person ; this is the first of the nine essentials, that of ascertaining the object to be negated. Then he clears away any sense of the aggregates in his mind and determines whether or not he has such a feeling of "I" left over. If the sense of an I persists, he then must decide whether it is sensible to have this feeling or

not. In order to do this, he applies the second aspect of the Sevenfold Analysis.

If the person and the aggregates which are his bases of imputation are inherently different, then, since they are also simultaneous, they must be unrelatedly different.<sup>70</sup> For two phenomena to be inextricably related they cannot be both simultaneous and different entities. If a person and the aggregates which are his bases of imputation are unrelatedly different, a number of faults accrue :

(1) The person would not have the characteristics of the aggregates in question. Here, characteristics refers to production, cessation and abiding—attributes shared by all impermanent phenomena. In the gross sense of production and cessation this would lead to the absurdity that the person would not be born and would not die.

(2) In the subtle sense of production and cessation this would mean that the person would have to be a permanent phenomenon, a non-product. It would then follow that it would not be suitable to impute the person to the aggregates. The person would be changeless, whereas its bases of imputation would be in constant disintegration and change.

(3) Furthermore, if the person were inherently different from the aggregates which are its bases of imputation, it would have to be apprehendable separate from them. A self which had a different character from the aggregates would have to be apprehendable without the apprehension of the aggregates just as the aggregates, which all have different characters, can all be apprehended separately. Such a self would not be able to know, experience and so on as the aggregates do or, if it did, its knowledge and the knowledge of the mental aggregates which are its bases of imputation would be unrelated.

The yogi applies this analysis and determines whether or not the conception of a person is appropriate in these circum-

stances. If he has had a firm experience of the unfindability of a person which is the same as its aggregates, then, if he moves on to this essential and refutes inherent difference, he may be able to realize an emptiness of the person. However, the mind is so thoroughly accustomed to conceiving inherent existence that the yogi would really have to apply himself and will probably have to move on to the other essentials in order to work effectively against the whole spectrum of modes of conception towards which the false view of a transitory collection has tendencies.

Thus, the remaining five reasonings are for the sake of driving home the meaning of no inherent existence and making it a living fact for the yogi.

#### **5. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is Not Dependent on its Bases of Imputation**

This is the third aspect of the Sevenfold Reasoning, that the person is not inherently dependent on the aggregates which are its bases of imputation. Here the simile is used that the self and the aggregates appear to be like a lion in a forest. The aggregates are more extensive than the self which appears to be somewhere within them, but not one of them. This is a branch of the fourth essential, that the self and the aggregates are not different, but with an emphasis on the aggregates as not being the base of the self. The same reasoning that applies in the fourth essential applies here.

#### **6. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is Not the Support upon which its Bases of Imputation are Dependent**

This is a refutation of the sense that the aggregates are dependent on the person. The conception of the person and the aggregates in this case is said to be like a forest in snow, where the aggregates are the forest and the person is the snow pervading the forest and surrounding it. Put another way, the self is like a bowl in which, like yogurt, are the aggregates. Again this is a branch of the fourth essential, this time with the

self not being the base of the aggregates. The reasoning which was effective in that essential can be applied here also.

#### **7. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Does Not Possess its Bases of Imputation**

There are two ways in which it is possible to possess something. One is like someone possessing a cow, in which case the possession is of a different entity; the other is like someone possessing his own head, in which case the possessor and the thing possessed are the same entity.

If the yogi feels that he possesses his aggregates in the manner of someone possessing his own head, then he can ask himself just what it is that is performing the action of possessing. No matter what aggregate or set of aggregates the self is identified as here, they or it will have to possess themselves. For instance, if the self is felt to be the mental consciousness, then, since the mental consciousness is also one of the aggregates, there would be a mental consciousness which, as the self, possesses the mental consciousness—that same particular mental consciousness, no other. That is to say, there would be two mental consciousnesses. (This is tantamount to saying that one person would have two heads; one being the head that he is, the other the head that he possesses.)

This reasoning is also applicable in the third essential, where the object imputed and the bases of imputation are seen to not be the same entity. Likewise, this part of the seventh essential is a branch of the third essential and the reasoning laid out for that essential is also applicable here.

If a person possessed his head, on the other hand, as if possessing a cow, then it would have to be shown that this person was a different entity from his head. The reasonings outlined in the explanation of the fourth essential refute this.

#### **8. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is Not the Mere Collection of its Bases of Imputation**

The "mere collection" is just the unarranged collection of

all the bases of imputation. For example, to assert that a chariot is the mere collection of its parts would be like saying that a pile of an axle and two wheels and so on would be a chariot and could take you on a journey.

In Prāsaṅgika the collection of the aggregates is the correct basis for the imputation of a person. However, the collection of the aggregates cannot be correctly considered to be either the same as or inherently different from the aggregates. If they were the same, then either (1) just as there are many aggregates there would be many collections or (2) just as there is only one collection there would be only one aggregate. If they were naturally different, then the collection would have a different character from the aggregates, a position refuted in the fourth essential.<sup>71</sup>

The mere collection cannot be the person because it is incorrect to assert that a phenomenon imputed is the same as its bases of imputation. This is one of the unique features of Prāsaṅgika; in Śvātantrika-Mādhyamika, for example, the person is a mental consciousness, *i.e.*, it is its own basis of imputation.

Jang-kya says that this point is difficult to understand. He gives as authority for its veracity a quotation from a Sūtra:<sup>72</sup>

Just as a chariot is spoken of  
In dependence on its parts,  
So, in dependence on the aggregates,  
There is the convention 'sentient being'.

This is interpreted in Prāsaṅgika as meaning that the person is not the aggregates.<sup>73</sup>

Furthermore, if the person were the mere collection of the aggregates of its own continuum, the fault would follow that agent and object of action would be one. In Buddhist terminology, the aggregates are appropriated at the time of rebirth by the person; the person is their appropriator. The person is said to "take up" a new collection of aggregates. If the person

were the same as the collection of the aggregates, it would follow that the person appropriated itself at the time of rebirth and this is clearly absurd.

This essential is a branch of the third (that the person and the aggregates are not the same) with the reservation that at the time of doing the third essential the yogi would not be considering the collection of aggregates but only the aggregates themselves.

#### 9. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is Not the Shape of its Bases of Imputation

The feeling that someone is identical with his shape is very common. When a certain person walks into the room he is recognized primarily through his physical appearance. Here the yogi has only to think that shape is merely physical, whereas the aggregates are both mental and physical. If the self really were just the shape of the aggregates, then it would not be possible to know anything, and so on. Further, if the person were both the shape of his body and his consciousness, there would be two persons.

The reasonings shown here to illustrate these nine essentials are mainly those which could be used when meditating on the person and the aggregates. Some of the reasonings which refute the inherent existence of a chariot, *i.e.*, which refute the inherent existence of phenomena other than persons, are different. The most obvious example of this is in the case of the ninth essential where the reasoning given, that the bases of imputation include both mind and body, applies only to sentient beings; the bases of imputation of a chariot do not include any non-physical phenomena. In the case of a chariot the reasoning would be that if a chariot were the shape of its parts, then a model of a chariot could be a chariot.

It is not necessary for a yogi to do all the reasonings or to expend the same amount of energy on each. He need only meditate on those essentials which are helpful in getting rid of the modes of wrong conception of the person and the

aggregates which are important to him and then, within those, he need meditate only on the arguments that are effective. However, he would have to do at least the first two reasonings, that the self and the aggregates are neither the same nor different, in order to establish the necessary pervasion.

It is important for the yogi to spend some time, in the beginning, becoming familiar with the various reasonings. This is why the example of the chariot is given. Sometimes it is easier to see the arguments as they are set up for a simple phenomenon such as this than to work solely with the person.

Then, when fluency is gained with the reasonings and the pervasion has been ascertained, the yogi can ascertain the lack of an inherently existent self through using the reasonings that are effective for him.

Although it may seem as if the yogi would be repeating arguments to himself forever when he uses the Sevenfold Reasoning, this is not the case. The nine essentials are to be thoroughly practiced until the point comes where the non-existence of a self such as was identified in the first essential is recognized.

The first valid cognition of emptiness that the yogi has is called an inferential cognition of emptiness. Inferential here means that it is a cognition based on realizing the pervasion of certain reasons (the Sevenfold Reasoning) by a certain predicate (non-existence of an inherently existent Self), not one in which the whole logical structure of the meditation has to be kept consciously alive once the inference has been generated. An inferential cognition of a lack of inherent existence can be tested by turning the attention of the mind to some other object; if a cognition of the emptiness of inherent existence of that object is generated without dependence on any further reasoning, then the yogi knows he has a valid cognition of emptiness.

Once the yogi has cognized emptiness by means of the Sevenfold Analysis, he has begun to destroy the false view of a

transitory collection which conceives an I. There are no special reasonings which attack the conception of mine. Nāgārjuna says:<sup>74</sup>

When there is no self,

How could there be mine?

Chandrakīrti says in the *Supplement* (VI: 165ab):<sup>75</sup>

Because there is no object without an agent,

There is no mine without a self.

The same analytical consciousness which realizes the emptiness of a person can realize the emptiness of mine merely by turning to it. No new reasons are needed because without an I (an owner), the mine (the owned) is impossible.

When the yogi has cognized and has become thoroughly accustomed to the emptiness of both I and mine, he has destroyed the false view of a transitory collection in both its innate modes. Having done that, he is liberated from cyclic existence. At this point it is only his compassion that keeps the yogi in the world.<sup>76</sup>

## *Refuting a Self of Persons by Way of the Sevenfold Reasoning*

	<b>SELF</b>	<b>CHARIOT</b>
	<b>Refutation</b>	<b>Refutation</b>
1.	<p><i>If the self was inherently one with the aggregates, it follows that:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ There would be many selves. Or, there would be only one aggregate.</li> <li>➤ The self would be substantially existent.</li> <li>➤ The view of the transitory collection would not be a wrong awareness because its referent object—a substantially existent self—would exist. Also, the view of the transitory collection would be abandoned through only abandoning the desirous attachment that observes it.</li> <li>➤ Memory of past lives would be impossible.</li> <li>➤ At the time of attaining a nirvana without remainder, the continuum of the self would be cut and this would be a view of annihilation.</li> <li>➤ The self would have production and disintegration.</li> <li>➤ The appropriated would be the appropriator, and *asserting a self would be senseless.</li> <li>➤ Former and later moments would be inherently existent and thus unrelated, so there would not be a relationship between actions and results, one would meet with the results of actions not performed by oneself, and actions done would be wasted. Also, one would be reborn without dying.</li> </ul>	<p><i>*If a chariot was inherently one with its parts, it follows that:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Just as there are many parts, so there also would be many chariots.</li> <li>➤ Just as a chariot is one, so the parts also would be one.</li> <li>➤ Agent and that acted upon (object) would be one, etc.</li> </ul>
2.	<p><i>If the self was inherently different from the aggregates, it follows that:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ The two would be different entities and unrelatedly other. The self would be apprehendable separately from the aggregates but it is not.</li> <li>➤ The self would not have the characteristics of the aggregates. Also, even without observing a self that is a different entity from the aggregates, there is a strong adherence to the view of a self.</li> </ul>	<p><i>*If a chariot is not inherently different from its parts, it follows that:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ The two would be different entities and unrelatedly other. A chariot would be apprehendable separately from its parts but it is not.</li> </ul>
3.	<p><i>If the self inherently depended on the aggregates, it follows that:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ The self and the aggregates would be inherently different and thus different entities, which was refuted in #2 above.</li> </ul>	<p><i>*If a chariot inherently depended on its parts, it follows that:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ A chariot does not inherently depend on its parts.</li> <li>➤ A chariot and its parts would be inherently different and thus different entities, which was refuted in #2 above.</li> </ul>

Note: The source for the asterisked items (\*), which are supplemental to our text, is Hopkins' *Emptiness Yoga*.


4.	The aggregates do not inherently depend on the self.	If the aggregates inherently depended on the self, it follows that: ➤ The self and the aggregates would be inherently different and thus different entities, which was refuted in #2 above.	The parts do not inherently depend on a chariot.	*If the parts inherently depended on a chariot, it follows that: ➤ A chariot and its parts would be inherently different and thus different entities, which was refuted in #2 above.
5.	The self is not an inherently existent possessor of the aggregates.	Because the self and the aggregates are neither inherently existent one nor inherently existent different, the self cannot inherently exist, and thus it cannot be the inherently existent possessor of the aggregates.	A chariot is not an inherently existent possessor of its parts.	*If a chariot inherently possessed its parts in the same way that Devadatta possesses an ox – The two would be inherently established as different entities, which is refuted in #2 above. *If a chariot inherently possessed its part in the same way that Devadatta possesses ears – The two would be inherently established as one entity, which is refuted in #1 above.
6.	The self is not the collection of the aggregates.	Sutra teaches that the sentient being is imputed in dependence on the collection of the aggregates. If the self was the collection of the aggregates, it follows that: ➤ Agent and that acted upon would be one. ➤ Buddha taught that the self is a protector, a subduer, and a witness; however, according to lower schools the collection of aggregates cannot be a protector, etc. because the collection is not a substantial existent.	A chariot is not the mere collection of its parts.	If a chariot was the collection of the parts, it follows that: ➤ If a chariot is dismantled, a chariot would exist in that mere collection of pieces. ➤ Since the possessor of the parts—a chariot—does not exist when dismantled, then the parts would also not exist.
7.	The self is not the shape of the aggregates.	If the self was the shape of the aggregates, it follow that: ➤ The self could not be posited in dependence upon mind and so forth because shape exists only with regard to form.	A chariot is not the shape of the parts.	If a chariot was the shape of the individual parts: ➤ If the shape of the parts was the same both prior to assembly and after assembly – Just as there was no chariot prior to assembly, similarly there is no chariot when the parts are assembled because the shape of the parts does not change in the process of assembly. ➤ If the shape of the parts changed upon assembly – Then we should be able to apprehend the newly emerged shapes with our eye consciousness; however, we cannot. If a chariot was the shape of the collection of parts: ➤ Then the shape must be imputed on the collection of parts, which is an imputed existent. However, this contradicts your tenet that a basis of imputation must be a substantial existent. Therefore, it follows that the collection of parts cannot be the basis for imputing the shape of a chariot, so the shape of the parts would not have a basis of imputation; thus the shape of the collection of parts cannot be a chariot.

Note: The source for the asterisked items (\*), which are supplemental to our text, is Hopkins' *Emptiness Yoga*.

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