

TREASURY *of* PRECIOUS QUALITIES

The Rain of Joy

by JIGME LINGPA

WITH *The Quintessence of the Three Paths*
A Commentary by Longchen Yeshe Dorje, Kangyur Rinpoche

BOOK ONE

Translated by the Padmakara Translation Group
Forewords by H. H. the Dalai Lama
and Jigme Khyentse Rinpoche



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- 221 “The practice of shamatha renders the mind immovable and impervious to the wind of thoughts. It is, however, unable to uproot defilements. It is vipashyana that eradicates the obscurations of ignorance and the belief in self. The Shravakas have more concentration than wisdom, whereas the Bodhisattvas have more wisdom than concentration. By contrast, the Tathagatas have both in equal measure.” [YG II, 410]
- 222 “When mastery is gained in this meditation, in which all ‘nonexistent’ phenomena of relative truth appear as an illusion, practitioners acquire the power in post-meditation to produce magical apparitions according to their wish. For this reason, they are said to possess ‘miragelike concentration’ (*sgyu ma lta bu’i ting nge ’dzin*). When their concentration is perfect and able to overcome all adversity, and when it is accompanied by all the elements leading to enlightenment and displays the vast activities of buddhahood and is, in addition, immune to the fear of falling into a nirvana without remainder, it is called ‘fearless or heroic concentration’ (*dpa’ bar ’gro ba’i ting nge ’dzin*). . . . Finally, they attain the ‘diamondlike concentration’ (*rdo rje lta bu’i ting nge ’dzin*), so called because it is able to vanquish all obscurations, just as a diamond can break all other stones. The first concentration is experienced while the Bodhisattva is on the first to the seventh (i.e., the impure) grounds. The second concentration occurs while the Bodhisattva is on the pure grounds, i.e., the eighth to the tenth. Only at the end of the tenth ground is the third concentration attained.” [YG II, 413]
- 223 This complex subject is discussed at length in the *Prajnaparamita sutras*. The distinction between “percept-thought” and “perceiver-thought” may perhaps be compared with the distinction made by Bertrand Russell between “sense-data” and sensation. See *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 4.
- 224 “The four reliances are as follows:
1. Knowledge of the Dharma comes from following a spiritual friend. However, the object of reliance is not the person of the teacher but the doctrine that he or she expounds. One should follow a teacher only after examining what he or she says.
 2. Since the teaching is to be implemented, one should rely on its meaning, not on its mode of expression.
 3. The meaning has two aspects: expedient and definitive. One must rely on the definitive meaning, and though one follows the expedient teaching for the time being, one should always do so with a view to the definitive meaning.
 4. The definitive meaning is comprehended by the mind. However, since intellectual assessment, however excellent, does not extend beyond the relative truth, it should not be relied upon. Reliance should be placed in thought-free wisdom that sees the absolute truth directly.”
- [YG II, 425]
- 225 See the *Akshayamatiniirdesha-sutra*. “What are the sutras of definitive meaning and what are the sutras of expedient meaning? The sutras taught with the

purpose of introducing people to the path are the sutras of the expedient meaning. The sutras taught in order that they can engage in the result are the sutras of definitive meaning.” [YG II, 428]

226 The three natures or realities (*rang bzhin gsum*) are characteristic of the third turning of the Dharma wheel, as discussed in scriptures such as the *Sandhinirmochana-sutra*. These texts are interpreted differently by the Chittamatra school and the Madhyamika school.

“The following is a general exposition:

1. Imputed reality (*kun brtags*). This consists in the mind’s reification of what does not exist in and by itself. An illustration of this is the idea of a ‘self,’ which in fact has no existence. Imputed reality also refers to all mistaken tenets and to all things of which the mind assumes a real existence but which lack this in any objective, concrete sense.
2. Dependent reality (*gzhan dbang*). This has two aspects: (i) impure and (ii) pure:
 - i. Our experience of the environment, the outer world and its inhabitants, is a product of deluded perceptions which are deeply ingrained. These perceptions are deluded precisely on account of the mind’s tendency to reify, as previously mentioned. This kind of perception may be likened to a situation in which a man falls victim to a magical trick and sees an illusory horse which he then assumes to exist. All such appearances are classified as impure dependent reality.
 - ii. Pure dependent reality refers to the perceptions of the outer world experienced by the Aryas in the times when they are not absorbed in meditation. They are ‘pure’ because uncontaminated by the tendency to reify, on account of which they are apprehended as existing in and by themselves. They could be also illustrated in terms of the previous example as being like the state of mind of the magician, who also sees the illusory horse that he has magically created but does not assent to its real, concrete existence.
3. Actual reality (*yongs grub*). Again, this is twofold: (i) unchanging and (ii) unmistaken.
 - i. This is emptiness itself, the ultimate reality of all phenomena, their unchanging nature regardless of whether or not beings understand it.
 - ii. This refers to the wisdom that directly and fully understands the ultimate reality of phenomena.” [YG I, 281]

227 Mipham Rinpoche said that here the Buddha was speaking from the point of view of ultimate reality, not from the point of view of relative existence. [K], 316]

228 Mipham Rinpoche: “The Buddha did not mean that they would be born in Sukhavati immediately after their deaths.” [K], 316]

- 229 Mipham Rinpoche: “The expression ‘existing in the manner of a dream’ means that things exist only on the conventional level.” [KJ, 316]
- 230 In the root verses, Jigme Lingpa adopts the wording of the *Sandhinirmochana-sutra*.
- 231 These correspond to the incorrect theories of causality (as viewed from the Madhyamika perspective) typified by four schools of Indian philosophy. (1) Phenomena arise from themselves (Samkhya); (2) phenomena arise from extrinsic causes (the lower schools of Buddhist philosophy); (3) phenomena arise both from themselves and from other causes (Jaina); (4) phenomena have no cause (Charvaka). See also Khenchen Kunzang Pelden, *The Nectar of Manjushri’s Speech*, p. 371ff. Cf. Nagarjuna’s *Mulamadhyamaka-karika*, “Not from itself and not from something else, Not from both and not without a cause, Does any thing whatever, Anywhere, at any time, arise.” (I, 1)
- 232 “For some were saying that his teachings were too elementary.” [KJ, 318]
- 233 I.e., two of the twelve links of dependent arisings. See chapter 4.
- 234 “Here ‘father’ and ‘mother’ are to be construed as the interdependent links of Craving and Grasping, respectively. The king is to be understood as the alaya, while the ‘two of pure life’ refer to the Brahmins, who represent the view of ‘I’ (the transitory composite), and to the virtuous ascetics, who represent the wrong view of ethical and doctrinal superiority. The ‘country and the royal court’ refer to the senses and the eight dualistic consciousnesses.” [DKR]
- 235 “This is the position of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. From the standpoint of the absolute truth, they argue that, if one assesses the two kinds of relative truth, both ‘mistaken’ and ‘unmistaken’ are on a level; they are the same in being produced by deluded propensities. Both appear to the senses and neither has true existence. In conventional terms, however, some phenomena function (i.e., are efficient) and some do not. And this is called unmistaken and mistaken relative truth.” [YG II, 452]
- 236 “For the Vaibhashikas, relative truth (*kun rdzob bden pa*) and imputed existence (*btags yod*) have the same meaning, and likewise absolute truth (*don dam*) means the same thing as substantial existence (*rdzas yod*).” [YG II, 466]
- 237 “The Sautrantikas are divided into two groups. The ‘Sautrantikas following scripture’ regard the seven sections of the Abhidharma as the shastras of the seven Arhats (Shariputra, etc.) but nonetheless regard them as authoritative (the Vaibhashikas regard them as Buddha-word). The ‘Sautrantikas following reasoning’ do not consider these shastras as scriptural authority (i.e., as providing *lung gi tshad ma*, or incontrovertible knowledge deriving from scripture) and have recourse to the sutras.” [YG II, 469]
- 238 It is important to bear in mind that the “Sautrantikas following scripture” and the “Sautrantikas following reasoning” (see previous note) have different

ways of distinguishing between the relative and absolute truths. To all intents and purposes, the Sautrantikas following scripture share the same view as the Vaibhashikas in holding that the absolute truth consists in the indivisible particles, while gross extended objects constitute the relative truth. The doctrine of the Sautrantikas following reasoning is more complex and involves an elaborate epistemological theory that in some respects resembles the representationist ideas of certain Western philosophers. Here, a distinction is made between the nonconceptual, direct perception of the sense consciousnesses and the conceptual, indirect perception of the mental consciousness. Whereas the sense consciousnesses actually contact external things, technically referred to as *specifically characterized* (*rang mtshan*), and which are no more than agglomerations of atoms, the mental consciousness identifies and knows objects only by virtue of a mental image which is described as *generally characterized* (*spyi mtshan*). The mental consciousness does not know external objects but only mental images. Given that the Sautrantikas distinguish absolute and relative truths according to efficiency, that is, the ability to perform functions, it stands to reason that absoluteness is attributed to the external objects and relativity to the corresponding mental image whereby recognition and knowledge take place. It is obviously only external objects that perform functions and not the mental image that the mind has of them. It is worth reflecting that for the Sautrantikas the division between the two truths does not occupy the same importance as it does for the Madhyamikas. This is because for the Sautrantikas the realization of the absolute truth (as defined by them) does not correspond to spiritual realization. Different commentaries show variant verb forms in the first half of stanza 132 (*don dam yod min* or *don dam yod yin*). Following the commentary of Sogpo Ngawang Tendar (*yon tan rin po che 'i mdzod kyi dka' gnad rdo rje 'i rgya mdud 'grel byed legs bshad gyi thur ma*), we have preferred the latter in the translation of the root stanza.

- 239 For a description of the Chittamatra view, see Khenchen Kunzang Pelden, *The Nectar of Manjushri's Speech*, pp. 319–320 and 326–332. See also S. K. Hookham, *The Buddha Within*, pp. 19–20.
- 240 The absolute is (1) the mind itself, the stuff of which objects, wrongly imagined to be external entities, are “composed.” It is absolute because, according to the Chittamatrins, the mind is an ultimate and irreducibly existent reality. The absolute truth consists (2) not only in the mind itself but in the fact that *there is nothing but the mind* and that any phenomena (*kun brtags*) only seem to be separate from it.
- 241 It seems that for the Svatantrikas, it is theoretically possible to confine oneself exclusively to the relative level and to discourse meaningfully about phenomena—the way they are and the way they function—without reference to the absolute truth. The absolute truth thus becomes a kind of overarching proviso to the effect that phenomena are completely without true existence, but it does not interfere with science and philosophy, which can continue on the relative level. It is still possible to philosophize. There is an obvious, and

probably indispensable, pedagogical advantage in the Svatantrika approach in that it provides space in which a teaching about the nature of phenomena can be elaborated in terms accessible to the ordinary intellect and which can thus help people to progress on the path. At the same time, the critique of the Prasangikas is understandable and inevitable. To say that phenomena have a natural existence of their own on the relative level amounts to attributing true existence to them. It is, so to speak, a ratification of the relative truth as being independently valid. The two truths are divided and their union is in practice abandoned. On the other hand, the purpose of Madhyamika is precisely to undermine the tyranny of clinging to phenomena. It must compromise the status of phenomena radically, even on the relative level.

- 242 Compare T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 87: “The Madhyamika system seems to have been perfected at one stroke by the genius of its founder—Nagarjuna.”
- 243 Perhaps a reference to Nagarjuna’s legendary alchemical accomplishments.
- 244 According to Butön, Nagarjuna’s six treatises on reasoning are: (1) *Mulamadhyamaka-karika*, *dbu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab* (preserved in Sanskrit); (2) *Shunyatasaptati*, *stong nyid bdun bcu pa* (lost in Sanskrit but preserved in Tibetan); (3) *Yuktishastika*, *rigs pa drug bcu pa* (lost in Sanskrit but preserved in Tibetan and Chinese); (4) *Vigrahavyavartani*, *rtsod zlog*; (5) *Vaidalyasutra and Prakarana*, *zhib mo rnam ’thag* (lost in Sanskrit but preserved in Tibetan); and (6) *Vyavaharasiddhi*, *tha snyad grub*.
- 245 The *Madhyamakavatara* is a general commentary on the meaning (*don ’grel*) of the *Karikas*, while the *Prasannapada* is a word-for-word commentary (*tshig ’grel*).
- 246 Chandrakirti says: “When a state of mind attuned to emptiness becomes manifest, this is referred to as the realization of emptiness. But it does not mean that emptiness is realized as an object.” [see YG II, 531]
- 247 They do not originate, they do not dwell, and they do not cease.
- 248 See the *Samadhiraja-sutra*:

Intellectuals asserting being and nonbeing,
Who thus investigate, will find no peace from suffering.
Is and is not, pure-impure,
Are both extreme positions.
But even in the middle the wise forbear to dwell.
[reference given in YG II, 537]

- 249 Emphasis here is placed on interdependence rather than on the number twelve. It is a statement about evolutionary causality arranged in a symmetrical formula, parallel to the twelvefold cycle of dependent causation as occurring in the existence of sentient beings. See DS, 28, where Dudjom Rinpoche says that outer dependent arising can be understood by analyzing from where phenomenal results have arisen.

- 250 “The notion of interdependence can also be applied to nirvana. For even though nirvana is not a product newly contrived on the basis of compounded phenomena, it is through the accomplishment of the path that adventitious obscurations are removed, that nirvana is actualized, and the creative virtuosity of uncompounded wisdom manifests unhindered.” [YG II, 543]
- 251 *gnyis snang*. The lingering appearance of phenomena as separate from the perceiver, even after the belief in their true existence has been abandoned.
- 252 “Some people object that if a sharp analyzing intellect is not operative at all times in the main meditation, and if there is not a certain apprehension of, and (intellectual) conviction in, the absence of the personal and phenomenal self, the all-discerning wisdom which is the nature of vipashyana cannot occur. But if this were true it would imply that an analyzing intellect must also be present in the meditation of the Aryas—and even at the level of buddhahood. For those who make this objection say that without it there can be no wisdom of vipashyana. In answer, it may be argued that this does not necessarily follow, since, in the context of the present objection, the meditators are ordinary beings and not like the Aryas who have vipashyana due to their direct seeing of ultimate reality. Our answer to this is that, even if there is a certain distinction, according to a given situation, the mind must be attuned to the wisdom that sees the ultimate directly, and it must remain in this state. For a mind caught in ontological extremes cannot bring forth the wisdom that transcends these extremes.” [YG II, 549]
- 253 The formless realm has four spheres. Starting from the lowest one, these are: (1) *nam mkha’ mtha’ yas*, Infinite Space; (2) *rnam shes mtha’ yas*, Infinite Consciousness; (3) *ci yang med pa*, Utter Nothingness; and (4) *yod min med min*, Neither Existence nor Nonexistence (also referred to as the Peak of Existence, *srid pa’i rtse mo*).
- 254 This means that they gradually spread downward, from the lowest level of the formless realm, through all the levels of the form realm, to the highest divine abode of the desire realm.
- 255 The six divine spheres of the realm of desire are in ascending order: (1) *rgyal chen rigs bzhi*, heaven of the Four Great Kings; (2) *sum bcu rtsa gsum*, heaven of the Thirty-three; (3) *’thab bral*, Free of Conflict; (4) *dga’ ldan*, the Joyous Realm; (5) *’phrul dga’*, Enjoying Magical Creations; and (6) *gzhan ’phrul dbang byed*, Mastery over Magical Creations of Others.
- 256 Reference is normally made to four periods: (1) *rdzogs ldan* (perfect endowment), when beings are characterized by four features: infinite life, luminous body, miraculous abilities, and sustenance on amrita; (2) *gsum ldan* (threefold endowment), when beings have only three of these qualities; (3) *gnyis ldan* (twofold endowment), when they have only two qualities; and (4) *rtsod ldan*, when all four qualities have declined and beings live in a state of conflict.
- 257 *rigs bzhi*. The four social classes or castes correspond to four psychological

types as they originally developed when beings began to live in organized society and support themselves by their work. Insofar as it existed within the context of Indian society, Buddhism recognized the existence of the caste system. But in contrast to Hinduism, which is grounded in the Vedic scriptures and therefore assigned rigid ritual functions to the castes, Buddhism advocated spiritual practice for all members of society indifferently. The four castes are *bram ze rigs*, brahmins; *rgyal rigs*, kshatriyas; *rje 'u rigs*, vaishyas; and *dmangs rigs*, sudras.

- 258 According to the Abhidharma, the actual sense faculties are subtle physical objects, variously shaped and located in their bodily supports. Thus, the faculty of sight is positioned in the eye and shaped like a blue flower, the faculty of hearing is in the ear and shaped like a roll of birch bark, and so on.
- 259 It is not certain which of these two events—*light-appearance* (*snang ba*) with the arresting of the thirty-three types of thought produced by anger, or *light-increase* (*mched pa*) with the halting of the forty types of thoughts of attachment—will appear first at the time of death. In this text, the dissolution of the red element is mentioned first, whereas it is often preceded by the white element.
- 260 *mi mjed 'jig rten*. Our universe is so called because its inhabitants endure defiled emotion and suffering in great measure and Bodhisattvas endure hardships and practice with courage. The term *mi mjed* can also be interpreted as “fearless,” in which case it is said to apply to our world because the beings therein show no fear of indulging in defilements. Yet another tradition interprets *mi mjed* as “undivided” because in our world, the mind cannot be dissociated from defiled emotions.
- 261 *bdun tshigs*. Every week, in the course of the forty-nine days of the bardo period, on the day of the person’s death, the consciousness “relives” the painful experience of the moment of death. The performance of the weekly ceremonies for the dead has the effect of alleviating this suffering.
- 262 Here the sun and the moon of the bodhichitta refer respectively to the male and female essences.
- 263 In the *Abhidharmakosha*, Vasubandhu explains each of the sixteen aspects in terms of an incorrect philosophical view to which it constitutes a remedy (see Roger Jackson, *Is Enlightenment Possible?* pp. 50, 344).
- 264 These last two aspects are to be understood as referring to the five aggregates of an individual. The third aspect, namely, that of their being without a “self that owns them,” may also be understood as a denial of the existence of a universal Creator.
- 265 “Are all phenomena accounted for within the four truths? The answer to this is no, for it is asserted that certain things are not included, such as space

and nonanalytical cessation. How then are phenomena categorized? They are accounted for in the aggregate of form, the *ayatana* of the mind (the six types of consciousness), and mental objects (feelings, perceptions, conditioning factors, imperceptible forms and uncompounded phenomena). [According to the *Abhidharmakosha*, there are three uncompounded phenomena: space, cessation through analysis, and cessation without analysis.] Are all the realizations of the Noble Path included within the four truths? Yes, and necessarily so. It should be understood that when cessation is spoken of in the context of the four noble truths, this refers only to cessation through analysis. Cessation without analysis and the absorption of cessation are not included. . . .” [YG I, 361] For more information on the absorption of cessation, see note 14.

- 266 According to the Abhidharma (see Mipham Rinpoche’s *mkhas ’jug*), perception is defined as “that which grasps or identifies characteristics” (*mtshan par ’dzin pa*). Perception is related to the six senses: the five physical senses, which are nonconceptual, and the mind or “mental sense,” which functions by means of concepts. These two categories of conceptual and nonconceptual perceptions are themselves divided into two categories according to whether, in the course of their activity, they succeed in discerning the characteristics of their objects. If they do so, they are referred to as *mtshan bcas* (discerning); if they fail to do so, they are called *mtshan med* (nondiscerning). The five (nonconceptual) sense perceptions are regarded as discerning (*mtshan bcas*) when they are operating normally and perceiving their proper objects: colors, sounds, smells, and so forth. Mental perception (which, as we have said, functions by means of concepts) is said to be discerning when it distinguishes identities or names. This happens (1) when the mind recognizes an object and correlates it with its name and (2) when the mind knows what is referred to when a name is given.

Perception is nondiscerning (*mtshan med*) when the sense organ in question is fully functional but there is no object. This occurs in states of profound absorption, whether of the Aryas or beings in the state known as the Peak of Existence. It occurs also when the mind is unable to identify and name objects, as in situations where something is encountered but is not recognized because the mind has no prior knowledge of it. This is the common experience of children, who are gradually building up a knowledge of their environment. Conversely, mental perception is also nondiscerning when (again, through lack of experience) it does not know what is referred to when names are given, as, for example, when an unknown language is heard. (It should be noted that nondiscerning perception does not refer to the mere privation of sensory stimulus, as, for example, when one is in a dark place with one’s eyes open or in a soundproof room. In these cases, the senses do in fact have objects—darkness and silence, respectively.) [see KJ, 9–10]

- 267 For the Prasangikas, the *kun rdzob bden pa* has three aspects: (1) *yid rtog spyod kyi shes pa*, discursive mind; (2) *ngag gi brjod pa*, verbal expression; and (3) *lus ngag gi ’jug pa*, speech and physical acts.

- 268 In this (Abhidharma) context, the Tibetan terms *blo*, *yid*, and *rigs pa* are all synonyms (whereas in Dzogchen they have different meanings).
- 269 The absolute nature is one and indivisible. One cannot speak, for example, of a table and a chair having different absolute natures.
- 270 If the absolute is beyond the intellect, how can it be realized by beings? In answer to this, Mipham Rinpoche says that the absolute truth can be approximately understood by the (ordinary) mind. It can be the object of intellect, as it were, on a provisional and temporary basis. In this case, the absolute truth is described negatively (apophatically) as a nonaffirming negation (*med dgag*). This refers to *nam gcod*, a process of exclusion, a logical analysis in which the existence of an object is searched for and found to be absent, so that absence or “nonfinding” (regarded as its ultimate condition) is the object of the intellect. It is only in this sense that the absolute can be understood by the ordinary mind. However, in the terms of the yogic experience of genuine realization of the absolute, which is utterly beyond the division into subject and object, the intellect is transcended with the result that the absolute cannot be said to be its object. This discovered state is an experience of the absolute that can only be described as an affirming negative (*ma yin dgag*). It is not a mere nothingness, a mere “nonfinding”; it is the manifestation of the fundamental nature of the mind, even though this is totally beyond conception and description. To deny this last point would be tantamount to saying that ultimate realization, buddhahood, is itself a mere vacuity.
- 271 See Khenchen Kunzang Pelden, *The Nectar of Manjushri’s Speech*, p. 315.
- 272 In other words, fire arises from the presence of fuel and the act of ignition, water is the combination of hydrogen and oxygen, and so on.
- 273 In other words, arguments that are driving at the ultimate nature of the object.
- 274 Existence cannot be ascribed to them simply on the grounds that they function according to conventional expectations.
- 275 In other words, they refrain from propounding a theory about conventional phenomena.
- 276 Of these eight, the first six are nonaffirming negatives (*med dgag*); the last two are affirming negatives (*ma yin dgag*).
- 277 In other words, as long as one is thinking of them at all (with the ordinary intellect), one cannot but think of them as things separate from the mind; one cannot but be imprisoned in duality.
- 278 The three modes (*tshul gsum*) are three criteria that establish the correctness of a syllogism as used in traditional Indian logic. See Daniel Perdue, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*, p. 38ff.

- 279 When relative phenomena are subjected to analysis, they are found to be devoid of inherent existence. Their emptiness is established and this is their absolute truth. When, however, emptiness is itself subjected to inquiry, it too becomes a conventionality and is itself found to be empty of inherent existence. Nothing that is made the object of intellectual analysis can be found to have absolute reality.
- 280 This is the traditional form of the syllogism in Indian logic.
- 281 Of course, on the absolute level, they deny that the mind exists in an ultimate sense, and the view is thus different from that of the Chittamatra or Yogachara school. The position of Shantarakshita and Kamalashila is a synthesis of the Madhyamika and Chittamatra approaches and as such is regarded as the last great development in the history of Buddhist philosophy in India.
- 282 As in the case of Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti among the Prasangika Madhyamikas. The founder of a school (*shing rta srol 'byed*, the maker of the chariot way) is considered to be not the master who first expressed a given idea, but the one who elaborated it into a fully fledged system. Thus, although Buddhapalita was the first to identify the Consequence (*prasanga*) as the method best expressive of Nagarjuna's intention, it was Chandrakirti who brought this insight into focus and organized it into a complete philosophical statement.
- 283 The point is that, while Prasangika is acknowledged as the supreme view, the Svatantrika approach is important as a preparation and propaedeutic and is therefore extremely valuable. This appreciation of Svatantrika is characteristic of the Nyingmapa school, for Shantarakshita was one of the founding fathers of the Tibetan tradition.
- 284 The meaning of this is that if, having refuted "true existence," we are left with phenomena untouched, as it were, we have not got very far in dealing with our cravings.
- 285 This would surely be more effective than trying to enter the dreamer's dream in order either to save him from what he is dreaming about or telling him, "You are only dreaming."
- 286 Unless and until we are made to see that self (ego) is unreal and purely imagined, the apprehension of, or clinging to, self cannot be dissipated. The only way that the man in the example can overcome his fear of the snake is to be shown that there is no snake there, but only a heap of rope. Without this, it is impossible for him simply to stop being afraid.
- 287 It is important to realize that the person in the sense of a sentient (e.g., human) being is not the same thing as the "personal self," which here corresponds to the subjective experience of "ego," of being "I." It is from the point of view of this subjective self that all other things, including other people as well as one's own psychophysical constituents, are regarded as phenomena.

- 288 The *inherently existent* ego and phenomena are purely imaginary. On the relative level, there is only a “person” and “phenomena,” which are nothing but imputations projected onto the appropriate constituents, and the latter are, of course, transitory phenomena. In other words, although “clinging to self” is real enough, the object of clinging (an inherently existent self) is a mere figment, as nonexistent as the apparent snake.
- 289 That is, the person and phenomena simply as they appear in common experience, but which are not inherently existent.
- 290 Clinging to the personal self constitutes the “emotional veil,” so called because all the defiled emotions arise from attachment to “I” and “mine.” Clinging to the phenomenal self constitutes the “cognitive veil.” This refers to clinging to the real existence of subject, object, and action, which thus obscures omniscience.
- 291 Real existence, *dnegos po*: all that appears as having origin, duration, and cessation. See Khenchen Kunzang Pelden, *The Nectar of Manjushri’s Speech*, p. 330: “In this context, ‘things’ are explained as referring to conventionalities validly perceived through sight, hearing, or the mind. And here, ‘sight’ refers to sense perceptions generally; ‘hearing’ refers to reports from other sources; and ‘mind’ refers to the process of inference.”
- 292 In other words, emptiness is not a predicate. It cannot be ascribed to phenomena, which somehow retain their supposedly independent status irrespective of the ascription.
- 293 These four alternatives refer to specific positions taken in Indian philosophy with regard to the problem of causality and which the Madhyamika subjects to criticism and explodes. The first, namely, the view that causes and effects are manifestations of a single substance, is the position of the Samkhya school. The second view, that causes and effects are of a different nature, is the position taken by the lower schools of Buddhism (including the Svatantrikas) and which the Prasangikas show to be just as problematic as the first view. The third position, which is an attempt to combine the positions of views one and two, is characteristic of the Jaina school (and of Hegel in the West), while the fourth position, which amounts to a rejection of causality altogether, is the standpoint of the Charvaka or materialist skeptics.
- 294 The whole language of causality implies difference and cannot be accounted for by a theory of identity in which the effect is merely the self-expression of the cause. In other words, as the text shows, an insistence on the identity of cause and effect cannot be combined with talk about causality, for this necessarily involves distinctions between the two terms of the process. Causality is in effect abandoned.
- 295 In other words, it is impossible to establish a link between producer and product.

- 296 To abandon causality altogether amounts to the belief that the universe is in chaos. This being so, there is no way to account for the manifest order visible in the phenomenal world. It also stultifies all human endeavor in which actions are undertaken with a view to obtaining certain results, including the attempt to communicate a theory of causeless origination. Thus, even if a theory of pure randomness is propounded, the fact is that no sane person, including the formulator of such a position, ever lives by it.
- 297 The Sevenfold Reasoning is expounded at length in the sixth chapter of the *Madhyamakavatara* of Chandrakirti.
- 298 Some of these qualities may be practiced by Bodhisattvas on the path of learning. They come to full fruition, however, only in the state of buddhahood.
- 299 In this context, freedom is understood as a state of mind totally divested of the obscurations that block the subsequently listed realizations.
- 300 See Khenchen Kunzang Pelden, *The Nectar of Manjushri's Speech*, p. 382: “. . . all phenomena, which appear to exist in the manner of cause, result, and nature, are the three doors of liberation. The examination of causes shows that they are (1) devoid of all conceptual characteristics [in other words there are no causes]. As regards the nature of phenomena, analysis shows that this is (2) emptiness. And as for the results, analysis reveals that they are (3) beyond expectancy.”