

NITĀRTHA, NEYĀRTHA, AND TATHĀGATAGARBHA IN TIBET*

D. S. Ruegg, in his *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra* and other works,¹ has mentioned the need for further study of the various Tibetan exegetical traditions involved in the controversies surrounding the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine. He has relied extensively on the exegesis developed by *dGe-lugs-pa* scholars. This paper is an initial attempt to address this need voiced by Ruegg, by presenting the views of a *bKa'-bryud-pa* and two *rNying-ma-pa* scholars. In particular, the focus will be on elucidating how they applied the interpretive devices of *niārtha* (*nges-don*, certain, definitive meaning) and *neyārtha* (*drang-don*, indirect meaning which is to be established) to texts dealing with the *tathāgatagarbha*.² One of the basic philosophical problems the Tibetans faced in this regard was the relationship between the concepts of *śūnyatā* and *tathāgatagarbha* emphasized in the second and third "turnings of the wheel of Dharma" (*dharmacakra-pravartana*) respectively.

Padma dkar-po (1527–1592), the great 'Brug-pa *bka'-bryud* scholar, in his *Chos-'khor rim-pa gsum-gi dogs-gcod*, criticized the majority of previous scholars who, "... took the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* as the basis for the second 'turning' spoken of in the *Saṃdhirimocanasūtra*, while taking the *Saṃdhirimocanasūtra* and others as the [basis for the] third 'turning'."³ On the basis of this erroneous notion, according to Padma-dkar-po, those who thought of themselves as *rang-stong-pas* (those who took *śūnya* as a reflexive concept)⁴ held the second 'turning' to be *niārtha* and the third *neyārtha*, while those calling themselves *gzhan-stong-pas* (those who took *śūnya* as primarily non-reflexive, denoting an ontological region devoid of relativity)⁵ put forward the reverse interpretation, i.e., the second 'turning' was *neyārtha* and the third *niārtha*. This error, said Padma dkar-po, was based on a more fundamental presupposition: that each 'turning' must be based on a unique set of texts. For him both the second and third 'turnings' were based "primarily" (*gsis-bo*) on the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*: the second 'turning', which is *neyārtha*, was in accord with the *Cittamātra* doctrine, which can be summed up in the theory of the *triniṣvābhava*. The third, which is *niārtha*, was in accord with the *Mādhyamaka* teaching, as set forth in such *śāstras* as the *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā*

and the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and as embodied in the *sūtras* which teach the *tathāgatagarbha* (*snying-po i mdo*).

In support of his position, Padma dkar-po shows, for example, that the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* teaches both *Cittamātra* and *Mādhyamaka* doctrines, and thus cannot be made the basis for claiming that the third 'turning' is strictly a *Cittamātra* teaching of certain, definitive meaning. Furthermore, he held that the *Cittamātra* teaching on the subject is in contradiction with the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine of the *snying-po i mdo*, which teach that there is but one *gotra* (*rigs*, spiritual lineage or affinity).⁶ Thus, despite his reversal of the usual order of the 'turnings', and his cautions on equating 'turnings' unequivocally with basic texts (which enable him, however, to account for *Cittamātra* interpretations of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*, as well as to bring *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* VII, 30⁷ into accord with a *Mādhyamaka* interpretation), Padma dkar-po's presentation remains quite orthodox by Tibetan standards.

Two *rMying-ma-pa* leaders of the nineteenth-century non-sectarian (*ris-med*) movement of Eastern Tibet, Kong-sprul bloḡgros mtha'-yas (1813–1899), in his so-called 'Indo-Tibetan Encyclopedia' (*Shes-bya kun-khyab*) and his commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*; and Mi-pham rgya-mtsho (1846–1912), in his commentary on the same work and in his *bDe-gzhegs snying-po i stong-thun chen-mo senge nga-ro*, presented similar views. Basically, they both held that the second and third 'turnings' were *mitartha*, although the third was nonetheless "higher" (*lhaḡ-pa*) or "ultimate" (*mithar-thug*). Kong-sprul's presentation, however, had been strongly influenced by the *gzhan-stong-pa* approach,⁸ while the influence of the *rDzogs-chen* philosophy of Klong-chen rab-'byarns-pa (1308–1364) was clearly evident in Mi-pham.

Kong-sprul states, in his *Shes-bya kun-khyab*, that the second 'turning', as explicated by the *Mādhyamaka*, is of "definitive meaning which is conceptually dependent or conditional" (*gnas-skabs kyi nges-don*), in that it focuses on opinionatedness (*lta-ba, dgyit*) so as to cut off ingrained "semantic structuring" (*spros-pa, prapañca*) whose sense-relations always operate in extremes (*mitha', anta*).⁹ The third 'turning', as explicated by what he calls the *Yogācāra* (*mal-'byor spyod-pa*) or *Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka* (*mal-'byor spyod-pa i dbu-ma*), is of "ultimately definitive meaning" (*mithar-thug-gi nges-don*), in that it clearly sets forth "pristine cognitiveness itself as a unique experience, the presence of Being which is absolutely real" (*dor-dam-pa i gnas-lugs so-so rang-rig-pa i ye-shes nyid*).¹⁰ This *Yogācāra* trend of thought,

in Kong-sprul's usage, which began with Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, is to be distinguished from the *Cittamātra* (*Yijñapramāna*) trend initiated by these two Indian masters, as well as from the later *Svātantrika-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika*. For example, in the introduction to his commentary on the *Uttaratantrasūtra*, Kong-sprul states that Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *gnod-joms*, as well as his commentary on the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, belonged to the "śiddhānta of the *Mādhyamaka* which is of definitive meaning" (*nges-don dbu-ma i grub-mitha'*), but that this exegetical lineage did not survive.¹¹

Mi-pham rgya-mtsho's major concern was to show the harmony, or more precisely, the unity (*zung-'jug, yuganaddha*), of the *śūnyatā* teaching of the second 'turning' and the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching of the third. This he accomplished through the *rDzogs-chen* conceptions of the facticity and actuality of Being (*ngo-bo, rang-bzhin*).¹² The facticity of the *tathāgatagarbha* is 'open' (*stong-pa, śūnya*), while its actuality is the intrinsic possession (*ye-ltan*) of Buddha-capabilities (*yon-tan, gūṇa*) of the *Buddhakṛtya* and its corresponding cognitiveness (*sku dang ye-shes*).¹³ Mi-pham's approach will become clear by considering his commentary on *Uttaratantra* I, 155,¹⁴ which states that the *dhiānu* (*khams*, spiritual make-up), which is a synonym for *tathāgatagarbha*, is "devoid of" (*śūnya, stong-pa*) incidental obscurations, but not "devoid of" (*asūnya, mi-stong-pa*) Buddha-capabilities. The first two *padas* refer to facticity and the second two to actuality, according to Mi-pham, and in view of this interpretation one can put concisely Mi-pham's objection to both the usual *rang-stong-pa* and *gzhan-stong-pa* approaches. The *gzhan-stong-pa*s err in regarding the facticity of the *tathāgatagarbha* as being something ontically ultimate (*bden-grub*) and not devoid of Buddha-capabilities (*mi-stong*); while the *rang-stong-pa*s err when they regard the actuality, as well as facticity, of the *tathāgatagarbha*, as "void" (*stong*). For Mi-pham, however, the actuality of the *tathāgatagarbha* is the luminous presence (*gsal-ba*) in utter spontaneity (*lhun-grub*) of intrinsic Buddha-capabilities; this spontaneous presence, however, should not be confused with something eternally present-at-hand (*riag-pa, niṭya*). For example, Mi-pham criticizes the position (that of the *dGe-lugs-pa*²) that *śūnyatā* as the mere "non-existence in truth of the *citta*" (*sems bden-grub med*) can serve as the basic cause-factor (*rgyu, hetu*) of Buddhahood.¹⁵ This position leads, for Mi-pham, to a contradiction of the principle of the unity of facticity, as open, and actuality, as luminous, mentioned above, in that it entails *śūnyatā*

without its inseparable, spontaneously present, luminous actuality: the intrinsic Buddha-capabilities. In their anxiousness to avoid having the *tathāgarbha* construed as the *dharma-kāya* existing in-truth (*bden-grub*) at the level of ground, the *dGe-lugs-pa* may have risked throwing the baby out with the bath-water.¹⁶ Several generations before rGyal-tshab and mKhas-grub-rje, the two chief disciples of Tsong-kha-pa who gave the *dGe-lugs-pa* interpretation its definitive form, Klong-chen rab 'byams-pa had already pointed out some of the pitfalls in such an interpretation, while also retaining some similarities with it, thus not incurring the faults of the *Jo-nang-pa* and Bu-ston interpretations which the *dGe-lugs-pa* would criticize.¹⁷

Klong-chen-pa's approach is nicely summed up in the following quotation from his autocommentary on the *Sems-nyid ngal-gso*:¹⁸

'At the time of the status of a sentient being, although the non-thematicness of experience (*sems-kyi chos-nyid*) possesses the complete capabilities of the *dharma-kāya* through its modality of openness and the capabilities of the *rūpakāya* through its modality of presence, since it has been obscured by impurities on account of which it does not shine forth directly, it is called 'spiritual affinity' or 'existential make-up' (*rtags, khamts*). Although, at the time of status of a Buddha, it is free from all impurities, it is called 'Enlightenment' (*byang-chub*), merely from the presence or absence in its completeness of the potency (*rus-pa*) of experience-as-such (*sems-nyid*) in its facticity, one cannot claim that the capabilities which are at first non-existent at the time of the status of a sentient being, are afterwards newly produced, since (experience-as-such) does not change into some other status.'

Although the *rNying-ma-pas* and the *dGe-lugs-pas* agree that the *tathāgarbha* doctrine is a *Madhyamaka* teaching of the third 'turning' which is of certain meaning, there is a source of contention here in the proper interpretation of the *Madhyamaka* understanding of *śūnyatā*. In this regard, Mi-pham, Kong-sprul, and Klong-chen-pa often warned against a negativistic (*phyang-*) *cahan*, 'one-sided' interpretation of *śūnyatā* taught in the second 'turning' as a mere 'absolute negation' (*med-dgag, prasaṅya-praṇeśha*). Such a negativistic interpretation creates problems in dealing with the *tathāgarbha* doctrine of the third 'turning'. According to Mi-pham,¹⁹ the second 'turning' has merely emphasized facticity as 'open', and the third has emphasized actuality as intrinsic possession of Buddha-capabilities. Problems only arise due to a one-sided emphasis on either facet, resulting in either negativism or substantialistic ontologizing. For Mi-pham the third 'turning' is only "higher" (*thag-pa*) in regard to its pointing out the inseparability of facticity and actuality in regard to the *tathāgarbha* doctrine. It is difficult at this time

to properly assess the *rNying-ma-pa* critique, as they do not mention their opponents by name, as, for instance, Go-tam-pa bsod-nams senge (1429–148) did on this matter of 'negativism'.²⁰

Another problem in assessing the *rNying-ma-pa* contribution is that, while the *dGe-lugs-pa*, for example, base their interpretation of *śūnyatā* on the texts primarily by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti which explicate the sūtras of the second 'turning', the *rNying-ma-pa* range farther afield, to include what they call the *Yogācāra-Madhyamaka* trend, as indicated above, on up to the *Mantrayāna* doctrine of the *rDzogs-chen*.²¹ The *dGe-lugs-pa*, on the other hand, did not mix *tantra* into their *sūtra* discourse. This issue is particularly relevant here, in that a major source of contention on the issue of *tathāgarbha* interpretation, the *Jo-nang-pas*, were generally regarded by their opponents as being unapproachable as Tantric yogins, who nevertheless erred in the way in which they brought their realization (*grub*) into the realm of philosophical explication (*bshad*). While this may have been true of the *Jo-nang-pas*, further research is needed to determine whether the *rNying-ma-pas*, some of whom have been *gzhan-stong-pas* (like Kong-sprul) and some of whom have not (like Mi-pham), were liable to similar criticisms.

In conclusion, I would venture that philosophical problems concerning the *tathāgarbha* doctrine will continue for contemporary scholars, as they did for the Buddhist tradition itself, as long as an undue emphasis is placed on the 'negative' aspect of *śūnyatā*, which is *both* a 'being-devoid-of' and an 'openness'.²² Several scholars have remarked (May and Conze, for example) that the main thrust of the *Madhyamaka* is ontological and not epistemological, but they did not bring out the nature of this ontology.²³ The *Madhyamaka* is certainly a critique of ontologies which tend to absolutize particular existents or beings. But this critique does not leave us with a collection of emptied-out phenomena (internal and external) – but rather fulfilled, in the open and luminous clearing of Being (-as-such) and its working "in" and "through" us as *tathāgarbha*.

University of Calgary, Canada

NOTES

* This is an amended and annotated version of a paper delivered at the 188th annual meeting of the American Oriental Society, Toronto, April, 1978.

- 1 See Ruegg, D. S., *La Théorie du Tathāgatatagarbha et du Gotra* (Paris, 1969), pp. 55–66; *Le Traité sur le Tathāgatatagarbha de Bu-ston* (Paris, 1973), Introduction; On the dGe lugs pa Theory of the Tathāgatatagarbha, in *Pratidānam* (La Haye, 1968), pp. 500–509.
- 2 On *nīrārtha* and *neyārtha*, see Lamotte, É., 'La critique d'interprétation dans le bouddhisme', *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves* (Bruxelles), IX (1949), 341–361; Ruegg, *La Théorie*, p. 55ff. Kajiyama puts it nicely in discussing *nīrārtha* and *neyārtha* as the third of the four "reliances" (*tron-pa, prati-sarṇa*), i.e., rely, "... on a sūtra teaching explicitly what it aims at (*nīrārtha*), but not on a sūtra the teaching of which implies a hidden intention (*neyārtha*)..." (Kajiyama, Y., 'Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation', in Kiyota, M., ed., *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation* [Honolulu, 1978], pp. 116–17.) Still, this represents only the formal aspect of the distinction, which is also a doctrinal one: *neyārtha* relates to the *samvṛti*, *nīrārtha* to the *paramārtha*.
- 3 PK, p. 336.
- 4 By 'reflexive' here we mean that *śūnya* does not indicate that one entity is 'devoid of' another, that something is absent in a given locus. *Śūnyatā* indeed means *nīḥsvabhāvatā*, although it is just this negative which is a source of contention, as we shall see, even though all *rang-stong-pas* in Tibet agreed it was a case of *med-dgag* (*prasaṅga-pratishedha*), non-implicative negation. To take *svabhāva* as the nature, or essence, of an entity, and then to negate this 'nature' and call this the understanding of *śūnyatā*, is to remain within the limits of a purely conceptual analysis, however valuable this may be.
- 5 The *gzhan-stong-pa*, making use of the Yogācāra theory of the *trīsvabhāva*, held the *pariṇipanna* to be devoid of both the *parikalpita* and the *paratantra*. This was attacked by the *rang-stong-pa* as being in contradiction with the Indian doctrine; however, on this point see Ruegg, D. S.: 'The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Cintakoti* and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism', *JIP*, 5 (1977), p. 67, n. 126. Cf. also notes 16 and 22 below.
- 6 PK, p. 338.
- 7 See Lamotte, É., trans., *Samdhirmocanaśāstra* (Paris, 1935), pp. 85, 206–7. This is the definitive statement of that *sūtra* on the three 'turnings'.
- 8 Cf. his presentation of the development of the Mādhyamaka in Tibet in *Encyc.*, I, 451, 7–459, 1. Kong-sprul's major works on *gzhan-stong*, however, are to be found in his *Thun-mong ma-yin-pa'i mdzod*, which has yet to be republished. See Gene Smith's Introduction to *Encyc.*, p. 69.
- 9 *Encyc.*, Part III, f. 24, 3.
- 10 *Encyc.*, Part III, f. 24, 3–4. On *prapañca*, see May, Jacques, *Candrakīrti Prasannapada Mādhyamakavṛtti* (Paris, 1959), p. 175, n. 562; and Bhikṣu Nānanda's *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought* (Kandy, 1971). *Mādhyamaka-kārikā* XVIII, 5 is central to an understanding of *prapañca*, where it is said to found *vikalpa*, dichotomous conceptualization; as well as Candrakīrti's commentary on XVIII, 9, which glosses *prapañca* as *vāk* (Valdya ed., p. 159). There, he tells us that the reason for this is that *prapañca* conjures up, proliferates (*prapañcayati, spro-bar byed-pa*) meanings (*artha, don*). Such hints have suggested 'semantic structuring' to us, but a contemporary poet, George Quasha, seem to have captured it best as "the linguistic unconscious of easy conceptualization." On sense-relations in modern semantics, see John Lyons' excellent survey, *Semantics I* (Cambridge, 1977), chapter 9.
- 11 *RG*, f. 7b, 4–6.

- 12 On *ngo-bo* and *rang-bzhi*, see Guenther, H. V., *Kindly Bent to Ease Us, Part One: Mind* (Emeryville, Calif., 1975), pp. 223–4; *Kindly Bent to Ease Us, Part Three: Wonderment* (Emeryville, Calif., 1976), pp. 5ff.; and *Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective* (Emeryville, Calif., 1977), pp. 119, 124–5, 156, 176, 212.
 - 13 This idea appears throughout the *DS*, first occurring on ff. 564, 4–565, 1.
 - 14 *RG*, f. 433, 6ff.; *DS*, f. 576, 6ff. The difference between the usage of *śūnya* here and in the *Prejāpāramitā* literature (and the works of Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, etc., which are said to explicate it), lies in what Tibetan scholasticism called the *strong-gzhi*, "the basis for (the understanding) of *śūnya*." In the *Uttaratantraśāstra*, the *strong-gzhi* is the *kharas* (*dharma*), while in the *Prejāpāramitā* it is any *dharma*, or entity, in its ontical givenness or 'nature'.
 - 15 *DS*, f. 568, 1ff.
 - 16 See Ruegg's article mentioned in note 1 for a concise statement of their approach.
 - 17 See the treatment of *tathāgatatagarbha* in his *Theg-pa mtha-'dag gi don gsal-bar byed-pa gsub-pa'i mtha' rth-po-che'i mdzod* (Gangtok, Sikkim, n.d.), p. 161, 4ff. and the following note.
 - 18 *rdzogs-pa chen-po sems-nyid ngal-gso'i 'grel-pa shing-ria chen-po* (Gangtok, Sikkim, n.d.), p. 312, 4–6. Klong chen-pa's most extensive treatment of the *tathāgatatagarbha* is to be found in this work, p. 310 ff., by way of commentary on the verse numbered "Bllc" in Guenther's translation, p. 65 (*Kindly Bent, Part One*). Klong chen-pa makes the same distinction which the dGe-lugs-pa were later to emphasize in criticizing the theories of Bu-ston and the Jo-nang-pa, i.e., we speak of *tathāgatatagarbha* or *gotra* as long as one is bound up with the adventitious *kṛiḍa*, but when these have been removed, we can speak of *tathāgata*. Cf. also *Kindly Bent, Part One*, pp. 52–3.
 - 19 *RG*, f. 381, 4ff.
 - 20 *TS*, p. 2ff. Here Tsong-kha-pa is placed under the *chad-mtha' la dbu-ma smra-ba* ("Nihilistic Mādhyamika").
 - 21 In his controversial commentary on the *Mādhyamakālamkāra* of Śāntarakṣita, for example, Mi-pham explicitly links the philosophical perspective (*lta-ba, dgrif*) of Candrakīrti with the *rdzogs-chen*:
- The intent of Candrakīrti (is) the profound perspective in which the deceptiveness of conventionality subsides in the continuum of Being (*dbyangs-su yul-ba*), because all presence is pure in exactly its own place (*rang-sar*). (This) is similar to the setting forth of the initially pure (*ka-dag*) in the works of the *rdzogs-chen*.
- (Collected Writings of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-mtsho, Vol. 12 [Gangtok, 1976], f. 46, 3–4.)
- 22 It is interesting to note that the *gzhan-stong-pa* seized on the difference between these two aspects, relegating the *rang-stong* (*śūnya* as 'being-devoid-of') to the *samvṛti* and the *gzhan-stong* (*śūnya* as an ontological region) to the *paramārtha*. See *TS*, pp. 1–2.
 - 23 This is closely related to the understanding of *prapañca* discussed in note 10, for *prapañca* clearly has an ontological function. Not only do we 'have' and 'use' language, but we have been "habituated to *samsāra* since beginningless time" because of *prapañca*, as Candrakīrti tells us in his commentary to *Mādhyamakālamkāra* XVIII, 5 (Valdya ed., p. 150).

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS

- DS *bd-gshegs snying-po'i stong-thun chen-mo senge nga-ro* of Mi-pham rgya-misho, in *Collected Writings of Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-misho*, Vol. 3, Gangtok, 1973.
- Encyc. *Kongrul's Encyclopedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture*, Paris I-III, ed. by Lokesh Chandra, New Delhi, 1970.
- PK *Chos-khor rim-pa gsum gi dogs-gcod* of Padma dkar-po, in *Collected Works of Kun-mkhyen Padma dkar-po*, Vol. 7, Darjeeling, 1973.
- RG *Theg-pa chen-po rgyud bla-ma'i bstan-bcos snying po'i don mngon-sum lam gyi bshad srol dang sbyar ba'i nam-par 'grel-pa phyir mi-ldog-pa senge nga-ro* of Kong-sprul blo-gros mtha'-yas, Gangtok, n.d.
- RMG *Theg-pa chen-po rgyud bla-ma'i bstan-bcos kyi mchan-'grel* of Mi-pham rgya-misho, in *Collected Writings of Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-misho*, Vol. 3, Gangtok, 1973.
- TS *lTe-ba'i shan-'byed theg-mchog gnad kyi zla-zer* of Go-ran-pa bsod-nams senge, in *The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa Skya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism*, Vol. 13, comp. by Bsod-nams rgya-misho, Tokyo, 1969.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Guenther, H. V.: 1975, *Kindly Bent to Ease Us. Part One: Mind*, Emeryville, Calif.: Dharmapress.
- Guenther, H. V.: 1976, *Kindly Bent to Ease Us. Part Three: Wonderment*, Emeryville, Calif.: Dharmapress.
- Guenther, H. V.: 1977, *Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective*, Emeryville, Calif.: Dharmapress.
- Kajiya, Yuichi: 1978, 'Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation', in Kiyota, M. (Editor), *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation*, Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press.
- Klong-chen rab-'byams-pa. *Theg-pa mtha'-dag gi don gsal-bar byed-pa grub-mtha' rin-po-che'i mdzod*, Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche.
- Klong-chen rab-'byams-pa. *rDzogs-pa chen-po sems-nyid ngal gso'i 'grel-pa shing-ria chen-po*, Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche.
- Lamotte, Étienne: 1935, *Saṃdhirimocana Sūtra*, Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve.
- Lamotte, Étienne: 1949, 'La critique d'interprétation dans le bouddhisme', *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves*, Bruxelles., IX: 341-361.
- Lyons, John: 1977, *Semantics I*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- May, Jacques: 1959, *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*, Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve.
- Mi-pham rgya-misho: *dbu-ma rgyan nam-bshad*, in *Collected Writings of Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-misho*, Vol. 12, Gangtok, Sikkim, 1976.
- Nānananda, Bhikkhu: 1971, *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought*, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
- Ruegg, D. Seyfort: 1968, 'On the dGe lugs pa Theory of the Tathāgatagarbha', in *Pratidandam*, La Haye.

Ruegg, D. Seyfort: 1969, *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra*, Paris: École Française D'Extrême Orient.

Ruegg, D. Seyfort: 1973, *Le Traité sur le Tathāgatagarbha du Bu ston*, Paris: École Française D'Extrême Orient.

Ruegg, D. Seyfort: 1977, 'The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Caṇḍakī* and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5: 1-71.

Vaidya, P. L.: 1960, Editor, *Madhyamakāśāstra of Nāgārjuna*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 10, Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute.