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ON
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THE "NEITHER ONE NOR MANY" ARGUMENT FOR ŚŪNYATĀ,
AND ITS TIBETAN INTERPRETATIONS

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Opening remarks

Arguments as to whether the self is one with or different from the aggregates (*skandha*) abound in such Mādhyaṃika literature as the *Mādhyaṃikāvatāra*, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and numerous other texts.¹ They do constitute a variety of the "neither one nor many" argument (*ekānekaviyogahetu; gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs*), but one which will not be my primary focus of interest in this paper. What I shall mainly deal with is rather the type of argument which Tsoñ kha pa, rGyal tshab rje and Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan term "the neither one nor many argument", and which finds its classic exposition in Śāntarakṣita's *Mādhyaṃikāvatāra*.²

Śāntarakṣita's version of the argument differs from the first variety in that it uses "oneness" (*ekatva; gcig*) and "manyness" (*anekatva; du ma* or *tha dad*) in what a modern logician would term a one-place or monadic sense of the form Fx , whereas the first sort involves a two-place or dyadic relation Fxy .³ Less technically, Śāntarakṣita is asking whether a certain phenomenon is one thing or many different things, where these predicates simply show a quality. The self-aggregate arguments speak about "... is one (identical) with..." or "... is different from...", thus involving a relation. (Note that in what follows I will often follow Ka-

¹ cf. *Mādhyaṃikāvatāra* VI, 124 and 127, also VI, 150: *phuñ las gzan min phuñ po'i ho bo min* "[the self] is not other than the aggregates, nor is it of the nature of the aggregates".

² It would be a mistake however, to think that this form of the argument was confined to Mādhyaṃika-svātantrikas. Prāsaṅgikas like Atiśa and others also made use of it. cf. *Bodhipathapradīpa* 276b7: *yañ ni chos rnam thams cad dag gcig dañ du mas rnam dpyad na | ho bo nid ni mi dmigs pas | rañ bzin med pa ñid du nes*

³ cf. for example A. Grzegorzczuk, *Outline of Mathematical Logic*, 3-5, or B. Mates, *Elementary Logic*, 36-37.

malasīla's advice and use "difference" (*tha dad*) instead of "manyness" (*du ma*).⁴ Similarly, context will often dictate that I use "identity" instead of the clumsy "oneness", although here the Tibetan correspondent simply remains *gigig*. In the dyadic relational sense I shall use "...is different from..." (...*dañ tha dad*) and "...is identical with...". The important thing to remember is that the switch from "manyness" to "difference" is one which Indian and Tibetan authors found perfectly natural).

The heart of the paper consists in a quote from Tsoñ kha pa which is an attempt to summarize Śāntarakṣita's argumentation. Tsoñ kha pa explains the impossibility of oneness (i.e. the monadic sense) by showing that all phenomena must have parts (*cha śas*), and that the parts cannot be one with their part-holders (*cha can*), nor different from them. Thus on Tsoñ kha pa's account, Śāntarakṣita's argument works only if it makes use of considerations involving the dyadic relational sense, in particular those which I have numbered points (3) and (4) below.

Tsoñ kha pa's account is taken up by rGyal tshab rje in *rNam bśad sñiñ po rgyan* and by Chos kyi rgyal mtshan in his textbook (*gyig cha*) on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, the *skabs dañ po'i spyi don*,⁵ it can be said to constitute a major strand in the prevailing dGe lugs pa interpretation. I shall argue that it seems to be a fair resume of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's views. The last half of the paper will consist of a point by point analysis of Tsoñ kha pa's arguments concerning parts and part-holders, and will necessitate a brief excursion into *Pramāṇa* texts to better understand the concepts of identity and relatedness involved in these arguments.

The Indian and Tibetan Formulations of the Argument Compared

Here, then, is *kārikā* No.1 of Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*:

Entities as asserted by ourselves and others, in reality have neither the nature of oneness nor manyness. Thus, they are without own-being (*svabhāva*; *rañ bzin*), like a reflection.⁶

⁴ *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā*, 89a: *cig śos źes bya ba ni du ma ñid de tha dad ñid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go*

⁵ *rNam bśad sñiñ po rgyan* 13a-14a; *skabs dañ po'i spyi don* 24a-27a.

⁶ *niṣvabhāvā ami bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat cited in Bodhicaryavatārapañjikā* 173, 17-18. The Peking beṣan'gyur 5284, 48b gives:

rGyal tshab rje transforms *kārikā* N.1 into the following *parārthanāmāna* (*gžan don rjes dpag*):

Whatever is not established as being truly (*bden pa*) one or many is not truly existent (*bden par med*), like a reflection. The bases (*gži*), paths (*lam*), and aspects (*rnam pa*) are not established as being truly one or many.⁷

Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan follows rGyal-tshab-rje's formulation, but gives a *hetu*-argument (*rtags sbyor*):

Let the subject (*chos can*) be the bases, paths, and aspects; they are not truly existent because they are neither truly one nor truly many.⁸

The major difference between Śāntarakṣita's and the Tibetan formulations - apart from differing logical forms - is that the subject (*dharmin*; *chos can*) is no longer entities as asserted by ourselves and others, but rather the bases, paths, and aspects, or in other words, persons, the *śāvaka*, *pratyeka*, and *bodhisattva* paths, and all *dharma*s. rGyal tshab and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan are commenting on the homage (*mchod rjod*) of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*; in particular, they are expanding on a line in the *sphuṭārthā* in which Haribhadra describes the difference between the dull (*dbañ po rtul po*) and the intelligent approach to understanding the three wisdoms (*mkhyen pa gsum*) mentioned in *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*'s homage, viz. the knowledge of the bases (*vastujñāna*; *gži śes*), the knowledge of the paths (*mārgajñāna*; *lam śes*), and omniscience (*sarvā-*

bdag dañ gžan smra'i dños 'di dag
yañ dag tu na gcig pa dañ
du ma'i rañ bzin bral ba'i phyir
rañ bzin med de gzugs brñan bzin

A curious discrepancy is that *rañ bzin med* (*niṣvabhāva*) in the last line of *kārikā* 1, is changed to *bden par med* by both rGyal tshab rje and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan in their formulations of the argument; Chos kyi rgyal mtshan even misquotes Śāntarakṣita and substitutes 'bden par med for *rañ bzin med* in *kārikā* 1. Tsoñ kha pa, in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* and *dBu ma dgoñs pa rab gsal*, does not usually employ *bden par med*, but rather *don dam par rañ bzin med* ("ultimately without own-being"). It may very well be that rGyal tshab rje wished to avoid jeopardizing the view *tha sñad du rañ bzin yod pa* ("conventionally, there is own-being") - a position which dGe lugs pa attribute to the Svātantrikas. As a result he chose a completely different term, *bden par med* instead of *don dam par rañ bzin med pa*.

⁷ *rNam bśad sñiñ po rgyan*, 13a

⁸ *skabs dañ po'i spyi don*, 25a

kārajñatā; rnam mkhjen).⁹ The intelligent disciple uses the "neither one nor many" argument to arrive at the conclusion that these three wisdoms, which perceive the voidness of the bases etc., are justified and attainable because the objects of these wisdoms do in fact lack any true existence.

Tsoñ kha pa on Śāntarakṣita

In the *Drañ hes Legs bśad śñiñ po* we find the following summary of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* argumentation:

He first shows that those entities as accepted by ourselves and others cannot be partless (*cha med*) in the sense of not having many parts, whether these parts consist in temporal stages, [physical] parts of an object, or aspects (*rnam pa*) of the object of consciousness. Now suppose something is established as having many parts. Conventionally, it is certainly not contradictory for one phenomenon (*dharmā*) to be of the nature (*bdag nid*) of many parts. But in terms of ultimate establishment, if the parts (*cha*) and part-holder (*cha can*) were essentially different (*ño bo tha dad*), then they would be unrelated other objects (*'brel med don gzan*). Moreover, if they were essentially identical (*ño bo gcig*), then the various parts would have to be identical, and the part-holders would have to be many. Thus having shown these absurdities, he [i.e. Śāntarakṣita] refutes ultimate phenomena.¹⁰

We can sum up Tsoñ kha pa's presentation as follows:

- (1) all entities have parts, be they temporal parts, physical parts or aspects.
- (2) if an entity is ultimately established (truly existent), its parts are either truly essentially identical with, or essentially different

⁹ Haribhadra, *Spiṭārthā*, 94a:

Chos kyi rjes su 'brañ ba rnam kyāñ gcig dañ du ma'i ño bo
ñid dañ brañ ba'i phyir zes bya ba la soḡs pa'i tshad mas
gzi dañ lam dañ rnam pa skye ba med pa yōñs su šes pa...

"Followers of the Dharma, however, understand that the bases, paths, and aspects are unignorated. They understand this by means of various *pramāṇas* to the effect that these [bases etc.] have neither the nature of oneness nor that of manyness." Cf. also *skabs dañ po'i spyi don*, 20b. For the definitions of the three wisdoms, see *Don bdun cu*, 1b-2a.

¹⁰ *Drañ hes Legs bśad śñiñ po*, 137.

from their part-holders.¹¹

- (3) if the parts were truly essentially one with their part-holder, then either the parts would all be identical or there would be many part-holders. Thus, this alternative is absurd.
- (4) if the parts were truly essentially different from the part-holder, then they would be unrelated with the part-holder. Also absurd.
- (5) therefore, entities are not ultimately established (truly existent).

How well does Tsoñ kha pa account for the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*'s arguments? Methodological considerations

Let us first examine points (1) - (4) in more detail.

(1) It seems to be a fair characterization of Śāntarakṣita's enterprise to say that much of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* argumentation is simply to show that entities have parts, where "parts" is understood as temporal stages, physical parts or aspects. *lcañ skya rol pa'i rdo rje* explains that pointing out the existence of temporal stages is used to refute "*prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, *īśvara* and the permanent *ātman* etc., as well as the *Vaibhāṣikas*" three unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) permanent entities". These were all accepted by their proponents as being partlessly single entities (*cha med pa'i gcig pa*). Showing physical parts is directed against "gross (*rags pa*) physical objects such as vases etc., as well as partless subtle atoms". Pointing out aspects of the objects of consciousness is directed against "consciousness as asserted by the five Outsider traditions, the two Buddhist traditions which assert objects [i.e. *Vai-bhāṣika* and *Sautrāntika*], and the two Cittamātra schools [*Sākāravāda* and *Nirākāravāda*]." ¹² One can consult M. Ichigō's *Synopses of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita*, as well as rGyal tshab rje's *dbu ma rgyan gyi brjed byaṅ* to verify which *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* verses refute which traditions; suffice to say here that Tsoñ kha pa as viewed through *lcañ skya* seems to give an elegantly simple and accurate classificational scheme in speaking of temporal stages, physical parts and aspects.

A more difficult point is to what degree the various traditions under attack by Śāntarakṣita understood "one" to mean "partlessly one"

¹¹ Tsoñ kha pa in *Drañ hes Legs bśad śñiñ po* and other texts, such as *dbu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, repeatedly stresses that conventionally, one can and should say that parts and part-holders are essentially identical. It is from the point of view of ultimate truth that the problems would arise. Cf. *dbu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* 40.

¹² *Grub mtha' thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan* 390-391.

(*cha med pa'i gcig pa*). Kamalaśīla, in the *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*, makes the blanket statement that the word "oneness" in *kārikā* 1 means "partlessness" (*cha med pa nid*).¹³ While it seems true that many Hindu and Buddhist schools held partlessness as a necessary property of certain entities, it seems farfetched to think that all the traditions under Śāntarakṣita's scrutiny, themselves, meant "partlessness" by the word "oneness". If that were the case, then all refutations of oneness would simply consist in pointing out that a thing had parts. There would be no need to establish an entailment (*khyab pa*) between "having parts" (*cha bcas*) and "not being truly one", a point which Chos kyi rgyal mtshan and rGyal tshab rje find necessary to justify and difficult to understand.¹⁴ Ultimately, the explanation may be that Kamalaśīla just presupposed the absurdity of the part-whole relation, and thus thought that "in reality one" could only mean partlessness.

(2) Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla both stress that oneness and manyness are mutually exclusive (*phan tsun spañ 'gal*), with no third alternative (*phuñ gsum*);¹⁵ in other words, if *x* is not one, it is many, and vice versa. Tsoñ kha pa, however, has introduced the terms "essential oneness" and "essential difference", terms which play a very small role in Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, but about which we shall have more to say below. At any rate, it seems that Tsoñ kha pa is transposing the same mutual exclusivity onto essential identity and essential difference.

(3) Śāntarakṣita relies on principle (3) at many points, notably the refutation of the single nature of the Nāyā-Vaiśeṣika's "all-pervasive space" (*vyāpakākāśa*; *khyab pa'i nam mkha'*; cf. *kārikā* 10), as well as in the various arguments against Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Outsider's view of consciousness. For example, in *kārikā* 22, he describes a Sautrāntika Sākāravādin school (*sna tshogs gñis med pa*) which held that the manifold of aspects produced from a multicoloured painting, were not distinct (*tha dad*) from consciousness. In such a case "it is not logical that there be a manifold (*sna tshogs*) of aspects. As these aspects are not different

¹³ *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*, 89a: *gcig 'jes bya ba cha med pa nid do*.

¹⁴ *rNam tśad śñiñ po rgyan*, 13a: *rtags dañ dgag bya'i chos kyi gñi mthun 'gog pa rtogs par dka' bas de rjod na...*

¹⁵ Since it is difficult to understand how to refute a common point between the reason ["having parts"] and the property to be denied ["being truly one thing"], I shall speak on this....

¹⁶ *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, 66b: *gcig pu'i bdag nid dañ du ma'i bdag nid ni phan tsun spañs te gmas pa'i mtshan nid yin pas phuñ po gñan sei to*.

(*tha dad*) from one consciousness, they would share its single nature." Further on he argues, "if consciousness were not something different from the many aspects, then like the varieties of aspects, it too would become many".¹⁶ There are numerous other examples which could be cited, but in general, it is sufficient to say that it is principle (3) which establishes the key entailment: given that *x* has many parts, and that the parts are essentially identical with *x*, principle (3) establishes that *x* cannot be truly one thing.

(4) In Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's texts principle (4) is little invoked. This might be explained by the fact that most traditions which Śāntarakṣita is seeking to refute, hold that the part-holder - be it consciousness, the atom etc. - is in some way one with its parts. An example where something vaguely like (4) is used, however, is the refutation of the Nirākāravādins (*kārikā* 47-57). Śāntarakṣita argues that consciousness would not experience many aspects because, according to the Nirākāravādins, these aspects are not real entities (*abhāva*; *dños med*). Thus, the aspects would be unrelated with consciousness; they would neither have a one nature relation (*tādātmya*; *bdag gcig tu 'brel*), nor a causal relation (*cadūptattī*; *de byuñ 'brel*) with consciousness.

I should, however, explain my hesitations about the Nirākāravādin example, and the introduction of the terms "essential identity" and "essential difference"; this will in turn lead to a question of methodology.

In general, Tibetans speak of "unrelated other objects" (*'brel med don gzan*) in cases where both objects exist; e.g. the pillar and the vase, or the yoghurt and the basin (*'khar gzoñ*). In that sense, as the Nirākāravādins do not consider aspects as being real entities, one could only consider the above example as a bona fide case of principle (4) if one loosened the strictures on the notion of "unrelated other objects". If Tsoñ kha pa did have any actual *kārikā* in mind as being examples of principle (4), it seems that 47-57 would be the only candidates. But it may well be that Tsoñ kha pa was not thinking of any particular *kārikā* at all.

In fact, this latter approach seems the most plausible. "Unrelated other objects" is a notion that was successfully used in Tibetan discussions of the *Madhyamakāvataṛā*, while "essential identity" is a key term

¹⁶ *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, 57b and 58b:

rnam pa de dag sna tshog pa 'di ni rigs pa ma yin te rnam par 'ses pa gcig dañ tha dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir 'ses pa de'i ran gñi ho bo bñin no. rnam par 'ses pa de rnam pa du ma dañ tha dad pa ma yin pa'i lus yin na ni rnam pa de dag gi bye brag bñin du du mar 'gyur ro.

in *Pramāṇa* philosophy. Their introduction here serves to create a rapprochement, a continuity between three otherwise distinct problem-situations.

Now, I think it is fair to say that Tsoñ kha pa was less concerned with what *Sántarakṣita* and others said, than with rationally reconstructing the logical situations they faced. We follow Imre Lakatos and make a distinction between internal and external history, the former being primarily logical deductions of what could have been said, given the key ideas of the philosopher in question, the latter being what was actually said, what actually took place.¹⁷ In this light, there is no doubt that Tsoñ kha pa, the great debater, was a specialist at internal history; as such his stretching of terminology, his imposition of concepts which have no obvious textual justification, should not be judged by the severe criterion of the external historian. Bearing this distinction in mind, we deprive neither Tsoñ kha pa, nor for that matter, ourselves, of the possibility of using fertile but foreign concepts.

Essential identity and difference

To resume the discussion, obviously the key concepts in Tsoñ kha pa's version of the "neither one nor many" argument are essential identity (*ño bo gcig*) and essential difference (*ño bo tha dad*). Let us first try to clarify these concepts, in order to be able to meaningfully ask the following questions: why does it follow that, if *x* is essentially identical with *y*, and *y* has many parts, then *x* must also have many parts? Why is it that, if *x* and *y* are essentially different, *x* and *y* must be unrelated?

Chos kyi rgyal mtshan speaks of six types of identity and difference in Buddhist philosophy: substantial identity (*rdzas gcig*); co-extensiveness (*don gcig*); identity of own-being (*rañ bzin gcig*); identity of nature (*bdag ñid gcig*); essential identity (*ño bo gcig*); identity of negatives (*ldog pa gcig*).¹⁸ A full study of all these notions is, of course impossible here. But fortunately we can simplify a bit by noting that three of the six (viz. identity of own-being, identity of nature and essential identity) are the same relation, and are used interchangeably.

¹⁷ Cf. his *History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions*, 102-105, 118-121.

¹⁸ *skabs dañ po'i spyi don*, 102h.

Substantial identity - in the Tibetan tradition at least - is a subset of essential identity, applying to cases of impermanent phenomena, or what is the same thing, phenomena which have substance (*rdzas yod*).¹⁹ In particular, *x* and *y* are substantially identical if they "appear non-distinct (so sor *mi snañ ba*) to a direct perception (*pratyakṣa*; *mñon sum*)."²⁰ A persual of rgyal tshab rje's *dbu ma rgyan gyi brjed byañ re-veals* that most of rgyal tshab's paraphrasing of *Sántarakṣita*'s arguments is in terms of substantial identity and difference. The difference between substantial and essential identity can for all intents and purposes be overlooked in this discussion - it is often overlooked in other contexts.

Take some examples of substantial or essential identity:

- (a) product-hood (*byas pa*) and impermanence (*mi rtag pa*); (b) subjects (*chos can*) and their qualities (*chos*); (c) particulars (*spyi ldan*) and universals (*spyi*); (d) activity (*bya ba*) and the agent (*bya ldan*); (e) the two truths; (f) parts and part-holders (at least conventionally, they are said to be essentially identical).²¹

Clearly the notion of identity here is a strange one, and can not be reduced to a standard logic textbook definition of identity, as in first order predicate calculus with identity. Take (b) above. Let the subject be a vase, and the properties be impermanence, and "being bulbous and able to carry water." By the normal criteria of "=" (viz. transitivity, symmetry and reflexivity),²² if vase = what is impermanent, and vase = what is bulbous and able to carry water, then it would follow that what is impermanent = what is bulbous and able to carry water. Absurd. However, I think that there is a clear notion here, one which can be understood with the aid of *Pramāṇa* texts. The *Pramāṇavārttika* states:

In all cases, there is only a difference between the words which describe substances [i.e. subjects] and entities [i.e.

¹⁹ cf. Yoñs 'dzin phur bu lcoog byams pa, *bsDus grwa 'briñ*, 9a for a brief discussion of *brags yod* and *rdzas yod*.

²⁰ An example of this definition in use is found in rgyal-tshab-rje's *rNam 'grel tshar lam gsal byed*, Vol. I, 101:

rdzas tha dad du thal | blo ma khrul ba'i gzuñ ñor so sor snañ ba'i phyir. Here *blo ma khrul ba* means direct perception (*mñon sum*).

²¹ For (b), (c), (d) cf. *rNam 'grel tshar lam gsal byed*, 97. In *skabs dañ po'i spyi don*, 102b it is said that "the two truths are essentially identical (*ño bo gcig*), but have different double negatives (*ldog pa tha dad*)".

²² cf. Grzegorzcyk, op.cit. 3-8. As for "bulbous and able to carry water", this the usual definition (*mtshan ñid*) of a vase (*bum pa*); cf. *bsDus grwa chuiñ*, 7a.

qualities]. Their denotations admit of no difference whatsoever.²³

In *Thar lam gsal byed*, rGyal tshab rje explains this *kārikā* as follows:

"Take as the subject of debate all cases of words describing substances or subjects, and entities or qualities. Although one grasps them [i.e. subjects and qualities] as being substantially different, there is in fact no substantial difference with regard to their denotations (*brjod bya*) as the difference is confined (*zad pa*) to one of understanding one object (*don gcig hid*) by means of different symbols. Although one might speak about qualities (*yon tan*) and quality possessors (*yon tan can*), actions and agents, universals and particulars, and although one might grasp them as substantially different, this is merely a difference imputed by the conceptual mind (*stog pas btags pa'i tha dad tsam du zad pa*); nonetheless these notions are intelligible (*go bar byed*)."²⁴

The picture begins to gradually emerge. Essential identity, or more particularly substantial identity, is identity for a direct perception - what looks the same to someone who is non-deluded. Based on the speaker's intentions, there is a separation made between subjects, qualities, universals, etc., but these are only mind-invented differences; the actual denoted object (*vācya*; *brjod bya*) is as it appears to direct perception, and admits no such differences. In the above-cited examples it is possible that $x \neq y$, but these differences will be mind-invented; the actual denotation of "x" = the actual denotation of "y". We can frame the following bi-conditional using "=" in its usual sense: x and y are essentially identical, if and only if, the actual denotation of "x" = the actual denotation of "y", where "actual denotation" is understood to mean the object free of mind or language invented differences.

Now suppose that the actual denotation of "part" = the actual denotation of "part-holder", as follows from the hypothesis of principle (3) that parts and part-holder are essentially identical. Then given the usual understanding of "=", and the premise that the actual denotation of "part" has the property of manyness, it would follow that the actual de-

²³ Svārthānūmānapariccheda, *Kārikā* 62:

Bheda 'yam eva sarvatra dravyabhābhābhedyānoḥ | śabdāyor na tayor vācye viśeṣas tena kaś cana ||

²⁴ rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed, vol. I, 97.

notation of "part-holder" should also have the property of manyness.²⁵ *Mutatis mutandis*, the singleness of the partholder would also transfer to the parts, and the parts would all have to be identical. Thus, the two absurdities mentioned in principle (3) can be derived.

A possible objection at this point might be to ask if it is at all meaningful to say "the actual denotation of 'parts' or 'part-holder' is many." Syntactically, it is anomalous to predicate "manyness" of a singular noun. There are two problems here: one is linguistic, and stems from the fact that "*cha śas*" and "*cha can*", and such nouns do not show a singular-plural difference; the other is logical, and stems from the fact that neither *Sāntarakṣita* nor *Tsoṅ kha pa* rely on set theory.

Be all this as it may, the problems are relatively easily surmounted if we take the responsibility for introducing some elementary set theory and speak about the cardinality of a set of objects X (i.e. CN(X)). The basic move is to say that the set of objects actually denoted by "parts" has many members while the set of objects actually denoted by "part-holder" has only one member. Let us call the first set "p" and the second "ph". Thus $CN(P) > 1$ and $CN(PH) = 1$ (What we have just done is a typical internal history move. We have placed *Sāntarakṣita* in a problem situation which he himself was, of course, never confronted with. But such a reconstruction is, I think, justified given the syntactic demands of our language, and the high level of familiarity and clarity which set theory has in our logic.) If we wish, we can reconstruct the preceding paragraph's arguments as follows:

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| (1) $P = PH$ | Premise |
| (2) For all sets, X, Y : if $X = Y$, then $CN(X) = CN(Y)$ | Theorem |
| (3) $CN(P) = CN(PH)$ | From 1 and 2 |
| (4) $CN(P) > 1$ and $CN(PH) = 1$ | Premise |
| (5) $CN(P) = 1$ and $CN(PH) > 1$ | From 3, 4,
and Leibniz' law |

The contradiction, $CN(P) = 1$ and $CN(P) \neq 1$, follows from (4) and (5), and can be used to infer $P \neq PH$ by *modus tollens*. Lines (1) - (5) constitute a reconstruction of *Tsoṅ kha pa*'s argument up until his conclusion that the parts must be one or the part-holder must be many; the inference that the parts can not be truly essentially one with their

²⁵ Frege's formulation was: for all properties F: if $x = y$, then if x is F, then y is F. (F) ($x = y \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fy)$).

Russell's was basically similar, apart from provisions for the theory of types. Cf. M. and W. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 619. For different formulations of identity, cf. P. Weingartner, *A Predicate Calculus for Intensional Logic*.

part-holder (i.e. P ≠ PH) is left implicit in Tsoñ kha pa.

What about the second question which I posed? Why is it that if x and y are essentially different, x and y must be unrelated ('brel med)? There are according to *Pramāṇa* texts, two and only two types of relatedness: one nature relation (*tādātmya*; *bdag gcig tu 'brel*) and causal relation (*tsadutpatti*; *de byuñ 'brel*). To postulate a third type would, according to Dharmakīrti, destroy the necessity for there being only three types of valid reasons, and would hence bring about an enormous rupture in the *Pramāṇavārttika* system.

lCañ skya, in discussing the *Madhyamakāvātāra*'s seven-fold reasoning (*znam bdun gyi rigs pa*), states the following concerning the chariot and its parts:

Take the chariot as subject; it is not by nature different from its various parts; because otherwise if it were, the parts and the chariot would be essentially different, and if two things are simultaneous (*dus mñam*) and essentially different, then they would have to be unrelated other objects ('brel med don gzan). Thus, the chariot and its parts would have to be separately apprehended (*dmigs pa*), just as a horse and a ox are separately apprehended. But such is not the case.²⁶

Now in general, if two phenomena are essentially different, it does not follow that they are unrelated. A causal relation, as it involves substantial difference (*rdzas tha dad*) of the relata, implies that these relata are essentially different.²⁷ But this substantial, and hence essential difference, is due to the fact that cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously. However, in the case of parts and part-holder, it is not a causal relation that is involved. The part-possessor must exist at the same time as its parts (the key words in lCañ skya are *ño bo tha dad dus mñam*). As a result only a one-nature relation would be possible. But since by hypothesis parts and part-holders are essentially different,

²⁶ *Grub mtha'* thub bstan lhun po'i mzes rgyan, 432.

It should be clear that Tsoñ kha pa's principles (3) and (4) are not just restricted to *Mādhyamika-Svātantrika* argumentation, but also play a major role in *Prāsaṅgika* texts - for example, the *Madhyamakāvātāra*'s arguments concerning the self and the aggregates, as well as the arguments known as "the seven-fold reasoning" VI, 127: gal te phuñ po bdag na de phyir de | mañ bas bdag de dag kyañ mañ por 'gyur; VI, 124: de'i phyir phuñ po las gzan bdag med de | phuñ po ma gtogs de 'dzin ma grub phyir.

²⁷ cf. *bsDus grwa 'brin*. 5b: chos de dañ rdzas tha dad pa'i sgo nas chos de'i 'bras bu'i rigs su gnas pa chos de dañ de byuñ 'brel gyi mtshan hid...

and hence not of one nature (*bdag nid gcig*), they would be completely unrelated. Nor can one sanguinely accept this conclusion; unrelatedness would imply that they could be perceived separately, and moreover, that one could exist without the other. - the part-holder ought to be able to exist without parts.

There is one last point to be mentioned, and I shall give it as short shrift as does Śāntarakṣita himself. The paper so far has dealt with arguments against oneness, and has left manyess untouched. Śāntarakṣita devotes only two *kārikā* (61, 62) to arguments against manyess, but the reasoning is cogent and easily laid out: if there is no phenomenon of which we can say that it is one individual thing, then we also can not meaningfully speak of "many phenomena". Manyess is a collection (*bsags pa*) of individuals, a collection of ones. If we prefer a set-theoretic formulation, we may simply say "sets with many members are impossible if there are no unit sets".

Summary and conclusions

- (a) We began by making a distinction between two sorts of "neither one nor many" arguments, those which simply spoke of the qualities one-ness and manyness, and those which were phrased in terms of "... is one with ...". Śāntarakṣita's version was of the former variety, although seen through Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation, it ultimately depended on arguments involving "... is one with ...".
- (b) Tsoṅ kha pa's account of Śāntarakṣita is in many places an accurate reflection of the latter's text. But it is also more than that. It is an attempt at internal history, a rational reconstruction of Śāntarakṣita's thought, first of all placing it in a conceptual framework common to *Pramāṇa* and *Mādhyamika* philosophy, and then imagining how the discussion could reasonably proceed in such a context.
- (c) The notions of essential identity and difference, so important to Tsoṅ kha pa's and hence Śāntarakṣita's argumentation, can be rationalized by recourse to *Pramāṇavārttika*'s theory of meaning, plus some modern logic. Given this account of these key terms, as well as *Pramāṇavārttika*'s notion of relatedness, Tsoṅ kha pa's principles (3) and (4) seem to follow.

Finally, although I have only touched on a few aspects of this key argument for *śūnyatā*,²⁸ I hoped, above all, to show that the arguments need to be understood in terms of a whole background network of logical notions. As is so often the case in the history of philosophy, sophisticated argumentation ultimately seems to rest on philosophies of language and logic.

²⁸ Various important points remain undiscussed so far, but I shall only mention one of them here:
In *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal* (135-136) Tsoṅ kha pa presents another line of reasoning, which he claims - with non-obvious justification - to be the position of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (*ži ba 'tsho gsal sras*). The argument is also used in *rNam bśad shiñ po rgyan* and *skabs dah po'i spyi don* as well as other texts, and represents the other major strand in the *dGe lugs pa* view of the "neither one nor many" argument. It can be summarized as follows:

- (i) Parts and part-holders are conventionally essentially identical.
- (ii) Parts and part-holders appear as being essentially different to the conceptual mind which thinks about them (*rtog pa la ho bo tha dad du snañ ba*).
- (iii) Therefore, the way in which parts and part-holders appear (*snañ tshul*), and the way they are (*gnas tshul*) are not in accord (*mi mthun pa*); thus, they are like an illusion, and are deceptive (*bdzrun pa*).
- (iv) Whatever is truly established (*bden par grub*) can not be deceptive in any way (*rnam par thams cad du bžun pa spañs te*).
- (v) Thus, parts and part-holders are not truly established.
I hope to say more about this argument and other aspects of the "neither one nor many" argument at a later date.

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 dañ bcas pa'i rnam bśad rnam pa gñis kyi dka' ba'i gñad gsal
 bar byed pa legs bśad skal bzañ klu dbaṅ gi rol mtsho źes bya
 ba las skabs dañ po'i spyi don of Sera Chos kyi rgyal mtshan.
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ON RANG RIG

by

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It is well known that Candrakīrti, in his discussion of the two
 satyas in the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*, placed under *mithyāsāvṛtīsatya*
 the philosophical views of his opponents. That is, all the philosophical
 activity of those thinkers who aren't *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika* is incorrect
 even from the conventional everyday point of view, without beginning to
 consider its pretensions to revealing ultimate truth.¹

In his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (the *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i
 shing rta*), however, Mi bskyod rdo rje, the eighth Karma pa, tells us
 that there were many earlier commentators who understood Candrakīrti's
 refutation of the substratum consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), self-refer-
 ring consciousness (*svasaṁvitti*), the external object and the person
 (*puḍgala*) to be only a refutation from the ultimate point of view, and
 not conventionally (*tha snyad du*).² Tsong kha pa certainly held that the
Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika accepts conventionally the external object and the
 person, when these are understood correctly.³ But Mi bskyod rdo rje sin-
 gles out for particular mention the Sa skya lamas Go ram pa bSod nams
 seng ge and Shā kya mChog ldan, and I want to look briefly at two things:
 First, the issues involved in urging the acceptance or otherwise of self-
 referring, reflexive consciousness; and second, some philosophical di-
 mensions of the dispute between Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge and Mi bskyod
 rdo rje.

¹ See Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* on *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI, 26. See also Atiśa's
Satyadvayāvatāra 70a: dang po gnyis te chu zla dang | grub mtha' ngan pa'i rtog pa'o |

² *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta* 457: go shāk sogs bod kyi 'jug 'grel byed pa mang pos
 slob dpon zla grags kyi bzhed par gzhung 'dis tha snyad du rang lugs la rang rig yod
 pa yin par sgrub po | zhes dang | de bzhi kun gzhi rang rig phyi don gang zag rnam
 lugs 'dis tha snyad du 'gog pa min kyi | dpyad bzod du grub pa'i kun gzhi sogs 'gog
 par byed pa yin lo |

³ For Tsong kha pa's acceptance of the conventional existence of the external object
 see, for example, his *rTsa ba shes rab kyi dka' gmas chen po brgyad kyi bshad pa*
 15ff. On the status of the person see the same text, 40ff.