

Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation:
Theory and Practice

Edited by

MINORU KIYOTA

Assisted by ELYN W. JONES

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS
PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI

Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation

Yuichi Kajiyama

The later Indian Mādhyamika school or the Yogācāra-mādhyamika, represented by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, may be characterized in two ways: as a philosophy, it is synthetic; as a religion, it teaches gradual enlightenment. The merit of the school lies in combining these two characteristics.

The major schools of Indian Buddhist philosophy came to completion by the fifth century A.D. Up to that time, the philosophical tradition of Hīnayāna had continued to be maintained in a perfectly systematized form by the Sarvāstivādin. It had, however, been epistemologically more developed by the representation theory of the Sautrāntika. The Mādhyamika, the earliest Mahāyāna school, founded by Nāgārjuna, had continued to flourish in the fifth century, while the subtlest philosophy of radical idealism, developed by the other Mahāyāna school, the Yogācāra, was given its final touch by Vasubandhu in the fifth century. Until its very end in the twelfth century, Indian Buddhism was represented by these four schools.

Soon after Vasubandhu, the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra philosophies were synthesized by Dignāga (sixth century A.D.)

and Dharmakīrti (seventh century A.D.), who both believed that these two schools shared the same spirit of criticizing Sarvāstivāda realism. Thus, Dharmakīrti carried on the systematizing of a new school, sometimes called Sautrāntika-yogācāra. The other form of syncretism, with which we are now mainly concerned, appeared in the eighth century. Śāntarakṣita and his student, Kamalaśīla, incorporated Yogācāra doctrines and practices into the Mādhyamika system. This new school was called Yogācāra-mādhyamika.

The theory and practice of gradual enlightenment, the other characteristic of the later Mādhyamika Buddhism, may be best illustrated by a historical event which took place in Tibet around 791 A.D. Tibet was then in a period in which it was greatly influenced by Chinese and Indian cultures, among which was early Chinese Zen Buddhism. During the eighth century in Tibet, a Chinese Zen monk called Hva-shan (Mahāyāna) was propounding the theory of sudden enlightenment which maintained that one can attain perfect emancipation instantaneously by means of mystic intuition and without the accumulation of learning, moral merits, and gradual training in meditation. The contemporary Tibetan king, Khri-song sde-tsang, invited Śāntarakṣita, and later Kamalaśīla, to come from India to Tibet. As a result of the Indian acceptance of this imperial invitation, Kamalaśīla, representing the Indian theory of gradual enlightenment, had a public debate with Hva-shan in the monastery of Sam-ye. Kamalaśīla won the debate, causing the waning within Tibet of influences of Chinese Zen in particular, and Chinese culture in general.¹

In the debate, Kamalaśīla argued that a bodhisattva can attain the highest enlightenment only by combining compassion (*karuṇā*), means of approach (*upāya*), and wisdom (*prajñā*), and that it will not occur all of a sudden without a preceding and prolonged training. Closely interrelated with one another, the three ideas of *karuṇā*, *upāya*, and *prajñā* show the way in which an Indian Buddhist trained himself.² Compassion in Buddhist terminology does not mean only sympathy or benevolence, but more importantly stresses the

bodhisattva's ideal of saving all sentient beings: he vows to remain in the world of misery until the last living being is emancipated by his teaching, even though he has already attained to enlightenment and is thereby able to pass into nirvāna at any time he wishes. Compassion, however, prevents a bodhisattva from being satisfied with lesser types of enlightenment with which he could save only a limited number of people. Instead, compassion urges him on to pursue unstintingly an ever-higher enlightenment. Naturally, this pursuit presupposes the spirit of a discerning attitude, by which he discriminates between the lower and higher doctrines of emancipation. This, in its turn, leads to the idea of the stages of Buddhist training, in which a bodhisattva climbs, criticizing and transcending a lower enlightenment in order to reach a higher one. This process of gradual progress is none other than the development of *upāya*, the means of approach.

Critical examination of all religious and philosophical doctrines, Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike, is referred to also by the term *cintamayī prajñā*, or wisdom gained by investigation. This is the second of the three kinds of wisdom which have been taught since the time of early Buddhism, the first and the third being *śrutamayī prajñā* (wisdom gained by learning) and *bhāvanāmāyī prajñā* (wisdom gained by meditation). The three kinds of wisdom, moreover, form the steps of Buddhist practice. Investigation, as the second step, can accommodate the critical spirit of the Mahāyāna and, therefore, the theory of the threefold wisdom is as much favored by later Mahāyāna as by the Hinayāna. Investigation is carried on in two ways: according to the authority of scripture (*āgama*), and according to reasoning (*yukta*). This idea of investigation came to be modified by Mahāyāna into a more elaborate theory called the "four kinds of reliance" (*catur-pratisarana*). A Buddhist student has to rely on the teaching (dharma), but not on a person, i.e., the personality of a teacher; on meaning (*artha*), but not on letters (*vyāñjana*); on a sūtra teaching explicitly what it aims at (*ntārtha*), but not on a sūtra the teaching of which implies a hidden intention

(*neyārtha*); and on penetrating knowledge (*jñāna*), but not on ordinary cognition (*viññāna*).³

In the days of Śāntarakṣita, when all Indian Buddhist philosophical systems had already appeared, a Buddhist student was usually confronted with the problems of which of the four powerful philosophical schools of Buddhism he should choose to follow and how he could create a system in which the four schools would be arranged in the proper order of merit. An important aspect of this tendency was that lower doctrines were not simply rejected, but admitted as steps leading to understanding of the highest one.

Śāntarakṣita begins his *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* by declaring that entities accepted as real and promulgated by Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical schools have in reality no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), and are like a reflection, because they are possessed of neither a unitary nor a plural nature, and because apart from these two kinds of natures there is no other one. What is devoid of an intrinsic nature is nonexistent (cf. v. 1).⁴

Next, he proceeds critically to analyze the following: atman, which is said to be permanent and unitary; nirvāna which the Sarvāstivāda Buddhist regards as an unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), unitary reality; *puṅḡala*, which the Vātsīputrīya Buddhist maintains to be an undefinable self neither identified with nor different from the five components of individuality (*skandha*); ether (*ākāśa*) which the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika hold to be a unitary and all-pervading (*vyāpin*) reality; a gross entity called "whole," (*avayavin*) which the same schools consider to be a reality inherent in a gross thing, say a jar, while different from all its parts; atoms (*paramāṇu*) which are not only found in many non-Buddhist schools, but also are accepted by both the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika Buddhists, who maintain them to be the minimum, indivisible units of matter; and so forth. Śāntarakṣita points out that these so-called "real entities" turn out, on examination, to have neither a unitary nor plural nature, and that they are therefore nonexistent (cf. vv. 2-13). We shall

not be concerned here with details of his arguments against the existence of these entities but will rather refer briefly to some of his criticisms which have direct bearing on our main subject.

Permanent entities such as *ātman*, *pradhāna* (primordial matter which the Sāṃkhya asserts to be the world-cause), and *nirvāna* as it is maintained by the Sarvāstivādin, can be all repudiated also from the point of view of causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*), besides which they are pursued by the logic of the dichotomy of unity and plurality. Since Dharmakīrti, it has been an established truth that the criterion of existence is causal efficiency. What is permanent and unchangeable is incapable of action (i.e., has no causal efficiency) and, therefore, it is not existent (cf. v. 8).

The Sarvāstivādin regards *pratisamkhyānirodha* (cessation obtained by thorough knowledge) or *nirvāna* as an unconditioned, unitary reality which permanently exists independently of cognition grasping it, but which, however, can be intuited by the true wisdom a *yogin* acquires through meditation practice. *Sāntaraksita*, however, contends that *nirvāna* cannot be single, insofar as it is related to the flux of successively arising momentary cognitions. If the nature of *nirvāna*, which has been known by an intuitive cognition, continues to exist even when another intuitive cognition occurs following the former, then these two cognitions, having the same object, would not be distinguishable from each other. On the contrary, if one and the same nature of *nirvāna* is not known by these two successive cognitions, *nirvāna* would be as much momentary as ordinary cognition. How then could it be called an unconditioned entity, which is to say, a permanent, unchangeable entity? (cf. vv. 3-5).

As for the view regarding atoms as unitary, minimum units of matter, there are various theories about the way in which atoms are united together to form a gross body. Some say that they are in contact with one another; some say that they are gathered together with intervals remaining between them; others say that they are in close contiguity, there being

neither contact nor intervals between them. Irrespective of the way in which atoms are gathered together, *Sāntaraksita* argues, the existence of atoms cannot be established. When an atom is surrounded by other atoms in the ten directions, is the atom in the center of a unitary nature or of a plural nature? If it faces the atom in the front by the single nature, at the same time facing the other nine atoms by the same nature, then all the ten atoms would occupy one and the same spot (i.e., the front spot). Resulting from this view, a gross thing such as a mountain would be reduced to the size of one atom, which is ridiculous. If the opponent wishes to avoid this absurdity, saying that the atom in the center faces the ten surrounding atoms by its ten natures (i.e., its ten segments), then the atom would have a plural nature (or many segments). Thus, the unity of the nature of an atom as well as its indivisibility would not stand careful scrutiny. This view goes against the idea of the atom which considers it as the minimum unit of matter (cf. vv. 11-13).⁵

All substances and ultimate factors which opponent schools claim to be unitary, noncomposite realities are, by critical scrutiny, seen to be plural in nature. Since unity forms the very essence of the idea of ultimate realities, the opponents are not in a position to admit their plurality or compositeness. As a result, ultimate realities prove to be neither unitary nor plural in nature, which means that they are not existent at all. Many of *Sāntaraksita*'s arguments are based upon those made by preceding *Yogācāra* philosophers, especially *Vasubandhu* and *Dharmakīrti*.

The Sarvāstivādin maintains the eighteen cognitive categories (*aṣṭadaśadhātu*, or six organs of cognition, six kinds of objects, and six kinds of consciousness) as rigorously comprehending all phenomena. *Sāntaraksita* criticizes the Sarvāstivādin position, saying that if atoms do not exist, ten out of the eighteen categories are condemned to be nonexistent, because the five sense organs and the five kinds of external objects are said by the Sarvāstivādin to consist of atoms. If they are nonexistent, the other eight (mental faculty, its ob-

jects or ideas, and six kinds of consciousness) are also unreal, since their reality is recognized only in relation to the foregoing ten categories. Thus, all their preferred realities do not withstand the scrutiny of the Mādhyamika (cf. vv. 14–15).

Now, Śāntarakṣita classifies philosophical systems under two groups: one is dualism (*dvaya-naya*) in which the grasping (*grāhaka*, cognition) and the grasped (*grāhya*, cognitum) or mind and matter, respectively, are both admitted to be real. This categorization includes the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika philosophies. The other group is nondualism (*advaya-naya*) represented by the Yogācāra philosophy which maintains the existence of mind only. Śāntarakṣita further subdivides dualism into the theory of cognition without images (*anākārajñānavāda*) as is maintained by the Sarvāstivāda, and that of cognition with images as is represented by the Sautrāntika.⁶

The principle of the Sarvāstivāda philosophy is an analysis of a whole into its constituents. It maintains that only elemental factors are real, whereas a whole composed of those factors is unreal. For example, individual trees which constitute a forest are alone real, while the forest is not. In the same way, the world as it is cognized by us is dissected into three factors, viz., consciousness, cognitive faculty, and object of cognition. An ultimate reality is an elemental factor which possesses one particular nature and function. It never has two or more natures and functions; if so, it could be further divided. Thus, consciousness only illumines; the cognitive organ merely perceives; and the object, having its form, is merely cognized. The Sarvāstivādin is led to the conclusion that consciousness is pure illumination and that, like a clean crystal, it does not undergo any morphological transformation, that is to say, it does not contain an image or representation when it cognizes an external object.⁷ The form of a cognition belongs not to consciousness, but to an external object. If we cognize a book, for example, the book is seen as having the form of a book; our visual faculty sees it, and our consciousness illuminates or understands. In the terminology

of Indian philosophy, this kind of theory is called *anākārajñānavāda*, or a theory that knowledge is not endowed with an image.

What is contrary to this is the Sautrāntika theory that knowledge is endowed with the image of its object. This is called *sākārajñānavāda*. The Sautrāntika admits the existence of the external world, but, he says, it is not perceptible. Its existence is postulated or inferred since, when a cognition takes place, there must be something external that causes or stimulates the cognition. An external object, as a cause, throws its form into our consciousness or knowledge, which is the effect. What knowledge knows is the image of the object, or a representation in our mind itself. When we see a book, what we are actually seeing as the book is in reality the representation in our own mind, since the book external to us is never seen, remaining always as "something." The reason the Sautrāntika believes in the existence of an imperceptible external world is that unless something is externally existent, we cannot explain why a particular cognition occurs only at a particular place and time, and not always and everywhere. To the Sautrāntika, what determines a cognition in nature, space, and time is an external reality.

When examining the Sarvāstivāda's *anākārajñānavāda*, Śāntarakṣita points out the essential difference between knowledge and matter. Matter, being insentient and unconscious, requires something else—a sentient being having consciousness—in order to be known. On the other hand, knowledge is a quality of consciousness and does not depend on other things for its manifestation, but is illuminated by its own self, being likened unto a lamp. Moreover, the self-illuminating function of knowledge is not construed as a relation of the agent and its action, since there are in reality no parts such as cognizer, cognitum, and cognition in knowledge. Thus, cognition is not that which occurs from the interaction of two or three different things, but rather is of itself self-cognition (*svasamvedana*). If, as the Sarvāstivādin says, consciousness has no image of its object, how can a

material object be known? Since matter is totally different in nature from consciousness, the Sarvāstivādin can establish no relation whatsoever between the two. Besides, if consciousness always remains the selfsame amorphous state when it cognizes various objects, how can we distinguish between the cognition of a blue object and that of a yellow one? (cf. vv. 16-17).⁸

To give a decisive blow to the *anākārajñānavāda*, Śāntarākṣita refers to the *sākārajñānavāda*, which, he thinks, surpasses the former in merit. According to the latter theory, the cognition of an external object, as a cause, throws its image into knowing. This image, as an effect, is part and parcel of knowing. The image, which belongs to knowing, is cognized by the same knowledge. Thus, what is figuratively called the cognition of an external object is none other than the self-cognition of knowledge (cf. vv. 20-21).⁹

With regard to the Sautrāntika theory of *sākārajñāna*, however, Śāntarākṣita sets forth a question. Whereas it is an established fact that knowledge is a unitary, incomposite modality, and the image thrown into it by an external reality is always manifold like a varicolored picture, how can the Sautrāntika claim an identical relationship between the unitary knowledge and the plural images? (cf. vv. 22-23).¹⁰ Without proving the case for making such an identity, he cannot assert that the image is cognized by knowledge. Śāntarākṣita insists that since knowledge is unitary, an image in it cannot be plural in nature, which contradicts our experience, and that if an image is variegated, knowledge cannot be unitary, which is again not the case.

Regarding this difficult problem, opponents of Śāntarākṣita, including the Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika, try to solve the contradiction by resorting to similes. Their arguments can be outlined as follows. When a needle rapidly penetrates many petals of a lotus flower, it seems to have done so at once, although in actuality it has pierced one petal after another in succession. A torch that is whirled quickly gives rise to the untrue conception (*bhṛānti*) of a circle of fire

(cf. v. 24).¹¹ In the same way, no matter how variegated an image may be, we nonetheless come to have the wrong conception of a single image because its parts are seen in quick succession. Śāntarākṣita, however, makes his opponent silent by citing contrary examples. Even if the words *latā* and *tālā* or *sarāḥ* and *rasāḥ* are pronounced in quick succession, they are heard separately and distinctly without being heard simultaneously and understood confusedly in meaning (cf. v. 25).¹² Purely conceptual cognitions not accompanied by perceptions occur in rapid succession, each lasting only for a moment. Why do they not form one unitary cognition if a rapid succession gives the wrong concept of simultaneity? The same thing can be said of all cognitions (cf. v. 26).¹³ The examples of a whirled torch and needled lotus petals are not warrantable either. The erroneous cognition of a circle of fire is not a creation of memory joining together the past perceptions, because the circle is seen very clearly, whereas the object of memory cannot be seen clearly. Therefore, the error is made not by conceptual cognition or memory but by the sense organ which has been confused by the quick succession of objects. In the case of needled lotus petals, the wise will easily determine that they are pierced not simultaneously but successively, just as many copper plates can only be pierced one after another. Thus, the opponents should not say that a quick succession of perceptions gives birth to the wrong conception (*vikalpa*) of a single perception (cf. vv. 27-30).¹⁴

Some of the Sautrāntikas contend that just as different kinds of perceptions—visual, auditory, and so forth—occur at the same time, even many of the same kind of perceptions can occur simultaneously. That is to say, while we see a picture, as many visual perceptions as there are colors in the picture (e.g., blue, white, red) arise at once. Each perception, having a part of the varicolored picture as its object, manifests a single image, and many perceptions occurring simultaneously form the whole of the varicolored picture. Thus, there is no incompatibility between the plurality of the image and the unity of the cognition (cf. v. 31).¹⁵

Sāntarakṣita argues against them as follows. If you once begin to divide an image into components of white, blue, and so forth, then you have to continue to divide even the part of white into many sections until you reach the minimum units, which are nothing less than atoms. But atoms are perceived by none of us (cf. vv. 32-33).¹⁶ The Sautrāntika cannot elude this difficulty, because he himself has an established theory that the five kinds of sense cognition have aggregates (of atoms) as their object.¹⁷ The sixth, or mental cognition (*manovijñāna*) cognizes feeling (*vedanā*), ideation (*saṃjñā*), or volition (*saṃskāra*) always together with consciousness (*citta*); as the result, a mental cognition is also plural in nature (cf. v. 34). After all, the Sautrāntika cannot solve the problem of the incompatibility between the singleness of cognition and the plurality of its image.

The Yogācārin, a radical idealist, asserts that the Sautrāntika postulation of an external reality is an unnecessary complication. We can explain cognition without supposing the existence of matter. Just as some cognitions appear to us in a dream without there being any external things causing those cognitions, so latent impressions (*vāsanā*) accumulated in our mind since the beginningless past, when they ripen, can give rise to representations in our knowledge. What we usually consider as an external object is in reality none other than an image in knowledge. Mind perceives its own image, which is caused not by an external reality, as the Sautrāntika holds, but by the preceding moments of mind. However, the Yogācārin's epistemology is not very different from the Sautrāntika doctrine of *sākārajñāna*, except that the former does not postulate the imperceptible external reality, preferring instead the doctrine of the preceding moments of mind.

Sāntarakṣita greatly appreciates the Yogācāra doctrine as based both on scripture and reasoning.¹⁸ Candidly, he admits that he himself owes many of his arguments to the Yogācārin. This opinion seems to be one of the reasons he is called a Yogācāra-mādhvamika. So long as he argues against both non-Buddhist and Buddhist dualists, Sāntarakṣita freely

employs Yogācāra theories. However, he is not completely satisfied with the Yogācāra standpoint of philosophy. Sāntarakṣita asks: Is an image or representation in mind real or not? If this image is real and true, the Yogācārin cannot escape the same dilemma into which the Sautrāntika has fallen, which is to say, he is confronted by the problem of how unitary knowledge can have a variegated image which is plural in nature as its perceptual object (cf. v. 46).

Whether an image in mind is real or not is a decisive problem which caused a schism in the Yogācāra school. One group, named Satyākāravādin ("one who asserts images to be true"; also called Sākāravādin), claimed that an image is as real and true as the essence of knowledge or the two are inseparable on the grounds that an absolutely unreal image cannot come into existence. The other group, named Alīkāravādin ("one who asserts images to be false"; also called Anākāravādin), dividing cognition into essential and subordinate parts, held that what is absolutely real is only the illuminating function (*prakāśamātra*) that is the essence of cognition; moreover, an image illuminated by it is a false fiction which disappears when one is enlightened. For example, we need only but consider the case in which a cognition is erroneously produced when we look at a shell on the beach and mistake it for silver, and then our mistake is sublated a moment later by a correct image of the shell coming to mind. An image in a dream is cancelled when one awakes. If an image can be negated by another, we must reason that the image must be in general untrue. The illuminating function of cognition, on the other hand, is never contradicted by any other thing, because it always remains the same illumination whether images illuminated by it are cancelled or not. Ratnakarāśānti (eleventh century A.D.), who is a later exponent of this theory, further argues that if all images are essential to cognition and are as true as the pure illumination, all people cognizing real images become, as a result, Buddhas, and that no distinction between enlightened and deluded persons would be possible.¹⁹ The Satyākāravādin, like Jñāna-

śrīmītra (eleventh century A.D.), contends that a deluded person always interprets an image by conceptual thinking (*adhyaśāyā* = *vikalpa*), whereas an enlightened one is bereft of concepts which are the cause of erroneous cognition; and that, therefore, a discrimination can be made between a Buddha and an ordinary man despite the fact that both have images in common.²⁰

To return to Śāntaraksita's criticism of the Satyākāravādayogācārin, he questions whether images caused by the ripening of latent impressions in mind are as much real as the essence of cognition. The Yogācārin is also driven to a dilemma in which he has to admit either the plurality of cognition or the unity of the image. Suppose that cognition and an image are inseparable; if the image is not manifold, movement in one part of the world of cognition would cause the whole world to move, and yellow in one part would dye all the rest yellow (cf. v. 47). If the Yogācārin tries to escape this absurdity, he has to contradict the unity of cognition by confessing the manifoldness of its image, which is inseparable from the essence of cognition. Since either case involves incompatibility, we should conclude that cognition and its images are separate and distinct things (cf. v. 46).

Some of the Satyākāravādins contend, as the Sautrāntikas have done, that many of the same kind of perceptions, which are images, can occur at one and the same time, just as different kinds of cognitions arise simultaneously. And since many cognitions, each of which has one image, occur at once, the manifoldness of the image is explained without contradicting the singleness of cognition.²¹

Śāntaraksita, however, points out that their theory is contrary to canonical traditions. One sūtra says that it is impossible for two minds to occur simultaneously;²² another sūtra, that every sentient being is but one stream of cognition. The opponent may contend that these passages refer to the *ālayavijñāna* (basic consciousness) which exists singly in each sentient being, but not to ordinary cognitions (*pravṛttivijñāna*), two or more of which can arise simultaneously. Śān-

taraksita says that the Yogācārin cannot refer to the *ālayavijñāna* as a single entity because, according to his own tradition, it manifests itself as a body with cognitive organs, their objects, and environments.²³ Moreover, Dharmakīrti, the most revered master of Yogācāra philosophy, says that cognitions of the same kind, such as two visual perceptions or two concepts, never arise together, although different kinds of cognitions may occur simultaneously.²⁴ And, finally, the opponent should not have recourse to a random argumentation disregarding his own tradition.²⁵

Regarding the sūtra passage, however, the Yogācārin proposes another interpretation. The word "one" in the passage can be synonymous with "mere" or "only" without meaning a numeral. Hence, what the passage intends to say is that every sentient being consists of mind only, being bereft of a soul (*ātman*) and those things which belong to it (*ātmyā*), or being bereft of the dichotomy of the grasping and the grasped (*grāhaka, grāhya*). With the passage being so understood, there is no incompatibility in the *ālayavijñāna* manifesting itself as various forms, since no idea of "one-mind" which may contradict variety is found there.²⁶

Against this improved interpretation, Śāntaraksita demonstrates a unique critique which has added much to his credit. If knowledge were admitted by the Satyākāravādin to consist of parts as many as the number of its variegated forms, then it would be difficult for him to avert the same kind of criticism which is made regarding the reality of atoms (cf. v. 49). A dilemma ensues from the idea of atoms: an atom, if it is combined with other atoms situated around it by its many natures (or segments), presupposes its being many-natured (or many-sided), which contradicts the idea of atom as a unitary entity. On the contrary, if an atom has only one nature (or does not have many segments), a number of atoms collected together would occupy one and the same spot, which would reduce a gross thing to the size of an atom (cf. note 5). In the Yogācārin's argument, many images in knowledge must be further divided until they finally become cognitive atoms, the

idea of which necessarily faces exactly the same dilemma as material atoms. The Yogācārin, who maintains the reality of images, cannot contend that cognition is bodiless (*amūrta*) and that, therefore, a criticism directed to material bodies should not be applied to cognition. Since the Yogācārin recognizes the reality of cognition alone, a cognition which appears having extended images is not different from a bodily thing.²⁷

Having refuted the Satyākāravāda-yogācārin, Śāntarakṣita deals next with the Alikākāravāda-yogācārin's theory. According to the latter, in the highest truth (*paramārtha*) cognition is, like a clean crystal, not stained by images;²⁸ images are manifested erroneously by the force of the ripening of perverted latent impressions accumulated in the mind, just as visions of a horse and an elephant are conjured up from a lump of clay by uttering a magical formula (cf. v. 52). Since an image is an unreal or false manifestation, this school seems to succeed in freeing itself from the incompatibility between a unitary cognition and a plural image.

Śāntarakṣita, however, puts forward a question. If images are unreal, how can they be perceived so clearly as experienced by us? In other words, how does one explain the fact that aside from images, we do not perceive illuminating cognition alone (cf. v. 53)? Where there is no object, we do not obtain its cognition. An unreal image neither has the nature of knowledge nor the efficiency to cause knowledge endowed with its image, and is like a flower in the sky and the horns of a horse (cf. vv. 55-56). Thus, the Alikākāravādin's assertion that unreal images are manifested is simply untenable. Furthermore, we do not find any relation which connects the real but unmanifested illumination of cognition and the unreal but manifested images. If the relation of identity (*svabhāva*) is admitted, it would follow that the image is as real as the illumination of cognition, or that the illumination is unreal as much as the image. Nor is a causal relation (*tadūpatti*) possible between the two, because this relation presupposes difference in time of a cause and its effect,

whereas the illumination and the image occur simultaneously (cf. v. 57). If an image has no cause, it is difficult to explain why it is only manifested from time to time, and not continuously. But if it has a cause, then it is as real as the *ālaya-vijñāna* which also has the nature depending on its cause or its preceding moments (*paratantrasvabhāva*). The image appearing because of latent impressions is not entirely unreal, just as a white shell will appear as yellow to one who suffers from jaundice, in which case the perceived shell is not totally unreal (cf. v. 60).

Neither the Satyākāravāda- nor the Alikākāravāda-yogācārin has been able to explain the reason a unitary cognition appears with a plural image. Having scrutinized the so-called realities proposed by the Sarvāstivādin, Sautrāntika, and Yogācārin by means of the dichotomy of unity and plurality, Śāntarakṣita declares that everything, mental as well as material, turns out on examination to have neither a unitary nor a plural nature, and that no entity is real in the sense of the highest truth, though its existence may be admitted in the sense of conventional truth (*samvṛti*) (cf. vv. 62-63).

An opponent raises a question. If everything is empty of an intrinsic nature, would not even unwise people understand the truth, as they easily know the absence of a jar from a particular place? Śāntarakṣita answers: Because they are deluded by their wrong habit of imagining things as real, they cannot understand the truth by perception, just as they do not perceive that everything is in actuality perishing at every moment (*kṣaṅkatva*). The truth of emptiness, therefore, is to be understood through inference based on sound probans by those who have shaken off false imagination, unless they are yogins who, being endowed with supernormal insight, can grasp the truth by perception (cf. vv. 73-75).

The opponent further contends that if everything is empty of an intrinsic nature, a syllogism, its component members, and its verbal expression are not established. Unless Śāntarakṣita states a proof for his thesis of emptiness, the thesis remains unproved; but if such a proof is stated, then his

assertion that everything is nonexistent fails, since the proof least must be existent.

To this objection, Śāntarakṣita replies as follows: Insofar as logic is concerned, he does not have recourse to a particular doctrine of his own school, but he uses terms as they are generally understood by the wise and the unwise equally. An inference must be manipulated in the domain of ordinary verbal usage (*vjāvahāra*), otherwise two parties engaged in discussion would not have a common ground of discourse. Logic is demonstrated and has its effect in the world of practical knowledge, and the Mādhyamika does not deny the practical function of logic if he knows that probans and probandum are not existent in the sense of the highest truth (cf. vv. 76-77).

The question of the incompatibility between universal emptiness and its demonstration by logic and words is an old one which all Mādhyamikas since Nāgārjuna have met with.²⁹ Another traditional criticism of the philosophy of emptiness is that the Mādhyamika, in denying everything, is identical with a nihilist (*naśtīka*) who denies causality, both moral and physical.

Śāntarakṣita briefly but persuasively argues against the criticism. Although everything is in reality free from the manifold fiction of human ideas (*prapañca*), unwise people are attached to both imagined existence and nonexistence. This fact itself makes us infer that in the minds of people there are seeds or latent impressions accumulated by the succession of deeds and rebirths occurring since the beginningless past, and that it is those seeds, and not external things, which cause ideas and images of both an existent and a nonexistent to appear. As is known to us all, ideas arise not at once, but in succession. This fact is contrary to the nihilist opinion that things occur without cause as much as it is against the metaphysical opinion that there is a permanent cause of the world such as *īśvara* (god) or *pradhāna* (the world-cause of the Sāṃkhya), because things arising gradually cannot be produced accidentally without causes, nor have they a permanent, self-identical cause. The existence of such

seeds postulates our past and future lives. Therefore, the Mādhyamika, unlike nihilists and those who maintain the existence of an ultimate cause, can establish causal relation by logic in the domain of conventional truth. The possibility of emancipation by means of insight into emptiness is proved by the Mādhyamika (cf. vv. 79-83).

With regard to moral and physical entities established in the sense of conventional truth by the Mādhyamika, it is asked if they are to be considered as ideas or as external realities. Śāntarakṣita on this occasion introduces the interpretative positions of two divisions of the Mādhyamika. The one group, whom Kamalaśīla, the commentator on the *Mādhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti*, explains as followers of Bhāvaviveka, maintains that the Buddhas have taught the theory of mind-only to repudiate the existence of a soul which is conjoined up by non-Buddhist philosophers as the subject of actions (*kartr*) and the enjoyer of their fruits (*bhoktr*). This opinion of the one group of Mādhyamikas is tantamount to saying that external things can be as real as mind insofar as conventional truth is concerned, although the soul must be denied. Therefore, this group of Mādhyamikas is closer to a Buddhist dualist, in this case, to the Sautrāntika, in admitting the existence of an external reality in the sense of conventional truth.

The other group is in favor of Yogācāra doctrine, arguing that an object of cognition is not an external reality, and that the Sautrāntika postulation of the external world as the cause which bestows an image into mind is untenable. They follow the Yogācārin who has replaced such an external reality by the immediately preceding moment of mind containing an impression or seed as the cause of the image of the present moment of mind; furthermore, they think that sutras such as the *Saṃdhitirmocana*, the fundamental scripture of Yogācāra philosophy, must be relied on by the Mādhyamika, too. This group of Mādhyamikas wishes to interpret the world of conventional truth according to the Yogācāra idealism (cf. vv. 91-93).³⁰

Even the standpoint of Yogācāra philosophy, however,

must be transcended by people with deeper insight when the highest truth is in question. It is necessary for them to examine the doctrine of mind-only by the logic of unity and plurality in order to know the unreality of mind from the view of the highest truth.

Śāntaraksīta summarizes the process of his investigation of Buddhist philosophies in verse:

Based on [the standpoint of] mind-only, one must know the nonexistence of external entities; based on this [standpoint of emptiness], one must know that an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) is really lacking even in mind. (v. 92)

The three stages of epistemological investigation counted in this verse can be increased to five when the whole process of the foregoing discussions is taken into account: (1) the Sarvāstivāda stage, in which external realities are recognized as much as mental ones; (2) the Sautrāntika stage, in which mental images are regarded as objects of cognition and the external world is reduced to the imperceptible cause of cognition; (3) the Satyākāravāda-yogācāra philosophy, which, replacing the external world by impressions in mind, asserts that the image in mind is as real as the illumination of mind; (4) the Alīkāravāda-yogācāra epistemology, which admits the reality of the illumination of mind alone, rejecting images as false; (5) the Mādhyamika theory of emptiness, which denies even the existence of the illumination of mind.

Śāntaraksīta traces his own theory back to the following two verses of Nāgārjuna:

Here nothing is produced, nothing is annihilated either; appearance and disappearance take place only in our knowledge. The four material elements (*mahābhūta*) taught [by philosophers] are in fact reduced to cognition. If seen from [a standpoint in which] cognition is shaken off, is it not true that it [or cognition] is human imagination too?²¹

A talented disciple of Śāntaraksīta, Kamalaśīla, who spent the latter half of his life in Tibet, wrote three *Bhāvānā-*

kramas, in which he gave a succinct summarization of the philosophy and meditation practice of his teacher. The following is a translation of some important portions of the first *Bhāvānākrama*, together with interpretations.

... Or one should examine [various theories] by reasoning (*yukti*) in the following way. All existent things are either material or mental. Of these, material things, such as a jar, have no single nature since they are characterized as being [composed of] different [particles when examined] in view of atoms. But it is neither possible that they, being a collection of many atoms, are of a plural nature, for atoms surrounding [an atom in the center] in the front, in the back, and so forth, must be necessarily divided into many sides like the front, the back, and so on, and cease to be atoms [since they lose indivisibility as the essential nature of an atom]. Apart from a single and plural nature, there is no other which can be called the intrinsic nature of a thing. Therefore, seen from the standpoint of the highest truth, these material things are empty of any intrinsic nature just like things seen in a dream and other [illusory cognitions] [p. 202, 1.12, to p. 203, 1.2].

Mental things also, when examined in the same way, prove to be empty of any intrinsic nature. For the fact that external things such as blue are nonexistent leads us necessarily to admit that the mental groups, beginning with cognition, are manifested in the forms of a blue thing, etc. [p. 203, 1.6-10].

Then, these [mentals] cannot be of a single nature because they appear with various images such as blue, etc., or with the dichotomized images of subject and object. Since unity and plurality are incompatible, [a mental] which is single cannot have a plural image. And when a nature of unity is not established, a nature of plurality cannot possibly be [ascribed to the mental], for plurality means the collection of single entities.

Or one may suppose that all these images of color-form, and so on, appear in it [i.e., in mind], although they are actually unreal (*alīka*). If so, however, cognition itself would be judged as unreal, because cognition is not separated from the nature of these [images]. Aside from the nature of the [images] manifested from [cognition] itself, no other nature of cognition is to

be found. And color-form, and so on, are not manifested by themselves (since they do not exist as separate things from cognition). When these things which by nature belong to cognition are unreal, we must admit that all cognitions are unreal as well. This is the reason why the Blessed One taught that cognition is like illusion.

Thus it is concluded that everything in the world is unreal as seen from the standpoint of the highest truth, because everything is empty of an intrinsic nature, either unitary or plural. [p. 203, 1.12, to p. 204, 1.3]

It is obvious that Kamalaśīla, following Śāntarakṣita, criticizes Bahirarthavādins (those who admit the existence of external things) or the Sarvāstivādin and the Sautrāntika on the one hand, and the Yogācārin on the other. It is also clear that the Yogācārin is classified into Satyākāravādin and Alākāravādin. While arguing in this way, Kamalaśīla cites many verses from the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* as an authority, a reliance on which he shares with Śāntarakṣita and Ratnākaraśānti. It seems that this sūtra, which was compiled after the establishing of basic Yogācāra doctrines and which was written with an intention to synthesize Mādhyamika and Yogācāra doctrines, suggested to later Mādhyamika philosophers a method whereby to accord a proper rank to each of the Buddhist philosophical systems.

Śāntarakṣita, in writing the *Madhyamakālamkāraṭṭhi*, did not say much about meditation practice, because the work was primarily concerned with philosophical viewpoints. Kamalaśīla, on the other hand, wrote his *Bhāvanākramas* with intentions to initiate Tibetan Buddhists into the stages of meditation practice whereby to climb up gradually one stage after another in order, finally, to attain perfect enlightenment. Besides, the *Bhāvanākramas* were written just after Kamalaśīla had won the famous controversy at Sam-ye mentioned earlier. Thus, the books mainly consist of descriptions of the meanings and methods of meditation practice.

In brief, the process of the practice of Mahāyāna Buddhists is as follows: A yogin is exhorted to acquire three kinds of

wisdom: *śrutamayi* (wisdom by learning), *cintāmayi* (wisdom by investigation), and *bhāvanāmayi prajñā* (wisdom by meditation). The second kind of wisdom (*cintāmayi*) consists of investigation by reasoning (*yukti*) and by reference to authority of scripture (*āgama*), and discrimination between the implicit (*neyārtha*) and explicit meaning (*nītārtha*) of the teachings in the sūtras, and so on. Meditation, the basis of the third kind of wisdom, is practiced in the following way:

(1) by mastering *śamatha* or the tranquilization of mind through the observation of moral and yogic rules, nine stages of *śamatha*, four dhyanas, and so on; then (2) by *vipaśyanā* (analysis of the object of meditation from the point of view of what has been studied by investigation). The importance of *vipaśyanā* has been stressed especially by Mahāyānists. In the practice of tranquilization, they say, there is not much difference between non-Buddhists, Hinayānists, and Mahāyānists alike, but what makes Mahāyāna meditation different from others is the doctrine that is investigated and the analysis of the meditative object. Furthermore, Mahāyāna Buddhists believe that obstructions to emancipation consisting of moral defilements and false knowledge cannot be annihilated merely by tranquilization, and that analysis is also necessary. When a yogin succeeds in mastering both tranquilization and analysis, he proceeds to practice both simultaneously. This is called (3) *śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddha*. When he succeeds in this last meditation, he is placed in the preliminary stage called *adhimuktīcaryābhūmi* for the ten stages of bodhisattva. In each of the following ten stages, he repeats *śamatha*, *vipaśyanā*, and *yuganaddha* to annihilate his defilements more completely and to attain to wisdom regarding various doctrines and supernatural powers. After completing these ten stages of a bodhisattva, he finally attains Buddhahood.

The investigations of various philosophical systems, Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist, are made chiefly in two places of the foregoing process. The yogin does it when he strives for acquiring *cintāmayi prajñā* before entering into meditative

practice itself. In this stage, he, as a philosopher, uses his knowledge of epistemology and logic to criticize different doctrines of non-Buddhist and Hinayāna systems of philosophy and, in so doing, becomes sure of the supremacy of Mahāyāna, especially Mādhyamika philosophy. Secondly, when he practices *vipaśyanā*, he meditates on each of the doctrines of the four Buddhist schools, according to a method taught in the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra*² and other sūtras. He visualizes the whole world as consisting of the eighteen categories of factors, (i.e., six objects, six cognitive organs, and six cognitions) according to the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika systems which recognize the existence of external realities. Then, transcending this theory, he enters into that of the Yogācāra school and sees the world as the representations of his own mind alone. Lastly he goes beyond this theory, seeing that even the mind is empty of an intrinsic nature and realizing that the world is nonexistent in the sense of the highest truth, as the Mādhyamika teaches.

Besides this lucid description of the combination of philosophy and meditation, we owe another matter to Kamalaśīla that is very important to our present study. His interpretation throws much light on the just-mentioned three verses from the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra*, no matter how different it may be from the original meaning of the verses. As cited by Kamalaśīla, the verses read:

cittamātram samāruhya bāhyam artham na kalpayeti;
tathatālabhane (1) sthivā cittamātram atikramet. (v. 256)
cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam (2) atikramet;
nirābhāse (3) sthito yogi mahāyānam sa paśyati. (v. 257)
anābhogagatih śāntā pranādhānair viśodhita;
jñānam nirātmakam śreṣṭham nirābhāseṇa (4)
paśyati. (v. 258)

In the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* and the *Madhyamakālam-kāravṛtti*—if the Tibetan translation is correct in the latter—v. 258d reads: *nirābhāse na paśyati*. And when it is cited

by Ratnakaraśānti in his *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*, it reads: *theḡ pa chen pos [poʃ] mthon bar hgyur = mahāyānam sa paśyati*.³

As will be seen from the following translation of Kamalaśīla's interpretation, he reads particular meanings at least in four words in these verses. According to him, *tathatālabhane* in v. 256c means *advayalaksane tathatālabhane* (1); *nirābhāsam* in v. 257b, *dvayanirābhāsam* (2); *nirābhāse* in v. 257c, *advayajñānanirābhāse jñāne* (3); and *nirābhāseṇa* in v. 258d, *advayanirābhāseṇa jñāneṇa* (4). Here (1) *tathatālabhane* and (2) *dvayanirābhāsa* refer to the illumination bereft of images (*prakāśamātra*) maintained by the Alākāravādayogācāra school, while *advaya(jñāna)-nirābhāsa-jñāna* that appears in (3) and (4) refers to the absolute emptiness asserted by the later Mādhyamika as meaning that which exceeds the *prakāśamātra* of the Alākāravādin, in spite of the same *nirābhāsa* that recurs in the sūtra itself.

If we understand the progress in epistemological stages according to Kamalaśīla's interpretation, it becomes clear that *cittamātra* at the very beginning of v. 256 must mean not Yogācāravāda in general, but rather the standpoint of the Satyākāravāda. The original verses could be interpreted in this way; but we cannot ascribe such an intention to the author of the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra*, the compilation of which occurs centuries before the controversy between the Satyākāravādin and Alākāravādin.

Interpreting in this way, Kamalaśīla succeeds in making these three verses correspond to the theory of gradual transcendence of Buddhist epistemologies, which he as well as his teacher maintains. This will be clear from the following translation.

Concerning this, the stages of meditation on wisdom are taught in brief in the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra*:

Having ascended [the truth of] mind-[with-images] only, the yogin should not imagine external objects [to be existent]; abiding in the meditation having as its object suchness [or il-

illumination marked by the absence of cognizer- and cognition-parts], he ought to go beyond mind-[with-images] only. (v. 256)

Having thus gone beyond even mind-[with-images] only, he should go also beyond [the illumination] without the manifestation [of the two parts]; abiding thus in the nonmanifestation [of the illumination without the two parts], the yogin intuits [the truth of] the Great Vehicle. (v. 257)

He attains an effortless state [of mind], quiescent and purified by his vows; by means of the nonmanifestation [of the illumination without the two parts] he regards what was [formerly considered] the highest knowledge as devoid of its nature. (v. 258)

The meaning of these lines is as follows: In the first stage, the yogin should examine those material things which other people imagine to be external objects. Are they different from cognition or are they mere manifestations of cognition itself, as it is the case with [images seen] in the state of a dream? If they are external to cognition, examine them in view of atoms. When the yogin investigates, analyzing atoms into their segments, he does not find [the existence of] those objects. It occurs to him who is not seeing [the reality of atoms] that all things [in the world] are mind-only, external objects being totally nonexistent. This is the reason why it is said: Having ascended to [the truth of] mind-only, the yogin should not imagine external objects [to be existent]. It advises him to abandon [the habit of] imagining the existence of material things, because all conditions of their perception being satisfied, they are not seen because of his [careful] examination.³⁴

Having revealed [the unreality of] material things, he then should consider immaterial things. As for what is called "mind-only," he should think that when there is no object, the subject which is in relation to the object cannot exist either; and, therefore, that the mind is devoid of subject and object, that is to say, the mind is without duality [*advaya*]. Abiding thus in the [meditation] having "suchness" as its object and being characterized by nonduality, he should go beyond that "mind-only" too. It means that he should, surpassing the image of subject, abide in the knowledge of nonduality in which the two [subject and object-parts] are not manifested.

Having thus surpassed "mind-only," he would go beyond

even the knowledge without manifestations of the two [images]. For this he should think that things arise neither from their own selves nor from other things and that when subject and object are unreal [*alīka*], the mind, being not different [from the two], cannot be true, either. Here, too, he must abandon attachment to ascribing reality to the cognition of nonduality [*advayajñāna*], and he must abide in the knowledge of nonmanifestation of even nondual knowledge [*advayajñānārabhāsa-jñāna*].

In this way he becomes established in the understanding of the lack of intrinsic nature of everything. Abiding in it, he enters into the nonconceptual concentration [*nirvikalpa-samādhi*] because he enters into the highest truth. When the yogin abides in the knowledge of nonmanifestation of nondual knowledge, he, being established in the highest truth, sees [the truth of] the Great Vehicle. (p. 210, 1.7-p. 211, 1.20)

... Concentration [*samādhi*] is not of the nature of complete darkness, but marked [only] by one-pointedness of mind. Since it is said that one in the state of concentration intuits things as they really are, concentration is surely in accordance with insight [*prajñā*], but it is not contrary [to insight, i.e., it is not of the nature of ignorance]. Therefore, when one in the state of concentration examines with insight, he intuits the nonmanifestation of all things; this is the highest nonmanifestation [*paramo'nupalambha*]. The yogin's stage so characterized is called an effortless state [*anābhogagati*], because in it he has nothing more to see beyond it. It is called quiescent, because there manifold discourse [*prapañca*], marked by concepts such as existence and nonexistence, totally cease. (p. 214, 11.3-10)

... Again, how is this stage of the yogin purified? Reply: It is purified by his vow. The bodhisattva, because of his great compassion, has made a vow that he will do everything for the benefit of all sentient beings; because of the force of this vow he strives for doing always more and more good deeds, such as benevolence. By this habit, his stage is so purified by the [vow] that although he knows the nonexistence of an intrinsic nature in all things, his consideration for all sentient beings does not subside and he stays in this world of transmigration so long as it lasts, and without his being stained by the faults of the world.

Again, how is [his state] effortless and quiescent? The reason for it is given [in the answer]: By means of [insight into] non-manifestness, he regards even what has been [formerly considered] the highest knowledge as devoid of an intrinsic nature. For by means of the knowledge of nonmanifestation of even nondual knowledge, the yogin sees as devoid of a kernel or devoid of an intrinsic nature even that knowledge marked by nonduality as the highest or the supreme truth. Thus, [his state is] effortless, because nothing more to be seen is existent; quiescent, since it is free from all concepts. (p. 217, 1.14, to p. 218, 1.6)

In the foregoing sections taken from Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākrama* I, four stages are plainly distinguishable: (1) the preliminary stage in which external realities admitted in the systems of the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika are presented as the object of criticism; (2) the stage in which only the mind with manifested images is admitted—the system of the Satyākāravāda-yogācāra school forms the object of meditation; (3) the meditation stage in which the images of cognition as well as the duality of subject and object are condemned to be unreal and in which the knowledge without duality is proclaimed to be real—this being the standpoint of the Alhākāravāda-yogācārin; (4) the stage in which even the nondual knowledge (*advayaśāntā*) or the pure illumination of cognition (*prakāśamātra*) is declared to be empty of an intrinsic nature. This latter stage is the highest one proclaimed by the Mādhyamika. Kamalaśīla's description of the method of gradual transcendence of Buddhist philosophies for the attainment of the final truth of emptiness perfectly corresponds to that of his master, Śāntaraksita.

NOTES

I thank Professor Masamichi Ichigo, my academic colleague, to whom I owe many of the identifications of verses in the *Mādhyamakālamkāra*. I also express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Louis O. Gómez who, having read a portion of this paper, gave me useful suggestions, and to Messrs. Leslie Kawamura and Kenneth O'Neill for their corrections of the English text. Since the present paper was written in 1972, much work regarding the

Mādhyamakālamkāra and related texts has been done by my colleagues, especially Professors Ichigo, Kazufumi Oki, Shōryū Katsura, and others. I regret that I cannot incorporate the results of their studies in this paper, due to limitations of space and time.

1. The controversy of Sam-ye and its historical and philosophical background have been studied by many modern scholars, such as P. Demiéville, G. Tucci, H. Sato, D. Ueyama, and others. See especially Paul Demiéville, *Le concile de Lhasa* (Paris: Bibliothèque de l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, vol. VII, 1952); and G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, "Introduction."

2. Kamalaśīla's argument in the debate in Sam-ye is reflected in his three *Bhāvanākramas*, Peking reprint edition vol. 102, mos. 5304, 5310, and 5311; and *Bhāvanākrama I* in G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Part II (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1958).

3. Cf., for example, Ratnakaraśānti, *Pratīpāramitopadeśa*, Peking reprint edition vol. 114, no. 5579, 237.3.6-8 (f. 153.a).

4. Śāntaraksita, *Mādhyamakālamkāra*, Peking reprint edition vol. 101, no. 5284. In the following, main arguments in *Mādhyamakālamkāra* are introduced in the form of free exposition. At the end of an argument I add in parentheses the number(s) of the *karika*(s) of *Mādhyamakālamkāra* which contain the argument. In so doing, I use freely Śāntaraksita's own commentary, as well as Kamalaśīla's commentary, without giving pages and lines, except in important cases. See Śāntaraksita, *Mādhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, Peking reprint edition vol. 101, no. 5285; and Kamalaśīla, *Mādhyamakālamkāraparīkṣā*, Peking reprint edition vol. 101, no. 5286.

5. In his *Vinśatīka* Sylvain Lévi, ed. (Paris: H. Champion, 1925), Vasubandhu analyzes atoms quantitatively: if an atom is combined with another six atoms situated around it, it must be six-sided (i.e., have six segments), which contradicts the idea of an atom as an indivisible minimum unit of matter; if, on the contrary, an atom does not have segments, a number of atoms collected together would occupy one and the same spot, which would reduce a gross thing into the size of an atom—this being ridiculous. Śāntaraksita, on the other hand, criticizes atoms qualitatively rather than quantitatively, changing the idea of the segments of an atom into that of intrinsic natures. This distinction, however, is not strictly observed by him when, for example, he says that a mountain would be reduced to the size of an atom.

... *alamkāra* vv. 11-13 are almost identical with vv. 1989-90 of Śāntaraksita, *Tattvasaṃgraha*, with the commentary Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla, edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi: Buddha Bharati, 1968). In the following notes, the sign = means that the verses are identical or almost identical.

6. Cf. ... *alamkāravṛtti* 4.2.2-4 (f. 56, bl-4); ... *alamkāraparīkṣā* 20.2.8 (f. 96, b8) ff.

7. Cf. . . . *alamkāravṛtti* 4.2.3 (f. 56, b3): *mam par zhes pa ni zhel gong dag pa lta bu yul gyi mam pa mi 'dsin par bryod pa ste*.
8. . . . *alamkāra* vv. 16-17 = *Tattvasaṃgraha* vv. 1999-8000.
9. . . . *alamkāra* vv. 20-21 = *Tattvasaṃgraha* vv. 2004-5. For *sākāra-jñānavāda* and *anākārajñānavāda*, see Yuichi Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Moksākaragupta* (Kyoto: Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, no. 10, 1966), paragraph 8.1 and note 148.
10. . . . *alamkāra* vv. 22-23 = *Tattvasaṃgraha* vv. 2036-37.
11. . . . *alamkāra* v. 24 = *Tattvasaṃgraha* v. 1246.
12. . . . *alamkāra* v. 25 = *Tattvasaṃgraha* v. 1250.
13. . . . *alamkāra* v. 26 = *Tattvasaṃgraha* v. 1251.
14. . . . *alamkāra* vv. 27-30 = *Tattvasaṃgraha* vv. 1252-55.
15. See Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* on the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, p. 696, 1.17-697, 1.2.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 697, 11.2-6.
17. Cf. Manorathanandin's commentary of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, edited by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, *Appendix to the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* XXIV, XXV, XXVI (Patna, 1938-40), II, v. 194: "samcētālambonāḥ pañcavijñānakāyāḥ."
18. Cf. . . . *alamkāravṛtti* on v. 45.
19. Cf. the *Pratyūpādāramitopadeśa* 243.3.6-7 (f. 168, a6-7): *de dag gi lter na gsal ba thmas cad phyin ci ma log pa'i rang gi ngo bo nyong ba'i phyir, thams cad 'khrul pa med par 'gyur ro. des na sems can thmas cad rtag tu grol bar 'grul la, rtag tu yang dag par rdsogs pa'i sangs rygas nyid du 'gyur ro*. See also Y. Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy* (Kyoto: Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, 1966).
20. For a more detailed description of the Sākāravāda-yogācārin and Anākāravāda-yogācārin, see Kajiyama, *Buddhist Philosophy*, paragraph 32.1 and note 418 = Appendix II. I prefer the terms "Sākāravādin" and "Alīkāravādin" to "Sākāravādin" and "Anākāravādin," respectively, since in so terming them we can easily distinguish these two schools of the Yogācāra from the Sautrāntika as a Sākārajñānavādin and the Sarvāstivādin as an Anākārajñānavādin. Śāntarakṣita himself, however, uses the terms "Sākāravādin" and "Anākāravādin" more frequently.
21. Cf. . . . *alamkāravṛtti* 6.3.8-6.4.1 = f. 62, a8-b1.
22. Manorathanandin, commenting on the *Pramāṇavārttika* II, v. 502, cites the passage: *asthānam etad yad dve cite yugapat sampratipadyeātām*.
23. Cf. Nago, *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*, p. 48, 11.7.8: *nimittaṃ pratīśādehobhogasamgrhitam*; and A. Thakur, ed., *Ratnakṛtīmibandhāvalī*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series vol. III (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1957), p. 122, 11.7-8: . . . *pratisantānam ca svapnavad abaddhitadehobhogapratīśādyākāraprakāśamātrānake jagati vyavasthite* . . .
24. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* II, v. 502, with Manorathanandin's commentary.
25. Cf. . . . *alamkāravṛtti* 6.4.1-5 = f. 62, b1-5.
26. Cf. *ibid.*, 6.4.5 ff. = f. 62, b5 ff.
27. Śāntarakṣita's argument here is cited in Moksākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*; see Kajiyama, *Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 150-51. The argument is lacking in the Sanskrit text, but is found in its Tibetan translation.
28. See also Kamalaśīla's *Pañjika* on the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, in which Śubhagupta cites Vasubandhu's *Madhyāntavibhāga* I, v. 16cd: *abdhātukamakāśāsūddhivoc chuddhir 'syate (buddhiḥ) as a doctrine of the Anākāravāda-yogācārin's*.
29. See, for example, Nāgārjuna, *Vigrahavyāvartani*. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts no. 10 (Darbhaga: The Mithila Institute, 1963), vv. 1-2 (the opponent's questions) and 21-24 (Nāgārjuna's answer).
30. Tibetan Buddhists classify the Mādhyamikas first under Prāsāngika and Svatantrika; and they divide the latter into Yogācāra-mādhyamika and Svatantrika, represented by Śāntarakṣita, and Sautrāntika-mādhyamika-svāntarika, represented by Bhāvaviveka. Śāntarakṣita is a follower of Bhāvaviveka, the founder of the Svāntarika school, in that he, unlike the Prāsāngika, gives importance to logic and manipulates categorical syllogisms. But he is closer to the Yogācāra than to the Sautrāntika, in that he does not admit the reality of the external world even in the sense of conventional truth. The Prāsāngika, represented by Candrakīrti, follows the Sarvāstivāda dualism in interpreting conventional truth. The foregoing classification made by Tibetans is based on Śāntarakṣita's argument in this part of the *Mādhyamakālamkāra*.
31. Nāgārjuna, *Yuktīśāstikā*, Peking reprint edition vol. 95, no. 5225, vv. 21 and 34. As cited by Śāntarakṣita, v. 21 reads: *'ti la skye ba ci yang med, 'gag par 'gyur ba ci yang med; skye ba dang ni 'gag pa dag; shes pa 'ba 'zhig kho na'o*. The Sanskrit texts of these two verses are found in Jñānāśrīmitranibandhāvalī, A. Thakur, ed., Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series vol. 5 (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Institute, 1959), p. 545, v. 25 and v. 27. Śāntarakṣita changes the original reading so that the verses may be interpreted according to his own theory. I believe that my translation of v. 34 is supported by Kamalaśīla, who says, "it or cognition does not appear in true wisdom," in . . . *alamkāravṛtti* 37.1 (f. 138, b).
32. See D. T. Suzuki, trans., *Lankāvatīrastra* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), ch. 10, vv. 256-58.
33. P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Saddharmalaṅkāvatārasūtra*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts no. 3 (Darbhaga: The Mithila Institute, 1963), p. 124: . . . *alamkāravṛtti* 13.3.3-4 (f. 79, b3-4); and Ratnakarāsānti, *Pratyūpādāramitopadeśa* 249.4.2 (f. 183, b2).
34. *Vidārayed*, p. 211, 1.3, should be corrected in such a form as *vīcārayataḥ*.