CLARIFYING MIND - PART TWO
An Introduction to the Tradition of Pramana
DUDRA: THE COLLECTED TOPICS
LORIK: THE CLASSIFICATIONS OF MIND

ADDITIONAL READINGS
Table of Contents

CLARIFYING MIND
An Introduction to the Tradition of Pramana

PART TWO - DUDRA
THE COLLECTED TOPICS

TOPICAL READING LIST

Root Text:

Collected Topics, Compiled by Acharya Lama Tenpa Gyaltsen, Trs. By Karl Brunnholzl. (Read sequentially along with the appropriate additional readings based upon the topics below).

Commentarial Literature:

A. Background:
1. bsDus grwa Literature, by Shunzo Onoda, *Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre,* Ed. Cabezon and Jackson, pp. 187-198
2. The Comparison of Phenomena, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*, Daniel Perdue, pp. 133-138

B. Phenomena, Objects, Things & Non-Things:
1. Established Bases, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*, Daniel Perdue:
    a. Introduction, pp. 267-269
    b. Established Bases, pp. 269-272
    c. Functioning things, pp. 272-279
    d. Permanent Phenomena, pp. 279-284
2. Permanent and Impermanent Phenomena, *Knowing, Naming and Negation: A Sourcebook on Tibetan Sautrantika,* Anne Klein, pp. 141-149
3. The Selfless, *Meditation on Emptiness*, Jeffrey Hopkins:
    a. Divisions of the Selfless, pp. 213-215
    b. Permanent Phenomena, pp. 215-219

C. Matter:
1. Colors and So Forth, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*, Daniel Perdue:
    a. Introduction, pp. 185-192
    b. External Forms – Visible forms, pp. 192-200
    c. Internal Forms, pp. 217-221
2. Things: Forms, Sounds, Odors, Tastes, Tangible Objects, Forms for the Mental Consciousness, The Selfless, *Meditation on Emptiness*, Jeffrey Hopkins, pp. 219-235

D. Non-Associated Formations:

1. Non-Associated Compositional Factors, The Selfless, *Meditation on Emptiness*, Jeffrey Hopkins, pp. 268-271
2. Excerpt that presents the non-associated formations from *The Gateway to Knowledge Volume I*, by Mipham, pp. 30-33

E. Causes, Conditions, and Results:

1. The Presentation of the Four Conditions from Chapter One: Causes and Conditions, *The Profound Inner Reality*, by Karmapa Rangjung Dorje, Trs. Elizabeth Callahan, pp. 9-11

F. How Things are Taken as Objects:

1. Established Bases, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*, Daniel Perdue:
    a. Specifically and Generally Characterized Phenomena, pp. 284-287
    b. Thought Consciousness, pp. 287-290
2. Chapter Five: Objects, *The Mind and Its Functions*, by Geshe Rabten, pp. 89-95
3. Objects and the Way They are Taken as Objects, *Mind and Its World 1*, Nitartha Institute, pp. 201-209

G. The Cognition of Objects by Subjects:

1. Established Bases, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*, Daniel Perdue:
    a. The Enumeration of Valid Cognizers, pp. 295- 297
    b. Eliminative Engagers and Collective Engagers, pp. 297-300
    c. The Mixture of Place, Time and Nature, pp. 300-304
2. Chapter Twenty Three: Methods that Lead to the Cognition of Objects and Subjects, *Dudra: The Collected Topics*, Commentary by Acharya Tenpa Gyaltsen, pp. 197-202

CLARIFYING MIND
An Introduction to the Tradition of Pramana

PART THREE - LORIK
THE CLASSIFICATIONS OF MIND

TOPICAL READING LIST

Root Text:

Presentation of the Classifications of Mind: The Essence of The Ocean of Texts on Reasoning, Khenchen Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, Trs. By Karl Brunnholzl. (Read sequentially along with the appropriate additional readings based upon the topics below).

Commentarial Literature:

I. Introduction: Mind and Cognition

A. Asian Perspectives: Indian Theories of Mind, Georges Dreyfus and Evan Thompson, *The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness*, pp. 89-111

1. Introduction, pp. 89-91
2. Self and Mental States: The Samkhya View, pp. 91-93
3. The Abhidharma Tradition and Its View of the Mind, pp. 93-95
4. Buddhist Epistemology, pp. 101-102
5. Reflexive Nature of Mental Events, pp. 102-104

II. Cognition and its Classifications

A. Part One: Introduction, by Elizabeth Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*, Lati Rinpochay, pp. 11-39

1. Sevenfold Division: In terms of types of cognition and consciousness, pp. 15-28
    a) Direct perceivers, pp. 16-20
    b) Inferential cognizers, pp. 20-22
    c) Subsequent cognizers, pp. 22
    d) Correctly assuming consciousness, pp. 22-23
    e) Awareness to which the object appears but is not ascertained, pp. 23
    f) Doubting consciousnesss, pp. 24
    g) Wrong consciousness, pp. 24-28
2. Threefold Division: In terms of the object appearing to them, pp. 28-31
    h) Conceptual consciousness which take a meaning generality as their apprehended object
    i) Non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses which take a specifically characterized phenomena as their apprehended object
    j) Non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses which take a clearly

appearing non-existent as their apprehended object

3. Twofold Divisions, pp. 31-35
    k) Primary and secondary consciousnesses, pp. 31-32
    l) Conceptual and non-conceptual consciousness, pp. 32
    m) Mistaken and non-mistaken consciousness, pp. 33
    n) Mental and sense consciousness, pp. 33-34
    o) Eliminative and collective engagers, pp. 34-35
    p) Minds and mental factors, pp. 35-40

B. Moving toward Knowledge, *Buddhist Psychology: The Foundations of Buddhist Thought Volume 3*, Geshe Tashi Tsering, pp. 121-136
C. Established Bases, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*, Daniel Perdue:
    1. Direct Perceivers, pp. 290-295
    2. The Enumeration of Valid Cognizers, pp. 295-297
D. Ideal Mind, *The Mind and Its Functions*, by Geshe Rabten, pp. 51-69
E. Explanation of Correct Reasons, *Debate 1 Workbook*, Nitartha, pp. 42-43

III. The Results of Valid Cognition

A. The Specific Explanation, Prasangika, *The Treasury of Knowledge, Book Six, Part Three: Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy*, Jamgon Kongtrul Lodro Thaye, Trs. Elizabeth Callahan, pp. 231-233
B. Explanation of the Result of Valid Cognition, *Mind and Its World 1 Sourcebook*, Nitartha Institute, pp. 242-251

IV. The Essential Modes of Engagement of the Mind

A. Established Bases, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*, Daniel Perdue, pp. 290-295:
    1. Eliminative Engagers and Collective Engagers, pp. 297-300
    2. The Mixture of Place, Time and Nature, pp. 300-304
B. Asian Perspectives: Indian Theories of Mind, Georges Dreyfus and Evan Thompson, *The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness*, pp. 89-111
    1. Theory of Perception, pp. 104-107
    2. Thought and Language, pp. 107-109
    3. Dharmakirti and Abhidharma: Intentionality Revisited, pp. 109-111
    4. Conclusion, pp. 111
C. Perception and Conception, *The Mind and Its Functions*, by Geshe Rabten, pp. 33-49
D. Epistemology: Conception and Perception, *Buddhist Psychology: The Foundations of Buddhist Thought Volume 3*, Geshe Tashi Tsering, pp. 95-113

V. Mind and Mental Factors

A. Part One: Introduction, by Elizabeth Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*, Lati Rinpochay, pp. 11-39
    1. Minds and mental factors, pp. 35-40
B. Asian Perspectives: Indian Theories of Mind, Georges Dreyfus and Evan Thompson, *The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness*, pp. 89-111
    1. Primary Factors of Awareness and Mental Factors, pp. 96-101
C. The Selfless**,** *Meditation on Emptiness***,** Jeffrey Hopkins, pp. 235-
    1. Consciousness: Mind and Mental Factors, pp. 235-268

This book has been approved for inclusion in **Textual Studies and Translations in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.** The editorial board for this series includes:

Debate in Tibetan Buddhism

Daniel E. Perdue

Snow Lion Publications
Ithaca, New York, U.S.A.

6 *The Comparison of Phenomena*

One main purpose of debate is to establish the boundaries of pervasion (*khyab mtha'*) between phenomena.[1] The boundaries of pervasion or extension of a phenomenon is its range—what it pervades, what it includes, and what it excludes. By understanding clearly a phenomenon's boundaries of pervasion one is able to ascertain the scope of that phenomenon. The essential tool in this investigation is the analytical comparison of phenomena. By comparing two phenomena and establishing their relative boundaries of pervasion, the limits of each phenomenon in relation to the other, one comes to understand the points of similarity and dissimilarity between them.

The nature of debate vitally depends on this comparative or associative aspect, for the normal process of debate involves establishing the relative differences between phenomena. In the chapter on procedure the implied debate ends when the Sūtra School Challenger has forced the Defender to contradict his main thesis; however, this need not necessarily signal the end of the debate. Frequently at

[1] Lati Rinbochay is the main source for this section, and the paradigm debates are structured in accordance with his explanations.

the end of such a debate the Challenger asks the Defender to describe the difference between the two principals of the debate. This process is not a mere afterthought, but serves to address directly the Defender's mistaken view. If an opponent asserts that whatever is a color is necessarily red, he obviously has not understood the difference between color and red. Moreover, the form of debate described in the procedure chapter is used as a process for supporting or denying claims that arise out of analysis of the differences between phenomena. If an opponent incorrectly discerns the comparison of phenomena, then the Challenger will employ the previously described strategy of consequences to point out his error. The analysis of differences between phenomena is not a separate strategy of debate that supersedes the other, but is one procedural framework within which reasoning by consequences may be employed.

The comparison of phenomena presupposes that those phenomena are different (*tha dad*) in the sense that they are not *exactly* the same from the point of view of name and meaning. Phenomena which are not different are one. A pot is the only thing which is one with a pot, for it is exactly the same as a pot in name and meaning. The investigation of differences does not address the cases of phenomena which are exactly the same. There is no difference between a pot and a pot. Every existent other than a pot is different from it—a pillar, a person, a gold pot, and so forth.

Any two different phenomena must compare in one of five ways. Expressed in terms of their relative pervasions and represented by Euler diagrams, these five ways of comparison are the following:



1 Whatever is a *p* is necessarily a *q*, and whatever is a *q* is necessarily a *p*.



2 Whatever is a *p* is necessarily a *q*, but whatever is a *q* is not necessarily a *p*.



3 Whatever is a *q* is necessarily a *p*, but whatever is a *p* is not necessarily a *q*.



4 Whatever is a *p* is not necessarily a *q* and it is not the case that whatever is a *p* is necessarily not a *q*. Whatever is a *q* is not necessarily a *p* and it is not the case that whatever is a *q* is necessarily not a *p*.



5 Whatever is a *p* is necessarily not a *q*, and whatever is a *q* is necessarily not a *p*.

Any two different phenomena must compare in one of these five ways. There is no sixth possible way.

In the first case the relative boundaries of pervasion or extensions of the two phenomena are absolutely concomitant. They pervade exactly the same things. This is represented by two circles combined into one—one is superimposed over the other.

In debate, the second and third cases are collapsed into one. Though in reference to *p* and *q* there are two separate cases, in reference to the two principals in general, such that the order does not matter, there is only one case. Here there is a uni-directional pervasion between the two. Whatever is a *p* is necessarily a *q*, but whatever is a *q* is not necessarily a *p* (or vice versa). This is represented by a smaller circle wholly included within the perimeter of a larger one. There is something (inside the smaller circle) which is both a *p* and a *q*, and there is something (inside the larger circle but outside the smaller) which is one but not the other. The relative sizes of the circles may or may not represent the relative extensions of the two principals being considered. What is being shown is that the larger circle includes at least one phenomenon the smaller does not.

In the fourth case there is an intersection of the relative extensions of the two phenomena, but there is no pervasion between the two. This is represented by two overlapping circles. There is something which is both a *p* and a *q* (in the overlapping area), there is something which is a *p* but not a *q* (inside the circle *p* but outside the circle *q*), and there is something which is a *q* but not a *p* (inside the circle *q* but outside the circle *p*).

Particular-form sentences, the information that some *A*'s are *B*'s and some are not, are communicated by either the second, third, or fourth cases above. For instance, the information that some impermanent phenomena are sounds and some are not is handled by stating their relative pervasions. Whatever is a sound is necessarily an impermanent phenomenon, but whatever is an impermanent phenomenon is not necessarily a sound.

In the fifth case above the relative extensions of the two phenomena do not correlate at all. There is neither any pervasion between the two nor is there any overlapping at all. There is nothing which is both a *p* and a *q*. This is represented by two separate circles.

When a debate is focused on an analysis of the differences between two phenomena, the Challenger asks the Defender to identify how the two compare in terms of the ways noted above. The Defender will give one of four answers:

1 They are mutually inclusive (*don gcig yin*).
2 There are three possibilities (*mu gsum yod*).
3 There are four possibilities (*mu bzhi yod*).
4 They are mutually exclusive (*'gal ba yin*).

The subsequent debate serves to establish or refute the Defender's decision on the comparison of the two phenomena. In the course of this debate the Defender must prove his assertion by positing subjects that exemplify the relative points of similarity and dissimilarity and by giving reasons that justify his assertions. In the context of such a debate the Defender is not limited merely to objecting to the Challenger's reasoning, but must justify his own reasoning as well.

The debate that develops in response to the Defender's answer follows one of several patterns. Examples of these patterns are provided below. The focus of this chapter is only the form of these debates; the content will be discussed in detail in the annotations to the translation. There are many different styles for debating the comparison of phenomena. The approach varies even between monasteries within the Ge-luk-ba order. Moreover, in a very real sense each debate is individual, for the development of that debate depends on the answers that the Defender gives and upon the knowledge, skill, and cleverness of the Challenger.

As with the implied debate provided in the procedure chapter, these examples are mere sketches of the patterns

and do not accurately reflect the vibrant and versatile nature of actual debate. For instance, here the Defender's answers are all correct according to the assertions of the Proponents of Sūtra, but in actual debate Defenders do make errors and subsequent debate arises from those errors. Still, these paradigm debates contain all the essential points to demonstrate the procedure in the most straightforward style possible for debating the differences between phenomena. One can understand that in actual debate many opportunities arise for detailed discussion of the individual points of these arguments.

MUTUALLY INCLUSIVE PHENOMENA

Mutually inclusive phenomena are represented by the first diagram above (p. 135), one circle superimposed over another of equal size. The extension of *p* is precisely equivalent to the extension of *q*. Things which are mutually inclusive are different phenomena which have all eight approaches of pervasion. The Tibetan term for "mutually inclusive" (*don gcig*) literally means "the same meaning". Mutually inclusive phenomena are different only in the sense of not having exactly the same name, for their meanings—the objects which are included within the extension of each—are exactly the same. Also, any two mutually inclusive phenomena have all eight approaches of pervasion. That is, whatever is a *p* is necessarily a *q* (and vice versa), if a *p* exists, then a *q* exists (and vice versa), and so on. These are the same eight approaches of pervasion that exist between a definition and its definiendum (see pp. 66-67).

That mutually inclusive phenomena have all eight approaches of pervasion entails that there is a common locus; that is, there is something which *is* those two mutually inclusive phenomena. A common locus is not something that exists halfway between the two and is neither. Rather, it is something which is both of them. For instance, product and impermanent phenomenon are mutually inclusive, and there is a common locus of these

two, for a pot is such a common locus. A pot is a product, and it is also an impermanent phenomenon. It is something which is both. Such a common locus exists for any set of mutually inclusive phenomena.

In the pattern of debate provided here for establishing mutually inclusive phenomena the two principals being compared are thing and that which is able to perform a function. That which is able to perform a function is the definition of thing, and, as is the case for any definition and its definiendum, they are mutually inclusive. The debate proceeds as follows:

C: What is the difference between the two, thing and that which is able to perform a function?
D: They are mutually inclusive.
C: It follows that the subjects, the two—thing and that which is able to perform a function, are mutually inclusive.
D: I accept it.
C: The subjects, the two—thing and that which is able to perform a function, are mutually inclusive—
D: Because of (1) being different and (2) having all eight approaches of pervasion.
C: It follows that the subjects, the two—thing and that which is able to perform a function, are different.
D: I accept it.
C: The subjects, the two—thing and that which is able to perform a function, are different—
D: Because of (1) being existents and (2) not being one.
C: It follows that if they (1) are existents and (2) are not one, then they are necessarily different.
D: I accept it.
C: It follows that the subjects, the two—thing and that which is able to perform a function, have all eight approaches of pervasion.
D: I accept it.

The Mind and its Functions

Geshe Rabten

Translated and edited
by Stephen Batchelor

Editions Rabten Choeling

Contents of Chapter Three

Chapter Three
Ideal Mind

We have seen in the previous chapter that a cognition has to be either a perception or a conception. However, amongst all the various perceptions and conceptions we have some are said to be ideal, i.e. perfect, and some non-ideal, i.e. imperfect, states of mind. In this and the following chapter we shall discuss the factors that constitute an ideal mind. In addition, we shall see which cognitions lack these factors and are thus considered to be non-ideal. More specifically, these different ideal and non-ideal minds will be described under seven headings referring to what are known as the "seven types of mind". Two of these types, ideal perception and ideal inference, are ideal states of mind and will be covered in this chapter. The remaining five types, subsequent cognition, correct belief, inattentive perception, indecision and mistaken cognition, are non-ideal and will be explained in the following chapter.

I. ETYMOLOGY AND DEFINITION

In Sanskrit the term for ideal mind is *pramāṇa*. *Pra* means either initial, fresh, principal or best and *māṇa* means awareness or cognition. All the Buddhist schools of philosophy except the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas understand *pra* to mean that an ideal mind is an initial and a fresh cognition, i.e. only the first moment of cognition within a particular stream of comprehension. The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, though, gloss the prefix *pra* to mean the principal object cognised and thereby interpret *pramāṇa* as meaning a cognition that comprehends its principal object. For them ideal minds are not only the first moments of comprehension but also any subsequent moments of cognition that comprehend the object. In this work, however, since we are following the Sāutrantika system, the former interpretation is accepted.

All *ideal minds** bear three defining characteristics: freshness, infallibility and cognition.

A. Freshness

The characteristic of freshness indicates that an ideal state of mind only occurs as the initial cognitive act within any co-related series of cognitions. For example, we may comprehend sound to be impermanent in dependence upon a logical proof. The initial moment of comprehension, when we fully grasp the significance of this point for the first time, is said to be an ideal state of mind. But when we subsequently refer back to this point, although we retain our comprehension, it will always be induced by the force of the original comprehension (and lack its initial impact). In this way all ideal minds, whether perceptual or conceptual, bear this quality of freshness and originality through the force of which any subsequent cognition is induced. To assert freshness as a defining characteristic of an ideal mind eliminates the possibility of any subsequent cognition being considered as ideal as is the tradition of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas.

B. Infallibility (Comprehension)

The second defining characteristic of an ideal mind is that of infallibility. This means that an ideal mind is one that comprehends its object. But what does it mean for a mind to comprehend its object? It means that it is able to lead to a correct ascertainment of the object and to eliminate misconceptions regarding it. *Comprehension**, as it is understood here, can pertain to either perceptual or conceptual cognitions. An example of a perception that comprehends its object would be a visual perception of a rose that creates a sufficient impression on the mind to be able to induce the correct conceptual ascertainment that the object seen was a rose. Furthermore, since upon the basis of this perception there is no possibility of misconceiving the rose to be anything other than a rose, it is said to be capable of eliminating misconception about the object. Likewise, in terms of conception, the correct inferential cognition that sound is impermanent is able to give rise to complete certainty about this fact and to leave no room for any further doubts or misconceptions concerning it. Therefore, it is also regarded as being a comprehension of its object. Hence it is these two criteria that establish whether a cognition comprehends its object or not and thereby can be considered to be infallible.

Previously we talked of *true* perceptions and *true* conceptions. However, it should not be thought that being a true cognition is identical with being an infallible one.

What characterises a cognition to be true or false is whether the apprehension of its object is in accordance with reality or not but not whether it is capable of inducing conviction and certainty about the object or not. In the case of our correctly believing sound to be impermanent, for example, the apprehension is in accordance with reality and thus the belief is a true conception. But it is not considered to *comprehend* that sound is impermanent because, being merely a belief, it lacks the basis of any sound reasoning and is thus unable to give rise to any real certainty and conviction about the fact. Therefore, although a correct belief is true, it is not an infallible cognition. Thus it cannot be considered as an ideal mind even though it may bear the other two defining characteristics of freshness and cognition. Similarly, an inattentive perception of a sound, for example, is also regarded as a true perception. However it is not an infallible cognition because the impression it leaves on the mind is not strong enough to induce any certainty as to what the sound was or whether one actually heard the sound or not.

C. Cognition

The third defining characteristic of an ideal mind is that of cognition, which is included in order to eliminate the notion that non-conscious forms of ideal mind may exist. Specifically, we are referring to the Vaibāṣika's belief that the physical sense-organs, since they act as the bases for an ideal mind, are also ideal (*pramāṇa*). In fact they are merely material objects incapable of any conscious activity.[1]

1 For an explanation of the Vaibāṣika position see *Theory and Practice of Tibetan Buddhism* p. 79 seq.

II. IDEAL PERCEPTION

We have already discussed the topic of perception in general as well as what it means to be a true or false perception. Now we shall make a further distinction between true perceptions into those which are ideal states of mind and those which are non-ideal.

An ideal perception is necessarily a true perception, but a true perception is not necessarily an ideal perception. An *ideal perception** is defined as a fresh, infallible cognition that is free from conceptuality. Hence any true perception that lacks either the defining characteristics of freshness or infallibility is considered to be a non-ideal state of mind. All subsequent perceptual cognitions, therefore, are non-ideal since they lack the quality of freshness, and all inattentive perceptions are non-ideal since they lack the quality of infallibility. As for ideal states of perception we can distinguish four distinct types in accordance with the fourfold division of true perception into true sensory, mental, apperceptive and contemplative perception.

An *ideal sensory perception** is defined as a fresh, infallible cognition, free from conceptuality, that arises in dependence upon a physical sense-organ as its dominant condition. According to the sense-organ upon which it occurs a fivefold distinction can be made into visual, audial, olfactory, gustatory and tactile ideal sense perceptions. An example would be the initial, visual comprehension of a rose. Only the initial act of cognition is regarded as ideal since all subsequent cognitions pertaining to both the same continuum of the visual perception as well as to any resultant conceptual comprehensions are induced through the force of this initial perception.[2]

2 This refers to the fact that any initial perception of a particular rose can give rise to its own series of subsequent perceptions and

An *ideal mental perception** is defined as a fresh, infallible non-apperceptive cognition, free from conceptuality, that arises in dependence upon the mental organ as its dominant condition. As with ideal sensory perception the defining characteristics of ideal mental perception are similar to those of its corresponding true perception with the addition of the qualities of freshness and infallibility. Likewise there is a sixfold division into ideal mental perceptions of visual forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations and purely mental objects. Examples of these, however, are only to be found in the minds of Aryas. For ordinary beings true mental perceptions will always be inattentive. One such example would be the initial moment of an Arya's heightened awareness of another person's mind.

An *ideal apperceptive cognition** is defined as a fresh, infallible perception bearing the aspect of an apprehension and being free from conceptuality. We can distinguish two forms: ideal apperceptive experience of sensory cognitions and ideal apperceptive experience of mental cognitions. As before, an example would be the initial apperceptive experience of any state of cognition, which is able to induce a subsequent certainty and conviction about its object.

Finally, an *ideal contemplative perception** is defined as a fresh, infallible, non-apperceptive cognition in the mind of an Arya that is free from conceptuality and arises in dependence upon the unified concentration of mental quiescence and penetrative insight as its dominant condition. The various divisions are made, as with true contemplative perception, according to the different objects perceived. An example would be an Arya's initial comprehension of the selflessness of the person.

---

conceptions of that particular one. It does not mean that the first perception we have of a rose in this life acts as the basis for all subsequent perceptions and conceptions of roses.

In the case of sensory, mental and apperceptive perceptions there exist subsequent and inattentive states in addition to the ideal states that we have described here. But for contemplative perception, although there exist subsequent states, an inattentive state is impossible because all contemplative perceptions necessarily comprehend whatever appears to them. The nature of subsequent and inattentive perceptions will not be dealt with here but will be clarified in the following chapter.

III. IDEAL CONCEPTION (INFERENCE)

In contrast to an ideal perceptual comprehension of an object that occurs in immediate experience, an ideal conceptual comprehension has to directly rely upon the basis of sound logic and reasoning for its occurrence. Amongst all conceptions, only an initial state of inferential comprehension generated upon the basis of perfect reasoning is therefore considered to be an ideal conception. This state of mind, known as an *ideal inference**, is defined as a fresh, infallible conceiving cognition that arises in direct dependence upon a perfect reason as its basis. In Sanskrit the term for inference is *anumāna*. *Anu* means after and *māna* means cognition. Thus an inference is a comprehension of something that occurs after a certain amount of logical inquiry. In this tradition, however, the term "inference" only refers to an ideal inference and not just to any cognition that occurs after thought and investigation.

A. A Perfect Reason

Inference is especially important in comprehending things which are not evident to perception. Many points, such as subtle impermanence, the selflessness of the person and the

selflessness of phenomena are at present obscured from our immediate experience and can only be comprehended through a conceptual cognition. In order to make any progress along the path to enlightenment it is essential to understand these things. But prior to be being able to gain a perceptual insight into them, it is necessary to correctly ascertain them by means of inference. However, an inferential comprehension of these things will not arise in our minds simply due to praying or through undergoing certain physical hardships. It has to be cultivated through a process of exact reasoning. In order to inferentially understand that sound is impermanent, for example, a perfect reason has to be found, stated to and established within the mind. In this case a perfect reason for proving sound to be impermanent would be the quality of its being created (in dependence upon causes and conditions). But simply to state this reason is not sufficient for a comprehension to occur. The reason must first be established as being both applicable to the subject and congruent with the predicate. In this case the subject is sound, the predicate or the factor to be established is impermanence, and the reason is the quality of its being created. Firstly, the quality of being created is shown to be applicable to the subject, sound, since it is a natural property of sound. Secondly, the quality of being created is congruent with the predicate, impermanence, because whatever is created is necessarily impermanent. Therefore, the quality of being created is a perfect reason for establishing sound to be impermanent. The inferential comprehension that sound is impermanent can only arise when these conditions of applicability to the subject and congruence with the predicate are established within the mind of a person desirous of such knowledge. [3]

3 Here, for the sake of simplicity, we have only mentioned the establishment of the reason's applicability to the subject (*phyogs.chos*) and congruence with the predicate (*rjes.khyab*) as necessary to qualify it as a perfect reason (*rtags.yang.dag*). In fact it is also necessary to establish a third factor, namely, the reason's incongruence with the elements contrary to the predicate (*ldog.khyab*). These three factors are called "the three modes" (*tshul.gsum*) and they are the defining characteristics of a *perfect reason**.

B. Establishing Cognitions

We may wonder through what cognitive process does the establishment of the applicability to the subject and the congruence with the predicate take place. Prior to the generation of an ideal inferential comprehension two other comprehensions—known as *establishing cognitions**—must first be gained. These act as the contributory conditions that transform the mere correct belief that sound is impermanent into a true comprehension. One of these *establishing cognitions** has the task of ascertaining the applicability of the reason to the subject and the other the task of ascertaining the congruence of the reason with the predicate. So, in terms of our example, two cognitions, one establishing that the quality of being created is applicable to sound and the other establishing that whatever is created is necessarily impermanent, must be generated before an ideal inference that sound is impermanent can occur. The first of these, an establishing cognition comprehending sound to be created (in the context of proving sound to be impermanent by the reason of its being created), is defined as follows: it is a cognition in the mind of a suitable recipient for the proof that is *(a)* an infallible apprehension that sound is created and *(b)* a cause for the inference that comprehends sound to be impermanent by the reason of its being created. It is by means of this comprehension that the applicability of the reason to the subject is established. The second establishing cognition for this proof comprehends that whatever is created is necessarily impermanent. It is defined as a cognition in the mind of a suitable recipient for the proof, that is *(a)* an

infallible apprehension of the fact that whatever is created is necessarily impermanent and *(b)* a cause for the inference that comprehends sound to be impermanent by the reason of its being created. This comprehension is necessary in order to establish the congruence of the reason with the predicate. Furthermore both of these establishing cognitions may be either perceptual or conceptual comprehensions, i.e. an ideal perception, an ideal inference or a subsequent cognition induced by either. Thus an establishing-cognition can be a comprehension grounded in immediate experience or based upon yet other reasoning. Hence in certain cases an inferential comprehension of one thing may act as an establishing cognition that produces an inferential comprehension of something else. In the definition we also mentioned that an establishing cognition is a cognition in the mind of a suitable recipient. A suitable recipient for a proof is a person in whose mind the proof has yet to be established. Someone who already comprehends sound to be impermanent would therefore no longer be a suitable recipient for our proof.

C. Three Types of Ideal Inference

Initial conceptual comprehensions that arise in dependence upon a reason which has been established as both applicable to the subject and congruent with the predicate are to be understood as ideal inferences. Furthermore, an ideal inference is generated in dependence upon one of three types of reason: a direct reason, a conventional reason or a reason of belief. A direct reason is one that establishes a fact about the subject through the direct force of a logical mark borne by the subject. A conventional reason, in addition to being a direct reason, establishes a fact about the subject that is true merely through the force of popular convention. A reason of belief is not a

direct reason but one that establishes the validity of a scriptural citation based on one's belief in the infallibility of the person who uttered it. Thus the inferential comprehensions that occur in dependence upon these three types of reason are respectively called, "a direct inference", "a conventional inference", and "an inference of belief".

1. Direct Inference

An example of a direct inference would be the inferential comprehension that sound is impermanent, based upon the reason of its being created. The quality of being created is a direct reason for proving sound to be impermanent. Thus the ensuing inferential comprehension that sound is impermanent is called "a direct inference". Most inferences that comprehend concealed phenomena such as the existence of past and future lives, liberation, omniscience, selflessness and so forth are also direct inferences.

2. Conventional Inference

Secondly, an example of a conventional inference would be the inferential comprehension that the term "the bearer of the rabbit" is fit to denote the moon, based upon the reason that it is an object of conception. The "bearer of the rabbit" is a common term used in India and Tibet to refer to the moon since in those countries the shape of a rabbit is commonly made out from the markings on the moon. Therefore this is a conventional inference, because what is being established is true solely because certain people have agreed upon this particular convention.

3. Inference of Belief

Finally an example of an inference of belief would be the inferential comprehension that Nāgārjuna's statement,

"Wealth arises from generosity and happiness from moral discipline" [4] is infallible because it is a statement certified by three-fold investigation. The point made in this statement is understood to be infallible, i.e. actually true, based upon the reason that it is a scriptural citation certified or validified by three forms of investigation. This means that the statement is found to be non-contradictory with either ideal perceptions, direct inferences or other inferences of belief. Thus if a citation, which states something that is concealed from both our sense faculties as well as from direct reason, can withstand critical examination based upon these faculties and be found not to contradict them, then it is said to be certified by three-fold investigation. Any inference that understands the meaning of such a citation to be true because of such a reason is what we call an "inference of belief".

D. The Need for Inference

Ideal inference is extremely important because it enables us to comprehend those things that are concealed from our perceptual consciousness. Both in terms of worldly scientific investigation as well as in following the path of Dharma the initial comprehension of many things must first be gained through analytical research based upon perfect reasoning, Such inferential understanding, whether or not we call it "a direct inference" or "an inference of belief" is nevertheless an ideal state of mind capable of clarifying our conception of reality and leading us to yet greater states of comprehension.

If we think about it, we shall find that what we do not understand is far in excess of what we do. Nevertheless many people assume that what they understand is identical to what exists and what they do not understand is

4 See Nāgārjuna, *The Precious Garland* v. 438.

identical to what does not exist. Consequently they assert many existent things to be non-existent, whereas, in fact, their existence is merely concealed from immediate cognition. Upon the basis of this confused attitude towards what is not perceptually evident, one's thoughts and actions become adversely affected and an unwholesome way of life, that brings only sorrow and discontent to oneself and others, is pursued. It is therefore essential to come to a clear understanding of those aspects of reality that are at present concealed and obscured from us in order to be able to conduct our life in a wholesome and meaningful way. Furthermore, the only means whereby to gain such understanding is through conceptual investigation, based upon one's own and other's immediate experiences, that leads to ideal inferential comprehension. Since such insight is not at present available to the faculties of perception it is thus necessary to recognise the importance of inference.

IV. SELF-ASCERTAINABLE AND SELF-UNASCERTAINABLE IDEAL MINDS

Having discussed the constitution of an ideal state of mind, we shall now make a further distinction amongst ideal minds into those that are self-ascertainable. For an ideal mind to be *self-ascertainable** it means that, in addition to having the characteristics of an ideal mind, it is able, by its own force, to lead to the certainty that it would not occur if the essential component of what it comprehends were removed from its objective field of reference. In other words, it is an ideal mind that clearly comprehends what the essential component of its objective field of reference is. For example, when we see a very familiar figure such as our father or mother, we immediately recognise the essential component of what we are seeing,

namely our mother or father. Thereby we are able to induce, through the force of our visual perception, the certainty that were the essential component removed from the objective field of reference such a visual perception could not possibly occur. This ideal state of mind is thus said to be "self-ascertainable" since through its own force we can ascertain whether or not it would occur if the essential component were removed from the objective field. A self-unascertainable ideal mind, though, is one that does not have the ability to lead to this certainty by its own force. Instead, it has to rely upon the force of yet further comprehension in order to know what the essential component of the objective field of reference is. We may be driving along in our car and hear a ticking sound coming from the engine. We fully comprehend that this is a ticking sound but we do not know that it is the sound of a loose piston rod. In this case the audial perception is an ideal congnition of the ticking sound. But since it is unable to lead to the certainty that it would not occur if the essential component—the sound of a loose piston rod—were removed from the objective field of reference, it is a self-unascertainable ideal mind. In order to gain such certainty it would be necessary to rely upon further investigation and comprehension, either one's own or that of a mechanic, in order to discover what the essential component of the objective field of reference is. Therefore, a *self-unascertainable ideal mind** is defined as an ideal mind that needs to depend on the force of another cognition in order to lead to the certainty that it would not occur if the essential component of what it comprehended were removed from its objective field of reference.

A. Self-Ascertainable Ideal Minds

There are five types of self-ascertainable ideal mind all of which conform to the defining characteristics stated above.

i. Ideal sensory perception of an evident function. An example of such a perception would be the sensory apprehension that fire has the function to burn wood. When we observe fire consuming wood its evident function is clearly comprehended and thus the essential component within the objective field of reference is identifiable.

ii. Ideal sensory perception of a famliar object. Through the force of familiarity with an object certainty as to what it is occurs swiftly and easily. An example would be a child's sensory perception of its father's form.

iii., iv., v. These are ideal apperceptive cognition, ideal contemplative perception, and ideal inference respectively. The natures of these have already been explained above. In addition we should now understand them to be exclusively self-ascertainable ideal states of mind. Hence a self-ascertainable ideal mind is one in which the object comprehended is the same as the essential component of what is comprehended. Since it comprehends this essential component, it comprehends what object is responsible for its occurrence and thereby is able to give rise to the certainty that without the presence of that object it would not have occurred.

B. Self-Unascertainable Ideal Minds

When classified according to etymology there are six kinds of self-unascertainable ideal minds. An etymological classification is one in which the divisions are made primarily from the point of view of the term, thus allowing certain things to be classified that are not actually the thing in question but merely bear some resemblance to it.

i. An ideal mind to which what appears is self-ascertainable but to which the real nature of the object is self-unascertainable. An

example of this would be the true sensory perception that apprehends a reddish patch of colour from afar whilst one is uncertain whether or not it is the colour of a fire, when in fact it is. In this case there is a self-ascertainable ideal cognition of what appears, namely the red patch of colour, but the cognition is self-unascertainable with regard to the real nature of the object, its being the red colour of fire. Thus it fails to comprehend what the essential component of its object is. Therefore, it is unable to lead, by its own force, to the certainty that were the colour of fire not present in the object it would not have arisen. For this certainty to be generated it is necessary to rely upon either other persons or further ideal cognitions of one's own that comprehend the essential component of the object to be the colour of a fire.

ii. An ideal mind for which the universal character of the object is self-ascertainable but for which the particular character is self-unascertainable. An example of this would be the true sensory perception that apprehends a tree whilst one is uncertain whether or not it is a sandalwood tree, when in fact it is. Here the universal character of the object, its being a tree, is comprehended, but its particular character of being a sandalwood tree is not. Thus in this case the essential component of the object, a sandalwood tree, is not comprehended. Therefore, this cognition is regarded as a self-unascertainable ideal mind. With this and the previous example it should be clear that the essential component of what is comprehended and the object comprehended are different for a self-unascertainable ideal mind whereas for a self-ascertainable ideal mind they are the same.

iii. A cognition that becomes a self-unascertainable ideal mind although the object has appeared. An example of this would be the true sensory perception of a blue patch of colour that leads one to doubt whether one saw the blue

patch of colour or not. In this case one did actually perceive a blue patch of colour but the perception itself lacked the force to lead to any certainty of this fact. But although one would need to rely upon other cognitions or other persons to gain this certainty, since the original perception was not an ideal but an inattentive perception, this example cannot be regarded as a genuine self-unascertainable ideal mind even though it is called such.

iv. Initial true perception. An example of this would be the true sensory perception of the red colour of a rose in the mind of someone who has never seen a rose before. This is an initial true perception since it is the first time it has ever occurred for the person. It is a self-unascertainable ideal mind since the essential component of the object, the red colour of a rose, is not comprehended. The person only comprehends that the object is the colour of a flower. This perception is therefore unable, by its own force, to lead to the certainty that it would not have arisen, had the essential component of what was comprehended, the colour of the rose, not been present in the object, the colour of a flower.

v. Undirected true perception. An example of this would be the true sensory perception of a sound in the mind of a person who is strongly attracted to a beautiful visual form. Here, since the mind is completely involved in the apprehension of a visual-form, although sounds such as people talking may be heard, no attention is paid to them. But this state of perception is in fact an inattentive perception, a non-ideal mind, and hence cannot really be considered as a self-unascertainable ideal mind. It is included here only because of certain similarities it bears with self-unascertainable ideal minds that might lead us to consider it as such.

vi. True perception that is a source of deception. An example of this would be a true sensory apprehension of the colour

of a mirage that directly gives rise to the misconception that the mirage is water. This is an example of an actual self-unascertainable ideal mind. In this case the object comprehended is a shimmering colour but the essential component of the object is a mirage and this is not comprehended. Thus, instead of bringing about the certainty that the nature of the shimmering colour is a mirage, it leads to the misconception that the shimmering colour is water. In order to comprehend that the shimmering colour is in reality a mirage and not water other people or further cognitions have to be relied upon. Hence this ideal visual perception is regarded as a self-unascertainable ideal mind.

V. THE ETYMOLOGICAL DIVISION OF THE IDEAL

In addition to denoting all ideal states of cognition, the term "the ideal" (*pramāṇa*) is also used to express ideal persons and ideal forms of speech. An ideal person is one who does not deceive those who are striving for liberation from samsara. An example of such a person would be the Buddha Shākyamuni. A Buddha is regarded as a non-deceptive, infallible being in that he precisely delineates for his individual disciples the means by which freedom and enlightenment can be won. The fact of a Buddha's infallibility is directly and extensively proven in the second chapter of Dharmakirti's *Commentary to Ideal Mind*. In the section dealing with the way in which a Buddha comes into being, his infallibility is mainly explained through a presentation of the Mahāyāna. While in the section dealing with his coming into the world and spreading the teachings, it is primarily explained through a presentation of the beings of intermediate and lesser spiritual capacity. For these reasons the second chapter of the *Commentary to Ideal Mind* is regarded as the substance of the entire work since it deals with this most essential point.

Likewise ideal speech is that in which the meaning communicated is both unmistaken and of benefit to others who are striving to find freedom from samsara. When the Buddha Shākyamuni delivered his discourses upon the Four Noble Truths, for example, this constituted ideal speech, because it instructed people in what has to be rejected, namely the truths of suffering and its origin, and in what has to be accepted, namely the truths of the cessation of suffering and the truth of the path that leads to such cessation.

Thus the term "ideal mind" (*pramāṇa*) is applicable to three things: ideal states of cognition, such as those that have been discussed above; ideal persons, such as a Buddha; and ideal speech, the discourse of an ideal person. It does not, therefore, exclusively denote states of mind.

Contents of Chapter Two

Chapter Two
Perception and Conception

Now that we have discussed the fundamental characteristics of all states of mind, i.e. clarity and cognition, we shall now proceed to classify these states into various different types. The first distinction to be made will be the basic one between perception and conception. Then we shall continue, in chapters three and four, to explain which of these perceptions and conceptions are ideal and which are non-ideal.

What is meant by "perception" here is a non-conceptual state of mind, that is to say, a visual, audial, olfactory, gustatory or tactile sense cognition as well as certain immediate mental cognitions. "Conception", on the other hand, refers to any conceptual state of mind, i.e. a mental cognition that does not behold its objects immediately or barely as in perception but cognises them via the media of mental images.

I. PERCEPTION

A. Sense Perception and Mental Perception

In classifying the different perceptions that we have, the first distinction to be made will be that between sense-perception and mental-perception. "Sense-perception" here refers to all non-conceptual cognitions that are dependent for their arisal upon a physical sense-organ, an external form and a previous state of cognition. Hence a visual perception, for example, arises in dependence upon the eye sense-organ, a visual-form and whatever state of cognition that occured immediately prior to it. These three conditions of visual sense-perception are respectively called "the dominant condition",[1] the "object condition" and the "immediate condition". The eye sense-organ is said to be the *dominant condition** for visual perception since in addition to being a principal, direct cause for it, it also is the condition that is mainly responsible for it. This is so because the eye sense-organ is the exclusive basis upon which visual perception occurs and it is by means of this basis that we recognise visual perception to exist. A colour would be an example of an *object condition** for visual perception in that it is a principal, direct cause for

1 The dominant condition is of two types: the common dominant condition (*thun.mong.ba'i.bdag.rkyen*) and the exclusive dominant condition (*thun.mong. ma.yin.pa'i.bdag.rken*). The common dominant condition in a visual perception, for example, would be the mental-organ i.e. the immediately preceding moment of mental consciousness. This is said to be "common" since it is a dominant condition for all five sense perceptions. The exclusive dominant condition in this perception would be the eye-organ. This is called "exclusive" since it is only a dominant condition for visual perception. In this text when we refer to the dominant condition we always mean the exclusive dominant condition.

its bearing the aspect of a colour. Thirdly, the *immediate condition** for a visual perception is the principal, direct cause for its being a mere clear and cognisant experience, i.e. the immediately preceding moment of cognition. In the same way, all sense perceptions arise in dependence upon their respective dominant, object and immediate conditions.

sense perception	dominant condition	object condition	immediate condition
visual	eye-organ	visual-form	the immediately preceding moment of cognition
audial	ear-organ	sound	
olfactory	nose-organ	smell	
gustatory	tongue-organ	taste	
tactile	body-organ	tactile-sensation	

Mental perceptions are similar in nature to sense perceptions except that they do not depend upon a physical sense-organ as their dominant condition. Their dominant condition is said to be the mental-organ. This is not a physical organ but simply whatever state of cognition that immediately precedes the mental perception. This immediately preceding state of cognition, be it sensory or mental, is the dominant condition for a mental perception since it is primarily through its force that the mental perception comes into being. For a mental perception, then, the dominant conditon and the immediate condition are the same. As for its object condition, mental perception can arise in dependence upon physical forms as well as subtle objects

such as other person's minds although this latter example would only be perceived in a state of heightened awareness.

B. True and False Perception

Among all these various perceptions some are regarded as "true" whereas others are regarded as "false". A *true perception** is defined as a non-deceived cognition that is free from conceptuality. Whatever objects appear to a true perception necessarily exist in the way in which they appear. A false perception, however, although it is a cognition free from conceptuality, is deceived with regard to what appears to it. Its objects do not exist in the way in which they appear.

The majority of perceptions that occur from day to day in our lives are true and apprehend their objects in the way in which they exist, but sometimes, due to such things as a defect in the sense-organ, an object appears in a way in which it does not exist. For example, when we have jaundice the eye-organ is affected by the increase of bile in the organism, and consequently we see everything tainted yellow. In reality these things may not be yellow in colour but since they now appear to be, such a visual perception is regarded as false. Similarly the mental perception of a blue colour in a dream is mistaken because there is no externally existing blue colour that corresponds to the one beheld in the dream. These are examples of false perceptions. However, let us first consider the various types of true perception. These fall into four categories: true sense perception. true mental perception, true apperceptive cognition and true contemplative perception.

False perception will be discussed separately in Chapter Four, section V. A, under the heading "Mistaken Perception".

1. True Sense Perception

*True sense perception** is defined as a non-deceived cognition, free from conceptuality, that arises in dependence upon a physical sense-organ as its dominant condition. A non-deceived cognition is one that is unmistaken with regard to what appears to it. All true perceptions bear this defining characteristic whereas all false perceptions and conceptual cognitions are said to be deceived with regard to what appears to them. "Being free from conceptuality" means to be a clear or immediate perception. This means that the object appears to the mind without the admixture of any subjectively projected mental images and is clearly beheld in the way it objectively exists. Since there are five physical sense-organs, five corresponding types of true sense perception can arise in dependence upon them, namely visual, audial, olfactory, gustatory and tactile true sense perceptions.

Before discussing the remaining three categories it will be necessary to introduce the classification of mind into apperceptive and non-apperceptive cognitions.

2. Apperceptive and Non-Apperceptive Cognition

All cognitions experience themselves. They possess an inherent selfconscious quality. This quality of consciousness is known as *apperceptive cognition**. Apperceptive cognitions are exclusively perceptions. They only have states of mind as their objects and, in addition, they are substantially identical with those states of mind. They never observe any external phenomena. Non-apperceptive cognitions, on the other hand, are all the cognitions that apprehend, either conceptually or non-conceptually, external objects as well as cognitions that are not substantially identical with themselves. This category includes all sense

perceptions and conceptual states of mind as well as mental perceptions that perceive external objects. Non-apperceptive cognition has the defining characteristic of bearing the aspect of an apprehensible object, whereas apperceptive cognition has the defining characteristic of bearing the aspect of an apprehension. To illustrate these characteristics let us take as example the visual perception of a blue patch of colour. The object of this perception is something apprehensible as opposed to an apprehension and therefore the perception beholding it is said to bear the aspect of an apprehensible object. Cognition or apprehension is often compared to a piece of clear crystal. For in the same way that the colour of an object is reflected in a piece of crystal that is placed upon it, likewise the mind reflects or bears the aspect of whatever object it apprehends. In this way the visual perception of a blue patch of colour is said to bear the aspect of an apprehensible object, a blue patch of colour, and is therefore a non-apperceptive cognition. But, occuring simultaneously with this apprehension of an external blue patch of colour, an apperceptive cognition experiences the visual apprehension itself and is thus said to bear the aspect of an apprehension. This apperceptive cognition does not arise in causal dependence upon the apprehension it experiences, but is substantially identical with it. In other words it is naturally as opposed to causally related with it. Therefore, all non-apperceptive cognitions without exception are experienced in this way by an apperceptive counterpart, i.e. an inherent conscious quality present within every state of cognition.

3. *True Mental Perception*

It was necessary to make the above distinction in order to be able to understand what we mean by a true mental perception as opposed to a true apperceptive cognition. A *true mental perception** is defined as a non-deceived,

non-apperceptive cognition, free from conceptuality, that arises in dependence upon the mental organ as its dominant condition. An example of a true mental perception would be the heightened awareness of another person's state of mind. Such a perception, though, is only available to someone who has attained mental quiescence and then proceeded to develop this ability upon that basis. In the minds of ordinary people like ourselves the only true mental perceptions are those that occur for an extremely short moment immediately after a true sense perception and immediately prior to a conception. For us sense perception and conception are the predominant cognitive functions. Nevertheless, when a sense perception stimulates mental activity, initially a mental perception briefly glimpses the object before any conceptual response takes place. This true mental perception is of such short duration that it does not strongly register on the memory and is hence called an inattentive perception.

In addition a sixfold division of true mental perception can be made according to the six different types of objects it apprehends, namely: true mental perceptions of visual form, sound, smell, taste, tactile sensation and purely mental objects. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that when talking of true mental perception we are only referring to true *non-apperceptive* mental perceptions.

4. *True Apperceptive Cognition*

*True apperceptive cognition** is defined as a non-deceived cognition, free from conceptuality, that bears the aspect of an apprehension. In fact all apperceptive cognitions are non-deceived and non-conceptual and hence these characteristics are applicable to any apperceptive state of mind.

There is much discussion between the various systems of Buddhist philosophy as to whether apperceptive cognition really exists or not. Its existence is asserted by the

Sautrāntikas, the Cittamātrins and the Yogācārya-Svātantrika Mādhyamikas, but is denied by the Vaibāṣikas, the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika Mādhyamikas and the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas. Especially in the Prāsaṅgika system much emphasis is given to its refutation when attempting to disprove the validity of certain tenets asserted by the Cittamātrins.[2] Nevertheless, since this work is written according to the Sautrāntika school, here it should be assumed to exist.

5. True Contemplative Perception

Fourthly, *true contemplative perception** is defined as a non-apperceptive cognition in the mind of an Arya that is non-deceived and free from conceptuality, and which arises in dependence upon the unified concentration of mental quiescence and penetrative insight as its dominant condition. Such a perception is exclusively true, non-deceived and non-conceptual and only occurs in the mental continuum of an Arya, i.e. one who has immediately comprehended selflessness. In addition, to attain its dominant condition, the unified concentration of mental quiescence and penetrative insight, it is first necessary to bring the mind to a state of concentrated quiescence as well as to cultivate a penetrating state of intelligence that comprehends the meaning of such things as the selflessness of the person. But it is only when these two states of consciousness are unified into one concentrated stream that they are said to be able to give rise to a true contemplative perception. Examples of such contemplative perceptions would be those that perceive gross and subtle impermanence, those that perceive the selflessness of the person and those that perceive the selflessness of phenomena.

2 See Shāntideva, *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, IX: 19-24, and Chandrakirti, *A Guide to the Middle Way*, VI: 45-97

This concludes a general presentation of perception in which we have attempted to describe the basic characteristics of perceptual states of mind that distinguish them from the discursive processes of conception. In the following chapters we shall continue to discuss the various types of perception that have been introduced here from the point of view of their cognitive validity, i.e. the characteristics that determine them to be ideal, subsequent, inattentive or mistaken cognitions.

II. CONCEPTION

It is by means of thoughts and conceptions that we consciously respond to the objects that have been barely perceived by the senses. Constantly we have this tendency to think about the world of colours and shapes, sounds and smells, tastes and bodily sensations that constitute our day-to-day experience. It is through the conceptual processes that man has constructed systems of philosophy and psychology in an attempt to explain the world to himself. It is the development of these same processes that has led to the rise of science and the technological era in which we now live. Likewise it is a conception, of a fallacious kind, that is responsible for all mentally disturbing thoughts and emotions that in turn motivate the physical, verbal and mental activity that brings about a cyclic condition of existence (samsāra) wherein suffering and discontent are unavoidably experienced.

Perception is essentially a receptive, non-reflective form of cognition whereas conception is responsive and reflective. As we saw in the previous section, perception relies upon three primary causes for its arisal: the dominant, object and immediate conditions. Conception, though, only relies upon two of these, namely, the dominant and immediate conditions. Its arisal, therefore, is not primarily

dependent upon an object condition but only upon the previously occurring state of cognition, which for it, since it is a mental cognition, would be both the dominant and immediate conditions. Unlike perception it does not apprehend an object through the force of the object's appearing to it, rather, it apprehends the object primarily due to the force of a subjective disposition. For example, a colour, the eye organ and a state of cognition are the conditions that automatically produce a visual perception of colour. But, unlike this, the conception, "this is a colour", is an intentional reflection upon an object already presented to the mind by the visual sense perception. This is an example of the common type of conception formulated within the internal stream of thought that constantly accompanies our sense experience of the world. Also, in addition to this type, all the internal emotional responses we have to our experiences, whether wholesome or unwholesome, are also regarded as conceptual forms of cognition. Such subjective responses occur due to our predispositions that are established through habituation. Some people, for example, have a very strong tendency to respond with anger whereas others lack this tendency and, on the contrary, are capable of patiently accepting whatever situation confronts them. Such reactions as these are both due to the way in which the mind has been conditioned and trained in the past. Therefore, since these predispositions are not intrinsic properties of the mind, it is possible to overcome any unwholesome and disturbing tendencies through acquaintance and habituation with their corresponding wholesome antidotes.

A. Mental Images

The most distinctive element within a conceptual cognition is its apprehension of the object by means of "mixing" it

with a mental image. To any conception the object conceived appears indistinguishably mixed together with a subjectively projected image of the object. The conceptual cognition, however, is unable to distinguish between the object as it objectively exists and its own subjectively projected image that appears mixed together with the object. Therefore, it is said to be a deceived state of cognition. But to call a conception "deceived" is not necessarily a denial of any cognitive validity. The deception here only concerns the mode of appearance but not the mode of existence of the object. Of course certain conceptions are deceived as to the mode of existence of their objects as well as to their mode of appearance. Thus they fall into the category of mistaken cognition. But many conceptions do correctly apprehend their object's mode of existence although the object *appears* in a fallacious manner.

This process may be more simply illustrated by means of the following analogy: suppose that we have a man who is shortsighted. Without his glasses everything in the distance appears unclear and blurred to him but as soon as he puts his glasses on, the previously indistinct images come clearly into focus. Likewise, similar to the way in which this man perceives visual forms by means of the intermediary factor of his glasses, a conceptual cognition apprehends its object by means of the intermediary factor of a mental image. A further similarity is that just as the man wearing glasses is unable to distinguish between the objects he sees and the lenses in his glasses, a conception of something is unable to distinguish between the actual characteristics of its object and the subjectively imposed characteristics of the mental image. However, this does not imply that a mental image is non-apprehensible. Although it is not apprehended by the conceptual mind that mixes it with the object, nevertheless it can be apprehended by other conceptual minds. Especially during recollection we can separately cognise the mental image of the object by

means of another conception. But this conception of the mental image itself is always a conception other than that of the recollection which uses the image to refer to its object.

Every conceptual state of mind, be it a simple thought or memory of an object or the instinctual clinging to the notion of a self-existent "I", should be understood to apprehend its object in this way.

B. Conceptions Based on Experiential and Nominal Images

A *conception** is defined as a conceiving cognition that apprehends its object through the media of experiential and nominal images that are fit to be mixed. Generally speaking, we define a *mental image** of an object as a mentally projected entity that, whilst not being the object, appears as though it were. Here, although we have to make a distinction between experiential images on the one hand, and nominal images on the other, both of them nevertheless bear these defining characteristics. Thus experiential images and nominal images are both types of mental images. Their difference lies in the manner in which the object in question has been or is being apprehended. If we have had or are having a direct cognition of an object, then it is possible for us to conceive of it via the medium of an experiential image, but without such an experience it would only be possible to conceive of it by means of a nominal image. To conceive of something through a nominal image is not dependent upon a direct experience of the object but merely upon a verbal description of it. Only when we are familiar with the object through direct apprehension as well as through verbal description is it possible to conceive of it in both ways. In such a case the experiential and nominal images of the object appear together. Hence when the definition states "fit to be mixed",

this is to indicate that a conception of an object can occur by means of *either* an experiential image or a nominal image alone, *or* by means of the two of them together.

This leads us to make a three-fold distinction amongst conceptual cognition into conceptions of objects solely by means of an experiential image, solely by means of a nominal image and by means of both. An example of the first type, a conception of an object solely by means of an experiential image, would be a young child's conception of an object that he has directly seen and apprehended but for which he knows no name by which to describe or identify it. After this experience the child is able to conceive of what he has seen, but this conception occurs to him merely through the appearance of experiential images without any images based upon a verbal description. An example of a conception of something solely by means of a nominal image would be the conception of Rome in the mind of a person who has never actually been there and has only heard a description of the city. Once again the person will be able to form a conception in his mind of Rome. But in this case it will occur to him merely through the appearance of nominal images without any images based upon his own experience. Thirdly, a conception of an object by means of both experiential and nominal images would be the conception in a person's mind of an object, such as his house or his car, which he has both directly apprehended and which he recognises by name and description. In this case the person's conception of the object occurs by means of both an experiential image as well as a nominal image appearing to his mind.

In all these three examples it should be pointed out that although experiential and nominal images appear to the mind, they are not apprehended by the minds that have them as their appearing objects. In any conceptual cognition the experiential or nominal images simply act as the media—like the lenses of the glasses in our example—

through which the primary objects—what was seen by the child, Rome, or the man's house and car are apprehended. In all three examples the experiential and nominal images are similar in that they are subjective projections that duplicate an image of the object by means of the appearance of which a conception is able to take place. The difference between an experiential image and a nominal image is made according to the bases upon which the duplication was made. If the image is formed from a person's direct experience, then it is said to be an experiential image. But if the image is formed from labelling and describing the object, then it is referred to as a nominal image. Since many images are duplicated from both direct experience as well as labelling and description (without exclusive dependence upon either of these bases) we also talk of conceptions occuring by means of both experiential and nominal images together. All conceptions, therefore, occur in one of these three ways, and through amplification upon each of the examples given above we should be able to see how this is so.

C. Term-Connecting and Fact-Connecting Conceptions

Another distinction that can be made amongst conceptual cognitions is that according to their cognitive function into term-connecting and fact-connecting conceptions. Most conceptions are said to function in one of these two ways: either they simply give a name to an object or they ascribe certain qualities to an object. A *term-connecting conception** is defined as a conception that apprehends its object through connecting a term to it.

Examples of this would be the thoughts, "this is called a jug" or "that is called a table". In these cases the conceptual apprehension is taking place through the simple designation of the terms "jug" and "table" to the objects

that bear the necessary characteristics for such an identification.

The definition of a *fact-connecting conception** is a conception that apprehends its object through connecting a quality to its basis. An example of this would be the thought, "sound is impermanent". Here the object is not merely identified with a term but is referred to by a phrase which ascribes to it the characteristic of impermanence. Nevertheless, all term-connecting conceptions are necessarily fact-connecting conceptions. The thought, "this is called a jug", for example, in addition to simply designating the object with the label "jug" is also connecting the quality of jugness to its basis, the object with the flat base, round belly and the ability to hold water. Fact-connecting conceptions, however, are not necessarily term-connectors. The thought, "sound is impermanent", only ascribes a specific quality, impermanence, to an object, sound, but does not label sound with a term by which it is exclusively understood.

All conceptions, however, do not necessarily fall into either of these two categories. For example, the simple conception of a jug, although it apprehends its object by means of mixing it with its own subjectively projected image, is said to be neither term-connecting nor fact-connecting but merely a conceptual apprehension of the jug's fundamental presence.

D. True and False Conceptions

Furthermore, conceptions are said to be either true or false. A true conception is one in which the object apprehended is existent, whereas a false conception is one in which the object apprehended is non-existent. Hence the conception that sound is impermanent, for example, is in accordance with reality and thus true, but the conception

that sound is permanent is false, since it does not accord with reality. In the case of perception, the distinction between its being true or false was determined according to whether the object appeared in a deceptive manner or not. But for conceptions, since the object always appears in a deceptive manner, i.e. inseparably mixed with a mental image, they are only determined to be true or false on the basis of what they apprehend, not on the basis of what appears to them.

E. Recollection and Future-Oriented Imagination

Finally, another two types of conception should be mentioned here because of their frequent occurrence, namely recollection and future-oriented imagination. Perceptions are concerned with objects presently existing that we are able to immediately experience. The conceptual mind, however, in addition to considering one's present experience, is also capable of remembering past experiences and planning for events to occur in the future. A large amount of our time every day is spent in these two conceptual activities. We constantly refer back to and recollect past events as well as plot the course of our future, be it tomorrow or next year or even the next life. From a positive point of view we can use our memory to aid us in gaining an understanding of the transient and unsatisfactory character of our lives by recollecting and investigating the nature of our previous experiences. Likewise, we can constructively plan for the future by contemplating the various stages upon the path to enlightenment and by generating a desire to attain these stages and progress along the path. On the contrary, though, we tend to indulge in the memory of sensual pleasures and plan ahead only for limited personal gratification in the immediate future. Thereby, we waste the great potential of

human life and perpetuate the cycle of discontented existence. Most of our activity is motivated by this future-oriented imagination and we consequently spend our lives in striving to obtain our various goals although in many cases we do not succeed.

THE FOUNDATION OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT SERIES

1. The Four Noble Truths
2. Relative Truth, Ultimate Truth
3. Buddhist Psychology
4. The Awakening Mind
5. Emptiness
6. Tantra

Buddhist Psychology



THE FOUNDATION of
BUDDHIST THOUGHT

VOLUME 3

GESHE TASHI TSERING

FOREWORD BY LAMA ZOPA RINPOCHE

EDITED BY GORDON MCDOUGALL

WISDOM PUBLICATIONS • BOSTON

good character, friendliness—our long-term aim is the attainment of bodhichitta.

From the very beginning it is important to have a strong long-term motivation and to see that the positive attitudes we are developing now are part of a much bigger plan. There is no solution that can solve *all* our problems immediately—even the different aspects of the mind we are now developing will take time to arise together as the causes for bodhichitta.

Mindfulness shows us the picture—what is happening in our activities or our thoughts—but neither mindfulness nor the other third-zone positive mindstates are the main antidotes to the deep-seated unwholesome mental factors such as attachment, anger, and jealousy. Whether they are manifest in our mindstreams at present or only there in potential, these positive mindstates are the tools to develop the more profound positive minds of loving-kindness and altruism.

6 Epistemology: Conception and Perception

Epistemology in Buddhism

Buddhist epistemology is the systematic investigation of the nature of knowledge: its scope, base, and reliability. It looks at the *scope* in terms of how far knowledge can go toward understanding reality, the *base* minds from which knowledge can grow, and whether knowledge can serve as a *reliable* source for an individual to completely understand reality.

Buddhist epistemology was first taught systematically and explicitly by the Indian scholar Dignaga (ca. 450 A.D.), and then by his commentator Dharmakirti (ca. 625 A.D.) in the *Commentary on Valid Perception (Pramanavarttika)*. As I have mentioned, although Nagarjuna and his disciple Aryadeva wrote texts on epistemology much earlier, this was not done in any structured or extensive way; thus Dignaga and Dharmakirti are considered the founders of Buddhist epistemology and logic.

Epistemology in Buddhism is not merely the study of knowledge for its own sake, but is aimed at bringing the seeker an understanding of how sentient beings can overcome their problems and eventually experience liberation—the cessation of suffering and its root causes. Dignaga and Dharmakirti's explanations of epistemology are not just empirical data, such as one would find in science—although of course

much within their explanations concurs with Western science. The difference between them is the motivation. In the case of Buddhist epistemology, this knowledge is acquired solely to develop the understanding that counteracts and eliminates our fundamental confusion.

Conception

Buddhist thought recognizes two basic kinds of mental experience: the experience in which the mind accesses its object directly, and the experience in which the mind relies on another mind to access its object.

These two states roughly correspond to *perception* and *conception*, terms most speakers of English would understand, although not always precisely, and certainly not in the context of the Buddhist analysis. If you feel that a concept is a thought and a perception is more direct, more correct, then you are getting there, but even so, as we will see, there's a great deal more to it than that.

Dharmakirti defines *conceptual cognition* as "that consciousness that apprehends the object indicated by words in relation to the actual thing." Here we see a close connection drawn between thought on one hand and language and concepts on the other. In the definition, "words" refers to both language and concepts. In Tibetan the term for "word" is *dadun*, literally the "object of concept." That is not to say that a concept is the same as a word. An intermediary mind helps the mind as a whole access its object, and that can take the form of an image or an idea, as well as an actual word or label.

For example, think about a particular table, perhaps the one in your living room. When you think about the table, the image of the table will probably arise in your mind. That image can never be more than a representation of the table. A thought about the table is not the

actual table. Between your consciousness and the actual table you are thinking about is the intermediary image of the table you have evoked.

However, the concept of table is more than just the intermediary process that occurs between the mind and the actual object; it also encompasses what we *mean* when we say "table." Our subjective representation of a table is not directly connected to reality because it is constructed by language and concepts. Thus, a conceptual mind is fiction rather than reality—it is made up by our minds. The concept is a subjective representation of an object that relates the object to other objects in the same class and is understood by society to be a whole. It is not the direct expression of the object.

Let's break it down a bit. We all relate to the concept of *table*. It represents an object with properties shared with all kinds of things—wooden tables, iron tables, simple tables, ornate tables, coffee tables, dining room tables—that have specific parts—legs, top, and so on—and function as table. This is a mental concept. The concept does not arise from the side of the table itself, but is part of our linguistic construction of *table*.

In reality there is no actual table that shares all the properties of every other table. We assume a common "table-ness," but that essence is fiction. The representation of the table in the conceptual mind is separate from the real table, and furthermore this fictional entity, table, that we hold is superimposed over any "real" individual table we are investigating. Our experience of a table is predominantly a projection, an abstract generality.

That does not mean the table does not exist. The object we call "table" sitting in front of us at this moment does exist, but the "table" of our conceptual mind only exists as a generality, because it is a mere conceptual construct.

Conceptual Thoughts Engage Through Elimination

In the common division of existent things, Buddhist philosophers distinguish two categories: impermanent and permanent (which are categorized from the side of the object) or affirmation and negation (which are categorized from the side of the subject—the mind apprehending the object).

Although the former division is more widely discussed, in some ways the latter is more important because, from a Buddhist perspective, we can never know an object without the involvement of mind, and thus without some degree of subjectivity. Therefore, this twofold division contains objects that can be known by affirmation and those that can be known by negation. I would like to look at these now.

The conceptual mind does not apprehend its object through a positive recognition but by eliminating all other objects that are not that particular object. Therefore, in Buddhist epistemology the conceptual consciousness is construed as negative in nature, as it arises from a process of elimination.

For example, if I say "apple" to you, the image of an apple will come into your mind. According to Buddhist thought, it arises through the systematic negation of all things that are *non-apple*. If I qualify my concept by saying "green apple," your mind will refine the generic image, and my saying "That large green apple you have just eaten" will further refine it. Still, there is no direct perception of that just-eaten apple. The concept remains an elimination of all the stored memories of what is *not* that apple and a generic construct of what *is* that apple.

This process occurs through the use of a linguistic sign—a word or label. This is more than just seeing an apple and sticking on the mental label, "apple." The process is much more subtle than that. It is virtually impossible for ordinary people such as ourselves to have a direct perception of an object, unadorned by conceptual process. Even if we

have no conscious discursive thought about the object, we engage in this mental process of object classification.

The negation process of conception has parallels in the way Buddhist practice is pursued. For example, this page is impermanent, but our minds presently perceive it as permanent, at least on a moment-by-moment basis. We need to eliminate the misconception that it is permanent to perceive it accurately. In this case, the concept of permanence is the object of negation. That is similar to the way the conceptual mind operates, though in this case we need to consciously intend the negation. Without negating its permanence we will never see its impermanence—either as a concept or, at a very advanced stage of meditation, as a direct perception.

We are categorizing things all the time. We classify objects as beautiful, ugly, tall, short, and so on. Moreover, our categories depend on our cultural context—so in one culture "beautiful" might be equated with tall, slim, blond, and blue-eyed, while in another it might be fat and bald!

We are also constantly making value judgments—good or bad, fair or unfair, right or wrong. Observing our personal instinctive dialogue of judgment is a very interesting exercise because value judgments as categories are particularly removed from the object at hand and say more about the perceiver than they do about the object. By looking at them, we can learn a lot about our minds. According to Buddhist epistemology, we arrive at our judgments—which are concepts—by elimination. On the basis of all of our accumulated conditioning, we decide that something is good by eliminating all that is not good.

Conceptual Thoughts Are Always Mistaken

The conceptual mind apprehends its object through negation, therefore it is considered a mistaken mind. Although it is a construct based

on a linguistic, generalizing process that has little to do with the actual object before us, this is not the way we see it. According to our view, the object of our conceptual consciousness is real and accurate. This is a mistake.

As long as the dichotomy persists between *apple* and *non-apple*, or whatever our conceptual mind is apprehending through this elimination process, there is no way to overcome this fundamental mistake. Thus conceptual consciousness can never reflect reality as accurately as a perceptual consciousness.

A conceptual thought is merely a fiction projected onto an object or event and depends on socially shared assumptions. A table does not think of itself as a table—it does not think that it is wooden and comes from Ikea, or that its function is to hold a computer. These are all assumptions we attach to the object. In fact, the term *table* is a conventionality that exists in the English-speaking world. It has no reality based in the actual object. The assumptions we layer on objects arise from the social process of language acquisition and the habit of labeling our sense stimuli in certain ways over and over again. We want to buy a table, we plan the purchase in our minds, and we feel the table we want to buy is a real table, while in fact "tableness" is a fiction created by the conceptual mind and nowhere to be found.

Our experience of objects as real and our acceptance of the terms commonly used for such objects as natural are the two key factors for the formation of the conceptual mind. Superimposed on the real table is this combination of memory and socially constructed generalization that ignores the fact that one object labeled *table* is entirely separate and different from another object labeled *table*. In reality all physical objects are unique, individual things. In the realm of reality, this concept of *table* does not exist within all things we call tables; we superimpose it upon the object.

Conceptual Thoughts Provide Cognitive Content

Mistaken though they are, conceptual consciousnesses are vital to our lives and well-being. They provide the elaboration necessary for us to make sense of the raw data of the direct sensory consciousnesses. Only a conceptual mind can categorize objects; only a conceptual mind can analyze and discriminate; only a conceptual mind can plan—in short, only a conceptual mind can "think." Because of that, conceptual thoughts are very useful.

On one level they are always mistaken, misrepresenting the real world. On another level they are vital for sentient existence. They help us to apprehend things and events not apparent to our sensory consciousnesses, either because of their subtle nature, because of their temporal location—meaning they happened in the past or are still to happen—or because of their physical location—meaning they occur too far from our sense consciousnesses for us to apprehend them. In such circumstances the conceptual mind is the only way we can connect with those things and events.

As discussed above, we must strive to realize objects such as subtle impermanence and selflessness if we are ever to experience the complete cessation of suffering and its origin. Dignaga and Dharmakirti assert that such knowledge can only arise through conceptions. At our stage of development we cannot directly perceive subtle impermanence, thus the conceptual mind is the only tool we have to connect us to this truth in any way. Therefore, it is important to keep conceptuality in perspective. While we must understand that concepts always contain an element of error and do not reflect reality accurately, thinking is nonetheless crucial to our spiritual development.

Implicative and Nonimplicative Negation

If you asked a Gelug master about nonimplicative negation, he or she might just say that it is the most important thing you can ever know. It is such a strange term, and yet it is so important! Without understanding nonimplicative negation, it is impossible to understand ultimate reality.

The difference between the two types of negation lies in whether the negation causes something else to be implied in its place. Hence we have the terms *implicative* and *nonimplicative*. If you go to university where there are two choices, full-time or part-time study, and you tell a friend that you are not studying full-time, this is a negative statement. However, through this negation you imply a positive statement—that you *are* studying part-time. Thus your statement is an implicative negation. If I tell you there is no honey in the kitchen, that too is a negative statement, but it does *not* imply anything positive, such as the fact that there *is* sugar, or coffee. This is a nonimplicative negation.

Gendun Drub defines nonimplicative negation as:

> ...That which is realized through an explicit elimination of an object of negation and does not suggest some other positive phenomenon in place of its object of negation.[23]

In other words, a nonimplicative negation eliminates whatever needs to be eliminated without implying that anything exists in its place. To state that I don't play football does not imply that I do play tennis.

This may sound a little silly to you, but nonimplicative negations become crucial when we seek to understand emptiness or selflessness. We are all trying to understand emptiness (at least I hope we are!). But what are things are empty of? When we realize that all phenomena are

empty of inherent existence, do we simultaneously realize that they possess other qualities? The insight into emptiness brings no such implication. There is nothing beyond, not even something called "emptiness." It is the same with selflessness. The very word directs us to the absence of a self, but it does not imply that something else exists.

Meditating on emptiness is a long and profound process. The object we are trying to negate is quite crude early on, but slowly it becomes more and more subtle. If, at the end of our analysis, we are left with anything positive at all, the analysis has gone wrong. Our negation should be nonimplicative. When our mind realizes an object's ultimate nature, its absence of inherent existence, what it realizes is just a mere absence of inherent existence and absolutely nothing else. If, when inherent existence is negated, anything remains—even something profound, like a realization of dependent arising—that mind does not have a true understanding of emptiness.

How the Mind Generalizes

Conceptual consciousnesses are mistaken in that the mind takes something generic and assumes it is specific. Superimposed upon the perception of a book, for instance, is almost always the concept of *book*, which helps us interpret the object but denies us direct access to it. There are four types of generalizations the mind makes about objects:

1. collective generality
2. categorical generality
3. meaning generality
4. sound generality

Getting a clear picture of these four points can really help us see the process by which we superimpose and the mistakes this process can

bring. The effect of these mental mistakes is huge. In fact, the ways we react socially and individually to our world are dominated by these first three generalities.

A *collective generality* is really another name for the *density of whole*, a topic that comes up in the next chapter. In this context, however, we are focusing on the way the mind elaborates on the original sense data. *Collective generality* refers to the assumptions we make about the completeness of an object. For example, when we watch the news on television, we only see the top part of the anchorperson's body, but we assume the existence of his or her waist and legs. This is a conception rather than a perception. Our experience tells us that a person has all these parts, so if we see one part, we assume the others will follow. This is something we rarely question, and in most cases experience does not contradict it. However, this mistaken mind can harm us—even on a mundane level. Once, I was helping to renovate Jamyang Buddhist Centre after the building was first purchased, and I stepped on some old linoleum in a deserted upper-story room. I had assumed there was solid floor beneath, but in fact the floorboards were rotten—a collective generality that could have seriously injured me.

A categorical generality is a generalization the mind makes based on the category an object fits into. This can be a useful conceptual shorthand, but it can also be very harmful, as when we judge an entire race of people based on a stereotype.

No two objects are identical. Even if they are the same shape, color, and so on, they are two different entities. If you have two glasses in front of you, they may *look* identical, but of course they are different glasses; they are composed of different atoms. However, it would be impossible for the mind to keep up if it had to newly label every object in the universe every time it encountered one, and so we categorize. I have used *glass* as an example, and I know that you have no trouble imagining one. If I ask a friend to buy me a carton of soymilk

at the shop, I know she won't come back with dog food. Placing objects into manageable categories is an essential role of the conceptual consciousness.

The worrying side to this mental process is that by categorizing, we may deny the unique integrity of the object. We may pigeonhole, reduce to stereotypes, or at worst, judge a person based on our generalized assumption about a group. The prejudice—racial, sexual, or whatever—that is the cause of so much of the world's suffering is probably the most dangerous manifestation of this. People under the influence of prejudice need no deep philosophical understanding in order to hate. If people with a particular bias—against a race, religion, sex, or skin color—see someone in that category, they react based on the categorical generality they are making. It colors and distorts their perception.

A *meaning generality* is another term for the generic image the mind creates. We have already covered the way the conceptual mind functions through image and language. Here the focus is the mental image that arises in place of the perception. As we have seen, the conceptual mind creates the image through negation, systematically eliminating everything that is not its object. So if I ask you to imagine an apple, the image that arises in your mind is everything that is not non-apple. No matter how specific that image might seem, it is not the actual object—it is the meaning generality. Say we both met His Holiness the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala in 1995 and I remind you that he shook your hand—a singular and powerful experience you are not liable to forget. That image may be strong and vivid in your mind, but it is still a meaning generality, a counterfeit of the actual event. In fact, we don't even remember real events at all for the most part; we recall our previous meaning generalities.

Sound generality is much the same, but based on sound. Think of your favorite song. In your mind you may hear it playing, although in

reality of course it is not. This is the conceptual mind producing a sound generality based on memories of listening to the sound. Again, for the most part this process is harmless, but because the mind is not apprehending the object exactly in accordance with reality, a fundamental mistake exists that can cause problems.

These generalities operate continually in our minds. They shape our opinions and color our entire world, and yet we are rarely aware of them as such. Although this topic is complex, we should seek to understand it, for the misunderstanding that skews our view of the world, no matter how subtle, causes mistakes that can lead to suffering.

Perception

As beings of the physical world, we are fortunate to not only possess the ability to make sense of our external environment, but also to possess the five sense faculties by which we can gather accurate information about it. According to Buddhist epistemology, although perception is not solely the realm of the sense consciousnesses—on certain occasions the mental consciousness can directly perceive sense data—nevertheless our sense perceptions are the main tools by which we gain impressions of the external world.

Perception can be defined as "a mental event that can apprehend its object positively, engaging the object as it is." This refers mainly to our five sense consciousnesses. I walk down a street and see a person on the other side, hear the traffic, smell the flowers in the park, and feel the cool breeze. I am also eating an ice cream cone. These mental events—seeing, hearing, tasting, and so on—engage the object—the person, the noise, and so on—directly and positively. At this level there is no elimination or indirect apprehension.

Of course, things do not remain so simple for more than an instant.

Immediately the mind begins to label things, and feelings and stories arise. The person is a friend, the traffic is loud, the breeze is cold, and so forth. This is the conceptual mind's process of enhancing the initial perceptions, but they are not in themselves perceptions.

Intuitively, when we see an object, hear a sound, or ascertain something with any of our other sense faculties, we assume that it exists exactly as we perceive it. But all Buddhist schools assert a discrepancy between the world as it actually exists and the world as we perceive it. There is even a school that denies the existence of the objects of the external world entirely.

Aspect

When we apprehend an object through direct perception, we assume we are ascertaining the actual object. We see a house and we think there is nothing between the actual house and our perception of it. But this is not so.

Among the schools of Buddhist thought, there is actually no clear agreement on what we actually see. In order to get an idea of the complexity of this issue, we need to examine the assertions of each of the four philosophical schools. For our purposes, we will limit our analysis to the first three schools, excluding the highest school, the Madhyamaka, as it really complicates the picture.

According to the Vaibhashika school, the least subtle of the four schools, our consciousness has direct and unmediated access to the object. However, the Vaibhashika also assert that we are unable to perceive an entire object with a single consciousness. If you think about it, this makes sense. We see an apple and think we are seeing the entire apple. In fact our eye consciousness has only taken in the color and shape of the part of the apple we can see, not its back or bottom, or the smell and taste that make up the complete object.

But apart from that, say the Vaibhashika scholars, a real apple exists, and that is exactly what our eye sees. For that reason we call the Vaibhashika a *realistic* school. This is not because they have an exclusive claim on the truth, but because they proclaim that things are real in the sense of having an intrinsic essence.

This assertion is strongly refuted by the other schools. First, say the others, this assumes a chronological impossibility, for according to the Vaibhashika, the existence of the apple and the apprehension of the apple would have to happen at the same time. This would eliminate the possibility of cause and effect, which by definition is sequential. If the apple and the apprehension of the apple were simultaneous, then the object could not be the cause for the mind that apprehends it, which, according to the other schools, is absurd.

The Sautrantika and Chittamatra schools introduce the concept of *aspect* (Tib. *nampa*) in their discussions of how objects are perceived. The aspect is the reflection of the object that becomes the direct perception. It is an intermediary between the object and the mind, and as such behaves in the same way as a conceptual consciousness. We see blue, but what is it that differentiates blue from yellow before the conceptual consciousness labels it? These schools say it is aspect. The aspect of blue is both caused by the "real" blue color of the object and its representation in the visual consciousness.

It is obvious that an object cannot physically be present within a consciousness. However, according to these schools, the object can cause an impact—a mark or a reflection—on the consciousness. This is like leaning on a freshly-painted wall. Your arm is not left on the wet paint, but the mark of your arm is. According to these schools, this is a necessary part of the process of perception—without it, there is no base for discrimination.

The difference in assertion between the Sautrantika and Chittamatra schools does not revolve around whether the sense consciousness

needs an intermediary, but around the status of the external object. The Sautrantika school assumes the external object exists, and the Chittamatra school refutes this. According to the Chittamatra, the aspects of color or taste that arise within our consciousness do not come about as a result of an impression from a real external object, but rather are produced by our own latent internal tendencies, or imprints. There is no experience of an external object without taking into account the mind that experiences it. Object and subject are one entity in that the table and the mind experiencing *table* arise at the same time from the same source.

Although having very different ideas about the subject/object relationship, both schools assert that a perception cannot arise independently of the object it perceives. Therefore perceptual aspects have a direct one-to-one correspondence with the objects they represent. A perceptual consciousness will arise only if there is an actual object, and therefore it can be said to hold the object itself. And so an eye sense consciousness apprehending a blue color is said to hold the actual blue even though it is only aware of the *aspect* of blue rather the blue itself.

Furthermore, an aspect is not something separate from consciousness. It is both a representation of the object in a consciousness as well as the actual consciousness that sees the object. Because of this double nature, it is said that the aspect has the *appearance* of the external object but the *nature* of consciousness.

The concept of aspect is also of great importance for these schools in that it opens the inquiry into self-cognition (Tib. *rangrig*),[24] or how the mind can apprehend itself. In relation to self-cognition, scholars such as Dharmakirti and Dignaga speak of two types of aspect, objective and subjective.

Objective aspect focuses on the object—the color blue, for instance—whereas the subjective aspect focuses on the eye consciousness itself as it apprehends blue. In any perception, two things

happen simultaneously: the object is reflected in the consciousness—the objective aspect—and the consciousness is aware that the process is happening—the subjective aspect.

Almost all of the schools besides Vaibhashika—Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Svatantrika Madhyamaka—assert that subjective aspect is a valid mind and that it is synonymous with self-awareness or self-cognition. They consider its presence absolutely necessary to trigger future recollections of the object. Dharmakirti says that cognition is *self-luminous*, which means that at the same time that the eye perceives blue, it is aware—self-aware—that it is perceiving blue. The meaning of *self-luminosity* is similar to that of the English term *apperception*, which means the mind's awareness of itself. These three schools assert that the mechanism by which we hold an object from one moment to the next is self-cognition.

The subjective aspect of a mind cannot be a different entity from the mind itself. If it were, for example, one mind looking at a separate mind, we would find ourselves in an infinite regression—for a mind apprehending an object, there would need to be a second mind aware of that mind, but that second mind would require a third mind that was aware of that one, and a fourth, and so on, ad infinitum. The subjective aspect is the *same* mind but a *different* aspect. The subjective aspect of an eye consciousness *is* the eye consciousness. It is the mechanism within the eye consciousness that allows the mind to later recall it.

Comparing Perceptual and Conceptual Minds

At this stage it is worth reviewing the two main divisions of consciousness, perception and conception, and expanding upon them. The chart below details this.

perception	*conception*
engages in its object positively, by affirmation	engages in its object negatively, by elimination
engages in its object as it is (without exaggerating)	does not engage in the object as it is
engages in a real object	does not engage in a real object
is generally very accurate	is always mistaken
does not provide any integrative content	provides integrative content

A perception apprehends an object without any labels or stories. It is not mistaken, unless there is some short-term physical problem, such as when we squeeze our eyes shut and see two moons. In contrast, as we have seen, conceptual minds are always mistaken with regard to their object.

It is not the role of the perception to identify the object; it apprehends only raw data. The conceptual mind then immediately adds the content and discriminates one object from another: eliminating what it is not, and identifying what it is, labeling it, and categorizing it. This process can also quickly arrive at a judgment about the object: good or bad, beautiful or ugly, friend or enemy, and so on.

Basically, all phenomena are either impermanent or permanent—there is no other alternative. Impermanent things depend on causes and conditions to come into existence and make up most of the *things* of our world. Permanent things do not function, nor do they depend on causes and conditions. Permanent things include states such as emptiness or concepts such as time. They do exist, but are unchanging, which is not to say they are eternal—they are not—but while they exist, they are not subject to cause and effect.

Impermanent things are also called *positive* or *established*, referring

to the way the mind apprehends them, whereas permanent things can be called *negative* or *eliminative*.

Perceptions apprehend impermanent things positively. The eye sees a book—an impermanent thing—or the ear hears a sound. Conceptions apprehend permanent things. We can see how time and maybe emptiness may be permanent, since they are somewhat abstract to us right now. But what about the mind that apprehends a beautiful sunset? Surely a sunset is an impermanent thing? The actual sunset is, but not so the image of the sunset that the conceptual mind apprehends. That image is permanent, because it cannot perform a function and does not change moment to moment while it exists.

The sense consciousnesses operate without interpreting their apprehended object. When the eye sees something, there is no elimination process. According to some Buddhist schools, between the object and the consciousness is the aspect, which has a direct one-to-one relationship with the object and hence is nonmistaken. The sense consciousness sees the object directly and positively. The conceptual consciousness in contrast apprehends its object indirectly, through mediation, and negatively, through elimination.

A mental event is passive or active depending on whether a process is involved. The perceptual mind involves no process and therefore engages passively with its object. The conceptual mind, on the other hand, always operates through an intermediary and therefore engages actively with its object. A conceptual construct arises between the object and the mind—whether this be the label, the feeling of attraction or aversion, or any of the other sorts of elaboration that go on—the internal dialogue of comparison, judgment, and identification.

The perceptual mind only collects the raw sense data; the conceptual mind does everything else. The perceptual mind is like the latent image on the film in a camera—light rays hitting sensitized film. The conceptual mind develops and prints the film (and complains because it is out of focus!).

Usually, in our everyday lives, perceptual and conceptual minds work together. Directly perceiving a red traffic light and not going any further in the process is dangerous. We need the conceptual mind to label *traffic light* and *red* and enter into an internal dialogue that causes our foot to hit the brake. As we have discussed, however, the conceptual mind adds more information than is necessary, exaggerating and even getting it plain wrong. In reality, our partner is *not* the most wonderful person in the world (or the least), and this new flat screen TV will *not* be the key to never-ending pleasure.

Normally we experience the world around us without questioning it. Sights appear, sounds happen—they all become part of our experience, filtered, sorted, judged, and either filed or discarded. Unconscious of the mechanics of our mental life, we mindlessly develop attractions and aversions, we remember and forget, under the sway of mental addictions and habits. If we are ever to gain any control over this circus within our heads, we need to understand conception's power, and the way consciousness creates the world we encounter. We need to liberate ourselves from servitude to the negative conceptions that now dominate us.

Valid Cognition

Pramana

When direct perception is not mistaken with regards to its object, it is called *valid cognition*. In Sanskrit the term is *pramana* (pra MAH na; Tib. *tsema*), a term used in both Buddhist and non-Buddhist epistemology. Non-Buddhist schools generally use this term to refer to two things: an instrument for gaining knowledge of an object and the knowledge itself.

For Buddhist schools, pramana refers to knowledge itself. It is a nondeceptive cognition. Dharmakirti and Dignaga assert that a consciousness is only valid and correct if it is nondeceptive, and if that is so, then that consciousness is pramana.

In his *Drop of Reasoning (Nyayabindu)* Dharmakirti further states that valid cognition is a prerequisite for the fulfillment of all human purposes.[25] All roads to enlightenment must cross the threshold of valid cognition, says Dharmakirti. There is no use looking for fulfillment and happiness in anything if it stems from a mistaken mind, because sooner or later suffering will result. Without pramana, we might seek chocolate ice cream but end up with chilis. Of course Dharmakirti is referring to much deeper levels of mistaken cognition than this, things like seeing others without the lens of self-interest and seeing phenomena without the distortion of self-existence.

On a common-sense level, we can all see the truth in this. Misfortunes sometimes seem to come "out of the blue," but generally, when we suffer, we can identify mistakes we have made somewhere along the way. We make physical mistakes, such as not watching where we are stepping, or verbal mistakes, such as speaking without considering another's feelings—but the mistakes that matter most are made with the mind. The much-quoted Buddhist teaching is that the root of all our problems is ignorance, and that ignorance is the fundamental mistaken mind. It is not a mind of spaced-out nothingness, or a mind that simply does not know, but an active mind of mis-knowing. Therefore, it is vital that we understand and develop valid minds while eliminating those that are mistaken.

A valid mind correctly differentiates between existent and nonexistent objects. It can see that the horns of a rabbit are nonexistent and that the table in front of us does in fact exist.

The Etymology of Pramana

This Sanskrit term *pramana* is a precise technical term. Though I have not studied Sanskrit formally, I will try briefly to explain the term. Sanskrit words can be divided into base terms and either suffixes or prefixes. Grammatically, the word *pramana* can be split into the words *prama*, the base term meaning "knowledge-event," and *ana*, the suffix, which in this case is the active agent meaning "to bring about." Although *pramana* is generally translated into English as *valid cognition*, the term encompasses a broader meaning. The Western concept *knowledge* implies something enduring. In Buddhism, in contrast, knowledge is not static but momentary, and this is reflected in the use of the active term *ana*.

In the monasteries, as a learning tool, we divide the word slightly differently, into the syllables *pra* and *mana*. *Pra* has many different meanings depending on the context: among them "excellent," "perfection," "first," and "newly." *Mana* means to measure, cognize, recognize, or apprehend. So *pramana* literally means to cognize perfectly, excellently, or newly. Different schools interpret this differently. Prasangika Madhyamaka scholars, for instance, read the *pra* to mean "main" or "prime." For when it is taken to mean "first" or "newly," then only the first moment of a mind can be valid, which is limiting. We will come back to this point below.

Nondeceptiveness

For a consciousness to be nondeceptive, the outcome must be consistent with the intention, meaning the object we are seeking must be determined correctly. Suppose we are looking for our friend John in a crowd. He is tall, bald, and wears glasses, and we think we see him in the distance. The consciousness has apprehended its object. When

we move to the other side of the room, we see that the shape we took to be John is in fact another man. However, directly behind him is John. We sought John and found him, so there is agreement between the goal and the outcome—the practical effect is nondeceptive—but there has been a deception of the intention in that our actual object differed from the object we cognized.

A valid cognition can be either a direct perception or an inference. Inferential valid cognitions are discussed below. For either kind of consciousness to be a valid cognition, it needs to be nondeceptive in two ways: in terms of its practical effect (you want A and you get A) and in terms its capacity to capture the object accurately.

This means that cognition is more than just getting things right—it is getting things right *intentionally*. The eye consciousness looks at the table and mind apprehends it, and there is no incongruity between the intention and the practical effect. However, there is no valid cognition between the eye consciousness seeing Dave and the mind mistaking him for John, since the intention and the practical outcome are not in accord.

Novelty

If, as I mentioned above, one takes the first syllable of pramana to mean *new*, then a valid cognition must know its object newly. In fact Dharmakirti states that: "With respect to this, valid cognition is only that which first sees an uncommon object."[26]

This element of novelty is quite important. Although a mental event that repeats previous information can be beneficial and may reveal correct information, because it is a repetition of a previous consciousness and therefore gives no new information, technically it cannot be a valid cognition. If it adds nothing new to the cognitive process, it is, in terms of cognition, irrelevant.

For example, according to most Buddhist epistemology, memory is not a valid consciousness, because it is a mere conceptual repetition of previous knowledge. There is no direct exposure to an object or event to ensure its validity, and so no matter how clearly and correctly we remember something, it no longer exists except as a mental fabrication. A nondeceptive mind must apprehend the object freshly. Thus memory can never be nondeceptive.

Gendun Drub wrote many commentaries on Dharmakirti, and he is one who claims that the *pra* in pramana definitely means *new* and therefore if a cognition does not reveal new information, it is not a valid cognition.[27] This view is widely held, but it can lead to complications. Khedrup Je, one of Lama Tsongkhapa's two main disciples, disagreed with the widely held view, arguing that novelty was not in fact a prerequisite for validity. He defined valid cognition instead as "the cognition that is nondeceptive with respect to the object that it [the cognition] realizes by its own power."[28]

So what does *by its own power* mean? It means without the help of another consciousness. Some masters assert that this implies a new apprehension, because a second moment of apprehending an object depends on the first moment. This does not refer to the general way that any moment of consciousness always depends on the preceding one, but to the specific way in which subsequent cognitions of the same object become dulled, losing the power of that initial moment. Here, we are *not* speaking of the conceptual minds that come into being immediately after any perception, but the raw direct perception itself, in its second or subsequent moments.

Other masters say the second moment of *perception* is still valid, but differentiate it from the subsequent moments of *mental* apprehension, the *conceptions* about the object. For them the idea of "newly" excludes only conceptions and not subsequent perceptions. If your definition of valid cognition is a mind that apprehends an object "by its own

power," then second moments and so on can therefore still be *novel* if that apprehension is free of other minds—free, specifically, of conceptual superimposition.

Inferential Valid Cognitions

Within Tibetan Buddhism, it is generally agreed that there are only two sources of valid cognitions: perception and inference. Other philosophies also cite testimony, such as the words of a realized master, as a source of valid cognitions, or analogies that point to the truth, but these are disclaimed by most Buddhist scholars, including Dharmakirti and Dignaga.

As we've already seen, perceptual valid cognitions are simply our sense consciousnesses perceiving an object directly and correctly. To understand how an inference can be correct takes further consideration. Inference is a concept, and by definition concepts are mistaken minds, so is there a contradiction? We need to look carefully at the difference in meaning—within Buddhist philosophy, at any rate—between *valid* and *mistaken*. Some minds can be both.

Besides the usual twofold division of existent things into impermanent and permanent, there is also a division of phenomena into obvious, hidden, and very hidden things. *Obvious* things are things that we ordinary people can recognize without depending on inference, such as the everyday objects available to our five senses. However, our sense perceptions cannot apprehend *hidden* objects. To cognize such objects, we need inference.

The usual and very clear example of this is inferring fire from smoke. This is the example that eight-year-old monks love debating! When visible to our eye consciousness, fire is an obvious object. But it can also be hidden when, for example, there is a forest fire in the distance. All we see is smoke, but based on this appearance we can infer the

existence of fire. This mind is valid because the mind accords with the object, although there is no direct perception.

It is the same with things like subtle impermanence or even our birthdays. We have no direct perception of the day we were born, not even a memory of it. We must rely on our parents' honesty and birth certificates. Despite all that, we still seem convinced enough to celebrate! Many of the really important ideas in Buddhism are hidden phenomena—emptiness, enlightenment, reincarnation, and so on. To understand and to finally realize such things definitely depends on inference.

The third category, *very hidden objects*, takes this all one step further. We can be certain that we are the product of our mother and father, but have no idea why we have a certain personality or why were born in a particular place. Buddhism says these things are due to karma, and at its most subtle level karma is a very hidden object. Very hidden objects can only be seen directly by a buddha and are thus penetrated by neither inference nor the direct perception of non-enlightened beings.

Through inference we can understand that we were born on such and such a date, which is a valid inference, but because it is a conceptual mind and not a perceptual mind it is still mistaken in that it does not apprehend its object directly. A conceptual mind is *always* a mistaken mind, even if it is nondeceptive. Seeing smoke and inferring fire is correct, or valid, but the mind that infers *fire* is also mistaken because it is conceptual and does not therefore directly apprehend its object.

Perceptions cannot apprehend concepts. My eye consciousness can apprehend the table in front of me but not the table's emptiness. For this reason, the conceptual mind of inference is a vital part of spiritual development, where we naturally move from a shallow, intellectual understanding of the concept of something like emptiness to a deeper one, and then to a valid inferential cognition. Without this, we could

never go on to realize emptiness directly, and enlightenment would be impossible.

The belief that because conceptual minds are mistaken they are therefore never valid is erroneous, for it leads to the verdict that realizing emptiness or enlightenment is impossible. Only through conceptual minds can we attain such states. In order to avoid the dangers of acceptance based on mere dogma, we must understand epistemology well and employ valid reasoning. To do that, we must examine perception—the phenomenon that bridges the conceptual mind and the external object.

Many masters make this fundamental point: if we trace all valid cognitions back to their origins, we arrive at perception. Eventually any valid cognition—perception or inference—must be validated by perception. Seeing smoke in the distance and apprehending that there is fire is mistaken in regards to its appearing object—we have no direct proof of fire—but valid because there *is* fire. But this inferential understanding is only possible through the valid perception of smoke. And we are only able to ascertain and accept this link between smoke and fire because we have previously perceived this causal relationship.

Perception and conception continually work hand in hand to bring us a complete picture of the world.

7 Moving Toward Knowledge

The Sevenfold Division

Part of epistemology is the knowledge of conceptions and perceptions, and of mistaken and valid minds, as we saw in the previous chapter. Another part is understanding the actual way we move from mistaken to correct minds and from conceptual to perceptual consciousnesses. In its examination of the validity of knowledge and the way we acquire it, the Gelug tradition commonly lists seven types of mind:

1. wrong consciousnesses
2. doubting consciousnesses
3. non-ascertaining consciousnesses
4. correctly assuming consciousnesses
5. subsequent cognizers
6. valid inferential cognizers
7. valid direct perceivers

Wrong Consciousnesses

Wrong consciousnesses, whether conceptual or perceptual, are erroneous with regard to the main object. Although a direct sense perception can

be a wrong consciousness, the error will generally be very superficial. The traditional illustration is seeing everything as yellow because of jaundice—although wearing sunglasses might be a more modern twist on this example. In contrast, wrong consciousnesses at the conceptual level, such as belief in a permanent self, can be quite deep.

Buddhist epistemology lists six sources of deception:

1. the object
2. the basis of perception
3. the situation
4. the immediate condition
5. karmic imprints
6. repeated familiarization

I'll deal with the first source of deception last. The second, the *basis of perception*, is deceptive when we mistakenly focus on an inappropriate object. Many minds and mental factors make up a mental event, and usually the mind moves to the most important but not always. Something can skew our appreciation of the object. For example, a loud sound can blind us to an oncoming car as we step off the curb.

The *situation* can also deceive us. For example, we may view a large male figure on a dark street as intrinsically threatening when no actual threat is present.

The *immediate condition* refers to the immediately preceding moments of mind that distort our appreciation of an event. An example is when intense anger leaves a residue that colors the following situation, causing us to see something we would ordinarily experience as pleasant or neutral as negative.

Karmic imprints trick us all the time. In fact, the propensities left on our mindstream from past actions have almost constantly programmed us to mistake things. The most important mistake relates to

the suffering of change, where we cling to objects as intrinsically desirable only to set ourselves up for future suffering when they inevitably "fail" us. The fault lies not in the object, but in our perception of it.

Similarly, *repeated familiarization* distorts the picture, dulling perception and making mistaken attitudes seem normal and correct. We see this with political rhetoric, advertising campaigns, and dysfunctional families when violence and selfishness are portrayed as desirable. It is also true of our habitual projection of self-existence onto objects.

These points are interesting to explore and, I think, reasonably easy to understand. But let us return now to the first source of deception on our list, the object. As I mentioned earlier, the object itself can also deceive us. The other sources of deception can be seen as subjective—they are all mistakes the mind makes. How is it that the object can be at fault?

In fact, the fault does not come from the side of the object, but rather from the inability of the mind to take in certain aspects of the object. These aspects are known in Buddhist epistemology as the *four densities:*

1. the density of continuity
2. the density of function
3. the density of object
4. the density of whole

Density is the word that English-language scholars use, but I prefer the Tibetan term, *nyurwa* or "quick"—as in, the object or event is too "quick" for the mind to apprehend.

The *density of continuity* refers to the mistake we make when we see a sequence of events in relation to an object and mistakenly impute them as simultaneous or continuous. The confusion arises because there the space of time between the first event and the second is so

small. The traditional example of this is of an arrow that is shot through a thick sheaf of paper. To the naked eye, it seems that the arrow has instantaneously created a hole through all the paper, but in fact it has gone through each sheet separately, one at a time.

We see another everyday example of this when we watch a film. Each second of a film is made of twenty-four separate frames, and each frame is a still picture. Because the frames are run through a projector very quickly, however, the movement in the picture seems to be continuous rather than composed of discrete stills.

The *density of function* looks at a set rather than a sequence as in the first density, but other than that it is quite similar. For example, walking up stairs seems like one single action to us, but, if we think about it, we can see that it involves a complicated set of motions.

The *density of object* refers to the way we see an object as a whole rather than as a collection of parts. A black-and-white photograph in a newspaper might look like one image of continuous tones, but if we examine it closely we will see it is nothing more than a collection of dots. Our mind makes connections that aren't actually present in the object itself.

The *density of whole* refers to objects that look uniform throughout although they are not. I see the front of something and presume the back and sides are identical. I bite into a delicious-looking apple only to find the inside is rotten. We are always making assumptions about wholes based on knowing only parts.

Recognizing that objects trick us all the time helps disengage us from appearances and look for deeper realities. Some people encountering television for the first time think that the characters and situations in soap operas are real. Of course we aren't like that (at least I hope not!), but we might well get so wrapped up in a good film that we forget we are watching actors in fictional situations. And rarely are we

conscious that the images we are watching on the screen are a series of still images.

This does not mean that objects and situations are utter illusions or that they do not function. They do function. A newspaper photograph functions as such, and merely because we fail to see that it is composed of many dots does not mean there is no photo. There is, however, an element of illusion at work that relies on our mind to fill in the spaces.

The lesson here is that we should not grasp onto things unreflectively, or take the labels our mind gives them as fixed. The capacity to create a little distance in this way can help us break the patterns that cause us so much unhappiness. This gap is essential for understanding reality and for reducing emotional distress.

Lama Yeshe offers a simple yet effective meditation.

> You check, you watch, your own mind. If someone's giving you a hard time and your ego starts to hurt, instead of reacting, just take a look at what's going on. Think of how sound is simply coming out of that person's mouth, entering your ear, and causing you pain in the heart. If you think about it in the right way, it will make you laugh; you will see how ridiculous it is to get upset by something so insubstantial. Then your problem will disappear—poof! Just like that.[29]

Wrong consciousnesses are minds that process the information about their objects incorrectly. This might seem a pedantic point but it is important to realize that there is a difference in Buddhist epistemology between a wrong consciousness, such as we have been discussing, and a mistaken consciousness. The Tibetan term for wrong consciousness, *lokshe*, means "reversed consciousness," implying a complete inaccuracy, such as seeing a flower and thinking it's a horse.

Mistaken consciousness (Tib. *trulshe*) is much more subtle, referring, as we saw above, to the conceptual mind's inability to perceive an object directly. As I have said, the conceptual mind is always mistaken in this way, whether or not it is wrong.

Doubting Consciousnesses

The second of the sevenfold division is *doubting consciousnesses*. This is a consciousness that is uncertain, wavering between one conclusion and its opposite. Everyday we are asked to make numerous choices, from products in the supermarket to decisions at work. If you are like me, most of those choices will be colored by indecision.

In Buddhist teachings, great doubt often arises in relation to the question of the inherent existence of things. We can listen to a teaching on emptiness and initially feel it is some esoteric concept that has nothing to do with our lives. That is doubt not tending toward the fact. If we hear more about it and start to feel that there is some possibility that things do not exist inherently, as the teachings are saying, that is doubt tending toward the fact. This is a powerful initial step in weakening the force of wrong view. It is the beginning of the process of moving toward correct understanding.

Even the suspicion that things and events may not be permanent is a thought diametrically opposed to our normal patterns and is in fact a very profound mind. As Aryadeva says in his *Four Hundred Verses (Chatushataka)*: "Even through merely having doubts, cyclic existence is torn to shreds."

In the sequence that leads us from wrong consciousness to direct perception, doubt is one of the first types of mind we want to eliminate. However, early on, healthy doubts that tend toward the fact are in fact positive minds. For instance, to doubt that this is the only life we have and wonder if there is a next life might lead us to think about it, research it, and from the understanding we gain, produce a positive result.

The danger of doubt is the unsteady mind that does not examine closely and stays stuck in a wavering state, under the sway of whatever view was encountered most recently. If, while doubting the existence of future lives and not having examined the issue carefully, we attend a lecture by a charismatic speaker who asserts there is no life after death, we may get caught up in the presentation and immediately grant it credibility. In order to progress on the path, we need to move beyond this chronic indecision.

Non-Ascertaining Consciousnesses

Every day millions of sensory experiences appear to our consciousness. Say you walk from your home to a nearby park. When you return, you might be able to tell your partner about the noisy dog, the new display in the shop window, or the leaves turning brown in the autumn chill—but in fact you do not ascertain the vast majority of sensory input.

If we could analyze our minds over a twenty-four-hour period, most of what we experience would fall into this category. Of course we pay attention when we walk down a street—our survival depends on it—but the mind cannot possibly take in everything. The mind must filter input to make sense of the world, otherwise it would be like receiving every radio station in the world at once. The majority of our mental events are consciousnesses to which the object appears but is not ascertained, meaning the object has been apprehended by the consciousness without enough force to register.

Similarly, we may attend to an object, but it fails to register deeply. There is no certainty about the object. We attend a talk on Buddhism, but two days later cannot recall what was discussed

because the teaching did not penetrate our minds sufficiently. That is another example of the mind that apprehends the object without ascertaining it.

Correctly Assuming Consciousnesses

The fourth consciousness is the last of what is called the *noncognizing consciousnesses*, in that they are conceptions and not perceptions and so do not actually "cognize" or know their objects. Correctly assuming consciousness is a consciousness that conceives the object in accordance with reality, but in a fallible manner.

While the vast majority of our consciousnesses fall into the category of non-ascertaining consciousnesses, the majority of the minds that *do* ascertain the object are correctly assuming consciousnesses. We ascertain the object but only through assumption. This mind can be positive, negative, or neutral, and it is a necessary step in developing the actual mind of direct perception.

A correctly assuming mind draws its conclusion based either on no reason at all or on a faulty reason. We have heard it, it seems right, and so we accept it without our own reasoning or experience playing a part. Even if we do investigate it in some way, we don't take this far enough. Investigation ceases before there is a full, clear understanding and whatever we are investigating becomes incontrovertible; it assumes without fully knowing. *Correctly assuming* means just that—the mind is correct about its object but it is only an assumption, without the weight of detailed analysis or realization. Very often cultural assumptions are taken as truths without investigation. I know many Tibetans who are very simple, devoted people who recite mantras every day and have unwavering faith in the law of cause and effect, but possess no understanding at all of subjects such as the four noble truths.

Because this consciousness assumes rather than knows, it has no real power to actually recognize the object. We learn about impermanence and assume that things are impermanent, which is good to a point, but the whole thing can become quite dangerous if we become content with our limited analysis and never go deeper, especially if our assumption is accompanied by a good deal of intellectual egoism. Generally in Tibetan Buddhism we talk of three wisdoms: the wisdom of hearing, contemplating, and meditating. Correctly assuming consciousness belongs to the first and is only really useful if it leads to the second, which takes whatever it has understood to the next level and eventually leads to single-pointed meditation upon the subject.

Subsequent Cognizers

The last three of the sevenfold division are cognizers, minds that actually get at the object. A *subsequent cognizer*, as the name implies, is a cognition of something that has been apprehended previously. It is subsequent to an initial and fresh valid cognition—either a perception or an inference. It is not the first moment of that mind. My eye consciousness sees a pen. The first moment is a valid perception, the second moment is a subsequent cognizer. Subsequent cognizers can be either perceptual or conceptual.

This distinction between *first* and *subsequent* is a point of debate among Buddhist scholars—some saying subsequent minds are valid, some saying they are not—but on a practical level, the difference is not so important.

Inferential Cognizers

Although an inferential cognizer is a conception rather than a perception, it incontrovertibly realizes its object of cognition and, as such, is as reliable a form of knowledge as a direct perceiver. However, while a

direct perceiver contacts its object directly and nonmistakenly, an inferential cognizer makes contact via inference with things that are not available to perception. Many points, such as subtle impermanence or selflessness, are at present obscured from our immediate experience and can only be comprehended through a conceptual cognition.

As we progress on the spiritual path, our capacity for logic develops and our understanding of hidden phenomena becomes deeper. Things that once were hidden to us and only accepted through the power of belief become objects of knowledge. Perhaps you have already had times when some level of understanding about a subject has come about, not through logical deduction alone but because some deeper comprehension has been triggered through a far subtler mechanism. You could call this intuition, but it could also be karmic imprints ripening due to meeting the right conditions. Buddhists call this a realization. You might have a good intellectual understanding of impermanence as a result of years of study, but all this knowledge can and should be solidified until it becomes incontrovertible. The mind that brings this about is an inferential cognizer.

Valid Direct Perceivers

Valid direct perceivers, the last of the sevenfold classification, are consciousnesses that apprehend the object directly and in a nonmistaken way. *Nonmistaken* means that no false element appears to the consciousness. The apprehension of the pen by the eye consciousness is without fault. What appears is the real pen. This obviously is a simpler concept of perception than the one we examined earlier, in which the *aspect* acts as a veil between mind and object.

The definition *nonmistaken* also eliminates mistaken minds that are not conceptual but also not direct perceivers. Sometimes certain sensory consciousnesses see or hear things completely incorrectly due to

temporary distortions. While you are on a train that begins to pull away from the station, you may feel that the train is still while the people on the platform are moving. This is obviously mistaken. Although the perception of the moving people is a direct perceiver, it is not a *valid* direct perceiver because it is not nonmistaken.

In Buddhist epistemology there are four types of valid direct perceivers:

1. sense direct perceivers
2. mental direct perceivers
3. self-knowing direct perceivers
4. yogic direct perceivers

Sense direct perceivers operate with our five sense consciousnesses. *Mental direct perceivers*, on the other hand, are direct perceivers that are not part of the sensory consciousnesses. *Self-knowing direct perceivers* are also known as self-cognizers, the aspect of the mind that is self-aware and the source of memory. These minds are accepted as existent by all schools except Prasangika Madhyamaka, the highest subschool. It is worthwhile to look briefly at mental direct perceivers, which are said to be of two types: (1) those that occur at the end of a sensory direct perception and (2) clairvoyance.

Between the sense consciousness perceiving an object and the conceptual consciousness that superimposes conceptual thought upon the object, a brief moment of mental direct perception occurs. This consciousness is so brief that we ordinary people cannot recognize it. That moment is a mental direct perceiver at the end of a sensory perception.

The second type of mental direct perceiver is clairvoyance. There are different types of clairvoyance, such as the clairvoyance that directly sees other beings' minds, or the clairvoyance that sees their

past lives. This kind of direct perceiver is developed as a by-product of the profound meditation of calm abiding.

Whereas clairvoyance is almost a side-effect of meditation, the development of yogic direct perceivers is a major goal of meditative training. Although we have the capacity to effortlessly and directly perceive such things as forms and sounds with our eye or ear consciousnesses, we do not have that ability with regard to profound phenomena like subtle impermanence or selflessness.

Through meditation and logical reasoning we start to understand subjects on an increasingly deeper level, moving from doubt to assertion to absolute conviction. However, at the beginning all of this occurs only within the conceptual process. In relation to impermanence, for instance, we get a stronger and stronger feeling for the momentary changes that occur in all things. The Gelug school says that a yogic direct perceiver realizing impermanence or selflessness directly—a perception—can only be achieved through the valid inferential cognizer—a conceptual mind. But through repeated meditation, that conceptual mental image becomes more and more part of our mind until it transcends conceptuality and becomes a direct perception. This is a yogic direct perception—we have realized the object directly, not through our senses, but through our mental consciousness.

Unlike clairvoyance, which is an achievement not exclusive to Buddhist practitioners, yogic direct perceivers occur only in the continuum of superior beings.[30] Although it shares some features with our sensory direct perceivers, such as freedom from conceptuality and being nonmistaken, yogic direct perceivers only occur through training. For this training, we need a clear understanding of the complete process of mental cultivation. The goal of having a yogic direct perceiver that realizes impermanence or selflessness seems impossible without understanding the definite attainable steps that get us there.

We start with conceptual minds, beginning at the wrong consciousness that sees everything as permanent. Through reading and listening, our doubts become awarenesses. For example, we may, after listening to or reading some Buddhist teachings, start to doubt that compounded phenomena are permanent. This doubt settles into a conviction and becomes a correctly assuming consciousness. With deeper reflection over time, it eventually becomes an inferential cognizer.

How do we turn these conceptual minds into a yogic direct perceiver? We need to develop calm abiding and then special insight, first separately and then together. The union of the two is not a yogic direct perceiver itself, but the tool that will help us develop it. Once we have done so, we can increase our realizations not only of impermanence, but also of emptiness and bodhichitta.

Remember that I said that there is no intermediary between a direct perceiver and its object, as opposed to a conceptual mind that is separated from its object by an image. Using the union of calm abiding and special insight—a mind that is simultaneously deep in meditation and possesses a strong understanding of the object—we can move beyond a consciousness reliant on mental images. When we separate our mind from these images, we are left with a direct perception of the very subtle object. Having gone through this process and attained this realization, it will never degenerate; it will remain stable from lifetime to lifetime. This shows the extraordinary power of the mind of yogic direct perception, and should inspire us to persevere to develop it.

Differences in Process Between Wisdom and Method

Examining this sevenfold division helps us see the process we need to undergo in order to attain enlightenment—from wrong consciousness

all the way to a direct perception of the way things really are. There is a difference, however, between the wisdom approach and the method approach.

As you know, when we work from the wisdom point of view we address facts, such as emptiness or impermanence. But when we develop the method side of our minds, such as great compassion and bodhichitta, what we engage with is harder to pin down. Many texts explain that our conceptual understanding of emptiness or impermanence can become direct perceptions while we are still unenlightened beings. On the other hand, we cannot have a direct perception of bodhichitta until we attain enlightenment.

The reason for this is the object. Every mind must have an object. The object of a mind developing a realization of emptiness is emptiness itself. The object of the mind developing a realization of bodhichitta is the suffering of all sentient beings and enlightenment. We can manage to directly see the emptiness of, say, our own body—it is difficult but not impossible. But until we have an omniscient mind, it is surely impossible to directly know the entire suffering of every single sentient being.

Within the Mahayana tradition, this is considered the point of difference between individual-liberation practitioners and practitioners of the bodhisattva vehicle. When you realize emptiness directly, you can go on to attain liberation from suffering, but if your goal is complete enlightenment or buddhahood, the focus of your meditation is the suffering of all sentient beings. Liberation can be achieved within lifetimes, it is said, but enlightenment takes three countless great eons.

According to our tradition, both perspectives, wisdom and method, need to be developed in tandem. In the first stages, both are conceptual minds, but we develop them in different ways. Then, it is comparatively easily to transform our wisdom into a direct perceiver, but the same is not true of method. Certainly, the objects of bodhichitta and great compassion can be realized before enlightenment, and we can have very powerful experiences in relation to them, but they cannot be realized *directly*. In the context of the sevenfold division, they do not become direct perceivers but only correctly assuming consciousnesses.

In the texts on *lamrim*, or the graduated path to enlightenment, the topics of calm abiding and special insight are taught after bodhichitta. In Tibetan Buddhism, and particularly in the Gelug presentation, we do not develop these later subjects in great detail in the early stages, focusing instead on laying the groundwork of study. However, my feeling is that without calm abiding and special insight we cannot experience direct realizations of anything. The earlier topics within the lamrim will remain intellectual exercises and not penetrate our consciousness in any deep way until we have engaged with them in stable and deep meditation.

The direct perception of emptiness starts at the path of seeing, the third of the five paths of a bodhisattva. This is a very subtle mind, and there is a risk, especially in the advanced stages of meditation, that we will be led into a blissful equanimity from which we will not want to emerge. It is said in some Mahayana sutras that when many individual-liberation practitioners get to a certain point, the wisdom realizing emptiness becomes a meditative absorption that can keep them in blissful stasis for many eons. Our goal is full enlightenment for the benefit of all beings, and if we keep this in mind then we will not get waylaid along the path.

It is difficult to develop this mind while we are still trying to deal with the gross mental afflictions that plague our daily lives. The layers of the mind must be systematically unpeeled to expose evermore subtle layers of affliction. Happiness—of ourselves and others—depends on reaching these deeper levels of mind and developing both wisdom and method in our practice. And in order to bring this about, we must cultivate a deep understanding of the mind and how it functions.

The understanding of the mind that is the subject of the Abhidharma and Pramana texts has been developed over centuries by masters who have been not only great logicians but also great meditators. Their theories have been formulated not in isolation but in the laboratories of their own minds; they actually experienced the mental states they write about.

I feel that so much of this understanding is not only relevant, but vital to our lives today. Our world is in crisis now, a crisis caused largely by an ignorance of the real path to happiness. Look about and see if this isn't so, in your own life, in the lives of the people you know, and in the way the cultures of the world are developing. More and more, the spiritual is being set aside for material pleasure; deep, lasting contentment for the quick buzz. This is due to an ignorance of the role the mind plays in creating happiness and suffering.

In our greed for possessions, we are eating the world we live in. Gandhi said that the world has enough for human need but not for human greed, and it is greed that we see manifesting so strongly in our lives today. Possibly there is no more greed today than in previous times, but with the increase in population and advances in technology, we now have the ability to destroy the delicate infrastructure of this planet. Wisdom has always been needed, but never more so than at this moment.

We have all the tools necessary for a great transformation, of ourselves and of the world we live in. All we need is an enquiring and persevering mind. Mind is complex, but not unknowable. The subjects covered in this book deal with understanding the mind and using that understanding to transform it. As with any tool, whether you use it is entirely up to you.

Appendix

The Fifty-one Mental Factors[31]

Always-Present Mental Factors

(1) contact (2) discernment (3) feeling (4) intention (5) attention

Object-Ascertaining Mental Factors

(6) aspiration (7) appreciation (8) recollection (9) concentration (10) intelligence

Variable Mental Factors

(11) sleep (12) regret (13) general examination (14) precise analysis

Wholesome Mental Factors

(15) faith (16) self-respect (17) consideration for others (18) detachment (19) nonhatred (20) nonignorance (21) enthusiasm (22) suppleness (23) conscientiousness (24) equanimity (25) nonviolence

Also by Jeffrey Hopkins

Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism
(with Geshe Lhundup Sopa)

The Buddhism of Tibet and the Key to the Middle Way
(with Lati Rinbochay)

The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses
(with Lati Rinbochay)

Tantra in Tibet

Death, Intermediate State and Rebirth in Tibetan Buddhism
(with Lati Rinbochay)

Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism

Yoga of Tibet

Tantric Practice in Nying-ma
(with Khetsun Sangpo Rinbochay)

Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism
(with Lati Rinbochay, Lochö Rinbochay, and Leah Zahler)

Meditation on Emptiness

Jeffrey Hopkins

Assistant Editor:
Elizabeth Napper

Wisdom Publications · London

The five beings who actualize the paths:
48 Stream Enterers
49 Once Returners
50 Never Returners
51 Foe Destroyers
52 Solitary Realizers

The three final fruits:
53 knowers of the bases, or Hearers' cognizers of emptiness
54 knowers of the paths, or Bodhisattvas' cognizers of emptiness
55 omniscient consciousnesses, or Buddhas' cognizers of all phenomena simultaneously.

1 *The Selfless*

Sources
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jang-gya's *Presentation of Tenets*

Traditionally, a master begins a student's instruction with a presentation of the Buddhist world.[161] He starts with the selfless as a basis and divides the selfless into the existent and the non-existent:

Chart 7: *Divisions of the Selfless*



In the Prāsaṅgika system 'the selfless' means that which does not inherently exist. The first category of the Buddhist world is the non-inherently existent because both existents and non-existents

do not inherently exist. Since nothing inherently exists, this is the broadest possible category.

Non-existents

Some of the more famous examples of non-existents are the horns of a rabbit, the hairs of a turtle, a garment made of turtle hairs, the diadem of a frog, a blue snow mountain (a snowy mountain appearing to be blue), a double moon, a self-sufficient person, and inherently existent phenomena. The horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist because they do not exist at all. The mere realization of their non-existence reveals that the horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist; therefore, the non-inherent existence of the horns of a rabbit is not an emptiness. An emptiness is not understood through realizing the mere non-existence of an object; it is known through comprehending in an existent object the absence of the quality of inherent or objective existence.

It is said that the horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist, are not inherently existent, and are non-inherently existent. In Buddhist logic none of these statements is necessarily an affirming negation; the fact that the horns of a rabbit are non-inherently existent does not imply that they have some other type of existence. The statement indicates a non-affirming negation.

A synonym of 'non-existent' is 'non-phenomenal non-product'. Non-existents are non-products because they are not produced from an aggregation of causes and conditions; they are also non-phenomena because they do not exist, unlike phenomenal non-products, such as the permanent phenomenon space, which do exist.

Existents

An existent is selfless, or non-inherently existent; its non-inherent existence is an emptiness. Synonyms of 'existent' (*sat, yod pa*) are 'phenomenon' (*dharma, chos*), 'object' (*vishaya, yul*), 'object of knowledge' (*jñeya, shes bya*), and 'established base' (*vastu, gzhi grub*). Thus, everything that exists is a phenomenon (*dharma*), so translated because all *dharmas* are objects of knowledge and can *appear* to the mind, even permanent phenomena such as emptiness and space. All existents are phenomena, and there is no noumenon which is a separate entity from the category of phenomena because nothing independently exists. The word 'noumenon' is not used in this translation scheme though it might be used for words indicating the nature of phenomena, such as *dharmatā*, as long as it is understood that all noumena are phenomena.

All existents are *objects* because whether they are subjects or objects they can be objects of a consciousness. All existents are objects of knowledge, or more literally objects of knowing, because all objects are continually known by some consciousness. Without even considering the penetrating clairvoyances of Buddhas and yogis, the various hungry ghosts and unusual types of beings which exist everywhere insure that even particles in the centers of huge rocks are cognized by some being.

All existents are *existent bases* or *established bases* because they are established as existing by valid cognizers. Valid cognizers are consciousnesses that are either direct perceivers, which cognize their objects without the medium of images and concepts, or inferring consciousnesses, which cognize their referent objects through images and concepts (see pp.346-7).

Existents are divided into two types:

Chart 8: *Divisions of Existents*



PERMANENT PHENOMENA

Permanent phenomena are defined as phenomena that do not disintegrate, disintegrating phenomena being those which cease every instant due to causes and conditions. The permanent are

specified as non-disintegrating *phenomena* because the non-existent or non-phenomenal are also non-disintegrating. Because of the inclusion of the word 'phenomena' in the definition of the permanent, non-existents are not permanent, even though they do not disintegrate. A synonym of permanent phenomenon is 'uncompounded phenomenon' (*asaṃskṛtadharma, 'dus ma byas kyi chos*).

There are two types of permanent phenomena: the occasional permanent and the non-occasional permanent. Though in common parlance 'permanent' means 'always existent', the philosophers of the Sautrāntika school and above have limited its meaning to 'non-disintegrating existent'. Therefore, phenomena that come into existence and go out of existence but do not disintegrate momentarily due to causes and conditions are 'occasional permanents'. For instance, the emptiness of a cup comes into existence when the cup is made and goes out of existence when the cup is destroyed; however, because the emptiness of a cup does not disintegrate moment by moment and does not change momentarily from one thing into another through the action of causes and conditions, it is non-disintegrating. Thus, because the emptiness of a cup is both a phenomenon and non-disintegrating but does not exist forever, it is an 'occasional permanent'. However, emptiness in general, though not existing as a separate entity from its specific instances, is always existent because there never is a moment when there is no instance of emptiness. There are always minds, space, the potential elements, and so forth, and these are all empty of inherent existence.

There is some debate about whether such a presentation makes emptiness an impermanent phenomenon. Since the coming into and going out of existence of an emptiness depend on a phenomenon that is produced and ceased by causes and conditions, it begins to look as if an emptiness is produced and ceased. However, it is said that the coming into existence of an emptiness, which is merely the non-inherent existence of an object, is unlike the production of an object by causes and conditions, and thus no one speaks of the production and disintegration of emptinesses.

Permanent phenomena are divided, but not exclusively (there are other phenomena which are technically permanent, such as the double reverse of pot which only appears to thought through the mental exclusion of non-pot or, more accurately, non-one with pot) into four types:

Chart 9: *Divisions of Permanent Phenomena*



Space

A space is a mere absence of obstructive contact. Space is all pervading because there is an absence of obstructive contact everywhere, even where solid objects exist, for without an absence of obstructive contact an obstructive object could not be there in the first place.

Because a space is a mere absence of obstructive contact, it is a non-affirming negative—there is no positive thing implied in its place—and it is in this sense that an emptiness, which is a non-affirming negative of inherent existence, is said to be similar to a space. Also, space, like emptiness, has parts because each physical object has a lack of obstructive contact, just as each object has a lack of inherent existence. The space of an object refers not to the area of the object but to the absence of obstructive contact associated with it.

Analytical cessations

Analytical cessations are final states of cessation of obstructions upon analysis of the nature of phenomena, which are such that those obstructions will never return. They are enumerated as true cessations, the third of the four noble truths, in terms of the individual obstructions being abandoned on the levels of the paths. 'Cessation' here means the absence of an affliction following abandonment and does not refer to the process of cessation. Analytical cessations are compared to the state of a locked door after a robber has been thrown out of a house in that the obstructions that have been abandoned will never return. Analytical cessations come into existence even though they are not produced; thus, although they never go out of existence, individually they are occasional permanents.

A nirvana is an analytical cessation that comes into existence upon the abandonment of the last affliction. It is not the act of cessation or the act of passing beyond sorrow but a phenomenon possessed in the continuum of a yogi that is the mere absence of the ceased afflictions.

Non-analytical cessations

Non-analytical cessations are compared to the state of having thrown out a robber but having failed to lock the door. They are temporary absences of afflictions and so forth due to the incompleteness of necessary conditions, upon the aggregation of which the afflictions will return. For instance, when a person pays intense attention to what he is seeing, he does not desire food. The desire for food has not disappeared from his mental continuum forever, but has temporarily disappeared. Non-analytical cessations come into existence and go out of existence and so are, in terms of specific instances, occasional permanents.

Suchness

'Suchness' refers to 'emptiness' because whether Buddhas appear or not the nature of phenomena remains as such.[162] A suchness is also a 'natural nirvana' (*prakṛtiparinirvāṇa, rang bzhin myang 'das*) which does not refer to an actual passage beyond sorrow, that is, an overcoming of the afflictions, but to an emptiness itself that naturally is passed beyond inherent existence. The teaching that cyclic existence and nirvana are not different means that the phenomena of cyclic existence are the same entities as their natural nirvanas, or emptinesses, and not separate entities. It does not mean there is no difference between being afflicted with the conception of inherent existence and not being so afflicted.

THINGS

The other division of existents is comprised of things or actualities. The definition of thing is: that which is able to perform a function (particularly the function of producing an effect). Therefore, according to all schools except Vaibhāṣhika, permanent phenomena are not things. The Vaibhāṣhikas say that permanent phenomena are things because, for instance, a space performs the function of allowing an object to be moved. The other systems of tenets, including Prāsaṅgika, say that the presence or absence of another obstructive object is what allows or does not allow an object to be moved, not space itself which is just a non-affirming negative of obstructive contact. Still, even the Prāsaṅgikas call emptiness—a non-affirming negative of inherent existence—a 'cause' of Buddhahood because without it the transformation of the mind into wisdom would not be possible. However, it is not said that space causes the possibility of movement, just as emptiness does not actually cause Buddhahood.

Things are impermanent (*anitya, mi rtag pa*) because of being phenomena that disintegrate moment by moment. Though impermanent things are momentary, they are not just one moment; if they were, it could not be said that beings without yogic direct perception ever perceive things because they are not capable of realizing a single isolated instant. The impermanent things that these beings cognize are series of moments; the phenomena are imputed to a series of moments and are unfindable among the various moments or as the series itself. Still, the imputed nature of things does not prevent their performing functions; rather, being merely imputed is a prerequisite for the performance of a

function. If things were frozen in a world of inherent existence, unaffected by causes and conditions and unable to affect anything else, there could not be any cause and effect. Non-inherent existence is the very basis of cause and effect, and the presence of cause and effect is a sign of non-inherent existence.

Things are also products, or caused phenomena, or compounded phenomena (*saṃskṛta, dus byas*) because they are made (*kṛta, byas*) in dependence on the aggregation (*saṃ, 'dus*) of causes and conditions. The term 'thing' (*bhāva, dngos po*), when used strictly as it is here in the table of phenomena, applies only to products; however when it is used loosely as it often is in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, it refers to both products and non-products as when Buddha says that all things do not ultimately exist.

Things, or products, are divided into three:

Chart 10: *Divisions of Things*



Forms

Source:
Cha-har Ge-shay's *Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes, And So Forth*

Etymologically, a form is so called because it is suitable to become an object of a sense consciousness upon the aggregation of other causes, such as the presence of an eye sense.[163] However, because there are forms that are perceived only by the mental consciousness, this explanation is merely an etymology and not a definition.

Forms are divided into eleven types—the five physical sense powers, the five objects of the senses, and forms which are objects only of the mental consciousness:

Chart 11: *Divisions of Forms*



Sense powers

The five sense powers are neither the coarse organs, which are the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body, nor are they consciousness. They are clear matter located in the coarse organs which

cannot be seen with the eye but can be seen by certain clairvoyants. They give their respective consciousnesses dominance or power with respect to certain objects and are thus called 'powers' (*indriya, dbang po*). An eye sense has power with respect to visible forms, that is, colors and shapes, but not with respect to sounds, odors, tastes, or tangible objects. An ear sense has power with respect to sounds but not visible forms, and so forth. Sense powers give their respective consciousnesses the ability to apprehend and to be generated in the aspect of their respective objects.

Eye (*chakṣuḥ, mig*), eye sense power (*chakṣurindriya, mig gi dbang po*), eye-constituent (*chakṣurdhātu, mig gi khams*), and eye-source (*chakṣurāyatana, mig gi skye mched*) are synonyms. An eye sense power is called an eye-constituent because of being the *cause* giving rise to the continuation of its own similar type, that is, later moments of itself. It is also called an eye-source because of being a *door, cause, condition,* or *source* producing and increasing an eye consciousness. The same terminology is also used for the ear, nose, tongue, and body sense powers.

The particles of each sense power are arranged in a specific shape: eye sense, like that of a bud of a *zar-ma* flower; ear sense, like the knot of a birch tree; nose sense, like two fine hollow needles at the root of the nostrils; tongue sense, like half moons having the area of only the point of a hair throughout the center of the tongue; body sense, like skin or hide throughout the body. As types of the body sense, the particles of the female organ are arranged like the inside of a drum, and those of the male organ are arranged like a thumb.

The sense power of the mental consciousness is not physical and thus has no shape; a former moment of any of the six consciousnesses acts as the sense power of a mental consciousness. For instance, when one pays attention to a color, an eye consciousness acts like a sense power in that it gives the mental consciousness the ability to perceive a visible object.

A sense power is an uncommon empowering condition (*asādhārana-adhipatipratyaya, thun mong ma yin pa'i bdag rkyen*) of a consciousness because it gives it power with respect to its own special type of object. Also, a former moment of consciousness causes it to be an entity capable of *experiencing* objects. Thus, a mental consciousness has two consciousnesses as its causes: any of the six consciousnesses which is its empowering condition and a former moment of consciousness which is its 'immediately preceding condition' (*samanantarapratyaya, de ma dag rkyen*).

A consciousness is also caused, or affected, by an object in the sense that an object causes a consciousness to be generated in its image, much as objects cause a mirror to reflect their image. These objects are called 'observed-object-conditions' (*ālambana-pratyaya, dmigs rkyen*). However, the world which is being seen is not just a mental image; the co-ordination of an image in consciousness with an object certifies that the object is being perceived properly, but the object seen is an external object, not an internal image. The Buddhist theory is not that everything being perceived exists inside either the eye or the brain.

Visible forms

Visible forms (*rūpa, gzugs*) are defined as objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness and are to be distinguished from the general term 'form' which is the basis of the division into eleven types of forms. A visible form is called a form-constituent (*rūpadhātu*) because of being a *cause* giving rise to the continuation of its own similar type, that is, later moments of visible form, and is called a form-source (*rūpa-āyatana*) because of being a form that is a *door, cause, condition,* or *source* of an eye consciousness. Visible forms are of two types:

Chart 12: *Divisions of Visible Forms*



Colors. There are twelve colors, four primary and eight secondary (see Chart 13). The four primary colors are the colors of the four elements. Wind is blue; earth, yellow; water, white; and fire, red.

Chart 13: *Divisions of Colors*



It is not that clouds and so forth are secondary colors but that their colors are secondary colors. However, some scholars do say that illumination, darkness, sunlight, and shadow themselves are secondary colors. Illumination refers to the light of the moon, stars, fire, medicine, and jewels. Darkness refers to a form that

obscures other forms and causes one to see gloom and blackness. Darkness obscures other forms such that they cannot be seen, whereas shadow makes other forms a little unclear but still perceivable; thus, darkness and shadow have a difference of density. Sunlight refers to the illumination of other forms when the sun appears.

The eight secondary colors do not include the secondary colors that are mixes of primary colors, such as green which is a mix of blue and yellow, and thus the category is not all-inclusive.

An eye consciousness actually apprehends only colors and shapes. Although pots, pillars, and so forth appear to an eye consciousness and although it is said that an eye consciousness sees them, pots, pillars, and so forth are not objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness. Rather, the color and shape of pots, pillars, and so forth—that is, their visible form—are objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness and thus are also form-constituents and form-sources. Although pots and pillars are matter and are forms, they are not visible forms, form-constituents or form-sources, but tangible objects, tangible-object-constituents, and tangible-object-sources. Similarly, when one sees the visible form of a human or horse, one sees their shape and color but does not, in a sense, see a human or horse. Also, seeing earth and water is a case of seeing their color, for earth and water are tangible objects, and, therefore, the eye does not see the capacity of hardness or of moistening. Furthermore, when the visible form of a pot is seen, an eye consciousness does not conceive, 'This is a pot'; a mental consciousness is the identifier and designator of names.

Shapes. Shapes are of eight types only (see Chart 14). Long refers to the form of a long board, a long rope, a long (deep) spring, and so forth. Short arises in relation to those. High and low refer to, for instance, a high mountain and a low valley. A square, or perhaps polygon, is technically a shape of equal sides, such as dice, or a pentagon, hexagon, and so forth; however, the shapes of a rectangular box or a board are also included. Round refers to

Chart 14: *Divisions of Shapes*



either the globular, like an egg, or the flat, like a mandala. Level refers to any shape having an even surface, whereas non-level refers to a shape with, for instance, bumps and depressions.

Sounds

Sounds, which are defined as objects of hearing by an ear consciousness, are of only eight types (see Chart 15). Sound, sound-constituent, and sound-source are synonyms. Although sounds are entities constructed from particles, they are not form-sources, that is to say, visible forms.

Odors

Odors, which are defined as objects of smelling by a nose consciousness, are of only four types (see Chart 16). An equal odor, such as the odor of sesame, does not infuse other objects, whereas the opposite is true of an unequal odor such as the odor of garlic. Odor, odor-constituent, and odor-source are synonyms.

Chart 15: *Divisions of Sounds*



Chart 16: *Divisions of Odors*



Tastes.

Tastes, which are defined as objects of taste by a tongue consciousness, are of only six types:

Chart 17: *Divisions of Tastes*



Sweetness arises from a predominance of earth and water; sourness, from a predominance of fire and earth; saltiness, from a predominance of water and fire; pungency, from a predominance of fire and wind; bitterness, from a predominance of water and wind; and astringency, from a predominance of earth and wind.

Tangible objects.

Tangible objects, which are defined as objects of touch by a body consciousness, are of only eleven types—the four elements and seven tangible objects that are arisen from the elements:

Chart 18: *Divisions of Tangible Objects*



The definition of earth is the hard and obstructive; its entity is hardness, and its function is the obstruction of other physical objects. The definition of water is the damp and moistening. The definition of fire is the hot and burning. The definition of wind is the light and moving.

The particles that serve as the bases for the construction of physical objects are aggregates of the eight substances: earth, water, fire, wind, visible form, odor, taste, and tangible object arisen from elements. (Sound is not included because it does not have a continuum of similar type.) Thus, wherever one of the elements exists, the other three also exist, but there is a difference of strength and, thus, dominance. (Some say that the others dwell in the manner of seeds, that is, in potency.)

The fact that stone, wood, and so forth hold together indicates the presence of the water element in the earth element; that stones and trees move indicates the presence of the wind element in the earth element; that sparks are produced when two stones meet indicates the presence of the fire element. Similarly, that the water element can serve as a support for boats, leaves, and so forth indicates that the earth element is present in the water element; that leaves and roots rot in water and that there are warm springs indicate the presence of the fire element in water; that water flows downward and moves about indicates the presence of the wind element. Similarly, that leaves and grass are held up in the wind indicates the presence of the earth element in the wind element; that there are warm winds and that damp objects dry when spread out to the wind indicates the presence of the fire element in the wind element; that currents of wind are held together in a twister indicates the presence of the water element. Similarly, that one tongue of fire grasps another and that a tongue of fire can support leaves, grass, and so forth indicates the presence of the earth element in the fire element; that tongues of fire do not split apart but burn together indicates the presence of the water element; that tongues of flame move about indicates the presence of the wind element.

The seven tangible objects that are evolutes of the elements arise from the four elements. Smoothness arises from a preponderance

of water and fire. Roughness arises from a preponderance of earth and wind. Heaviness arises from a preponderance of earth and water. Lightness arises from a preponderance of fire and wind. Cold arises from a preponderance of water and wind. Hunger arises from a preponderance of wind. Thirst arises from a preponderance of fire.

The colors of particles depend upon the element that is predominant. If the earth element is predominant, the color is yellow; if water, white; if fire, red; and if wind, blue. The shapes of particle clusters are determined by the arrangement of color particles and are not separate particles themselves. The particles of color/shape are different from the particles of odor, shape, or touch and thus are classed separately from the four elements as visible objects.

Visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects are all 'atomic' in that they are masses of particles, but these are not necessarily single particles.[164] Otherwise, the only sense objects would be single particles, and there would be no gross objects. Though visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects are 'atomic', many say that these are not 'established atomically' (*rdul du grub pa*) because the word 'established' carries with it the force of 'truly established' (*satyasiddha, bden grub*) or its synonym 'truly existent' (*satyasat, bden par yod pa*). Since 'established atomically' is the definition of matter (*kanthā, bem po*), it can be said that the Prāsaṅgikas do not accept 'matter'. This, however, does not mean that particles or gross objects constructed from particles are not accepted in the Prāsaṅgika system. Indeed, the word 'matter' seems to refer to the atomically constructed and nothing more; however, the difficulty is not merely in translation. For, in a similar way the Chittamātrins accept forms and particles which are of the same entity as a perceiving consciousness, but they do not accept 'matter' because for them the term itself implies an external object. To say in Tibetan that there are particles and objects constructed from particles but no *bem po* is as forceful as saying in English that there are particles and objects constructed from particles but no matter. The word 'matter' carries with it a connotation of findability under analysis,

or true existence. That there are particles and masses of particles is accepted conventionally, but matter, because of the implications of the word, is not accepted even conventionally (according to Jam-ȳang-shay-bā).

Since visible forms and so forth are atomically constructed, it may be wondered why the four elements which are necessarily present in every particle are classified under tangible objects. The reason is that without touch, the function of earth, hardness and obstructiveness, cannot be experienced. Similarly, without touch, the function of water, dampness and moistening, cannot be experienced; without touch, the function of fire, heat and burning, cannot be experienced; without touch, the function of wind, lightness and moving, cannot be experienced. Therefore, the four elements are classed as tangible objects. Visible forms, odors, tastes, and the other tangible objects are evolutes of the elements.

The five sense powers and the five objects are called the ten obstructive physical objects. Among these, colors and shapes that can be shown to an eye consciousness are called demonstrable obstructive forms; thus, demonstrable form and object of apprehension by an eye consciousness are synonyms. The five sense powers and the four remaining objects—sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects—are undemonstrable obstructive forms.

Forms for the mental consciousness

The final category of forms is comprised of forms for the mental consciousness, which are undemonstrable and non-obstructive. They are defined as form aggregates which are objects only of the mental consciousness and thus are classed not as form-sources (*rūpāyatana, gzugs kyi skye mched*) but as phenomena-sources (*dharmāyatana, chos kyi skye mched*)[165] (see Chart 19)

Forms arising from aggregation. A single particle does not appear to an ordinary being's sense consciousness, but when the mental consciousness analyzes a gross form into parts, a single particle does appear, and thus it is classed as a form for a mental consciousness.

Chart 19: *Divisions of Form for the Mental Consciousness*



The shape of a single particle is necessarily round, but its colors are various as described above for the four elements. Since single particles appear only to the mental consciousness, all shapes and colors are not included in the category of visible forms seen by an eye consciousness.

Space-forms. Space appears both to an eye consciousness and a mental consciousness and thus the bluish space that appears to an eye consciousness is a visible form whereas the space that appears to a mental consciousness is a form for a mental consciousness.

Both are impermanent whereas uncaused space, which is a non-affirming negative of obstructive contact, appears only to an inferential mental consciousness and is permanent. Like emptiness, it is a mere absence of a negated factor—for emptiness, inherent existence, and for space, obstructive contact.

Forms arising from promises. When one takes a vow of individual liberation, a form arises in dependence on the shape of the body, as in crouching, and in dependence on the sounds of speech, as in declaring that one will turn away from killing. This subtle physical entity is said to arise at the moment of first taking the vow and remains with the person until losing the vow or death. Similarly, a form arises from non-restraint as, for instance, in dependence on a butcher's physical and verbal actions in killing animals and selling their flesh. A middling variety of such is a form that arises from physical or verbal virtue. Forms arising from promises are continuations of virtue or sin and arise from revelatory actions of body or speech or arise from cultivating meditative stabilization. Since the motivations of these actions are not knowable by others, they are called 'non-revelatory forms' (*avijñaptirūpa, rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i gzugs*).

Imaginary forms. Dream objects, such as elephants, and non-actual objects of meditation, such as corpses filling the world, appear as if they were actual forms but are not; thus, they are classed as imaginary forms. The Prāsaṅgikas say that a dream consciousness is solely a mental consciousness appearing in the aspects of the five sense consciousnesses. A dream object is an external object affecting a mental consciousness just as a reflection in a mirror is an external object affecting an eye consciousness. The non-Buddhist Mīmāṃsakas say that the light of the eye hits the mirror, and through returning to the eye an image is seen. The Buddhist Vaibhāṣhikas say that a clear type of form arises in the mirror. The Sautrāntikas, Chittamātrins and Yogāchāra-Svātantrikas say that a mirror image is a false appearance to the mind and is not a different entity from the mind. The Prāsaṅgikas, however, say that reflections, the falling hairs seen by one with

cataracts, and mirages are visible forms just as echoes are sounds. A consciousness perceiving these is nevertheless mistaken because, for example, a mirror image of a face appears to be a face and not just a mirror image.

Forms for one with meditative power. Forms that appear to one who has attained mastery in meditation are objects of meditation that exist in fact. Mere earth or mere water as a meditative manifestation of one who has attained mastery in meditation is actual and is not an imaginary form. Included in this category are objects of meditative manifestation that can be shown to another being's eye consciousness, but this does not make the object as it appears to the master a visible form; for him it still is a form for the mental consciousness. This is compared to the varieties of externally existent objects seen by different types of beings, as in the case of a god's seeing a bowl of fluid as ambrosia and a hungry ghost's seeing pus and blood in the same place.

Consciousness

Sources:

Ye-shay-gyel-tsen's *Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and Mental Factors*

Lati Rinbochay's oral teachings

The second division of things, or impermanent phenomena, is consciousness, defined as the clear and knowing.[166] Consciousness is of two types:

Chart 20: *Divisions of Consciousness*



Minds

A mind is a knower of the mere entity of an object, whereas a mental factor is a knower which, on the basis of observing that

object, engages in the object from the point of view of other features, such as function and so forth. Minds and mental factors are different within being the same entity; they possess five similarities which, as described in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* (*Abhidharmakosha*) are:

1 *Sameness of base.* A mind and its accompanying mental factors depend on the same sense power, as in the case of an eye consciousness and its mental factors which both depend on the physical eye sense power.
2 *Sameness of object of observation.* A mind and its mental factors observe the same object. For instance, when the main eye consciousness apprehends blue, so does the mental factor of feeling that accompanies it.
3 *Sameness of aspect.* For instance, if the main eye consciousness is generated in the aspect (or image) of blue, so is the mental factor of discrimination that accompanies it.
4 *Sameness of time.* A mind and its mental factors are produced, abide, and cease simultaneously.
5 *Sameness of substantial entity.* Just as at any one time the substantial entity of a particular mind is single and there are not many minds of the same type, such as several eye consciousnesses, so the substantial entity of, for instance, the mental factor of intention that accompanies the eye consciousness is also single.

Asanga's *Compendium of Knowledge* (*Abhidharmasamuchchaya*) combines the sameness of object of observation and sameness of aspect and adds another, sameness of realm and level. This refers to the fact that if, for instance, the main mind is of the Desire Realm, only mental factors of the Desire Realm will accompany it, and not mental factors of the Form or Formless Realms.

Minds are of only six types (see Chart 21). An eye consciousness is an individual knower depending on the eye and observing visible form. An ear consciousness is an individual knower depending on the ear and observing sound. A nose consciousness is an individual knower depending on the nose and observing odor. A tongue consciousness is an individual knower

Chart 21: *Divisions of Minds*



depending on the tongue and observing taste. A body consciousness is an individual knower depending on the body and observing tangible objects. A mental consciousness is an individual knower depending on the mind sense (which is a former moment of consciousness and thus non-physical) and observing phenomena.

The mind cognizing emptiness, either inferentially or directly, is a mental consciousness, not an eye, ear, nose, tongue, or body consciousness, except in the case of a Buddha whose consciousnesses are cross-functional. The mental consciousness has the capacity to penetrate, first conceptually and then non-conceptually, the nature of phenomena, which not only is beyond the realm of a non-Buddha's sense perception but also is obscured by a false overlay that until Buddhahood accompanies sense perception. In dependence on reasoning, the mental consciousness

first realizes an emptiness of a particular object conceptually—by way of the image of a vacuity which is a negative of inherent existence; then through familiarity with that knowledge, the imagistic element is removed, whereupon the mental consciousness becomes a Superior's wisdom directly cognizing emptiness.

Mental factors

There are fifty-one mental factors which are classed in six groups:

Chart 22: *Divisions of Mental Factors*



Omnipresent mental factors. The omnipresent mental factors are so named because they necessarily accompany all minds, even the wisdom cognizing emptiness. The five omnipresent mental factors are:

Chart 23: *Divisions of Omnipresent Mental Factors*



Feeling. Feeling is an entity of experience individually experiencing the fruitions of virtuous and non-virtuous actions. Its objects are pleasure, pain, and neutrality. Pleasure is that with which, when it ceases, one wants to meet again; pain is that from which, when it arises, one wants to separate; and neutrality, being neither pleasure nor pain, is that with respect to which, when it arises, neither the wish to meet nor the wish to separate occurs. Pleasure, pain, and neutrality are called 'fruitions' in order to emphasize that all generations of pleasure, pain, and neutral feeling are results of former actions.

All pleasures, even that arising from a cool breeze in a hell, arise from virtuous actions (*karma, las*) accumulated in the past. Similarly, all pains, even a headache in the continuum of a Foe Destroyer, arise from non-virtuous actions accumulated in the past. In other words, pleasure and pain do not arise causelessly, or from a discordant cause, such as the nature (*prakṛti, rang bzhin*) asserted by the Sāṃkhyas or the lord Īshvara as asserted by the Aishvaras. Rather, general pleasure and pain, such as

being born as a human or as a hell-being, arise from general virtuous and non-virtuous actions, such as an ethical deed or the sin of murder. Similarly, the varieties of particular pleasures and pains arise from the varieties of particular virtuous and non-virtuous actions. The development of certainty as to this definite and undeceived relationship of action and effect—of pleasure to virtue and pain to non-virtue—is praised as the basis of all auspicious doctrines and called the correct view of all Buddhists.

Pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), and neutrality (*aduḥkhāsukha*) can each be divided into physical (*kāyikī*) and mental (*chaitasikī*) feeling, making six types of feeling. Physical feeling refers to that accompanying any of the five sense consciousnesses, not just that accompanying the body consciousness. It is called physical because the five sense powers are composed of clear matter and because the body sense power pervades the sense powers of eye, ear, nose, and tongue. Mental feeling is that accompanying the mental consciousness.

From the viewpoint of their base or sense power, feelings are of six types:

1 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (*chakṣhuḥsaṃsparshajā vedanā*)
2 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness (*shrotrasaṃsparshajā vedanā*)
3 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness (*ghrāṇasaṃsparshajā vedanā*)
4 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (*jihvāsaṃsparshajā vedanā*)
5 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness (*kāyasaṃsparshajā vedanā*)
6 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness (*manaḥsaṃsparshajā vedanā*).

Taking into account pleasure, pain, and neutrality, these six are further divided into eighteen types of feeling.

When divided from the viewpoint of object of abandonment and antidote, there are two types:

1 feeling as the base of attachment (*gredhāshritavedanā*), which is feeling accompanying attachment to attributes of the Desire Realm
2 feeling as the base of deliverance (*naiṣhkamyāshritavedanā*), which is feeling accompanying a mental consciousness that has turned away from desire for attributes of the Desire Realm and is included within an actual concentration.

This division into two is made in order to make known how attachment is induced by the power of feeling and how one separates from attachment to feeling in dependence on the concentrations.

There is also a division of feeling into materialistic (*sāmiṣhavedanā*) and non-materialistic (*nirāmiṣhavedanā*). The former is feeling accompanying attachment to contaminated mental and physical aggregates, whereas the latter is feeling accompanying a wisdom consciousness directly cognizing selflessness.

Discrimination. Discrimination apprehends, upon the aggregation of an object, sense power, and a consciousness, the uncommon signs of an object. There are two types:

1 non-conceptual apprehension of signs: apprehension of the uncommon signs of an object appearing to a non-conceptual mind
2 conceptual apprehension of signs: apprehension of the uncommon signs of an object appearing to thought.

These two types of discrimination operate on (1) *perceptions*, involving the designation of expressions to objects manifestly perceived, (2) *hearing*, involving the designation of expressions in dependence on hearing believable words, (3) *differentiations*, involving the designation of expressions to objects ascertained in dependence on signs (such as in determining that an article is

good due to possessing the signs of superior quality), and (4) *knowledge*, involving the designation of expressions to objects ascertained directly.

There is also a division of discrimination into two types:

1 discrimination apprehending signs in objects: apprehension individually differentiating the features of an object, such as blue, yellow, and so forth
2 discrimination apprehending signs in expressions: apprehension individually differentiating the features of expressions, such as in, 'This is a man; that is a woman.'

From the viewpoint of its base, discrimination is of six types:

1 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (*chakṣuḥsaṃsparshajā saṃjñā*)
2 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness (*shrotrasaṃsparshajā saṃjñā*)
3 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness (*ghrāṇasaṃsparshajā saṃjñā*)
4 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (*jihvāsaṃsparshajā saṃjñā*)
5 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness (*kāyasaṃsparshajā saṃjñā*)
6 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness (*manaḥsaṃsparshajā saṃjñā*).

From the viewpoint of object of observation, it is also of six types:

1 reasoned discrimination (*sanimittasaṃjñā*): (a) discrimination skilled in the relationship of names and meanings, (b) discrimination observing products as impermanent and so forth, and (c) discrimination having a clear subjective aspect and object of observation

2 unreasoned discrimination (*animittasaṃjñā*): (a) discrimination unskilled in the relationship of names and meanings, (b) discrimination observing products as permanent and so forth, and (c) discrimination lacking clear subjective aspect and object of observation
3 discrimination of the small (*parīttā saṃjñā*): (a) discriminations in the continuum of an ordinary being in the Desire Realm who has not attained an actual concentration and (b) discriminations observing attributes of the Desire Realm
4 discrimination of the vast (*mahadgatā saṃjñā*): (a) discriminations observing the Form Realm and (b) discriminations in the continuums of beings of the Form Realm
5 discrimination of the limitless (*apramāṇasaṃjñā*): (a) discriminations observing limitless space or limitless consciousness
6 discrimination of nothingness (*akiñchinsaṃjñā*): discriminations observing nothingness (a state beyond coarse feeling and discrimination).

In general, discrimination involves the differentiation and identification of objects; as a mental factor accompanying a non-conceptual mind such as an eye consciousness, it implies a non-confusion of the details of the object without which a later identification could not be made.[167] Discrimination is the heart of identifying the object of negation in the view of selflessness and then reflecting on a reasoning proving non-inherent existence; thus, far from being a hindrance to the path, correct discrimination is to be enhanced.

Intention. Intention (or attention) is the mental factor that moves and directs the mind that accompanies it to its object; it has the function of engaging the mind in the virtuous (*kushala, dge ba*), non-virtuous (*akushala, mi dge ba*), and neutral (*avyākṛta, lung du ma bstan pa*). Intention is the most important of all mental factors because through its power minds and mental factors engage in objects, like pieces of iron powerlessly moved by a magnet.

From the viewpoint of its base, intention is of six types:

1 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a

visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (*chakṣhuḥ-saṃsparshajā chetanā*)
2 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness (*shrotrasaṃsparshajā chetanā*)
3 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness (*ghrāṇasaṃsparshajā chetanā*)
4 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (*jihvāsaṃsparshajā chetanā*)
5 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness (*kāyasaṃsparshajā chetanā*)
6 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness (*manaḥsaṃsparshajā chetanā*).

Intention is mental action (*manaskarma, yid kyi las*) from among the two types of action (*karma, las*), actions of intention (mental actions) and intended actions (physical and verbal actions).

Contact. Contact distinguishes its object—upon the aggregation of object, sense power, and mind—as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral in accordance with subsequent feelings of pleasure, pain, or neutrality; thus, it has the function of serving as a basis for feeling. Since contact distinguishes its object as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, it serves as a cause for the feelings of pleasure, pain, or neutrality which in turn serve as causes for desire, hatred, and ignorance.

From the viewpoint of its base, contact is of six types:

1 contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness
2 contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness
3 contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness
4 contact upon the aggregation of a taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness

5 contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness
6 contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness.

Mental engagement. Mental engagement directs the mind accompanying it to a specific object of observation (*ālambana, dmigs pa*). The difference between intention and mental engagement is that intention moves the mind to objects in general whereas mental engagement directs the mind to a specific object.

Without the five omnipresent factors, the experience of an object would not be complete. Without feeling, there would be no experience of pleasure, pain, or neutrality. Without discrimination, the uncommon signs of the object would not be apprehended. Without intention, the mind would not approach its object. Without contact, there would be no basis for feeling. Without mental engagement, the mind would not be directed to a specific object of observation. Thus, all five are needed to experience an object.

Determining mental factors. The five determining mental factors are shown in Chart 24.

Aspiration. Aspiration observes a contemplated phenomenon and seeks it. Aspiration serves as a base for the initiation of effort in the sense that, for instance, through perceiving the advantages of meditative stabilization, a captivating faith in meditative stabilization is produced, and in dependence on this, a strong continuous aspiration seeking meditative stabilization is generated such that one is able to generate continuous effort. Effort in meditative stabilization, in turn, generates a pliancy of mind and body that bestows an ability to remain in the practice of virtue night and day, thereby overcoming the laziness which is a non-delight in cultivating meditative stabilization and liking for what is discordant with meditative stabilization. Thus, faith, aspiration, effort, and pliancy are the antidotes to laziness.

Chart 24: *Divisions of Determining Mental Factors*



Aspiration is divided into three types: aspiration wishing to meet, aspiration wishing not to separate, and aspiration that seeks. The last is again divided into aspiration seeking desires, aspiration seeking views, and so forth.

Belief. Belief holds an ascertained object to be just as it was ascertained; it has the function of keeping the mind from being captivated by another view. For instance, when one considers Buddha and other teachers and analyzes to discover which is an undeceiving refuge, one ascertains that only Buddha is the teacher of an undeceiving refuge. Then, when the doctrine taught by him and the spiritual community properly achieving his doctrine are ascertained by valid cognition as undeceiving, a firm belief in them as final refuges is gained. Thereupon, Forders and so forth cannot lead one away from this position. One has then entered among the number of Buddhists, and based on this, all auspicious qualities increase.

Mindfulness. Mindfulness is non-forgetfulness with respect to a familiar phenomenon; it has the function of causing non-distraction. Mindfulness has three features:

1 objective feature: a familiar object. Mindfulness cannot be generated toward an unfamiliar object.
2 subjective feature: non-forgetfulness within observation of that object. Even though one might have become familiar with an object previously, if it does not presently appear as an object of mind, mindfulness cannot occur.
3 functional feature: causing non-distraction. Since the stability of the mind increases in dependence on mindfulness, non-distraction is specified as the function of mindfulness.

Mindfulness that possesses these three features is extremely important for both sutra and tantra practice, as all auspicious qualities of the grounds and paths increase in dependence on mindfulness and introspection. In particular, all achievements of meditative stabilization in sutra and tantra are attained through the power of mindfulness.

Stabilization. Stabilization is a one-pointedness of mind with respect to an imputed object; it has the function of serving as the base of knowledge, that is, special insight. The object of stabilization is specified as 'imputed' because when meditative stabilization is cultivated, the mind is held to a mentally imputed or imagined object of observation. This indicates that meditative stabilization is not generated by a sense consciousness, such as by an eye consciousness staring at an object, but by the mental consciousness observing an internal object. Through continuous cultivation of meditative stabilization, the object of observation —whether true or untrue—will be perceived clearly and non-conceptually.

In dependence on the meditative stabilization of calm abiding, which is a setting of the mind internally in equipoise, special insight is achieved through the force of analytical wisdom. Therefore, the function of stabilization is specified as serving as the base of knowledge. Stabilization, in turn, depends on ethics.

Knowledge. Knowledge (or wisdom) individually differentiates the faults and virtues of objects of analysis; it has the function of overcoming doubt. When one analyzes with reasoning and gains ascertainment, doubt is overcome; thus, the function of knowledge is specified as overcoming doubt.

Virtuous mental factors. The eleven virtuous mental factors are:

Chart 25: *Divisions of Virtuous Mental Factors*



Faith. Faith has the aspect of clarity (*prasāda, dang ba*), conviction (*abhisampratyaya, yid ches*), or a wish to attain (*abhilāṣha, 'thob 'dod*) with respect to the existent (such as actions and their effects), the possession of qualities (such as by the Three Jewels), or powers (such as the powers of the path to actualize cessation). It has the function of serving as a basis for aspiration. The faith of clarity, or clarifying faith, is, for instance, the clarity of mind that comes through perceiving the qualities of the Three Jewels; it is called 'clarifying' because just as when a water-clarifying jewel is put in water, the dirtiness in the water is immediately cleansed, so when this type of faith is generated in the continuum, mental troubles are cleared away, whereupon the qualities of realization are suitable to be generated.

The faith of conviction is, for instance, the gaining of conviction in dependent-arising or in actions and their effects through contemplating these doctrines as set forth by the Conqueror. The faith which is a wish to attain is, for instance, the faith thinking, 'I will definitely attain the cessation of suffering', upon contemplating the four noble truths, ascertaining true sufferings and true sources as objects of abandonment and true cessations and true paths as objects of attainment, and realizing that through striving in the proper way these can be attained.

Although the world equates faith (*dad pa*) and liking (*dga' ba*), they are not the same. Liking one's child or spouse and liking beer are cases of liking but not of faith. Also, the faith which is a concern and conviction from one's depths with respect to the faults of cyclic existence is faith but not liking. The faith which is a conviction and liking from the depths through contemplating the qualities of a spiritual guide or the benefits of wholesome actions and their effects is both faith and liking.

Furthermore, faith and respect (*gus pa*) are not the same though they are considered to be so in the world. For instance, liking a spiritual guide is faith, but respecting a spiritual guide involves contemplating his kindness, knowing shame, and valuing him highly; thus, faith and respect are different mental factors.

As explained earlier, effort is the cause of all auspicious qualities, and in order to generate effort, aspiration seeking those

qualities is necessary. In order to generate aspiration, one must perceive those qualities and have the faith of conviction in them. Thus, faith is frequently praised in the scriptures and their commentaries as the basis of all auspicious attainments.

Shame and embarrassment. Shame is an avoidance of misconduct due to one's own disapproval whereas embarrassment is an avoidance of misconduct due to others' disapproval. These mental factors both have the function of serving as a basis for restraining misconduct. In the case of shame, when one is about to engage in misconduct, one avoids it by thinking, 'This is not something I should do,' whereas in the case of embarrassment, one avoids it by thinking, 'Since others will despise me, this is not suitable.' This latter involves concern for the displeasure of a lama, teacher, or the like.

Shame and embarrassment serve as a basis for restraining misconduct in the sense that to restrain physical, verbal, and mental misconduct, one must definitely have shame and embarrassment; for if one does not have either concern from one's own point of view over the fruition of an action or concern for the discomfort of a lama or teacher, there is no way to cease misconduct.

Non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance. Non-attachment is an emergence from and non-desire for cyclic existence and the articles of cyclic existence. Non-hatred is a factor that, in observing either harmful sentient beings, sufferings, or sources of suffering, conquers the generation of hatred; it is an absence of the intent to harm. Non-ignorance is a knowledge of individual analysis that can serve as an antidote to ignorance; it is either attained from birth through the fruition of actions in an earlier lifetime without depending on contributing causes in this lifetime or arises through application by way of hearing, thinking, or meditating.

Non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance have the function of serving as bases for non-engagement in misconduct, being *roots* of all virtuous practices, *methods* for ceasing all misconduct, and the *essence* of all paths. Since all grounds and paths are for the

sake of abandoning the three poisons of desire, hatred, and ignorance and since these three mental factors cause one to emerge from the three poisons that cause all misconduct, their function is specified as serving as bases for restraining misconduct.

A being of small capacity generates non-attachment to this life and, turning away from this life, seeks his own welfare in future lives. A being of middling capacity generates non-attachment toward all the marvels of cyclic existence and, having reversed his grasping from the depths, seeks release from all cyclic existence. A being of great capacity generates non-attachment to both cyclic existence and a state of solitary peace and seeks the non-abiding nirvana of a Buddha wherein he can remain in meditative equipoise on emptiness while at the same time manifesting countless forms in order to help migrators in cyclic existence. In this way, all paths can be related to non-attachment as well as to non-hatred and non-ignorance.

Effort. Effort is a mental delight in virtue; it has the function of fulfilling and accomplishing virtues. Although in the world everything that involves striving is called effort, toil only for the sake of the affairs of this lifetime is not effort but is laziness that is an attachment to bad activities; it is discordant with effort.

There are five types of effort:

1 effort of armoring—this is the thought prior to engaging in virtue that is the mind's taking delight in that activity. It is like putting on great armor in that it affords a willingness to engage in extended activity.
2 effort of application—a mental delight while engaging in practice
3 effort of non-inferiority—a delight generated such that one will not be discouraged, thinking, 'How could one such as I do this?'
4 effort of irreversibility—a fullness of mental delight such that circumstances cannot divert one from engaging in virtuous activity

5 effort of non-satisfaction—a striving for higher qualities without being satisfied with achieving small virtues.

All auspicious qualities depend on effort.

Pliancy. Pliancy is a serviceability of mind and body such that the mind can be set on a virtuous object of observation as long as one likes; it has the function of removing all obstructions. It is of two types:

1 physical pliancy—through the power of meditative stabilization physical unserviceability is purified, whereupon the body is light like a ball of cotton and capable of being used in virtuous activity according to one's wish
2 mental pliancy—through the power of meditative stabilization the mind becomes free of unserviceability, whereupon it has the facility to engage in a virtuous aim without impediment.

The function of pliancy is specified as removing all obstructions because through its power all unfavorable conditions of mind and body are purified. Once pliancy is attained, meditative stabilization is increased from within; through this the bliss of pliancy increases, whereupon meditative stabilization again increases. Through this, in turn, the mind becomes empowered, when conjoined with special insight, to overcome obstructions.

Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness keeps the mind from contaminations and causes the achievement of virtue while abiding in effort. It keeps the mind from coming under the influence of the afflictions and has the function of serving as a basis for the achievement of all mundane and supramundane marvels. Conscientiousness is of five types:

1 conscientiousness with respect to the former—a remedying of past faults in accordance with the doctrine
2 conscientiousness with respect to the later—an earnest intention to remedy future faults
3 conscientiousness with respect to the middle—remedying faults without forgetfulness in the present

4 conscientiousness prior to activity—a tightening of the mind, thinking, 'How nice it would be if I could behave and abide in such a way that faults do not arise!'
5 conscientiousness of concordant behavior—abiding and behaving in such a way that faults do not arise.

Conscientiousness is very important as a root of all grounds and paths.

Equanimity. Equanimity is an evenness of mind, a dwelling in a natural state, and a spontaneous abiding discordant with the afflictions. It is associated with non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance and has the function of not allowing an opportunity for the afflictions.

In dependence on techniques for setting the mind one-pointedly, the nine states of mind (see pp.80-86) are gradually achieved. When the ninth is attained, the exertion of using the antidotes to laxity and excitement is no longer needed. At that point one attains a spontaneous abiding of the mind on its object, and with this state an equanimity that involves non-application of the antidotes to laxity and excitement is attained. Thus, equanimity here is an equanimity of application, not an equanimity of feeling nor the immeasurable equanimity of wishing that all sentient beings abide in an equanimity free of desire and hatred, intimacy and alienness.

The function of equanimity is specified as not allowing an opportunity for the afflictions because when the ninth state of mind is attained, it is easy to overcome the afflictions of the Desire Realm and also at the time of meditative equipoise laxity and excitement do not arise.

Non-harmfulness. Non-harmfulness is a compassionate attitude, included as part of non-hatred, which is patience devoid of intention to injure. It observes suffering sentient beings and thinks, 'May they be free of such suffering!' The function of non-harmfulness, not injuring sentient beings, is said to be the essence of Buddha's teachings.

These eleven virtuous mental factors are called 'natural virtues' because they are virtuous entities in themselves, without depending on consideration of other factors such as motivation and so forth. Though these eleven are the principal virtues, there are four other types:

1 virtue through relation—the minds and mental factors that accompany any of the eleven virtues
2 virtue through subsequent relation—virtuous predispositions established by virtuous minds and mental factors
3 virtue through motivation—physical and verbal actions motivated by faith and so forth
4 virtue through ultimacy—suchness, or emptiness, is designated a virtue because when one observes and meditates on it, all obstructions are purified; however, it is not an actual virtue.

From the viewpoint of state or situation, virtues are divided into eight types:

1 virtue by way of attainment at birth—such as faith that arises through the force of predispositions established in former lifetimes without depending on familiarization in this lifetime
2 virtue by way of application—such as the faith of wishing to attain Buddhahood that arises in dependence on relying on a virtuous spiritual guide, listening to the excellent doctrine, properly taking such to mind, and achieving doctrines that are conducive to attaining nirvana
3 virtue by way of an activity in front—imagining, for instance, a field of assembly of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and so forth in front of oneself, and then bowing down and making offerings
4 virtue by way of helping—actions such as ripening sentient beings by way of the four means of gathering students (giving articles, teaching the means for attaining high status in cyclic existence and definite goodness, causing others to practice what is beneficial, and behaving that way oneself)
5 virtue by way of bearing—such as wholesome actions that serve as the means for attaining high status and definite goodness
6 virtue by way of acting as an antidote—such as actions that possess the special power of directly overcoming objects of abandonment and the unfavorable
7 virtue by way of pacification—such as true cessations
8 virtue by way of concordant cause—such as the five clairvoyances and ten powers that arise through the force of attaining true cessations.

A similar presentation of seven types is made with respect to non-virtues:

1 non-virtue by way of attainment at birth—such as spontaneously engaging in murder due to predispositions from a former lifetime
2 non-virtue by way of application—such as misconduct of body, speech, and mind that arises in dependence on relying on a non-virtuous friend, listening to specious doctrine, improperly taking such to mind, and so forth
3 non-virtue by way of an activity in front—such as offering a blood sacrifice to an image
4 non-virtue by way of harming—such as actions of body, speech, and mind that injure sentient beings
5 non-virtue by way of bearing—such as actions impelling future lifetimes and actions completing the character of a future lifetime that yield only suffering as their fruit
6 non-virtue by way of non-conduciveness—such as bad views that prevent generation of non-contaminated paths
7 non-virtue by way of interruption—such as bad views that interfere with virtuous activity.

Root afflictions. Afflictions, in general, are defined as knowers that, when generated, cause the mental continuum to be very unpeaceful. The six root afflictions, which are so called because they are the sources of all other afflictions, are shown in Chart 26.

Desire. Desire perceives an internal or external contaminated phenomenon to be pleasant from the point of view of its own

Chart 26: *Divisions of Root Afflictions*



entity and thereupon seeks it. It has the function of generating suffering. Like oil that has set in cloth, desire adheres to its object of observation and thus is difficult to separate from it.

Desire is divided into three types: desire of the Desire Realm, desire of the Form Realm, and desire of the Formless Realm. The reason for stating that the function of desire is the generation of suffering is that the root of all suffering is birth, and the main cause of birth in cyclic existence is desire, or attachment.

Anger. Anger is an intention to harm sentient beings, to harm sufferings in one's own continuum, or to harm phenomena that are sources of suffering (such as thorns). It has the function of causing oneself not to remain in contact with happiness and serves as a basis for misconduct. Through anger, one does not

abide in happiness in this lifetime, and immeasurable suffering is induced in the future.

Pride. Pride depends on the view of the transitory collection as a real I and has the aspect of a puffing up of the mind upon observing one's own wealth, qualities, youth, and so forth. It has the function of serving as a basis for the arising of disrespect and suffering. There are seven types of pride:

1 pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is superior to lower persons
2 excessive pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is superior to equal persons
3 pride beyond pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is greatly superior even to persons who are superior to others
4 pride of thinking I—a puffing up of the mind, observing the appropriated aggregates of mind and body and thinking, 'I'
5 pride of conceit—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one has attained what has not been attained, such as clairvoyance or meditative stabilization
6 pride of slight inferiority—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is just a little lower than others who are actually greatly superior
7 wrongful pride—a puffing up the mind, thinking that one has attained auspicious qualities when one has actually deviated from the path, such as claiming high attainments when one has actually been carried away by a spirit.

Because pride causes disrespect for high qualities and for those who possess high qualities, it serves to obstruct the new attainment of doctrines of verbalization and realization, to cause rebirth in bad migrations, and, even when reborn as a human, to cause birth in a low class, such as a servant. Thus, it produces the unwanted in both this and later lives.

Ignorance. Ignorance is an absence of knowledge that involves obscuration with respect to the status of phenomena. It has the

function of serving as a basis for the arising of false ascertainment, doubt, and afflictions. Its principal antidote is the wisdom cognizing selflessness.

Ignorance is of two types: obscuration with respect to actions and their effects and obscuration with respect to suchness. The latter serves as the causal motivation for all rebirth in cyclic existence, but in terms of operational motivation at the time of actions, obscuration with respect to actions and their effects is specified as the cause of accumulating actions that result in birth in bad migrations whereas obscuration with respect to suchness is specified as the cause of accumulating actions that result in birth in happy migrations.

In dependence on ignorance, the other afflictions arise, and in dependence on them contaminated actions are accumulated. From those, all sufferings in cyclic existence are produced. Therefore, all afflictions and faults arise in dependence on ignorance.

Doubt. Doubt is a two-pointedness of mind with respect to the four noble truths, actions and their effects, and so forth. It has the function of serving as a basis for non-engagement in virtues. Doubt obstructs all virtuous activities and especially interferes with seeing the truth.

Afflicted views. There are five afflicted views: (see Chart 27).

View of the transitory collection. A view of the transitory collection observes the appropriated mental and physical aggregates and conceives them to be a real I and mine. It is an *endurance* in the sense of not fearing the mistakenness of inherently existent I and mine; a *desire* in the sense of seeking a mistaken object; an *intelligence* in the sense of thoroughly discriminating its object; a *conception* in the sense of adhering strongly to its object; and a *view* in the sense of observing its object. A view of the transitory has the function of serving as a basis for all bad views.

It is called the view of the transitory collection because the mental and physical aggregates, which are the base of the view,

Chart 27: *Divisions of Afflicted Views*

afflicted view
- view of the transitory collection (as real I and mine)
  satkāyadṛṣhṭi
  'jig tshogs la lta ba
- view holding to an extreme
  antagrāhadṛṣhṭi
  mthar 'dzin pa'i lta ba
- conception of a (bad) view as supreme
  dṛṣhṭiparāmarsha
  lta ba mchog 'dzin
- conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct as supreme
  shīlavrataparāmarsha
  tshul khrims dang brtul zhugs mchog 'dzin
- perverse view
  mithyādṛṣhṭi
  log lta

are impermanent, and thus transitory, and are a composite of the plural, and thus a collection. The name itself indicates that there is no permanent and partless person. (See p.176 for its divisions.)

A view of the transitory collection conceives of an inherently existent I and exaggerates the distinction between self and other. Thereupon, desire for one's own side and hatred for others arises.[168] Through viewing the self, pride is generated, a view of the self as eternal or as annihilated at death arises, and the conception of one's own bad behavior as superior is generated. Similarly, teachers of selflessness and their teachings of cause and effect, the four noble truths, the Three Jewels, and so forth are conceived to be non-existent or become objects of doubt. In this way, the view of the transitory collection acts as the basis of all afflictions. Although usually identified as ignorance, in this context its relation to ignorance is like the relation of a mind conceiving the presence of a snake to the dimness surrounding a rope in a dark area.

View holding to an extreme. A view holding to an extreme observes the self as apprehended by the view of the transitory collection and conceives it to be either permanent in the sense of unchanging or annihilated in the sense of not transmigrating to another lifetime. Since it causes descent to the extremes of permanence and annihilation, it has the function of obstructing progress on the middle way free from the two extremes. As above, it is an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.

Conception of a (bad) view as supreme. A conception of a (bad) view to be supreme observes a view of the transitory collection, a view holding to an extreme, a perverse view, or the mental and physical aggregates in dependence on which these views arise and conceives such (1) to be supreme in the sense of claiming it to be perfect, (2) to be chief in the sense of holding that there is nothing greater, (3) to be superior, or (4) to be ultimate in the sense of holding that it has no equal. A conception of a (bad) view to be supreme has the function of serving as a basis for adhering strongly to bad views in that it establishes predispositions for not separating from them in this and future lives. As above, it is an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.

Conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct as supreme. A conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct to be supreme takes as its object (1) a faulty system of ethics that is intended to abandon faulty ethics, (2) a faulty mode of conduct that prescribes dress, behavior and physical and verbal activities, or (3) the mental and physical aggregates in dependence on which these are performed. It considers these to purify sins, liberate from afflictions, and release from cyclic existence. It has the function of serving as a basis for fruitless fatigue. As above, it is an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.

Perverse view. A perverse view is a denial of cause, effect, functionality, and existent phenomena and can involve holding that Īshvara and so forth are the cause of beings migrating in cyclic existence. Denial of cause is a view that good and bad

behavior and so forth do not exist. Denial of effect is a view that fruitions of virtuous and sinful actions do not exist. Denial of functionality is a view that former and later lives and so forth do not exist. Denial of existent phenomena is a view that, for example, attainment of the state of a Foe Destroyer does not exist.

Perverse views have the function of severing virtuous roots, causing tight adherence to non-virtuous roots, serving as a basis for engaging in non-virtue, and causing non-engagement in virtue. Since denial of cause, effect, and rebirth sever all virtuous roots, these are the worst among all perverse views.

Secondary afflictions. The twenty secondary afflictions, which are so called because they are close to or portions of the root afflictions, are shown in Chart 28.

Belligerence. Belligerence is an intention to harm another through striking and so forth when one is in any of the nine situations of harmful intent, thinking:

1 'This person has harmed me.'
2 'This person is harming me.'
3 'This person will harm me.'
4 'This person has harmed my friend.'
5 'This person is harming my friend.'
6 'This person will harm my friend.'
7 'This person has helped my enemy.'
8 'This person is helping my enemy.'
9 'This person will help my enemy.'

Belligerence has the function of serving as a basis for bearing weapons, punishing, and preparing to injure others. It differs from the root affliction anger in that anger is an impatience and intent to harm that arises when a harmful sentient being, or one's own suffering, or sources of suffering appear to the mind. Belligerence is an extremely disturbed state of mind which, upon a great increase of anger, is a wish to inflict harm on another such as by physically striking that person when he is in one's presence.

Chart 28: *Divisions of Secondary Afflictions*



Resentment. Resentment is a wish to harm or to answer harm, involving non-release of a continuum of anger. It has the function of serving as a basis for impatience.

Concealment. Concealment is a wish, through the force of ignorance, to hide a fault when another person, such as a spiritual guide, points out that fault. It has the function of increasing faults, of serving as a basis for contrition and not abiding in contact with happiness, and of impelling rebirth in bad migrations.

Spite. Spite is a wish, through the force of belligerence and resentment, to speak harsh words out of ill-will to another who has pointed out a fault. It has the function of causing one not to abide in happiness in this lifetime by causing engagement in many faulty actions, such as speaking harsh words, and by generating many non-meritorious actions. Spite also generates unpleasant fruitions in future lives.

Jealousy. Jealousy is a disturbance of the mind from the depths that involves an inability to bear another's fortune due to being attached to goods and services. It involves hatred and has the function of causing discomfort of mind and not abiding in contact with happiness.

Miserliness. Miserliness is a tight holding onto articles without letting them go through the power of attachment to goods and services. It has the function of serving as a basis for the non-diminishment of possessions, and it generates the unwanted in this and later lives.

Deceit. Deceit is a pretension of having good qualities, whereas one does not, through the force of strong attachment to goods and services. As in the case of the hypocrisy of pretending to have a disciplined mind in order to deceive others, deceit can involve ignorance and desire and has the function of serving as a basis for wrong livelihood. 'Wrong livelihood' refers to deceitfully gaining goods

(1) through hypocrisy, (2) through speaking soft words in accordance with another's thought, (3) through praising others' possessions, (4) through speaking on the faults of miserliness and so forth, and (5) through praising another's act of giving and so forth.

Dissimulation. Dissimulation is a wish to hide one's faults from others through the force of desire for goods and services. Both dissimulation and deceit have the function of preventing the attainment of true preceptual instruction and cause one in this and future lifetimes not to meet with a Mahāyāna spiritual guide.

Haughtiness. Haughtiness is a puffing up of the mind through taking joy and comfort in observing one's own good health, youth, beauty, power, signs of long life, prosperity, and so forth. It has the function of serving as a basis for all afflictions and secondary afflictions and acts as a root of non-conscientiousness.

Harmfulness. Harmfulness is an unmerciful wish to harm other sentient beings. Involving anger, it is a lack of compassion as in wanting to harm or to cause others to harm, or in taking delight when seeing or hearing of harm to sentient beings. It has the function of injuring others.

Non-shame. Non-shame is a non-avoidance of faults from the viewpoint of one's own disapproval or of religious prohibition. It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of assisting all root afflictions and secondary afflictions. For example, if a monk, when encountering an intoxicant, did not avoid drinking it, thinking, 'This is something I should not do,' he would have the mental factor of non-shame.

Non-embarrassment. Non-embarrassment is non-avoidance of faults from the viewpoint of another's disapproval. It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of assisting all root afflictions and secondary afflictions. If one does

not avoid faults thinking that the Teacher Buddha and clairvoyant gods would be disturbed and others would criticize oneself, one would have non-embarrassment. It and non-shame assist all afflictions and act as causes of all faults, for without a wish to avoid faults, one cannot keep from them. Thus, these two mental factors are said to accompany all non-virtuous minds.

Lethargy. Lethargy is a heaviness and unserviceability of body and mind. It involves ignorance and has the function of assisting all root and secondary afflictions, for in dependence on lethargy these increase.

Excitement. Excitement is a scattering of the mind to attributes of the Desire Realm experienced previously and an engagement in them with attachment. Excitement is a non-peacefulness of mind that involves desirous engagement in the pleasant; it has the function of preventing calm abiding. Thus, all scatterings of the mind are not instances of excitement since excitement is a portion of desire whereas the mind is frequently distracted to objects by way of afflictions other than desire and even scatters to virtuous objects of observation. Scattering involving desire is both scattering and excitement whereas other instances are just scattering.

Non-faith. Non-faith is non-conviction, non-delight, and non-wishing with respect to virtuous phenomena. It involves ignorance and has the function of serving as a basis for laziness. Non-faith is the opposite of the three types of faith; it is non-conviction in actions and their effects, etc., non-delight and dislike of the possessors of auspicious qualities such as the Three Jewels, and non-wishing or non-seeking of liberation and so forth.

Laziness. Laziness is a non-delight in virtue due to attachment to lying down and so forth. It involves ignorance and has the function of preventing application in virtue. (See p.71.)

Non-conscientiousness. Non-conscientiousness causes a looseness of mind, not keeping it from afflictions and faults and

resulting in non-cultivation of virtuous phenomena. It can involve an abiding in desire, hatred, and ignorance as well as laziness and has the function of serving as a basis for the increase of non-virtues and decrease of virtues.

Forgetfulness. Forgetfulness is an unclarity of mind and a forgetting of virtuous objects through mindfulness of objects of the afflictions. It has the function of serving as a basis for distraction in that, based on afflicted mindfulness, the mind is distracted to the objects of observation of the afflictions.

Non-introspection. Non-introspection is an unknowing engagement in physical, verbal, and mental deeds. It has the function of serving as a basis for the infractions of codes of ethics.

Distraction. Distraction is a scattering of the mind from its object of observation. It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of preventing separation from desire. Excitement is a scattering of the mind to pleasant objects whereas distraction is a scattering to any object.

Changeable mental factors. The four changeable mental factors are so called because they become virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral by the power of the motivation and the minds accompanying them. They are shown in Chart 29.

Sleep. Sleep is a powerless withdrawal inside of the engagement by sense consciousnesses in objects. It depends on causes such as heaviness of body, weakness, fatigue, taking the figure of darkness to mind, and so forth. Sleep involves ignorance and has the function of serving as a basis for losing virtuous activities. The proper time for sleep is the middle watch of the night, not the first or last watches nor during the day. During the middle watch of the night one should sleep with a wish to practice virtue, and not motivated by afflictions. Thus, there are two types of sleep, virtuous and non-virtuous, the latter having the function of degenerating virtuous activities.

Chart 29: *Divisions of Changeable Mental Factors*



Contrition. Contrition is remorse or regret for a deed done by oneself in accordance with one's own thought or upon pressure by someone else which one subsequently comes to dislike. It involves ignorance and has the function of interrupting the stability of the mind. Contrition is of three types:

1 virtuous—remorse for sins done previously
2 non-virtuous—remorse for meritorious actions done previously, such as making donations and then feeling sorry for having depleted one's wealth
3 neutral—remorse for activities that neither helped nor harmed others, such as making a mistake sewing.

Contrition for sins is suitable when their fruition has not yet occurred and they can still be affected by confession and so forth. When the fruition of a sin has already occurred, such as in having been born blind, contrition can no longer overcome the effect of the deed.

Investigation and analysis. Investigation is an inquiry into the rough entities of objects as well as their names whereas analysis is a fine discrimination of these. In dependence on their objects,

investigation and analysis are of three types, virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral. The virtuous, such as analyzing selflessness with an intention to emerge from cyclic existence, has the function of serving as a basis for abiding in contact with happiness in that it generates pleasant effects. Non-virtuous investigation and analysis, such as inquiring into pleasant and unpleasant objects motivated by desire and hatred, has the function of serving as a basis for not abiding in happiness in that it generates unpleasant effects. Investigation and analysis into crafts, styles, and so forth without a virtuous or non-virtuous attitude are neutral. (For another way of presenting consciousness see Appendix 1.)

Non-associated compositional factors

Source

Gön-chok-den-bay-drön-may's *Beginnings of Annotations on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Essence of the Good Explanations'*

The final division of impermanent phenomena is comprised of compositional factors which are neither form nor consciousness.[169] They are called compositional factors because of being factors that allow for the aggregation of causes and conditions and for the production, abiding, and cessation of products. They are called 'non-associated' because, unlike minds, they are not associated with minds or mental factors. Non-associated compositional factors are divided into two types:

Chart 30: *Divisions of Non-Associated Compositional Factors*



A person is a non-associated compositional factor because of being designated in dependence upon a collection of form and consciousness. Since a person is neither form nor consciousness but impermanent, it can be only an instance of the remaining category of impermanent phenomena, a non-associated compositional factor.

Non-person non-associated compositional factors are of twenty-three types (see Chart 31). These twenty-three are called 'designations to states'. 'Acquisition' is designated to a state of the increase and decrease of virtues and so forth, of which there are two types: 'finding acquisition' which is a new attainment of such increase or decrease and 'possessive acquisition' which is the retention of it.

'Absorption without discrimination' is designated to a state involving a lack of the coarse feelings and discriminations associated with the third concentration and below. It is produced in dependence on the fourth concentration by common beings only. 'Absorption of cessation' is designated to a state achieved only by Superiors in which there is a lack of the coarse feelings and discriminations associated with the peak of cyclic existence (the highest formless level) and below. 'One having no discrimination' is designated to the state of a person born among the gods in the condition of being without coarse feelings and discriminations.

'Life faculty' or 'life' is designated to the state of living; it is the base of consciousness and warmth. 'Similarity of type' is designated to the state or condition of likeness. 'Birth' (or 'production'), 'aging', 'duration', and 'impermanence' are designated to states of the characteristics of things. 'Group of stems', 'group of words', and 'group of letters' are designated to various states of verbal conventions. Stems are bare names without case endings, etc., whereas words are stems with case endings, etc.

'State of an ordinary being' is designated to one who has not attained the qualities of Superiors. (The Vaibhāṣhikas substitute non-acquisition for this category and do not assert the remaining nine, limiting their presentation of non-associated compositional factors to fourteen.) 'Continuity' is designated to the non-interrupted state of a continuum of causes and effects. 'Distinction' is of three types: distinction of the particular and the general, distinction of virtues and sins and pleasures and pains, and distinction of causes and effects. 'Relatedness' is of three

Chart 31: *Divisions of Non-Person Non-Associated Compositional Factors*

- non-person non-associated compositional factor
  - acquisition; *prāpti, 'thob pa*
  - absorption without discrimination; *asaṃjñisamāpatti, 'du shes med pa'i snyoms 'jug*
  - absorption of cessation; *nirodhasamāpatti, 'gog pa'i snyoms 'jug*
  - one having no discrimination; *āsaṃjñika, 'du shes med pa pa*
  - life faculty; *jīvitendriya, srog gi dbang po*
  - similarity of type; *nikāyasabhāgata, rigs 'thun pa*
  - birth; *jāti, skye ba*
  - aging; *jarā, rga ba*
  - duration; *sthiti, gnas pa*
  - impermanence; *anityatā, mi rtag pa*
  - group of stems; *nāmakāya, ming gi tshogs*
  - group of words; *padakāya, tshig gi tshogs*
  - group of letters; *vyañjanakāya, yi ge'i tshogs*
  - state of an ordinary being; *pṛthagjanatva, so so skye bo nyid*
  - continuity; *pravṛtti, 'jug pa*
  - distinction; *pratiniyama, so sor nges pa*
  - relatedness; *yoga, 'byor 'grel*
  - rapidity; *jāva, 'gyogs pa*
  - order; *anukrama, go rim*
  - time; *kāla, dus*
  - area; *desha, yul*
  - number; *saṃkhyā, grangs*
  - collection; *sāmagrī, tshogs pa*

types: 'means' which is the collection of, for instance, an artisan's tools, 'aggregation' which is a collection of causes but specifically their reliance on each other within the collection, and 'suitability' which is each thing's having its own function.

'Rapidity' is designated to a condition of the arising of effects immediately after their causes and to the speed caused by persons, magical emanations, and so forth. 'Order' is designated to a serial state of former and later, high and low, and so forth. 'Time' is designated to states of the past, present, and future. 'Area' is designated to the composite of a place and the persons therein. 'Number' is designated to a condition of measure. 'Collection' is designated to the state of a complete collection of causes, and specifically to that completeness.

AGGREGATES, CONSTITUENTS, AND SOURCES

Sources
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jam-ȳang-shay-bā's *Great Exposition of Tenets*

Another way of dividing all impermanent things is into the five aggregates, or, more literally, 'heaps' or 'piles' (*skandha, phung po*).[170] These five are:

Chart 32: *The Five Aggregates*

- thing
  - forms (*rūpa, gzugs*)
  - feelings (*vedanā, tshor ba*)
  - discriminations (*saṃjñā, 'du shes*)
  - compositional factors (*saṃskāra, 'du byed*)
  - consciousnesses (*vijñāna, rnam shes*)

The heaps are so called because when Buddha taught them he heaped up various grains—rice and so forth—into five piles, to represent the categories of impermanent phenomena. These heaps are defined as aggregates of phenomena, and, therefore, 'aggregate' is often used here as the translation equivalent.

The eleven types of forms and all their instances constitute the first aggregate, 'forms'. The three types of the mental factor 'feeling'—pleasure, pain, and neutrality—and all their instances constitute the second aggregate, 'feelings'. The mental factor of discrimination and all its instances constitute the third heap, 'discriminations'. Non-associated compositional factors and the remaining forty-nine mental factors as well as all their instances constitute the fourth aggregate, 'compositional factors'. The six main minds and all their instances constitute the fifth aggregate, 'consciousnesses'. The person is imputed to these aggregates of impermanent phenomena and is unfindable either separate from or among them.

All *impermanent* phenomena not only of the personal continuum but also of the external world are included in these five. However, the emptiness of the mind, a permanent phenomenon included within the personal continuum, is not counted among the five aggregates because the five aggregates are exclusively impermanent. Thus, all phenomena of the personal continuum are not included in the five aggregates, only the impermanent.

The last four aggregates are mental phenomena and the first is physical; thus, the five are the 'mental and physical aggregates'. Each instance of the five is also called an 'aggregate' because, for instance, a table itself is an aggregate of particles and a consciousness is a continuum of moments. A single particle and a single moment of consciousness are also called a form aggregate and a consciousness aggregate not because they are aggregates of particles or moments but merely from the point of view of designating a part—for example, an instance of a form aggregate—with the name of the whole—'form aggregate'.[171] This mode of appellation in which every instance of an aggregate is itself called an aggregate accords with the relationship between a generality and its instances. If the generality is 'form aggregate', each of its instances must be a form aggregate. To be an instance of a generality (such as pot), a phenomenon (such as a gold pot) must be the same entity as the generality, the phenomenon must be it (a pot), and there must be other instances.

All phenomena, both permanent and impermanent, can be divided into the eighteen constituents (*dhātu, khams*), which are so called because they give rise to phenomena of similar type.[172] These are the six objects, the six sense powers, and the six consciousnesses, every instance of which is called a constituent:

Chart 33: *The Eighteen Constituents*

object	*sense power*	*consciousness*
form	eye sense power	eye consciousness
sound	ear sense power	ear consciousness
odor	nose sense power	nose consciousness
taste	tongue sense power	tongue consciousness
tangible object	body sense power	body consciousness
phenomenon	mind sense power	mental consciousness

'Phenomenon', the sixth category of objects, refers to *other* phenomena, those that are not sense objects but are objects only of the mental consciousness, such as impermanence and emptiness. Since sense objects are also objects of a mental consciousness, the category 'phenomena' does not include all objects of a mental consciousness—just its exclusive objects among which mental factors and permanent phenomena, such as space, are included.

Since each of a Buddha's six consciousnesses cognizes all phenomena, this list does not apply to Buddhas. However, the ability of a Buddha to cognize all objects with any consciousness does not imply that there is only one mind which is merely designated with the names of the six consciousnesses when it arrives at the various organs and experiences their respective objects. The cross-functionality of a Buddha's consciousnesses is an extraordinary quality and does not affect the presentation of the consciousnesses and objects of non-Buddhas.

The eighteen constituents include all phenomena, both permanent and impermanent, due to the inclusion of all permanent phenomena in the category 'phenomenon'. These eighteen can be reduced to the twelve sources (*āyatana, skye mched*) through eliminating the six consciousnesses, yet still contain all phenomena because the six consciousnesses are still included in

the category 'mind sense power'. The mind sense power is a previous moment of any of the six consciousnesses which acts as the base of a mental consciousness much as a physical sense power acts as the base of a sense consciousness.

The twelve sources are so called because they open the way for the production of the six consciousnesses.[173] They are the six objects and the six sense powers:

Chart 34: *The Twelve Sources*

object	*sense power*
form	eye sense power
sound	ear sense power
odor	nose sense power
taste	tongue sense power
tangible object	body sense power
phenomenon	mind sense power

Teachers repeatedly enumerate the twelve sources or the eighteen constituents in order to emphasize a sense of the multiplicity of phenomena that are the bases of imputing or designating a person. The tables are memorized, with students not only repeating the names but causing the phenomena to appear to their minds. This practice helps greatly to crowd out the sense of self and prepare the way for a recognition of the imputed nature of the person. Then, one can proceed to investigate the imputed nature of these phenomena themselves.

2 *Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence*

Sources
Dzong-ka-ba's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*
Geshe Lhundup Sopa's oral teachings
Pan-chen Sö-nam-drak-ba's *General Meaning of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament for Clear Realization'*
Den-ba-dar-gyay's *Analysis of Dependent-Arising*

The last twelve of the fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class are the twelve members of the dependent-arising of cyclic existence.[174] These twelve are to be viewed as faulty because they obstruct the path to liberation. They are:

1 ignorance (*avidyā, ma rig pa*)
2 action (*saṃskārakarma, 'du byed kyi las*)
3 consciousness (*vijñāna, rnam shes*)
   a. cause consciousness
   b. effect consciousness
4 name and form (*nāmarūpa, ming gzugs*)
5 six sources (*ṣhadāyatana, skye mched drug*)
6 contact (*sparsha, reg pa*)