

COGNITION

- makes us reach the object
- turns our attention straight to the object
- point out the object as an aim of possible purposive action (proper function of cognition)
- proper function is at the end after object is cognized

MODES OF COGNITION

1. DIRECT

- dependent upon the senses
- direct cognition converts object of senses into object of possible purposive action
- direct cognition constructs an image of object
- makes person feel the objects are present directly
- not contradicted by that underlying essence of reality which possesses efficiency or is consistent
- Knowledge exempt from construction (synthesis of image and word/meaning) is perceptive right knowledge.

1.1. SENSE DIRECT

- object in this moment is the same as the object in prior moments and produces one mental sensation
- object of inner sense is different from object of outer sense
- This internal object or internal sensation is a postulate of this system.

-

1.2. REFLEXIVE DIRECT

- apprehends its own existence and special states of consciousness, such as emotions.

1.3 YOGIC DIRECT

1. DIRECT KNOWLEDGE (cognition, perception)

- Its object is the (extreme) particular.

- (Every) reality, indeed, has its real essence which is the particular (the unique) and a general (imagined aspect).

- The object of cognition is really double (has two aspects):

1. Particular: unique, the prima facie ("based on the first impression") apprehended. That aspect which appears directly (in the first moment).

2. General: imagined aspect: The definitely realized. The second aspect is the form which is constructed in a perceptive judgment.

PARTICULAR ASPECT:

- When the mental image varies according as the Object is near or remote, the Object then is the particular.

- When an object of cognition produces a vivid (flash) of consciousness, if it is near, and a dim one, [and] if it is, although remote, but still amenable to the senses, it is a particular.

- That alone (which is unique) represents ultimate reality.
- Because the essence of reality is just efficiency.
- The object, i. e., the aim, has an action, i. e., produces something.
- The efficiency, i. e., the capacity to produce something,

We apply the term ultimately real to anything (that can be tested) by its force to produce an effect. Such an efficient object (is always localized, it) is either near or remote.

RESULT OF COGNITION

This direct cognition itself is the result of cognizing.

RESULT OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

- some spontaneous function of absorbing the object, which alone when achieved makes the object distinctly cognized (i. e., assimilated)...this is just (what we call) the result of right knowledge. When this (result) is reached, knowledge becomes efficient.

COGNITION AS COORDINATION

The source of cognizing consists in coordination between the constructed image and its real object.

For us (Buddhists, when we say that) a cognition has sprung up from an object, this (simply) means that this cognition is a fact which is coordinated to a (momentary) object, as, e. g., the cognition produced by a patch of blue colour is coordinated to (the substratum of) this blue.

This coordination is described in other terms) as an idea, or representation (of the object).

DISTINCTION

Owing to this, a distinct cognition of the object is produced.

"This" means coordination. ("Owing to this" means through the influence of the fact of coordination. The distinct cognition of the object means a self-conscious idea of it. Coordination is the cause producing (distinctness).

IMAGE

Direct cognition of an object in the form of a perceptive judgment is possible, i. e., (the object is really) being cognized, owing to the coordination (of an image with a point of external reality and its contrast with correlative images).

END OF PROCESS OF COGNITION

Indeed, as soon as our awareness (begins to present itself as) an image of something blue, only then can we judge that we have a distinct cognition of it (in the form "this is blue", (or "this is not non-blue"). It then is (really) cognized.

SIMILARITY/CONTRAST

The senses, indeed, and (the object which together) produce (in us an indefinite) sensation are not equal (to the task) of determining it as an awareness of the presence in us of a self-conscious image of something blue. But as soon as we become aware of its similarity with (other) blue (objects and its contrast with everything non-blue), it then can be determined as a self-conscious image of (what is) blue.

ISSUES

CAUSAL RELATION

- the relation (which is here admitted to exist between coordination) as producing and (cognition) as obtaining (distinctness) is not founded upon a causal relation (as between two things).

- It would be a contradiction (to assume such a relation in what, in our opinion, is but the same entity. On the other hand, the relation of being determined (as a content) and of determining it (as a process can be assumed to exist in what is essentially but one thing).

PROCESS AND CONTENT

If we therefore admit that the same entity has the (double) aspect of being, to a certain extent, a process of cognition and, to a certain extent, a resulting content of it,

Coordination is indeed the cause imparting distinctness to our cognition. Our self-conscious image of (e. g.) a blue patch is, on the other hand, the content obtaining distinctness.

-When we become aware of the similarity of our cognition (with other blue objects), it then appears (as though) grasping something blue in a definite judgment, ("this is blue"). But (at the same time our cognition is being determined as a self-conscious image of the blue, (it may then be regarded as a content which is being grasped and thus) obtains distinctness.

TWO PARTS OF DISTINCTNESS

Therefore coordination, when (it is regarded as a process and) contrasted (with other processes which are) not coordination, becomes the cause conferring distinctness (and self-consciousness on our cognitions). But when (the process has been, as it were, stabilized and) our cognition appears as a self-conscious image of

the blue, it is then contrasted (with other ideas which are) not images of the blue (and it then can be regarded as a content) obtaining distinctness.

THE IMAGE AND DISTINCTNESS

- What imparts distinctness (to our cognitions) is a constructed image. **It** must be regarded as something which is called forth (in us) by the influence of (pure) sensation. But it is not itself (strictly speaking) a sense-perception, because the latter is (passive), non-constructive; and therefore it is not capable of delineating its own self in the shape of a self-conscious image of the blue patch.

Although our sensation which has not yet been determined in the judgment ("this is blue") really exists, it is nevertheless quasi altogether non-existent, (if we want it to represent) the self-conscious idea of the blue patch. Therefore our cognition (begins) really to exist as possessing its essence of a self-conscious image of the blue only when it is being definitely shaped in the judgment ("this is blue") (Coordination is then immanent to the image). [?]

2. INDIRECT KNOWLEDGE (*cognition, perception*)

- indirect cognition points out mark of the object
- characteristic essence is subsequent coordination.
- appears after the logical mark has been apprehended, concomitance apprehended etc.
- involves construction or judgement: a distinct cognition of a mental reflect which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation, meaning that a denoted aspect of the object and its verbal aspect are mixed up in its apprehended aspect.
- when the denoted fact and the word denoting it have entered into one act of cognition, then the word and the object have "coalesced"
- primitive (non-worded) constructions are also included in indirect cognition.
- "constructed knowledge" is not produced by the object (actually apprehended) and therefore it is not a (narrowly) restricted mental reflex, since the factor corresponding to it does not exist, (it is created by the synthesis of productive imagination).
- this contrasts with the non-constructiveness of the particular in direct cognition
- meaning involves synthesis
- An unreality appears in the moment to the mind, and its course consists in distinctly cognizing an unreality as (a kind of) reality. It apprehends (prima facie) an unreality. But this imagined object, which is apprehended (by inference), is definitely referred to an (imagined) particular. Thus it is that constructed particulars are the proper province of inference, but its immediate object is an unreality.