


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A CONTROVERSIAL TOPIC FROM MI-PHAM'S ANALYSIS OF ŚĀNTARAKṢITA'S *MADHYAMAKĀLĀMĪKĀRĀ*

Kennard Lipman

Abbreviations

<i>MAL</i>	<i>Madhyamakālamkāra</i> of Śāntarakṣita
<i>BCA</i>	<i>Bodhicaryāvatāra</i> of Śāntideva
<i>UG</i>	<i>dBu-ma rgyan-gyi nam-bśad</i> of Mi-pham rgya-mtsho

The story of Śāntarakṣita's sojourn in Tibet is well-known, but this is mostly because of its symbolic content: the failure of Śāntarakṣita's exoteric *paramitayāna* to impress itself upon the Tibetan "barbarians" and their land, as opposed to the success of Padmasambhava's esoteric *mantrayāna* in doing so. Śāntarakṣita's two major works—the encyclopedic textbook of Indian philosophy, the *Tattvasaṃgraha*; and a presentation of his own approach to Madhyamaka philosophy, the *Madhyamakālamkāra* (along with his disciple Kamalāsīla's *pañjika* on each)—spawned almost no Tibetan commentarial tradition. The translation of the *MAL* into Tibetan, made in the early period, is often obscure, but it was not revised during the period of "New Translations" (*phyi-'gyur*).¹ Tsoñ-kha-pa has left us some incomplete notes (*zin-bris*) on the *dBu-ma rgyan*,² and his *gSñān-'bum* also contains the *rGyal-tshab chos-rjes-la rgyan-pa'i dbu-ma rgyan-gyi brjed-byañ*, a guide written by rGyal-tshab according to Tsoñ-kha-pa's instructions. Only in the nineteenth century do we find a rNīn-ma-pa scholar of the *ris-med* movement, Mi-pham rgya-mtsho (1846–1912), writing an extensive commentary, the *dBu-ma rgyan-gyi nam-bśad 'jam-dbyañs bla-ma dgyes-pa'i 'dal-tuñ*.³ Mi-pham

wrote commentaries on all the major Indian Mahāyāna *śāstras*, presenting a rNīn-ma-pa position in this vast field of scholastic exegesis, to an extent never before developed among the rNīn-ma-pas.

It will become clear in the course of our paper why Mi-pham decided to resurrect, as it were, the *dBu-ma rgyan*. He was particularly concerned to present what he considered to be a proper understanding of the relationship of the Svātantrikas to the Prasaṅgikas, a relationship which had become dogmatically rigid, in his view, over the long course of Prasaṅgika dominance in Tibet. The source of this viewpoint, of course, was Candrakīrti's attack on Bhāvaviveka in the introduction to the first chapter of his *Prasannapāda*.⁴ Mi-pham's *dBu-ma rgyan* commentary must be read in the overall context of the polemics engendered by his commentary on the ninth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, the *Sēs-rab le'u'i tshig-don go sla-bar nam-par bśad-pa nor-bu ke-ta-ka*.⁵ In fact, in the midst of his commentary on *BCA* IX, 2—one of the prime sources of controversy—Mi-pham expressly refers his readers to his commentary on the *dBu-ma rgyan* for a more extensive treatment of the issue regarding the Svātantrika and Prasaṅgika approaches to the Two Truths, the main topic of our paper. Because of this, we have included a translation of sections of Mi-pham's commentary on *BCA* IX, 2 in an appendix.⁶

Here we must make some remarks on the history of the Madhyamaka in Tibet. We know, from the *lDan-kar* catalogue, that very few of what later came to be known as Prasaṅgika texts were translated in the early period, i.e., only five works representing Buddhapaḥita, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva, as opposed to a dozen texts of Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalāsīla (a dozen works of Nagarjuna and Āryadeva, who antedate any split, were also translated).⁷ Ye-śes-sde, in his contemporaneous *lTa-bu khyad-par*—which, along with the *dBu-ma rgyan* and Bhāvaviveka's *Tarkajvāla*, provided the early models for the Tibetan *grub-mtha'* genre of literature—divided the Madhyamaka into two: the Sautrantika-Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra-Madhyā-

ma. 8 The eleventh-century rÑin-ma-pa scholar of Madhyamaka and rDzogs-chen, Roñ-zom chos-kyi bzañ-po, also knows only this distinction among the Madhyamikas. 9 The terms *raiñ-gyud-pa* (Svāntarika) and *thal-'gyur-ba* (Prāsaṅgika) only come to designate different "schools" around the time of Bu-ston. It is interesting to note that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla never mention Candrakīrti by name, although it is clear that they were aware of critiques of the *svatantra* approach such as Candrakīrti had made, verses 76–78 of the *MAL* being devoted exclusively to such objections. In his commentary on *MAL* 1, Kamalaśīla does use the terms *raiñ-gyud-pa* and *thal-'gyur-ba*, but they refer only to argument forms.¹⁰

Even at the start of the later spread (*phyi-dar*) of Buddhism,¹¹ the Svāntarika remained predominant in the form of the teachings of rÑog lo-tsa-ba blo-ldan śes-rab (1059–1109), who taught according to Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* at gSañ-phu, just south of Lhasa. The fifth abbot in the succession there was Phywa-pa chos-kyi señ-ge, whose most famous students were known as the "Eight Great Lions" (such as gTsañ nag-pa brtson-'grus señ-ge and rMa bya-ba rtsod-pa'i señ-ge). The majority of these students of Phywa-pa, led by gTsañ nag-pa and rMa bya-ba, came to follow the interpretation of the *Madhyamakakārikā* by Candrakīrti, while the others, as well as Roñ-ston śes-bya kun-gzigs (1367–1449), continued to follow the Svāntarika of Kamalaśīla, along with some rÑin-ma-pa study centers (*chos-grwa*). The reasons why all of this was so are obscure, awaiting further detailed study of the period.

It was Pa-tshab lo-tsa-ba, however, who introduced the Prāsaṅgika approach during the later spread when he went to study with Sajjana (eleventh century) or his disciples. It was said that he studied in Kashmir for twenty-three years and then translated the *Madhyamakakārikā*, the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, and the *Catuhśataka*. From his students, known as the "Four Sons of Pa-tshab" (Gañs-pa Śe'u, gTsañ-pa 'bre-sgur, rMa bya byañ-brtson, and Zañ-thañ sag-pa ye-śes 'byuñ gnas), came the great majority

in Tibet who follow this trend, such as Sa-skya pañḍita, Bu-ston rin-chen grub, Red mda'-ba, Tsoñ-kha-pa, Padma dkar-po, etc. It is only about Tsoñ-kha-pa's time (1357–1419) that the Prāsaṅgikas assumed the pre-eminence they have maintained to the present day among Tibetans.

Mi-pham's commentary follows Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's closely, offering an interlinear commentary on the *kārikās* and then expanding on and clarifying the commentaries of the Indian masters. Mi-pham also engages in extensive discussion of issues of concern to him (particularly at vv. 64, 71–2, 75, and 83). Thus Mi-pham's commentary is invaluable, although it forces its reader to attempt to fill in the gap of no less than the whole history of the Madhyamaka in Tibet which lies between Mi-pham and its founders. Mi-pham's commentary also has a long general introduction (ff. 2b–39b) surveying aspects of Citamātra and Madhyamaka philosophy, including a section on "The five special positions in the approach [of the *dBu-ma rgyan*] which are superior to other Madhyamaka [presentations]."¹² We shall discuss one of these positions the Svāntarika distinction between two forms of the ultimate—the discursively-formulated and non-discursive ultimate (*nam-graṅs pa'i don-dam*, *pariyāyaparāmāṭhā*; *nam-graṅs min-pa'i don-dam*, *aparīyāyaparāmāṭhā*).

Śāntarakṣita explains the distinction in the ultimate reality as follows:

The ultimate eliminates the whole net of linguistic proliferation, such as *śūnya* and *aśūnya*, origination and non-origination, particular existent and [negative] abstraction. Since non-origination, etc., is in accord with understanding this [ultimate reality], they are designated, 'ultimate'. [As it is said:] 'Without the ladder of that which is ultimately valid conventionally,

It would be impossible to know how to proceed to the upper story of the ultimate.'

Since there is no origination, etc., non-origination, etc., are impossible.

On account of the refutation of the very fact of these, even linguistic expressions for them become impossible. /71

There does not exist a proper application of a negation to a non-existent object.

In that it relies on divisive conceptualization, [such a negation] partakes of the conventional and not the ultimate. /72¹³

In his discussion of this distinction, Mi-pham focuses on the problem of *śūnyatā* as a non-implicative negation (*med-dgag*, *prasajya-pratisedha*), as well as on the universal Madhyamika concern that one not remain in the more subtle extreme of negation, thereby reifying *śūnyatā*. The yogācārinś had tried to avoid this problem by invoking a conception of *śūnyatā* from the *Cūla-sūnātā-sūtra* in which "something remains" after the operation of *śūnya* as a negation has been performed; thus the negation of duality (*parikalpita*, *kun-btags*) in the relative (*paratantra*, *gžan-dban*) leaves remaining this *paratantra* as the genuinely real (*pari-niṣpanna*, *yoñs-grub*). G.M. Nagao, in an article on this Yogācāra conception of *śūnyatā*, puts it this way:

The expression, 'something remains' (*avaśiṣṭa*), however, is enigmatic indeed, for *śūnyatā* is generally accepted as non-being, negative in character, while 'something remains' positively asserts the existence of something. Perhaps one should understand this as an ultimate reality which is never denied, not even at the extremity of radical negation; it is, for instance, similar to the situation in which one cannot negate the fact that he is negating.¹⁴

It is precisely this possibility for non-implicative negation which the Madhyamikas are claiming; like rubbing two sticks together to produce a fire which consumes both of them, the fire of *prajñā* which negates any essential existence in entities also consumes itself. Mi-pham, in the course of his discussion, quotes the famous verses of Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva on this matter:

If *śūnyatā* is wrongly envisaged it will destroy those of little intelligence, just like a snake wrongly handled or a *mantra* wrongly employed. Therefore, the mind of the Sage was dissuaded from proclaiming his message (*chos*), having realized the difficulty that those of weak [intellect] would have in fathoming this profound message.

If a particular existent (*dnos-po*) were established, then a negative abstraction (*dnos-med*) could be established, since people call what is other than a particular existent an abstraction. Those who perceive essential existence, conditioned existence (*parabhava*), particular existents, and negative abstractions, they do not truly perceive the Buddha's teaching.

By accustoming oneself to the ingrained tendency towards *śūnyatā*, one will eliminate the tendency towards particular existents. Eventually even the accustoming oneself to 'there is nothing whatsoever' will be eliminated. When one cannot represent a particular existent to be investigated as 'that which is non-existent', then how can non-existence [as an abstraction], being without a support, remain before the intellect. When neither particular existents nor their negation [as an abstraction] remain before the intellect, then, since there is no other possibility, [discursiveness] is pacified, there being nothing objectifiable.¹⁵

It is relatively easy to set up and then negate the essential existence (*svabhava*, *rang-bzhin*) of entities, and it can even become an intellectual game. First of all, affirmation and negation are not mere devices for propositional affirmation and denial. The Madhyamika is concerned with their ontological significance, that is, with their phenomenological genesis within experience. Thus, affirmation is rooted in the involvement with Being as a permanent 'presence-at-hand', or, as the Madhyamaka texts like to say, in the "obsessive concern with particular existents since beginningless time." This is not a historical statement about some long past event. Mi-pham puts it nicely:

Since those who have been habituated to an obsessive concern with particular existents from beginningless time have had

no opportunity to give birth to pristine cognitiveness (*ye-ies*) which is free from the four extremes, first, it is necessary [for them] to activate appreciative discernment—a mental event that discerns all particular existents as being just non-existent ultimately.¹⁶

How are we to negate this beginningless obsession with the ontic, yet not be left with a mere absence but be released into the openness of Being (*śūnyatā*)? The point stressed by Mi-pham is that the self-destructing or self-consuming (to use the previous fire-metaphor) of negation is the entry into, the letting oneself into, the unity (*zun-jug*) of the two truths. This point is the basis for Mi-pham's understanding of the relation of the Svātantrikas to the Prāsaṅgikas which actually forms the heart of the matter here.

According to Mi-pham the Svātantrika is the approach of the beginner who negates particular existents 'from the ultimate point of view', while validating their conventional existence according to the valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) set forth by the methods of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Experientially, this approach represents the view of the *prajñā* cultivated in the post-meditative phase (*rjes-thob*) of Madhyamaka cultivation. This is articulated in the discursively formulated ultimate (*mam-graṅs pa'i don-dam*). That is, the Svātantrika bases himself on the *initial* separation of the two realities, opening up this distinction, and setting forth the sphere of each. Mi-pham states:

The division into a discursively-formulated and a non-discursive ultimate is a good procedure which makes [this approach] very superior. That is, if one did not, in the beginning only, teach [the ultimate] as non-existence in truth, there would be no means for removing the errant obsession with particular existents which has been habituated to since beginningless time. . . . Therefore, having first destroyed obsession with particular existents by this discursively-formulated ultimate, and subsequently through the teaching of the non-discursive ultimate, one will remove the aspect of obsession with this [conception of *śūnyatā* in the discursively-formulated ultimate] as a negative abstraction.¹⁷

So, the Svatantrika may be conveniently summed up by the slogan, "conventionally existent, although ultimately non-existent," in its discernment of *dharma*s.

As for the Prāsaṅgikas, Mi-pham states:

This aspect of adhering to the separation of the two truths is the special object of refutation of the Prāsaṅgikas. . . . As long as one is still involved with apprehensions (*'dzin-pa*) and has not brought into one-valueness (*ro-grig-tu ma-gyur*) the two realities, one has still not gone beyond the sphere of operation of the dichotomizing intellect. . . . Because of this the Prāsaṅgikas *from the very start* set forth the non-discursive unity of the two realities. (emphasis mine)¹⁸

This conception of the Prāsaṅgikas has important consequences for Mi-pham. Not only does it experientially represent the ordinary awareness (*jñāna*) of the phase of meditative composure (*mān-bzag*) of Madhyamaka cultivation and an advance over the beginner's approach, but it offers the possibility of a more 'rapid' approach. Mi-pham states in his *mKhas-jug*:

The Madhyamikas, who are those who deny essential existence, claim that since all entities, such as the psycho-physical constituents, are present without their essential existence being established, they are open. [They] non-implicatively negate any establishing of [entities] which can withstand a critique by a logical inquiry from the ultimate standpoint. Both presence in contextual origination and such an openness, which are present as a single non-contradictory reality, are the very Being of particular existents. [This] is the perspective of Nagarjuna, the Great Madhyamaka, the unity of presence and openness. While this is the final intent of the Buddha, there are different internal divisions within this perspective, such as the manner of affirming the conventional, and the gradual and all-at-once approaches to understanding [this final intent].¹⁹

This last sentence refers to the division into Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas; and the commentator, mKhan-po nus-ldan, informs us that "gradual" refers to the Svātantrikas and "all-at-once"

of the two truths.²³

How are we to evaluate all this? Mi-pham was concerned to present this kind of understanding of the relation between the two approaches, which from his point of view had become eroded by centuries of Prāsaṅgika dominance, particularly that of the dGe-lugs-pa scholasticism. Go-ram-pa bsod-nams seṅ-ge had already made similar use of the dual division of the ultimate truth, as a Prāsaṅgika, in his critique of Tsoṅ-kha-pa's Prāsaṅgika system. And he and Mi-pham, though living some 400 years apart, said basically the same thing: such an approach does not, in effect, go beyond a Svātantrika notion of the discursively-formulated ultimate truth. Go-ram-pa was harsher than Mi-pham, it seems, calling Tsoṅ-kha-pa's approach "Annihilationist Madhyamaka" (*chad-mitha' dbu-mar smra-ba*), which Mi-pham, in criticizing a similar view without naming names, states that it is going too far to call it 'annihilationist', saying that it is quite good for the beginner.²⁴

Of central importance here is the matter of the *dgag-bya*, that which is to be negated by the non-implicative negation employed by the Prāsaṅgikas. Here all our problems nicely come together. What is to be negated, according to Tsoṅ-kha-pa, is the essential existence or existence in truth (*bden-grub*) of particular existents, not particular existents *per se*. (I borrow this felicitous phrase from two translator-exponents of this view, A. Wayman and R. Thurman.²⁵) This distinction was made to avoid the extreme of annihilationism. Tsoṅ-kha-pa's reasoning was the following: the statements found in many texts, such as "not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither," mean "ultimately or in truth, not existent, and conventionally, not non-existent," because otherwise the statements will be misunderstood. This is because 'not existent' (*yod-pa min*) entails non-existence (an extreme—*med-pa*), and 'not non-existent' entails existence (an extreme—*yod-pa*). These statements also can be misunderstood as asserting the Hva-saṅ heresy of not doing anything with the mind, that is,

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to the Prāsaṅgikas.²⁰ This distinction of "gradual" and "all-at-once" should not be confused with the "gradual vs. sudden enlightenment" controversy of early Tibet, but refers to the possibility of negating all four extremes of the *catuṣkoṭi* all at once. Here Mi-pham appears to harken back to Go-ram-pa bsod-nams seṅ-ge (1429–89), the Sa-skya-pa master who polemicized against Tsoṅ-kha-pa's formulation of the *dbu-ma'i lta-ba*.²¹ But one should also note here Mi-pham's rNin-ma-pa background in the *rDzogs-chen*, whose philosophy epitomizes an 'all-at-once' approach in its doctrines of "initial purity" (*ka-dag*), etc. Mi-pham explicitly sets forth this connection between the Prāsaṅgika and *rDzogs-chen* in the introduction to the *dBu-ma rg.yan*:

The intent of Candrakīrti [is] the profound perspective in which the deceptiveness of conventionality subsides in the continuum of Being (*dbyāṅs-su yal-ba*), because all presence is pure in exactly its own place (*ran-sar*). [This] is similar to the setting forth of the initially pure in the works of the *rDzogs-chen*.²²

All of this, however, should not lead one to conclude the inferiority of the Svātantrika approach. The Svātantrika does go on from the discursively-formulated ultimate of the beginner to the non-discursive ultimate which is no different from that of the Prāsaṅgika. For just as the conventional and the ultimate, the phases of meditative composure and post-concentration, etc., are a unity, so too are the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika in their ultimate intent:

Since he (Śāntarakṣita) follows the tradition which explains the discursively-formulated ultimate, which accepts independently-formulated syllogisms and the existence of particular existents conventionally, he is counted as an *ācārya* of the Svātantrikas. Do not think that this is inferior to the Prāsaṅgika perspective, because having made such a division in the general Mahāyāna way, which is the unity of these two approaches, there is no difference whatsoever in the essential harmony in the non-abiding continuum which is the unity

not dealing with any of the extremes.²⁶ After all, was it not the concept of *svabhāva* that Nāgārjuna relentlessly attacked in the *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā*? mDo-sñags bstan-pa'i ñi-ma, a twentieth century exponent of Mi-pham's approach, presents a concise critique of the above presentation in his *lTa-grub ñan'-byed*:

Even at the level of a critique from the ultimate point of view, it is said that "A pot is not devoid of a pot but is devoid of truth-status as a pot (*bum-pa bum-pas mi-stoñ bum-pa bden-pas stoñ*)." It is also said that "One must refute the truth-status which is founded on this pot while not refuting the pot as that which is under consideration (*chos-can*)." By this method, even the ultimate which is the object of valid knowledge [becomes] a mere discursively-formulated ultimate as a negative abstraction (*dhos-med*) similar to the explanation of the Svāntarīkas. One is in no way able to establish the non-discursive ultimate, the great sameness of presence and openness which is spoken of as "unconditioned, sheer lucency, non-discursiveness, profound calm."²⁷

This claim is supported by the following reasoning: If we already know particular existents *per se* as conventional entities which are like an apparition, then in this case we are not led to assert the existence of some (ultimate) truth-status founded on these entities. So what refutation could there be of such a truth-status by a critique from the ultimate point of view (*don-dam dpyod-pa'i tshad-ma*)? One would just incur the fault of proving what has already been established.²⁸ In other words, this approach threatens to reduce the Madhyamaka to a 'conceptual analysis', and indeed a great deal of contemporary scholarship has arisen interpreting Nāgārjuna in terms of analytic and ordinary language philosophy, precisely invoking '*svabhāva*-language/natural language' or 'metalanguage/object language' distinctions. But the distinction between a thing and its 'nature' is a purely conceptual one; mDo-sñags does, however, point out the usefulness of this approach in noting its similarity to the Svāntarīkas, as we have seen Mi-pham and Go-ram-pa do.

We shall conclude with a pertinent example of the dGe-lugs-pa

approach which led to critiques such as those of Mi-pham. It concerns a misinterpretation of BCA IX, 140 a-b, which reads: *brtags (btags) pa'i dhos-la ma-reg-par/ de-yi dhos-med 'dzin-ma-yin/ (kalpitam bhāvam aspr̥ṣṭvā tadabhāvo na gr̥hyate).*²⁹ This may be translated as: "In not contacting the imagined entity, one does not apprehend the non-entitateness of this." This is a classic Madhyamaka statement of all entities as 'empty subject terms'. But 'Jam-dbyaṅs bžad-pa (1648-1722), in his *Grub-mtha chen-mo*, the most important work of its kind for the dGe-lugs-pa, takes this verse to mean: "Without contacting the imputed existent, one cannot apprehend its non-existence."³⁰ The present Dalai Lama, in his *Key to the Middle Way*, takes the verse in the same way.³¹ Thus *ñnyatā* becomes non-entitateness (*dhos-med*). But Śāntideva's point here is exactly the opposite: neither *dhos-po* nor *dhos-med* can be found. It is interesting to note that rGyal-rshab, Tsoñ-kha-pa's disciple, who wrote a definitive commentary on the BCA, as well as Tsoñ-kha-pa himself, who wrote a commentary only on the ninth chapter, seem to take it in a different way. They say that, in not apprehending an imputed entity (which is the *dgag-bya*), its non-entitateness (*dhos-med*), i.e., *ñnyatā*, is not apprehended in truth (*bden-par*).³² But it is just this qualification, by existence in-truth vs. existence *per-se*, which we have seen to be the problem in the first place.

Notes

1. *Mādhyamakālamkāra-kārikā*, Peking ed. #5284 and *Vitti*. (#5285), v.101, Sa 48b, 7-Sa 84b, 7.
2. Peking ed., v.153, Na 71b, 7-Na 86a, 7.
3. *Collected Writings of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-mtsho*, v.12 (Gangtok, Sikkim, 1976), ff. 1-359.
4. See Th. Stecherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965), pp. 87-122.
5. *Collected Writings of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-mtsho*, v. 13 (Gangtok, 1975), ff. 1-95.

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31. Tenzin Gyatso, *The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way*, J. Hopkins and Lati Rimpoché, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 57.
32. See esp. Tson-kha-pa, Peking ed., Vol. 153, Na 28a, 8-28b, 2.

6. See attached Appendix.
7. See Yoshino Imacda, "Documents Tibétains de Touen-Houang Concernant Le Concile du Tibet," *Journal Asiatique*, v.263 (1976): 126-146.
8. *Ibid.* pp. 132-3.
9. Ron-zom chos-kyi bzah-po, Selected Writings (*gSun thor-bu*) (Leh, Ladakh: 'Chi-med Rig-'dzin, 1974), ff. 341, 3-344, 2.
10. *MAI*, f. 89b, 4-5.
11. For the following historical discussion we have relied on George N. Roerich, trans., *The Blue Annals* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976); and *Kongtrul's Encyclopedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture*, ed. Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1970), I, 445-458.
12. *UG*, f. 51, 2-4.
13. *MAI*, f. 71a, 8-71b, 4.
14. Gadjin M. Nagao, "What Remains' in Śūnyata: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness," in Minoru Kiyota, ed., *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii, 1978), p. 70.
15. *Mulamadhyamakārikā*, XXIV, 11-12; XV, 5-6; *BCA IX*, 32-34.
16. Extracted from Appendix.
17. *UG*, f. 55, 4-6.
18. *Ibid.*, f. 62, 6-63, 3.
19. *mKhas-pa'i tshul-ta 'jug-pa'i sgo* (Kalinpong, 1963), f. 134a.
20. *mKhas-pa'i tshul-ta 'jug-pa'i sgo'i mchan-'grel legs-biad snan-ba'i 'od-zer* (Delhi: Lama Jurme Drakpa, 1974), f. 591, 5.
21. See his *lTa-ba'i san-'byed theg-mchog gnad-kyi zla-zer*, in the *Sa-shya bka'-bum*, ed. bSod-nams rgya-mtsho (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1976), Vol. 13, pp. 1-24.
22. *UG*, f. 46, 3-4.
23. *Ibid.*, f. 46, 1-3.
24. *Ibid.*, f. 57, 4ff.
25. See A. Wayman, trans., *Calmng the Mind and Discerning the Real* (New York: Columbia Univ., 1978), p. 277, etc.; and R. Thurman, trans., *The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti* (Univ. Park, Pa.: Penn. State Univ., 1976), p. 2, etc.
26. *lTa-ba'i san-'byed*, pp. 3, 8.
27. *lTa-grub san-'byed gnad-kyi sgron-me yi tshig-don nam-bśad 'jam-dbyans dgoṅs-brgyan*, xylograph, n.p., n.d., f. 24a.
28. *Ibid.*, f. 45a.
29. The Sanskrit is to be found in the *Bodhicaryavatāraṇāṅkā* of Prajñākaramaṇi, P.L. Vaidya, ed. (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series #12, p. 266.
30. See J. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (Ph.D. Diss., Univ. of Wisconsin, 1975), pp. 785, 958.