What Are Arhats and Buddhas?

All of the Buddhist schools agree that the elimination of ignorance will bring liberation from saôsåra. We have already discussed their views of ignorance; what remains is to review their depictions of liberation, Buddhahood, and the states that lead to it.

First, let us distinguish between the attainment of insight—a first, direct cognition of selflessness, however that might be defined—and the attainment of liberation. The Buddhist schools agree that "enlightenment" is not a once-and-for-all experience. We are not immediately liberated upon first gaining insight. The tenacious grip of our previous misconceptions is gradually loosened only by repeated meditation, as we eliminate the afflictions of desire, hatred, etc., which are born from ignorance and bind us in saôsåra.

There are four degrees of liberation:

1 **Stream Enterer** is the name of the first, since those who have experienced liberating insight have entered into the metaphoric river of wisdom that will carry them out of saôsåra. Their status has changed permanently. They will definitely be fully liberated Arhats in not more than seven lifetimes, possibly even in this lifetime. None of their rebirths will be lower than the human level (i.e., they will not be born as a hell being, as a hungry ghost, or as an animal).

2 **Once Returners** will achieve that goal in not more than one more lifetime in the Desire Realm (our own realm, which has six types of rebirth).

3 **Never Returners** will be liberated with no more births in the Desire Realm, although they may be born in through meditation in the Form Realm (the realm of higher gods) once.

4 **Arhats** are those who are fully enlightened and liberated (although as we will see, there is some controversy over the permanence of their status).

Each of these four grades can be divided into Approachers and Abiders in the Fruit, respectively, those who are presently absorbed in realization of emptiness, resulting in the abandonment of a portion of the afflictions, and those who enjoy the fruit of that abandonment subsequently. They may also be further distinguished according to where they take whatever rebirths remain. That is why sometimes there are said to be eight or even twenty divisions.

The schools mostly agree that an Arhat is a person whose liberation is incontrovertible.[1] However, the Vaibhåýikas distinguish six different types of Arhats, five of whom can "fall back." That is, although they have experienced the elimination of the coarse afflictions that can cause suffering, they may not have eliminated the *subtle* afflictions and, therefore, can still commit unethical acts, commit suicide, etc., and thereby lose the status of Arhat.

Is Buddhahood Inevitable?

One of the main ways to distinguish Mahåyåna and Hþnayåna is whether the state of Buddhahood is a realistic goal for a Buddhist practitioner. For the Hþnayåna, Buddhas are extremely rare beings. Motivated by compassion, they have practiced for an amazing length of time (three incalculable eons), have the physical properties of thirty-two major and eighty minor marks, are perfect teachers, and establish a new religion of Buddhism when the world is ready for it. That is why the Buddha did not teach people to seek Buddhahood but rather to seek their own liberation. For the Mahåyåna, Buddhahood is a goal for everyone (although there is some disagreement over whether it will *actually* be reached universally).

The difference between the Mahåyåna and the Hþnayåna can also be expressed by discussing the three "vehicles"—those of the Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas. We have already differentiated these, pointing out that the vehicles cannot be correlated to philosophical views or levels of enlightenment but only to circumstance and motivation. That is, Hearers and Solitary Realizers have different

[1]Historically, the Arhat was a very early subject of debate in Buddhism. Here the Sarvastivåda (Vaibhåýika) view is represented; it was opposed by the Vibhajjivåda, the precursor of today's Theravåda school. Unusually, Jamyang Shayba says nothing on this topic; it is found only in Losang Gönchok.

circumstances because the latter do not have teachers; and Bodhisattvas differ from the others by their altruistic intention to attain Buddhahood.

According to the Hīnayåna schools, each of these vehicles is "final." A particular person becomes either a Hearer Arhat, a Solitary Realizer Arhat, or a Buddha (the "Bodhisattva Arhat"). Most of the Mahåyåna schools, by contrast, say that there is only *one* final vehicle, that of the Bodhisattva. Although a person may practice as a Hearer or Solitary Realizer and become an Arhat, such a person will be exhorted by the Buddhas to develop *bodhicitta* and practice as a Bodhisattva until attaining Buddhahood. There are three practice vehicles but only one of them is regarded as a *final* vehicle.[1]

The anomalous Mahåyåna school is Asaêga's, that of the Cittamåtrins Following SÛtra. Asaêga, in his *Compendium of Abhidharma*, doubts that all beings are destined for Buddhahood. In fact, he sets forth five possibilities. In addition to the three vehicles as final ends, there are those who switch to the Bodhisattva vehicle from one of the others, and those without a lineage for liberation. Therefore, there are two ways that Asaêga's school differs from the other Mahåyåna schools: it does not assert that the other Arhats necessarily switch into the Bodhisattva vehicle and it holds that there are some beings who are never liberated.

The claim that liberation is not universal is the one that is most problematic. Asaêga believed that there are persons whose "roots of virtue" have been severed.[2] The roots of virtue are our favorable karmic predispositions, those whose fruition can result in favorable rebirth or mere happy experiences. If our roots of virtue have been cut, we are never born in circumstances where we can create the causes for happiness. We are thrown into a vicious cycle. In lifetime after lifetime we perform non-virtuous deeds and dig ourselves a hole that just gets deeper and deeper.

It is a sad and hopeless state of affairs. What could cause the severance of our roots of virtue? The answer is anger, especially if it is directed against a Bodhisattva by someone who is not one. This emotion has a particularly powerful effect, one that all Buddhist schools recognize.[3] The other Mahåyåna schools also admit that

[1]Svåtantrikas differ from Pråsaêgikas in their description of the Bodhisattva path. According to the Svåtantrikas, the two sets of obstructions, those to liberation and omniscience, are removed simultaneously, whereas the Pråsaêgikas say they are removed serially.

[2]He makes a distinction between "roots" and "seeds" of virtue and non-virtue such that it might be possible for someone to have lost "roots" but not "seeds" and, therefore, retain the possibility of future regeneration of the roots of virtue. However, he contends that some of those whose "roots" of virtue are eradicated also have no "seeds" of virtue.

[3]For an extensive analysis, see Cozort, "Cutting the Roots of Virtue."

anger can cut the roots of virtue but do not conclude that there are those whose fates are forever sealed. According to Mådhyamika, in contrast, our mind's emptiness of inherent existence is a "natural lineage" that is the "Buddha nature" of each of us. The fact that the mind has no fixed nature means that change is always possible. Hence, there is no one who will fail, eventually, to attain Buddhahood.

Nirvāṇa With and Without "Remainder"

Nirvåòa is neither a place nor a mental state. It is a *fact* about us. A nirvåòa is the absence of afflictions in someone whose cultivation of wisdom has resulted in the destruction of ignorance, desire, hatred, etc. That mere absence is the nirvåòa.

On that, all Buddhist schools agree. However, they disagree over the use of the term "remainder" used in conjunction with nirvåòa. Other than Pråsaêgika, it is said that after a person attains nirvåòa, he or she subsequently can be said to have a "nirvåòa *with* remainder," the "remainder" being the body and mind. Death cuts the remainder. However, the nirvåòa *without* remainder is a single moment, occurring just at the time of death but not after. After death there is no person to whom the nirvåòa can belong!

The Hīnayåna schools do not recognize any existence after death for an Arhat. The Mahåyåna schools do, and all except Asaêga's say that Arhats manifest in different forms, no longer helplessly reborn according to karma, and continue to cultivate wisdom and merit until they have become Buddhas. Because Asaêga and his followers say that there are Arhats who do not go on to Buddhahood, they must explain that those Arhats are born in the pure lands of Buddhas and abide there forever in meditative absorption.

The Pråsaêgika school uses the term "remainder" in a completely different manner. For them, "remainder" has to do with whether or not to an Arhat things still appear to have true existence. To explain this, we have to recall what was said previously about the obstructions to liberation and obstructions to omniscience. What prevents our liberation is our *conceptions* of inherent existence. Things *appear* to us as though they exist from their own side, independently, and we assent to this appearance by *conceiving* of them in this way. Meditation that analyzes the way things exist will destroy this false *conception*, and we can be liberated from it and from the saÔsåra it causes.

However, because of the way we have been conditioned, which in Buddhism is a process without beginning, things still *appear* to exist inherently. The liberated person is someone who no longer *assents* to this appearance, who is always doubtful of the evidence of the senses and resists *conceiving* of them in the wrong way. He or

she is like someone who wears sunglasses, well aware that the green tint pervading all visible objects is just the effect of the lenses. It takes a very long time for the appearance of inherent existence itself to fade. Those "taints" of appearances are the obstructions to omniscience.

From this perspective, then, an Arhat experiences a nirvåòa with remainder most of the time, since most of the time things appear falsely. But then, when does a nirvåòa *without* remainder occur? It occurs only when that person is meditating on emptiness because at that time only emptiness appears to the mind. For non-Buddhas, it is impossible for both emptiness and other things to appear to the mind simultaneously. (Another way of putting this is to say that the two truths cannot appear simultaneously to a non-Buddha's mind.)

So, both Pråsaêgikas and others could identify an Arhat's usual state, the time when he or she is not absorbed in meditation on emptiness, as a nirvåòa with remainder, but they would mean very different things by it. Pråsaêgikas would mean that things falsely appear to the mind; others would mean that the Arhat is alive. Similarly, both Pråsaêgikas and others would identify the nirvåòa of an Arhat at the time of death as being a nirvåòa without remainder but they would mean something different by it. Pråsaêgikas would mean that at that time there is no false appearance to the mind (because, for a short time, only a vacuity appears to the mind), whereas others would mean that the body and mind are abandoned.

Other than the purpose of again pressing home their contention about the empty nature of things, why do Pråsaêgikas change this terminology? Jamyang Shayba here gives two arguments. First, it makes no sense to say that there is any person who experiences a nirvåòa without remainder if that means that the aggregates are abandoned. There is no person once the aggregates are destroyed. Second, the language that suggests that Arhats "extinguish" their aggregates really just refers to their emptiness. Like all things, our bodies and minds are "primordially extinguished" into emptiness because they are, and always have been, empty of inherent existence.[1]

[1]In his *Great Exposition*, Jamyang Shayba quotes sÛtras and the works of CandrakØrti and Dzongkaba to discuss this point.

Bodies of the Buddha

The Buddhist schools commonly distinguish between two "bodies" of the Buddha, the Truth Body and the Form Body. The Truth Body is not a physical body but the Buddha's enlightened consciousness; the Form Body is his physical form.[1]

The Mahåyåna schools elaborate this scheme considerably. The Truth Body, which for them is an omniscient consciousness, can be further distinguished as the Wisdom Body (the consciousness itself) and the Nature Body (its emptiness). (Further distinctions can be made about the Nature Body because while the mind, like everything else, has always been empty, there are also absences which have come into existence as the obstructions to liberation and the obstructions to omniscience have been removed.)

The Form Body is the manifestation in form of the Truth Body. That is, whether a Buddha appears in the Emanation Body (which can take many forms in addition to the human form in which the twelve "deeds" of a Buddha's career are displayed), or as the Enjoyment Body (which can take many forms and resides in a pure land), it is a case of the Buddha's *mind* taking on these forms. Thus, a Buddha is essentially wisdom, not form.



[1]Vaibhåýikas specify that this body is not the Buddha that is one of the three refuges. The Buddha's form aggregate is the body that he got from his parents, one that was impelled by karma. Although this body is the Buddha, and although once he is enlightened it causes him no more suffering, it is not the Buddha Jewel, which is only his wisdom. Other schools do not make such a distinction. For the Mahåyåna schools, that is because all of a Buddha's appearances in form are manifestations of his wisdom; therefore, there is no "problem" of a body that is impelled by karma.

There is disagreement over whether the mind's emptiness should be identified as the meaning of "Tathågatha essence" or "Buddha nature." (In sÒtras such as the *Tathāgatha Essence*, the Buddha taught that a permanent, fully developed Buddha exists in each being. No Buddhist school, according to Gelukba interpretation, takes this literally.) For Mådhyamikas, it is appropriate to identify the mind's emptiness as our Buddha nature because it is what enables the mind's transformation into an omniscient awareness. But Cittamåtrins say that it is a seed or potential for spiritual attainment that has always abided naturally in the mind-basis-of-all. All beings are, therefore, predisposed to attain higher states (although, as we have seen, some Cittamåtrins say that not all will be able to attain them, in fact, because their "roots of virtue" may have been cut).

Who Was the Buddha?

The HÐnayåna and Mahåyåna schools have differing pictures of the nature of the man whose earthly career founded the Buddhist tradition. These differences are summarized by their view of the "twelve deeds" of the Buddha. Although both agree on the basic list, HÐnayånists see the deeds as those of a man who becomes enlightened, Mahåyånists as those of an already enlightened being who "displays" the correct way to seek enlightenment. What are these twelve "deeds"?

1. The Buddha-to-be descended from the Joyous Pure Land where he had lived in his previous life.
2. He entered the womb of his mother-to-be, who dreamt of being circled by a white elephant.
3. He was born in a miraculous way. He emerged from his mother's side as she stood, gripping the limb of a tree.
4. He excelled at youthful sports and mastered many arts.
5. He lived in a household with many consorts.
6. He renounced saÔsåra, leaving his wife, child, and father in the palace.
7. He performed acts of asceticism in order to purify himself. He practiced with five ascetics he encountered in the forest.
8. Having understood his mission, he meditated under the tree of enlightenment.
9. He conquered the array of demons who appeared to him.
10. He became a Buddha.
11. He began to teach.
12. He attained his *parinirvāṇa* (death).

According to HÐnayånists, the first nine deeds are performed by the Bodhisattva (the aspirant to Buddhahood), the last three by the Buddha. The HÐnayåna perspective on the Buddha is that he was a human being who had to make the difficult decision to leave his family and responsibilities to follow a spiritual path, who struggled mightily on his own (as a Solitary Realizer, in fact), and on one great night traversed the four degrees of liberation and became omniscient as well.

The Mahåyåna says that all twelve deeds are performed by the Buddha; that is, that he was already fully enlightened before taking birth. The Mahåyåna understands the Buddha to have lived a life that was itself a teaching. From his experience as a young man confronting the "four signs" (a sick man; an old man; a corpse; a monk), we understand the pervasiveness of suffering and the promise of the spiritual path. From his willingness to leave his comfortable, privileged life, we understand that happiness does not come from material possessions. From the persistence of his great quest over six difficult years, we understand the power of compassion as a motivation; and so forth. But like K¸ýòa, like Christ, he is depicted as an already perfect being who descends into the field of mortality to lead others through his example.

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

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CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTER OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

ALTHOUGH IT IS customary to speak of Eastern philosophy with Buddhism as its most influential exponent, every serious student of Far Eastern thought is struck by the fact that none of the Oriental languages has a word which in any way corresponds to our 'philosophy.' This in itself is not a defect, rather it compels us to reconsider the meaning of the word 'philosophy.' It is evident that any dealings with Eastern thought involve comparative studies, but to take one's own premise for granted, as is most often done, and then to criticize other premises with this bias, is a travesty of comparative research. It will readily be admitted that we may mean many things by 'philosophy,' such as, for instance, the sum of the beliefs which man has held about himself at different times and, above all, about the universe, or the examination of these beliefs. On closer inspection, however, much of what is labelled philosophy turns out to be a mere sham and basically a negation of philosophy. What, then, do we have to understand by 'philosophy'? Certainly, it can never be an achievement; it remains a movement, a continual striving for truth by pre-eminently intellectual means. In this quest for truth philosophy brings about a change in ourselves by opening our eyes to wider horizons. Such a vision is directly related to the desire to cultivate and refine the personality. Moreover, philosophy as an encompassing vision wants to know all that is knowable; unlimited cognition is its basic characteristic. Any limitations imposed on it will inevitably kill it. But the most decisive point is that in this striving for truth, truth itself is the primal source of our

thinking. Yet it becomes perverted easily by positing as absolute something which is valid from certain points of view and in certain respects and at a particular level of thinking. It also becomes false by considering the particular knowledge of something within Being as the knowledge of Being as such and as a whole. Philosophy as a quest for truth born out of truth is therefore constantly struggling against its two foes: absolutization and concretization. This is the theme of Buddhist philosophy in particular. It begins with a vision of what there is, and then progressively enlarges this vision. Its rejection of the non-Buddhist systems, all of which in some way succumb to anti-philosophical tendencies, as well as its trenchant critique of its own digressions into this dangerous territory, are due to, and reflect, the endeavour to keep the philosophical spirit alive.

In course of time there developed within Buddhism four major lines of thought, each in its own way endeavouring to fathom the message of the Buddha. The earliest systematic attempt was that of the Vaibhāṣikas, who favoured a 'realistic' approach in dealing with the first great division within Reality as a whole: the distinction between that which is transitory and that which is (or seems to be) eternal. For the Vaibhāṣikas both 'departments' consisted of substances, and for this reason they may roughly be classified as 'substantival dualists.' But inasmuch as there are apparently fundamental differences of kind among the many things and substances constituting the same department, the Vaibhāṣikas held different views about them. The eternal was believed to comprise three or four substances which were not just what might be called substances of a 'natural kind' that were eternal, but which had specific properties, so concerning the realm of the eternal the Vaibhāṣikas were specific-property pluralists.

In the department of the transitory each substance, apart from being of the 'natural kind' that is transitory, had a special attribute which made it of such and such a kind. There were material substances, mind-substances, mind-related substances, and substances which could not be defined

as being either of the others, yet had being of their own. Thus, concerning the transitory they were differentiating-attribute pluralists. Believing in different kinds of substance, even within a single department, the Vaibhāṣikas had to accept a great plurality of substances and, on the whole, they accepted a much greater plurality of substances than of kind.

The Vaibhāṣikas' theory of transitory and eternal substances became the target of the Sautrāntikas' critique. Within Reality as a whole, they distinguished between that which exists and that which is real but not existent. The former consisted of the concrete things we encounter in common experience and being a concrete thing entailed its transitoriness, just as everything which is not a concrete thing entails its permanence and not being a concrete thing must be abstract. The Sautrāntikas then initiated the systematic development of the science of logic and developed different epistemological theories. If we accept the account of the dGe-lugs-pas who became the most influential school of thought in Tibet and who were almost exclusively interested in epistemological problems, the Sautrāntikas' line of thought on the whole resembles phenomenalism in the West, not representational realism, as has often been stated. The latter's absurd theory that something unexperienceable can be experienced contradicts the Buddhist claim of all-knowability. A common feature of both Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas was their belief in physical objects as coinciding with what is assumed to be real and having an ontological status. For the Vaibhāṣikas any physical object was of the nature of being reducible to a substance; for the Sautrāntikas the notion of physical object had been abstracted from the data of sense. This idea of things existing really became the target of all other philosophical trends in Buddhism.

The third great movement was that of the Yogācāra. This doctrine is usually called idealism, which is a misnomer for what is implied by it both in the West and in the East. The Western form should have been termed idea-ism or mentalism which is its essential feature, and the Eastern one experientalism, since experience counts. By idealism, to use

this common, though inappropriate, term, we understand the doctrine that nothing exists except minds and their ideas. This is easily misinterpreted and caricatured by the failure to distinguish between sensations and imaginations. Idealism rests its case on two principal contentions: (a) physical objects such as mountains, trees, houses and the like are genuine objects of knowledge; and (b) to know these things is to have an experience of them. It is easy to develop these two theses in terms of sensations, and since sensations are events in a mind, all reality must be sensations and hence mental. While idealists of the Western type insist on this conclusion, the Yogācāra philosophers thought otherwise. They declared that physical objects must be defined in terms of what can be experienced, but that which can be experienced is not just sensations or mental events. The yellows and blues which are the objects of my immediate and direct awareness, are not the awareness itself, but that of which I am aware. There is no point in saying that not only my awareness but also that of which I am aware is mental. Similarly it is meaningless to assert that the colours which I see are physical. After all, to which physical object do the red spots belong which I see when I get hit on the head? To put it concisely, seeing blues and yellows is doubtless a mental event, as any seeing is; but this does not for a moment imply that what is thus seen is mental or physical. The mental and the physical are special constructs within the field of experience, and another such construct is the relation of externality which makes me believe that things exist as such and external to the observer. Once we appreciate that it is the experience that matters, we will never bring up any questions of things existing unexperienced. The Yogācāra philosophers did not deny that there were things external to the observer, but they disclaimed their independent existence and they objected to their being equated with mind. They never accepted the Leibnitzian idea that lumps of coal are colonies of spirits of low sentience.

The bifurcation of Nature into the material and the mental with an unbridgeable gulf between them, which

found its extreme expression in Descartes' reasoning and which ever since has overshadowed the thoughts of Western philosophers, makes the understanding of the Yogācāra doctrine rather difficult, inasmuch as certain superficial resemblances make us overlook the tremendous differences between it and the Western mentalistic trends. Some Yogācāra philosophers held sensa—particular existents which resemble physical objects as ordinarily conceived, but which in their dependence on the observer are like mental states—to be either true or delusive, but they would never declare that material characteristics were delusive appearances of certain mental characteristics, as was done by Leibniz, Hegel, Ward, Bradley, Mc'Taggart, and Berkeley who, however, held that sensa do have some material characteristics. Nor would the Yogācāra philosophers claim with Bradley that the Absolute or, as they termed it, the Ideal consisted of 'experience.' A little reflection shows that no experience occurs more than once and that all repeated experiences are in fact analogous. It is this particularity as well as the Ideal, which is not just another particular existent, which they considered as existing really.

This remnant of the earlier beliefs in something really existing became the target of critique by the Mādhyamikas, the fourth great movement within Buddhism. The Mādhyamikas divided into two larger branches, the Svātantrikas who took over certain ideas from the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāra philosophers, and the Prāsangikas. All of them were unanimous in rejecting the assumption that something exists really. In this respect they followed up the distinction made by the Yogācāra philosophers between that which is held to coincide with what is assumed to be real and that which does not, as for instance that which is termed the notional-conceptual, comprising first and second intentions which have been known in the West since Aristotle. For the Svātantrikas things existed as being-things, as self-evident, and by virtue of that which makes a thing what it is, its essence. But they also realized that the concept of what something is is not as such indicative of the fact that it

exists, and even to conceive of it as existing, i.e., of the actual existence of a particular thing, still leaves open the question whether such conceived existence is in fact true.

The Prāsangikas realized that no solution can be reached by pursuing this line of thought any further and they embarked on a philosophical venture which is akin to what the later Wittgenstein has called the 'language-game,' although they would not have equated philosophy with a mere critique of language. However, they recognized that a name is logically independent of the characteristics of the thing named and that the christening ceremony is not the use of the name but the way in which we give it a use.

This short survey of the main trends in the four major lines of thought within Buddhism and their formulation in concise statements might suggest that the task of philosophy is to provide compelling rational insight which everyone must see and can know. This, however, would mean that the nature of truly philosophical thinking has been overlooked. In philosophizing we travel the path to the primal source of our being. As a methodical reflection it can be subsumed under three questions: What do I know? What is authentic or true? How do I know?

The answer to the first question is that everything I know is relational in structure. The objective as well as the subjective are given with the same evidence. Although this becomes evident again and again, there is a strong tendency to slur over this unique intentional phase of our being, and either to reduce the object to a state of the subject, or the subject to that of an object. Buddhism has never lost sight of the intentional and relational structure of our awareness, and thus has avoided both a pan-objectivism and a pan-subjectivism.

The second question cannot be answered by referring to the many existents we encounter, but by apprehending that which only inadequately can be referred to as that which is in itself. This differentiation between that which is in itself and knowable and that which in ordinary parlance is said to exist is technically known as the Two Truths. These have

nothing to do with the Western distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, the one knowable and the other forever unknowable. To interpret the Two Truths in this way is to overlook the all-knowability on which Buddhism insists; and to interpret them as appearance and reality, the one delusive and the other true, is to fail to take into account the Buddhist conception of the unconditional realness of what there is. The Vaibhāṣikas tried to answer this question, in the same way as the philosophers and physicists in the West before the modern age. They thought of the world as composed of things, an idea which they developed into that of material substance, and this, in turn, they thought of as consisting of particles, each very small, and each persisting through all time. It was these 'atoms' that were believed to be ultimately real, while the concrete 'thing' was relatively or conventionally real. The Sautrāntikas and the other philosophical schools understood the Two Truths in the sense of epistemic correlation. It is the aesthetic, intuitive factor that is declared to be ultimately real, while the theoretically designated factor in our experience is only relatively so.

The third question is solved by inquiring into the limits of knowledge. Here it becomes clear that all truth is apprehended in specific modes of thought and in studying these modes we provide a basic tool for philosophical thought. This study makes us aware of what is valid and invalid and thus we are enabled not only to know, but to know how and by what means we know, which is particularly important for the problem pointed out by the second question.

The three points discussed so far are the basis for setting out on a path which is not so much an inert link between a starting point and a goal, but a name given to the process of inducing and experiencing a change in our outlook. Hence 'path' and 'knowledge' and 'awareness' are synonymous in Buddhism. It is here again that the intentionality of all our experiences is most clearly marked. In order to travel a path I must have an idea of where it will lead to, because I cannot go unless I go somewhere. But since the path is my

very being I must have an idea of myself as I am going to be. This does not contradict the statement that the objective pole of the 'path,' the content of my 'cognition,' is the fact that there is no self as some unchanging and forever existing individual and 'objective' entity. As a matter of fact, to conceive of myself as either this or that, and thus to prejudge the outcome of my striving, is to block any progress, and such bias instead of clearing my view will only add to my blindness and make me emotionally unstable. But since the way which I travel is said to remove all bias and blindness, its nature must not be predetermined in any way; it must find its determination in the progress along it to a point which is free from all bias.

Such progress comprises different stages. Although the number of the stages is the name for all the three spiritual pursuits, the Śrāvakas', Pratyekabuddhas', and Bodhisattvas', their nature is not of the same order. Each path signifies a specific mode of human response and partakes of an anticipatory response, and each course denotes a variety of fundamental frames of references or leitmotifs which come to characterize man's entire life. The path is therefore essentially a process of learning which begins with the acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge is not merely an accumulation of intellectual data, it is tied up with the social environment. Man learns through being with others, and this social aspect is referred to as 'acquisition of merits.' Both merits and knowledge are futile if they are not used properly, if we fail to gain insight and understanding and through them a more satisfactory mode of being with our fellowmen. But when we succeed in doing so, we have already progressed in the direction of transcending our pettiness, and prepared ourselves for seeing ourselves and others (persons and things) as they are and without the emotional instability that characterizes our self-centred seeing. Afterwards work on ourselves can begin, which is all the harder because it demands that we remain true to ourselves.

Such work, however, is facilitated by 'warmer' feelings which principally tend to reinforce mental life and conduct,

although they do not initiate activity. The four degrees of intensity that have been classified clearly illustrate the fact that these warmer feelings lend added strength to action already in progress, and cause it to be continued. Although here the elimination of wishfulness and intellectual fog begins, this does not, as is often assumed, lead to a state of emotional undernourishment and intellectual blankness. Rather it produces a heightened perceptivity and responsiveness which is all the more satisfactory since the disturbing and upsetting elements have been eliminated. Seeing properly, which evolves in the course of this striving, is both a process and a product. As the former, it consists of the phases of eliminating the obstacles which prevent us from seeing things and ourselves as they are and of the free passage after the removal of the obstacles, the security in feeling that the obstructing forces will not make themselves felt again. As the latter, it is the outcome of both the elimination of the obstacles and the feeling of security, although it cannot be designated as being either of the two. What we see and immediately experience is nothing determinate or definite which any adjective referring to a specific quality can designate. It is an utter openness which nevertheless is emotionally moving and aesthetically vivid, even more so than anything else. Seeing properly is but the preliminary step to the essential phase of our being, attending to that which has been seen, making it the leitmotif of our further conduct. This in particular relates to a change in our personality. 'Seeing' is deemed to be sufficient for eliminating all that is due to our upbringing, our environment with all its superstitions and traditions, all of which can easily be overcome by broadening our mental horizon. But 'attending to that which has been seen' is more difficult to practise. It means to live up to that which is absolute in the sense that it holds for all people under all circumstances, that it is not transitory and variable from person to person. In the last analysis it relates to the conquest of the deep-rooted individual self-idea which prevents us from seeing and acting properly and colours our view by some bias or other. Free from all de-

termination, positive or negative, the noetic power is now enabled to understand and appreciate things as they are in themselves, and not merely from a certain point of view and from the demands elicited by a certain fixed position. But at what point the thinker believes he has reached the end of his striving, remains his secret and no universal absolutizations are possible; otherwise Buddhism would not have been able to distinguish between Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas.

A major division in Buddhism is known as Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. These two appellations are used to indicate attitudinal rather than philosophical differences. Mahāyāna refers to a socially-orientated attitude, Hīnayāna to an individualistically-orientated one. Since historically the philosophical systems of the Yogācāra adherents and of the Mādhyamikas came after those of the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas, and since the development of the former systems coincided with the change in attitudes, it has become customary to list the Yogācāra philosophers and Mādhyamikas as representatives of Mahāyāna and the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas as those of Hīnayāna. However, dKon-mchog 'Jigs-med dbang-po makes it clear that a particular social attitude does not necessarily coincide with a certain philosophical belief. A mentalist-'idealist' can be extremely selfish, just as a 'materialist' can be thoroughly altruistic.

While the philosophical systems that evolved in time represented the speculative aspect of Buddhism, they were not an end in themselves, but essentially a means to come to a deeper, more basic form of existence stripped of the fictions of consciousness about it. This 'existential' Buddhism is called Vajrayāna. Vajra is the symbol term for Being-as-such which as the indestructible core underlies all growth and self-realization in the same way that truth itself underlies the quest for truth. It has to be noted that the term 'self' in self-realization does not imply the glorified ego of subjectivistic philosophies with their postulate of a Self. Similarly, 'existential' is not a defining characteristic of some human subject, but refers to Being-as-such. 'Existential' Buddhism is therefore totally different from the various forms of Western existentialism which is purely anthropocentric and ego-centric, unable to realize that Being-as-such and egoness are two different categories. 'Existential' Buddhism, claimed to be the climax of the philosophical quest, is concerned with Being, not with an ego, in however idealized a way it may be presented.

Before the major philosophical systems developed, a great many ideas had been propounded, unsystematically, yet deeply affecting the continual quest. This intellectual activity is reflected in the list of schools, eighteen according to tradition, that we find mentioned in the numerous indigenous works. Sometimes these schools were no more than splinter-groups gathering around a gifted teacher or communities in various parts of India. Although for the most part we have merely the names of these schools, not their ideas, because the tenets attributed to them vary in the various listings, the very existence of these schools indicates the impact of the Buddha's teaching on his contemporaries and on subsequent generations.

In the following passage Mi-pham 'Jam-dbyangs rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho gives us a glimpse of the beginnings of Buddhist philosophical thought which was both the outcome and the source of a way of life. It is true he gives us this picture of early Buddhism in retrospect and he criticizes its tenets from the viewpoint of a later logician and metaphysician. But his criticism is not meant to destroy, but to open our eyes to wider horizons. Much of what the early Buddhists believed to be the answers to their questions may seem to us to be something of the remote past. Nevertheless these questions and answers made the subsequent development of Buddhist philosophy possible.

Another important point to be noted in his criticism is that he does not attack the early tenets from the outside, but that he reveals their inner weaknesses. When lastly he extols the Mahāyāna he merely re-emphasizes the positive character of Buddhist philosophy as a quest for truth born out of truth.

FROM

THE SUMMARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

YID-BZHIN-MDZOD-KYI GRUB-MTHA' BSDUS-PA

foll. 9b ff.

THE BUDDHIST philosophical systems that are to be accepted comprise Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. Hīnayāna, according to the gradation in intellectual capacity, consists of Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna.

The Śrāvakayāna is discussed here according to schools, character, and philosophical tenets.

SCHOOLS

There were eighteen schools. In the beginning there were the Mahāsānghikas and the Sthaviras.

The Mahāsānghikas split up into the branch-Mahāsānghikas, Ekavyavahārins, Lokottaravādins, Bahuśrutīyas, Nityavādins, Caityakas, Pūrvaśailikas, and Uttaraśailikas.

The Sthaviras split up into Haimavatas, Sarvāstivādins, Hetuvādins, Vātsīputrīyas, Dharmottaras, Bhadrayānikas, Sāṃmitīyas, Bahudeśakas, Dharmadeśakas, and Bhadravarṣikas.

They had different views. All of them have been refuted in the main work [from which the following is an excerpt].

CHARACTER

The Śrāvakas observe impeccable manners and abolish all (positive and negative) imputations concerning the knowable [which is analyzed by them into] the psycho-physical constituents, the elements, and the interactional fields, by studying and pondering over the four truths in every possible way and in a faultless manner. When they are reviled, angered, beaten, or irritated they do not retaliate in any

way. They possess the four qualities marking a religious person [1] and with them set out on the Path.

Further, they have few desires and know how to be content; they observe the twelve practices that mark a scrupulous person; [2] they are moderate in eating, try not to sleep during the first and last parts of the night, practise the thirty-seven topics conducive to enlightenment over the five paths by properly meditating on the ugly and other aspects of things as the antidote against the three poisons, on the four truths, and on the chain of interdependent origination.[3] Thereby they reach their goal: deliverance from the three worlds.

Since both their paths and the deliverance [reached by them] are something positive, they must not be discarded, and since also in Mahāyāna these (lower) paths and deliverances are commonly accepted as being necessary for the higher reaches, they are not to be looked down upon. However, the petty selfishness and the philosophical belief that what is only a partial aspect of the ground, the path, and the goal is something existing in an ultimate sense, is what is going to be refuted here in the Mahāyāna.

PHILOSOPHICAL TENETS

The philosophical tenets are listed in two groups: those which are common to them, discussed below, and the individual philosophical systems.*

The Śrāvakas have seven points in common. Since their lower paths must be transcended they must be known here in the Mahāyāna, because it has been said that to transcend is to know and to see with open eyes.

The seven points are: (1) the four truths as objective realities; (2) atoms and moments as ultimate builders of the universe; (3) Arhatship as the final goal; (4) the non-recognition of a primal ground, (5) the non-recognition of the Mahāyāna, (6) the non-recognition of the ten spiritual

* These latter begin with the Vaibhāṣikas. See Chapter Two.

levels; and (7) the claim that the Buddha is merely an individual human being.

1. These are the truths of frustration: its origin, its cessation, and the way to its cessation. The first relates to the psycho-physical constituents representing an affectively-toned and affect-arousing effect. It includes all the sentient beings as they are born in the six kinds of life-forms, as well as their environment, the external world. These four truths are the embodiment and presence or resting-place of frustration because among these beings three kinds of misery are encountered.[4]

Origin means the cause of frustration. It is karmic action and emotive responses. Karmic actions are motivations, perceptions, and that which has been set up by motivations, acts by body and speech. Each of them is good, evil, and neutral. Emotive responses are passion-lust and others.

Cessation means that frustration, together with its cause, has ceased to operate. It is twofold: (i) the psycho-physical constituents still being present, and (ii) their being no more.

The path to the cessation of frustration is the application of [what is termed] the five paths in one's life,[5] so as to realize the cessation of frustration by eliminating its cause through being aware of frustration.

2. Since indivisible atoms as ultimate and primary factors in the physical universe and indivisible moments as the primary instances of the flux of cognition exist in an ultimate sense, it is claimed that they build the physical world [and its cognition].

3. An Arhat who has passed into a state where the psycho-physical constituents are no more does not relapse into the world, because the cause for being born in the three worlds has lost its generating power. There is no Buddhahood, because he is tied to the Śrāvaka pattern. It is claimed that passing into Nirvāṇa is like a flame going out when the oil has been consumed.[6]

4. While the six groups of perceptions are recognized, no common ground for their operation is accepted, because it

does not constitute an objective reference. Moreover, such a ground is said to be inadmissible because if there were a static mind serving as the ground of everything, it would have to be an individual self.

5. While the four sections of the Vinaya and the other scriptures of the Hīnayāna are considered to be the Buddha's words, the Prajñāpāramitā literature is not so considered, because, so they say, this literature has been composed by Māra and outsiders in order to proselytize,[7] and because they seem to contradict the Tripiṭaka and the four axioms.[8]

6. When one sees the truths one cannot stay in Saṃsāra for many aeons more. A highly gifted individual who on the level of an ordinary man is capable of accumulating merits and knowledge during three 'countless aeons'[9] has the power to become a Buddha. He will realize the factors conducive to and forming part of enlightenment during one night session.

7. Some highly gifted persons who for countless aeons have been able to endure hardships in Saṃsāra will become Buddhas when they have studied the Śrāvaka paths and accumulated merits and knowledge during these aeons. Others are not capable of doing so because frustration in the world is overwhelming and because malicious elements prevent them from working for others. Therefore, while 'Buddha' means a sublime individual, it does not mean authenticity (*nirmāṇakāya*), because an (individual) Buddha still has the residua of what is going to mature inasmuch as he bleeds and feels pains in the back.

There also is no continual concentration, because it is said in the scriptures that he came out of a state of deep concentration and went for alms. They also claim that after the Buddha had passed into Nirvāṇa his working for others stopped completely.

The critique of these points is as follows:

1. The four truths do not exist as ultimate realities, because they are found nowhere when one examines the whole of the given, the world and its inhabitants, and the psycho-physical constituents and the interactional fields, and because

all that is termed 'rejection,' 'acquisition,' 'riddance,' and 'possession' are indexes, not entities.

2. There are no atoms building the physical world. If they did they would have to meet each other partially or totally. In the former case they would not be indivisible inasmuch as they have parts, and in the latter case a whole closed system would become an atom. Hence they cannot exist as builders of the universe. If they would build the world without meeting each other, atoms of darkness and of light could enter the spaces in between them and still other atoms could enter into the spaces in between the latter, so that into a small grain three thousand atoms and more could enter.

Atoms are also not found when one investigates shadows, distances, and arrows being shot.

Time moments also do not exist as such. The problem is whether the middle moment joins with the previous and subsequent moments or not. In the former case it would have to do so by degrees or at once. If it does by degrees, moments are divisible, and if they do so all at once, even an aeon becomes a single time moment.

If time moments do not join, that which is in between them can be interrupted by other time moments. This latter time moment either comes in between other time moments, or it does not; if it does not, one could not know duration as an addition of time instances, and if it does come in between, the indivisibility of time moments becomes untenable.

3. Arhatship is not final Nirvāṇa because the obscurations of the various patterns of existence have not yet been completely removed; because the radiant light which is the very nature of mind is what constitutes Buddhahood; because the obscurations are incidental; because even if the activity of mentation may be stopped while the obscurations have not yet been removed, the cause for projecting a mind existence is still there; and because the two prerequisites as the cause for final enlightenment must be acquired.[10]

4. A primal ground must be accepted because, if it did not exist, continuity would not be possible; neither could one be born in Saṃsāra nor be liberated from it, because there

would be no substratum for the tendencies moving in either direction; and when there is no mind in which the six perceptive functions operate, a mind could not come into operation again because, when the functions have been stopped, there is nothing from which they might start again. Moreover, if it is a fact that the whole of appearance is of the nature of experience, the ephemeral perceptive functions cannot be the cause of the possible experiences. Hence one must assume a common substratum or a primal ground.

5. The rejection of the Mahāyāna is not admissible. Not only does the Mahāyāna not contradict the Tripiṭaka and the four axioms, it is even superior to the earlier teaching, because in the Hīnayāna the path to Buddhahood is incomplete, while in the Mahāyāna the path culminates in the most sublime goal of enlightenment.

6. There are the ten spiritual levels. Even if one has set out on the Noble Path, the prerequisites must be prepared because there are many hindrances on the path due to the many emotional imbalances, and the prerequisites [for goal attainment] are not complete on the level of ordinary persons because they have not received the initiatory confirmations and empowerments. Hence the levels are not contradictory to the gradation of knowledge on the levels counteracting the ten obscurations which have to be eliminated.

7. If the Buddha is merely a human being and if his working for others ceases with his passing into Nirvāṇa as a result of his having removed the obscurations and ignorance, such an ephemeral and merciless being cannot command any respect. At the time of enlightenment when the radiant light is felt to shine free from all obscurations, the appearance of the Buddha, though He may be seen in different forms and shapes according to the different states of the beings, is not some individualistic phenomenon.

CHAPTER TWO

THE VAIBHĀṢIKAS

THE EARLIEST systematic attempt to work out the implications of the Buddha's teaching was that of the Vaibhāṣikas who are so named after the title of their most authoritative work, the Vibhāṣā, and who grew out of the larger group of the Sarvāstivādins.[1] This accounts for the fact that various tenets are listed as being held by them, although properly speaking, these tenets represent the beliefs of other groups among early Buddhist philosophers.

The Vaibhāṣikas started with an analysis of Being (*yod-pa*). This they understood as meaning 'all that exists.'[2] Existence as such was for them inseparable from the feeling of reality which we know primarily belongs to whatever can have an effect on us. Their analysis led to the first great division within Being as a whole, between that which exists and is transitory and concrete (*dngos-po*) and that which exists but is eternal, i.e. absolute (*rtag-pa*). This division remained valid for all subsequent philosophical schools, although different interpretations and evaluations were placed on it.

The Vaibhāṣikas' approach has often been termed 'realistic.' But here a word of caution becomes necessary because this term, derived from and developed within the Western philosophical framework, hardly does justice to Eastern patterns of thought; at best it merely points to certain, usually inconclusive, similarities. The fact that in indigenous works on philosophy the tenets of the Yogācāras,[3] whom we generally equate with 'idealists,' are dealt with as being on the same level as those of the alleged 'realists' actually should give us pause. The objections raised by the later philosophers of Buddhism against the systems ranging from 'realism' to

'idealism' are directed toward their concretism and reductionism, and since much in our thinking would be open to the same critique, it is extremely hazardous to employ our traditional concepts without distorting the nature of Buddhist philosophy, which as a spiritual movement goes beyond realism and idealism.

Each of the two departments into which the Vaibhāṣikas divided Being consisted of particular existents. For this reason the Vaibhāṣikas may roughly be classified as 'existential dualists.' But inasmuch as there are apparently fundamental differences of kind among the existents constituting the same department the Vaibhāṣikas held different views about them. The absolute was believed to comprise three, and, with certain groups, even four or five particular existents.[4] These can best be understood as inner factors of lived experience, and cannot simply be discussed or ignored as merely subjective, but play an important role in the individual's life-world. One of these existents is termed 'space', which must not be confused with geometric, mathematical space, any point of which is, like any other, at various measurable distances from material bodies. Nor is it the mere absence of resistance. Lastly it also is not sensed space with which it sometimes seems to have been equated even by Vaibhāṣikas. Belonging to the department of the eternal within Being, it is an existential category which has a 'perspectival' character disclosing or, as the texts say, 'not obscuring' the naked facticity of a situation which not only stretches away from the subject towards the object but also refers from the object to the subject. As the oriented space of an individual's life-world it is of course quite distinct from geometric space which is a secondary intellectual construction; and as a meaningful horizon of Being it is closely related to the two remaining existents constituting the department of the absolute. One of these existents is the non-reoccurrence of the processes which involve man in Saṃsāra. Its existential character is clearly indicated by the definition of its being present when the conditions that ordinarily initiate such an involvement with its attending frustration do not obtain in their entirety, and by the qualification that it is not

dependent on the use of insight. The other existent is the cessation of the working of the factors causing involvement, due to insight which, however, does not produce the state of non-involvement and freedom but merely discovers it. Actually one and the same 'reality' is here looked at from different angles; the one is viewed *from* the goal, which strange to say is the basis of all activity in freedom and hence truly existential. The other is looked *at* as the goal and its effect on man's life. But since each aspect could be named, it seems that the names were responsible for the fact that this feature of Being was counted as two entities. It also seems that 'insight' as goal-discovery and goal-inspired living and 'space' as the lived world of the individual, rather than his location in a predetermined framework, touch upon the pattern of space and time as aspects of man's being rather than as categories of interpretation.

In the department of the 'transitory' (*mi-rtag-pa*) each particular existent, apart from being of the 'natural kind' that is impermanent, had a specific attribute which made it of such and such a kind. It is here that the Vaibhāṣikas listed everything which we would call the physical-material, the mental-spiritual with its subdivision into mind- (particle or particles) and mind-related substances, and, lastly, concrete entities which could not be defined as being either of the others, yet could be defined as having being of their own. The physical-material, in particular, was constituted of relatively stable patterns, with 'significant forms' such as the material universe both exhibiting a substantive nature and being susceptible of perception. But it also comprised what we would call 'sensa' in the phenomenological meaning of contents of awareness (colours, sounds, fragrances, flavours, and pressures) and in the physiological meaning of the processes of sensing them. Lastly they included in this section an intangible entity which we would rather term a behavioural property or a trait tending to typify reactions favourable or unfavourable, of rejection and acceptance, of likes and dislikes, of withdrawal and approval.[5] From this short survey it is obvious that concerning the 'transitory' the Vaibhāṣikas were

differentiating-attribute pluralists. Believing in different kinds of concrete entities and in a plurality of substances, they accepted, on the whole, a much greater plurality of concrete entities than of kind. In the field of the mental-spiritual it becomes even more patent that our Western categories do not fit the Vaibhāṣikas' tenets. They claimed that we have an immediate apprehension of the nature of things as they are in themselves, but as they never lost sight of 'experience,' which may be described as the sum total of appearances and feelings together with ordering thought, they at once were aware of the distinction between (a) data available for ordering and (b) thought as ordering activity. More precisely, they held that we are directly aware of external material objects and that therefore the senses give us trustworthy knowledge. Sensory awarenes, however, is intimately connected with perceptual and conceptual knowledge. Perceiving and conceiving begin when we select and attend to connections which are already 'thought about' in sensory awareness (*dbang-shes*).[6] The distinction between sensory, perceptual and conceptual data was one both of kind and of degree of definiteness. Within this scheme what we translate by 'mind' (*sems*) had merely a 'privileged' position in its co-existence with the various mind-related substances, all of which participated in one way or another in the total conscious experience. Mind seems to have been considered as a homogenous substance exhibiting a specific function in its conjunction with sensations which themselves were cognitive. This suggests the idea that mind represents the possibility of originative response which becomes first selective emphasis and then symbolic construction. The distinction between perception and conception is drawn not between two different entities, body and mind, but between two modes of activity integrated in one actuality. The one is a direct *rapport* with other actualities, the other is a selective and interpretative activity. Mind is thus not just an entity 'decoding' messages received through the bodily organs, but an originative form of activity arising in conjunction with various (physical-mental) activities and through them is in contact with the surrounding universe. This co-

operation of mind with the various mental events, accounting for a determinate conscious experience, becomes intelligible when we clearly focus the two modes of cognitive life. The one, which may be termed 'adverbial,' is marked by integral feelings having certain affective tones, motivation and other characteristics of sensitivity and qualifying a state of experience which comes as the result of a response to and *rapport* with the environment. The other, which we shall call 'transitive,' is a differentiation of contents of awareness. The latter seems to call for developed powers of discrimination and therefore opens up new perspectives. This explains why 'appreciative discrimination' belongs to the 'entourage' or group of mental events (*sems-byung*) operating on various levels, practical, aesthetic or theoretic, and is not itself the 'privileged' factor (*sems*), which acts rather as the initiator of cognitive experiences.

The last group of particular existents belonging to the department of the 'transitory' is made up of so-called 'disjunct entities.' They are interpretative schemata by means of which relations between perceptions can be represented. In the creation of this group there has been operative a law of projection of which the Vaibhāṣikas do not seem to have been aware, and which prompted them to consider the relations that obtain between facts when they are rendered as propositions, as something like 'real objects.' Thus, for instance, '*A* attains *B*' tells of a way in which *A* and *B* are combined, but our only means of expressing this way is to name it and, all of a sudden, a new entity 'attaining' seems to have added itself, which is then looked on as a 'thing' or 'particular entity' (*dngos-po*) having power in itself. In looking on these entities as 'particular existents' or 'things' the Vaibhāṣikas were embodying relics of mythical thinking.

The prominence given to the concept of 'particular existents' means that the Vaibhāṣikas' philosophy was formally an *ontology*, a doctrine of what there is.[7] The way, however, they worked it out shows that they were primarily concerned to give a unitary account of experience as a whole.

Metaphysics comes into the picture when those who accept

the foregoing analysis proceed to inquire into the nature of these particular existents. The metaphysical concern is linked with the notion of two truths. Superficially it seems to correspond to the traditional Western conception that the philosophers (metaphysicians) have access to real things which are stable, unchanging and for that reason fully knowable, and as a consequence they recognize the world of appearances for what it is: impermanent, flickering, and unreal like a dream. The key terms here, of course, are 'real' and 'unreal' respectively. Certainly, a dream is quite real in the sense that it is the case that we are dreaming and having certain beliefs; it is also 'unreal' in the sense that the beliefs entertained in dreaming refer to what is not the case. This shows that 'real' is used in an evaluative sense with reference to some interpretation. While it would seem natural to conclude that the 'real' is the genuine, the authentic, as opposed to the spurious, the Vaibhāṣikas did not separate reality from existence, and therefore did not accept some things as unreal or non-existent. Their distinction was that between the ultimately real and the empirically real. The Buddhist philosophers were the last persons in the world to deny the empirical world which for them always remained quite 'real,' but as metaphysicians they saw it in a different light. This had tremendous effect on practice which is summed up in what the called the 'way' (*lam*) and which has remained a means to see things differently. Philosophy, metaphysics, and practice thus formed a unity.

The Vaibhāṣikas' metaphysical interpretation of Being does not, as might be assumed, coincide with their division of Being into that which is absolute on the one hand, and transitory on the other. Ultimately, real was that which, it was assumed, existed *as* substance (*rdzas-yod*), while anything that could be claimed to *exhibit* substantial existence (*rdzas-grub*), though not having existence as substance in itself (which nevertheless might be a constituent of the latter), was considered to be conventionally or empirically real and to have nominal existence (*btags-yod*).

Speaking of substance in the context of Buddhist philoso-

phy needs clarification because this notion, even in Western philosophies, is notoriously ambiguous. It is usually associated with the twin notions of long duration and the possibility of independent existence which, in turn, lack precision. However, according to the commonly accepted view, anything transitory would not be considered as a substance but as an 'event in' or a 'state of' a substance. The Vaibhāṣikas rejected these criteria for 'substance' and were as much in agreement with McTaggart, for whom every particular existent, however transitory, is a substance, as with Spinoza, for whom no existent could count as a substance unless it was eternal. They were, however, not quite consistent in their use of the notion of 'substance' because they understood it both in an absolute sense and in that of consisting of collocation of atoms (which, strictly speaking, fulfilled the Vaibhāṣikas' criterion for the ultimately real). In this respect a certain similarity with the Vaiśeṣikas' idea of substance as being the material cause of derivative substance is evident.[8] Apart from this ambiguity the Vaibhāṣikas' idea of substance does not imply any materiality; their notion rather reflects the 'thingness' of thought so characteristic of the early stages of mental life. Aside from the eternal or absolute and 'ultimately real,' the transitory 'ultimately real' must be understood to include the determinable qualities of temporal and spatial position. This is to say, no particular existent can be characterized by different determinate forms of the quality of temporal position while being the same particular existent. In other words, a particular existent is instantaneous. Similarly, no particular existent characterized by the quality of spatial position can be characterized by two different determinate forms of the quality. Hence all particular existents of the material realm are punctiform, and are instantaneous events and point-instants. The former were the constituents of the 'mental' and the latter those of the 'material.' The mental and the material thus were further characterized by the 'extensional' qualities of duration and spatiality, forming certain ways by virtue of their 'positional' qualities. What we would call a mind would on this

analysis be a set of point-instants varying continuously in their quality of temporal position, and its determinate duration would depend upon the determinate relation between the determinate qualities of temporal position characterizing the first and last point-instants of this set. A body, on the other hand, would be a set of point-instants all of which have the same determinate temporal position, but whose spatial position is varying continuously. Thus the constituents of a mind and a body are ultimately real, but the mind and the body are themselves only conventionally or nominally real. The Vaibhāṣikas' conception of Being, both ontological and metaphysical, can be shown as follows:

BEING = THE UNIVERSE OF SUBSTANTIVAL REALITIES



1. the physical material

2–3. the mental (mind particle and mental events)

4. interpretative schemata

5. the absolutes

The Buddhist philosophers not only dealt with ontological and metaphysical problems, but also paid close attention to

the factors which constitute the foundations of personality. Especially they investigated *feeling, emotions, moods,* and *temperaments,* not only in their overt manifestations but also as to their latent potentialities. It is a well-known fact that some situations tend to call forth reactions which we call pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent. Others which are more critical arouse emotional responses. An emotion, then, is a stirred-up state of acute disturbance of the individual which is related to certain perceived stimuli. In everyday life we experience a wide variety of feelings and emotions, collectively known as affective states. Each of us, in addition, is characterized by periodic fluctuations in the nature of his or her emotional-feeling tone. We may be gay at one time and depressed at another. These moods may occur daily in periodicity, they also may be of longer cycles. Further, certain patterns of mood may come to dominate the total personality for years and even for a whole lifetime. Even so there may be fluctuations of subordinate feelings, emotions, and moods, all of them tending to disrupt the personality. The recognition of this fact prompted the Buddhist philosophers to discuss still another division in reality: the split into that which brings about emotional instability and that which ensures emotional stability. The latter, in particular, is intimately connected with learning as a process of integration rather than as the acquisition of unrelated bits of information. It is the integrated person that is no longer at the mercy of the affective vagaries, and in the vision of what reality is and means he has been given the opportunity to become and remain integrated by further learning. This vision comes on the so-called 'Path of Seeing,'[9] from which goal-directed learning with its advances and setbacks becomes possible.

The status of an integrated person is closely related to the idea a man has about himself. What, then, are we to understand by 'I'? Indian thought has had the tendency to speculate whether 'I' denotes a peculiar and separate substance, or whether it is merely an index word indicating the one person from whom the noise 'I' issues and therefore is not an extra name for an extra being. While the Hindus hardly ever went beyond the first kind of speculation, the Buddhist fervently

upheld the second alternative. Still, 'I,' in my use of it, always and only indicates 'me' and it seems to have a uniquely adhesive quality. Various groups among the Vaibhāṣikas held various views about which constituent of the personality served as the peg on which to hang this 'I.' Apart from this, all philosophers had to face the problem of accounting for what seems to be and to constitute my indivisible and continuing identity. These speculations took the form of centre-theories and non-centre theories. The former ascribe the unity of the mind to the fact that there is a certain particular existent, a centre, which stands in a common asymmetrical relation to all the mental events which could be said to be the states of a certain mind, while non-centre theories deny the existence of such a centre, and ascribe the unity of the mind to the fact that certain mental events are directly interrelated in certain characteristic ways while others are not so interrelated. Centre-theories further divide into those which accept a Pure Ego and those which do not, but which conceive of the centre as an event. The Buddhists, on the whole, have rejected Pure Ego theories and gradually have arrived at favouring a non-centre theory. The Vaibhāṣikas, however, adopted a central-event theory. That is to say, for them the unity of a total state of mind, consisting at any moment of mental events of various kinds and of events of the same kind but with different epistemological objects, depended on a common relation in which all its differentiations stand to a common centre, which is itself an event and not a peculiar extra entity; it is of the same nature as the events which it unifies. There is a single central event (*sems*) which stands in a common relation to a number of other mental events (*sems-byung*), each of which has its own characteristic quality and some of which stand in characteristic relations to objects. As the relation between mind and mental events is so intimate that the one cannot be without the other, the mental events are more precisely termed a function of mind. In listing the mental events related to a central event the Vaibhāṣikas adopted a qualitative method and, in the end, named fifty-one such events, the earlier number hav-

ing been forty-six.[10] These events included not only emotions and cognitive processes but also behavioristic features. The fact that these latter properties were listed as 'mental events' clearly shows that the Vaibhāṣikas dealt with man in the concrete rather than in the abstract as a mere postulate and that the trend towards emphasizing mind was already present, because on this basis it could be said that the body is mind insofar as a mind animates a body and therefore behaves in a certain way which it would not do if it were not so animated.

The analysis of Being, particularly with regard to its division into the objective and subjective, merely provided the raw material with which the individual had to deal, and in so doing the validity of knowledge arose as an important problem. The Vaibhāṣikas recognized immediate apprehension and inference as the means providing us with valid knowledge. Inference comprised both genuine or mediate and immediate inference. In this respect their conception of inference was wider than ours, which is almost exclusively restricted to genuine or mediate inference. Through the latter we pass to a new fact not already known, but potentially involved in the premise, while through immediate inference we merely pass to a new symbolic formulation which refers to the same existent fact. Judgments of perception which are neither inferences (in our sense of the word) nor immediate apprehension would fall under inference in the Vaibhāṣikas' line of thought.

In the field of immediate apprehension the Vaibhāṣikas distinguished between and recognized three types. The first, immediate sensory apprehension, was considered as not involving the noetic (*shes-pa*).[11] The latter, as has been shown previously, acted essentially as an initiator of cognitive experiences and, if it apprehended anything at all, it merely apprehended the bare haecceity. Yet, we *see* colour-forms, *hear* sounds and so on. This the Vaibhāṣikas explained as being due to the specific function which each sense-organ performs by way of its peculiar structure. The eye, for instance, is a specific sense-organ which has its own peculiar function of 'seeing forms,' and in exercising its function it

provides its own validity. 'Seeing' thus becomes an active process of formulation which begins in the eye. It is not a passive storing of chaotic stimuli out of which a mind construes forms to suit its own purpose.

The second type, intellectual apprehension, is an immediate awareness of meaning, not a logical reflection or ratiocination which may develop out of the former.

The third, mystical apprehension, is a manner of knowledge by connaturality; it is beyond concepts and analogies and silent in respect to apprehension through the senses.

This discussion of ontological, metaphysical, psychological, and epistemological problems served as the framework within which the individual had to work out his way of life which was considered to culminate in freedom or salvation. Working out one's way of life was termed the 'Path' (*lam*) which, ensuring the development of the personality, was understood as a continuous broadening of the individual's spiritual horizon. The 'Path' therefore was essentially a cognitive process affecting every aspect of the individual's life. It is here that Buddhism left the realm of philosophy (as we understand this discipline now) and, by assuming the character of ethics, joined with religion. In speaking of Buddhism as a religion we must understand the word 'religion' as implying an ultimate concern for ultimate reality, rather than as a set of doctrinal postulates.

The 'Path' in its last analysis consisted of two major phases, one of learning and one of no-more-learning. The former was subdivided into four stages, each called a 'path' so the following diagram of the 'Path' obtains:

Phases of Learning	Phase of No More Learning
1. preparation	5. no more learning
2. linkage	
3. vision	
4. cultivation of the vision	

The first or preparatory stage is known as 'accummulation of merits and perfection of knowledge.' Its first aspect

emphasizes the ethico-social character of learning which never occurs in a vacuum, and, in particular, it refers to those activities which safeguard the existence of man as a human being within the cycle of rebirths.[12] In Buddhist thought human existence is something exceedingly rare and valuable. It is easily lost and difficult to retrieve, and it is possible to find salvation only through a human existence. The second aspect, perfection of knowledge, facilitates the first, inasmuch as knowledge assists in curbing the emotions which underly man's actions and which, jointly with his deeds, make him lose his humanity.

The second stage represents the transition from the preparatory aspect to the central experience of the 'Path' as such, the vision of reality in its true nature. That is to say, whatever we perceive is transitory, death-doomed, and unable to provide emotional satisfaction or to give spiritual sustenance. But inasmuch as everything transitory is merely a temporary differentiation of and in a wider aesthetic field, the transitory itself offers the possibility of escaping its frustrating limitations and of making us more keenly aware of the wider aesthetic field and of prompting us to attend to the latter's presence which alone can provide an essentially spiritual contentment. It is from this third stage that the later 'perfection of transcending awareness' starts, because it is the discriminative-appreciative function (*shes-rab*) that enables man to step 'outside' the death-delivering ravages of all that is transitory.

This vision leads to the fourth phase of the 'Path' as the conscious cultivation of what has been realized in the vision of reality. It is viewed from two angles: the one is experienced as 'obstacle-removing,' the other as the feeling of 'being freed' from what was formerly disturbing and obstructing. Gradually this will lead to a state in which the aspirant has no longer to learn.

With the exception of the third phase, the vision of reality in a new perspective, all phases, including the final one, may or may not arouse affective responses that are related to success or failure in the enterprise, which is itself considered

as a fluctuation between 'coarser' and 'subtler' experiences. These relate to the triple division into a world of sensuality, pure form, and formlessness. Each subsequent 'world'-experience is more subtle than the preceding one.

The arousal of affective responses occurs in the wake of the learning process, which is marked by endeavour. This, in turn, is enhanced by the feeling of success and lowered by that of failure, although these feelings may also have the opposite effect. Since the curbing of the emotions that involve man in the coarser and subtler aspects of the world is a continuous task performed on and by the 'Path,' even the last stage of it does not exclude the possibility that these disturbing emotions may reassert themselves. This happens according to the Vaibhāṣikas when the individual, having reached the phase of no-more-learning, becomes negligent in his watchfulness. They therefore held that the saintly sage may fall from his elevated position, although he will not fall so low as to become an unregenerate person again, because by his previous learning he has already moved far beyond this level.

The fact that the Vaibhāsikas distinguished between a 'path' arousing affective responses and one not so doing points to a very important characteristic of the Buddhist way of life which takes into account and emphasizes the transitoriness of all that exists concretely. Inasmuch as the 'Path' is essentially a cognitive process we may know impermanence in two ways: (*a*) by having a keen awareness of it that enables us to make the appropriate compassionate response to a given situation, and (*b*) by having it so grown into our bones that we respond by our immediate being, as having become connatural with impermanence. The former is the way of saintly persons. The latter is the 'noble' path itself. From this idea of connaturality directly follows the Vaibhāṣikas' claim that in spite of the cognitive function of the 'Path,' the so-called 'Truth of the Path' (*lam-bden*) is not identical or co-extensive with the noetic, but is the sum total of what constitutes the individual divorced from the arousal of affective states.

As an index of man's spiritual growth and his experience of it, the path is intentional in structure. That is to say, I cannot go without going somewhere; I cannot think without thinking about something; and I cannot do without doing something. Thus the objective as well as the subjective are given with the same evidence and the objective is present in a peculiar relational mode of becoming. This means that the objective is a challenge to make up one's mind about it and to take a stand (although it may be no standpoint in the ordinary sense of the word), rather than a stubborn clinging to outworn schemes (with which we tend to confuse a standpoint). In grasping or accepting these possibilities man has already made up his mind about what he is seeking, and in following the path he discards whatever may prevent him from attaining his goal. This is indicated by the discussion in the original texts of what has to be and actually is eliminated by the path.

These possibilities form the content of the vision and are summarized as the Four Truths, which for practical reasons are enumerated in the obverse order of effect and cause: The Truth of Frustration, exposing the unsatisfactoriness of all that is, and the Truth of the Coming into Existence of Frustration on the one hand; the Truth of the End of all Frustration and the Truth of the Way towards it, on the other. Each of the four truths is envisaged in four aspects which have been open to different interpretations.[13] Nevertheless each of the four aspects of each truth are logically related to each other.

Although knowledge is essential for the development of the individual, the vision of the Four Truths is not yet knowledge in the proper sense, but an 'acceptance' of what a person ordinarily has avoided facing. This acceptance of things as they are—that is, to see them as truly transitory and for this reason unsatisfactory and causing sorrow—brings about knowledge, which unlike propositional knowledge is an emotionally stabilizing, deeply 'felt knowledge.' The Vaibhāṣikas subdivided the stage of vision into sixteen moments or grades, eight of which were 'acceptance in

knowledge' and the remaining eight 'felt knowledge.' But it was only the last grade that was true 'felt knowledge' and as such belonged to the phase of conscious cultivation. Each of the four truths relates to each of the three spheres into which the universe has been divided: the spheres of pure form and formlessness forming a unit here as contrasted with the sphere of sensuality. Each truth thus has two grades of 'acceptance'—the one referring to the sphere of sensuality, the other to the joint spheres of pure form and formlessness—and two corresponding grades of 'felt knowledge.' Each grade was considered to follow the other: the acceptance of the transitoriness of the spheres of sensuality giving rise to knowingly feeling this transitoriness, which in turn gives rise to the acceptance of the transitoriness of the higher spheres of pure form and formlessness and the feeling of it in knowledge. Similarly, what applies to the Truth of Frustration also applies to the remaining three truths.

From the very beginning Buddhism opposed the absolutistic subjectivism of the Hindu philosophers; in other words it rejected any form of a Pure-Ego theory (*ātman*). This rejection was the direct outcome of its functional view of what constituted the individual, and fully harmonized with the observable transitoriness of all that is.

The subjectivism which was to dominate the later Hindu philosophies had in the Upaniṣads before and around Buddha's time assumed the character of an impersonalistic Idealism according to which an eternal solitary and sovereign self, a Pure Ego, is the essential self within each individual. This view was termed a 'coarse' idea of what makes us talk about an individual or a self, and its rejection was accordingly called 'coarse' idea of the nonexistence of a Pure Ego. A modified form of this theory was held by the Vātsīputrīyas and Sāṃmitīyas, who rejected an absolutistic *ātman* but postulated a self-sufficient substance which, being transitory as other substances, did not contradict the Buddhist conception of impermanence,[14] although it violated the functional character of what is called an individual. Their theory, which is halfway between a Pure-Ego theory and a central-

event theory, was termed a 'subtle' idea of a self and its rejection was the 'subtle' idea of the nonexistence of a self.

The awareness of the non-existence of a Pure Ego in any form, which originated in the vision phase of the 'Path,' is easily understandable when we bear in mind that the decisive difference between Buddhism and Hinduism consists of the fact that Buddhism took a dynamic-functional world view, while Hinduism remained static-absolutistic. The functional view Buddhism developed concerning the self can be illustrated in the following way. The Kāśyapīyas, who with their insistence on the priority of mind within the constituents of the personality seem to have been the forerunners of the mentalistic schools of advanced Buddhism, considered mind alone as the ground for talking about a self. However, mind and mental events are so intimately related that the one is not without the other. Accordingly, if we let x stand for the 'individual' or 'self,' m for 'mind' and n for 'mental event(s),' the functional character of the 'self' can be expressed as

$$x(m, n)$$

and since n is a function of m, the formula can be rewritten

$$x(m, f(m)).$$

On the basis of the Kāśyapīyas' line of thought, this formula would have to be restated as

$$x(m, n) = x\,(m, 0) + n$$

and developed according to the generally accepted view that five 'mental events' are everpresent with each 'mind.' Thus we have

$$x\,(m, n) = x\,(m, 5) + (n - 5).$$

The Vātsīputrīyas, however, not content with the purely functional character of the 'self,' demanded an additional variable; and, provided that they, too, shared the Buddhist esteem of the mental, they would have set up the impossible formula:

$$x(x') + (m, n)$$

With the realization of the functional character of the 'self' those emotive reaction patterns and possibilities are eliminated which cluster round the belief in a 'self' as an

entity in itself. But still those patterns which operate in response to the other contents in experience are present and have to be eliminated by repeated attention to them in the phase of the conscious cultivation of what has been seen of reality in the phase of vision. The latter reaction patterns are divided into nine categories of strong-strong, strong-medium, strong-weak, medium-strong, medium-medium, medium-weak, weak-strong, weak-medium and weak-weak. These nine categories belong each to the nine levels into which the triple division of the universe has been subdivided:

A. Kāmadhātu (sphere of sensuousness and sensuality)	1. denizens of hell 2. animals 3. unhappy spirits 4. men 5. demons			Level I
	6. gods	1. Caturmahārājakāyika 2. Trāyastriṃśa 3. Yāma 4. Tuṣita 5. Nirmāṇarati 6. Paranirmitavaśavartin 7. Devaloka		
	1st Dhyāna	1. Brahmakāyika 2. Brahmapurohita 3. Mahābrahmā		II
	2nd Dhyāna	1. Parīttābha 2. Apramāṇābha 3. Ābhāsvara		III
B. Rūpadhātu (sphere of pure form)	3rd Dhyāna	1. Parīttaśubha 2. Apramāṇaśubha 3. Śubhakṛtsna		IV
	4th Dhyāna	1. Anabhraka 2. Puṇyaprasava 3. Bṛhatphala 4. Avraha 5. Atapa 6. Sudṛśa 7. Sudarśana 8. Akaniṣṭha		V
C. Ārūpyadhātu (sphere of formlessness)	I. Ākāśānantya II. Vijñānānantya III. Ākiñcanya IV. Naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñā		Caturārūpya Brahmaloka	VI VII VIII IX

Each of the nine categories throughout the nine levels of the universe has to be overcome or eliminated in order to attain the goal. In this process two moments operate, one of eliminating and one of being in the possession of the elimination of the respective category. The Vaibhāṣikas here adhered to a strictly gradual progression towards their ideal. One category after the other was eliminated, first in the sphere of sensuality, then on each level in the sphere of pure form, and lastly, on each level in the sphere of formlessness. They rejected the idea of a simultaneous elimination of one category on all nine levels. This gradual elimination was related to a typology of 'saintly person'; for instance, a person who had succeeded in eliminating the sixth category (medium-weak) had become a 'once-returner,' that is, a person who would only once relapse into the world of sensuality, while a person who had eliminated the ninth category (weak-weak) had become a 'no-returner.' It is when the last category on the last level is eliminated, a process called an 'integrative concentration as solid as a diamond,' that the person may attain the ideal of a 'saintly-sage' (*arhat*).

Essentially the 'Path' is a means to attain a goal. When we talk of goals, aims, ends, or ideals, we are but stating in another way the principle of teleological action, which, in Buddhism, is acquired in the course of living with others and is internally determined by learning. The aim towards which an individual strives is defined both individually or personally, and socially or culturally. Both ways of definition interact because the former does not develop in a vacuum or without reference to social interaction and the latter is made of interacting individuals. Each individual reorganizes his experiences in such a way as to express what he comes to consider his basic want. In this sense each person is unique as he builds up his own style of life. Out of the emphasis that was laid on either the individual or social definition, the major division into Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna in course of time developed, the former giving preference to the individual-personal definition of man's ideal, the latter to the

social-cultural one. Both existed side by side and therefore it would be wrong to equate Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna with philosophical tenets, for they represent values, individual and social.

When individual values are emphasized two types of individuals are recognized: the Arhat who has succeeded in curbing his emotional nature and the Pratyekabuddha who, in addition to having curbed his emotions, has developed his intelligence. Where social values are given preference the Bodhisattva becomes the ideal.

The importance which Buddhism attaches to the path and its goal, the individual who through the exercise of his discriminative ability has subjugated and eliminated his passions, must not lead us to assume that Buddhism recognizes the supremacy of moral values at the expense of everything else. It is true that Buddhism stresses morality as a basic factor in the individual's life-world, but morality has only a limited value. As a matter of fact, morality is the outcome and corollary of knowledge which is grounded in freedom. Liberation from the bondage of the passions and of insufficient knowledge is the ultimate value in a man's life. While this ultimate value was more and more clearly elaborated in the course of philosophical enquiry, the early Buddhists, and the Vaibhāṣikas in particular, must be credited with having clearly understood that ethics has nothing to do with metaphysics. They were convinced that in the end man would become extinct—'like a flame going out.' This conviction did not lead them into the fallacy of assuming that what counts in a person's life is the gratification of his desires, in other words, to do only what will give us pleasure. The conviction that every man will finally become extinct does not alter the fact that, as long as I and others are alive, some actions and some states of mind, such as kindness and the appreciation of beauty, are better than others, such as cruelty and the enjoyment of others' suffering. Whether the environment in which we live is better or worse will largely depend on our present actions, and whether we are mortal or not, it is our duty to produce a better

state rather than making a bad one even worse. In performing this duty it may be desirable to believe that we shall continue through countless aeons, but this belief in the desirability of immortality or semi-immortality does not give us any reason to assert the actuality of a state of immortality.

In his *Jewel Garland* dKon-mchog 'Jigs-med dbang-po presents the philosophical tenets of the Vaibhāṣikas in their own right and succinctly defines the various categories which, although accepted by all subsequent philosophical systems, were to become the objects of critical investigation. Although there were different philosophical trends, as is easily understandable from the fact that the Vaibhāṣikas were widely spread over the northwestern and central parts of the Indian sub-continent, individual philosophers such as Vasumitra dominated the scene and in one way or another gave coherence to the philosophical endeavour.

Mi-pham 'Jam-dbyangs rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho, in his *Summary of Philosophical Systems,* singles out certain topics of the Vaibhāṣikas and, by subjecting them to a trenchant criticism, indicates in retrospect how Buddhist philosophy developed. Since he also gives a detailed account of the contents of the categories, his presentation is a valuable complement to dKon-mchog 'Jigs-med dbang-po's.

Mi-Pham (1846–1914) author of *The Summary of Philosophical Systems*

FROM

THE SUMMARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

YID-BZHIN-MDZOD-KYI GRUB-MTHA' BSDUS-PA

foll. 13a.

THE SALIENT features of the Vaibhāṣikas' philosophical tenets will be dealt with under seven heads: (1) the five groupings of the knowable; (2) decay as a separate entity; (3) the substantiality of the three aspects of time; (4) an ineffable self; (5) the noetic as not being self-revealing and cognitive of an object; (6) the difference between signatum and index; and (7) an inexhaustible substance.

Their views are not correct because they are mixed with all sorts of wishful thinking.

(1) a. The five groups of the knowable:
The physical-material consists of eleven items, i.e., the four elementary functions, i.e., solidity, cohension, temperature, and movement as cause (giving rise to):
the *five* senses, i.e., sight, hearing, smell, taste, and bodily feeling as effect;
the *five* sense objects, i.e., colour, sound, taste, fragrance, and touch, and
the behaviour-trait.[29]

b. Mind as the primary factor is the six sensory consciousness which apprehend the mere object. It is claimed that they apprehend the bare haecceity.[30]

c. The mental events as the entourage of mind apprehend the characteristics of the object. There are fifty-one of them:

The five ever-present ones are: rapport, categorizing, feeling, ideation, and motivation.
The five object-determined ones are: attention, interest, inspection, intense concentration, and appreciative discrimination.
The eleven positive functions which accompany every positive attitude are: trust, carefulness, lucidity, imperturbability, decency, decorum, unattachment, non-hatred, non-deludedness, non-violence, and assiduity.
The six basic emotions are: lust, rage, arrogance, dullness, opinionatedness, and doubt.
The twenty subsidiary emotions are: anger, hostility, dissimulation, malice, jealousy, avarice, hypocrisy, dishonesty, spitefulness, pride, contempt, indecorum, delusion, overexuberance, distrust, laziness, carelessness, forgetfulness, excitability, inattentiveness.
The four variables are: drowsiness, regret, selective emphasis, and discursiveness.
Mind and mental events operate from the same basis with the same reference, observable quality, time and substance.[31]

d. There are twenty-three disjunct entities: attainment-possession, attainment of the suspension of attitudinal and functional operations, attainment of induced unconsciousness, induced unconsciousness, life, force, similarity, birth, old age, duration, transitoriness, nouns, verbs, letters, status of an ordinary person, process, distinctness, connection, quickness, sequence, time location, number, totality. It is claimed that these entities are different from the physical-material and the mental.

e. The absolute is that which is not born from causes and conditions; it consists of space, cessation of involvement due to insight, cessation of involvement independent of insight.

(2) Decay as a separate entity. There are four specific characteristics indicating the composite nature of such things as a jug. They are: being born, growing old, duration, and transitoriness. There are four subsidiary indicators of their composite transitory nature: the coming into being of the process of being born, duration of duration, the growing old of the process of aging, and the process of decaying of the decaying process. The coming into being of the process of being born brings about the actual coming into existence [of a thing]. This actual coming into existence [of the thing] brings about [the presence of the thing], totalling eight indicators. The same feature applies to the other indicators such as duration and the rest. The signatum and its specific characteristic are claimed to be different substances, just as a crow indicating [the presence of] a house [is different from the house].

(3) Since the past and future exist *substantialiter* in their own rights, the three divisions of time exist now as substances. If it is objected that this would entail the observation of the past and the future now, the Vaibhāṣikas answer that they are not seen because they are concealed through that which has ceased to exist and that which has not yet come to exist. There is a difference from the Sāṃkhya-system because the divisions of time exist as a continuity of moments.[32]

(4) The ineffable self. They claim that a self must exist as the perpetrator of acts and as the experiencer of their effects, because otherwise the relation between one's acts and their effects would not hold. Therefore, this self is neither identical with nor different from the psychophysical constituents and cannot be said to be eternal or non-eternal. While the Vātsīputrīyas and some others recognized such a self the Vaibhāṣikas proper did not do so. However, since certain sections within the Vaibāṣikas and Sautrāntikas recognized such a self, it has been dealt with here.

(5) The noetic is not cognitive in itself nor does it know an object. They say that non-referential awareness is not possible because that which is known cannot be the knower and while the sensory function pertaining to the physical-material apprehends the bare object because it is coupled with the mind, the noetic is like a crystal without any images and merely a selective process.

(6) The difference between the signatum and the index. They claim that when the white and red colours and the dewlap indicate an ox these three characteristics must be different substances. If they were one, act and actor would become one, which is not the case.

(7) An inexhaustible substance. This is a special form of the attainment-possession, which is an item of the disjunct entities. The fact that an act done is not exhausted, is like a promissory note. Because of its neutral character it is inexhaustible.

The critique of the above tenets:

(1) All physical-material entities [listed as] cause and effect are refutation of atoms. A trait also is not something physical-material. It is not something in itself, apart from being a label put on the mere projecting activity which lets good and bad actions by body and speech continue. While mind and mind-related substances are multiple and instantaneous, a partless point-instant is not really established and moreover is not found either outside or within. Because the knowable is not the knower there can ultimately be no self-cognitions, and there can also be no cognition of something else because no relation [between the knowable and the knower] exists, and because simultaneity and non-simultaneity are not found as cognition. The disjunct entities, too, are

mere labels for certain occurrences of body and mind, but are not substances because they are neither identical nor different from them. Furthermore the absolutes are not substances but mere labels, in view of the fact that that which is to be denied does not exist.

(2) 'Process of decaying' is a name for the fact that a perishable object such as a jar does not continue for the second self-contained moment. While it is a specific characteristic of anything concrete, like the wetness of water, if the process of decaying existed apart from the thing, the thing itself would be imperishable and the process of decaying would be fortuitous, because the thing separated from its process of decaying would be imperishable, and the decaying process would exist independently as something different from the thing. If the decaying process exists as something different from the thing, of what is it the decaying process? And for what reason is it called process of decaying? If the thing and its decay are simultaneous, the thing is not made to decay by this [alleged] process of decaying, and if they are not simultaneous, the decaying process is meaningless regardless of whether it comes earlier or later.

(3) The three divisions of time do not exist *substantialiter*. If the past as that which has ceased to be, and the future as that which is not yet, exist now, everything must be now. If one argues that the past exists merely as the characteristic of that which has ceased to be, it is a label and not a substance. 'Time' is not at all a self-sufficient substance but merely an interpretation concerning things.

(4) There is no ineffable self. [This is evident from the fact that] there is no third alternative to either identity with or difference from the psycho-physical constituents, to either a permanent or an impermanent particular existent, and that [such an ineffable

self] cannot be defined according to the four points of argumentation.[33]

(5) The noetic must be non-referential. The experience of feeling happy and so on in all its vividness, without having recourse to other cognitive means, is in common parlance called a non-referential awareness. If it did not exist, all distinctions made by the man in the street would come to naught because not a single statement concerning what is immediately experienced would be possible and the sensory function pertaining to the physical-material would not be able to cognize the object; if the noetic has no images of the objects appearing before it, the object would be imperceptible.

(6) Signatum and index do not exist as such but are mere distinctions from a practical point of view. If the fire were different from its heat it would have to be cold, and since heat which is not fire is not found anywhere, fire and heat are not different entities.

(7) The inexhaustible substance is not some other agency producing the effect of one's actions. Apart from the fact that action and effect stand in mutual relationship, a [special] substance, different from the physical-material and the mental, called 'inexhaustible substance,' cannot be validly proved. Its postulation violates the logic of the general refutation of an 'attainment-possession' and of the particular unnecessariness of such a substance.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS

WHILE IT cannot be denied that the Vaibhāṣikas contributed enormously to the subsequent development of Buddhist philosophy, the charge that their system contained considerable inadequacies is not wholly unjustified. Their main weakness lay in the field of epistemology and in what may aptly be called their substantive-substantialism, and it was here that the Sautrāntikas started with their critique.

It can easily be pointed out that the Vaibhāṣikas' theory of knowledge is merely a hypothesis, for it can never be experienced that knowledge is the product of any collision of basically neutral substances, be this collision between the instantaneous noetic and the punctiform 'atoms' or between the former and the latter's derivatives. We have a perception and immediately are aware of certain objective things, and every total state of mind seems to be diversified both qualitatively and objectively. This diversity can be expressed in the two statements 'I see a chair' and 'I feel happy.' The former seems to express *what,* and not *how,* I am perceiving, the latter *how,* and not *what,* I am feeling. Of course, words like 'seeing,' 'feeling,' and so on, as we use them, do introduce the 'fallacy of many questions,' and there also seems to exist an unbridgeable gulf between 'feeling' and 'knowing-perceiving.' This gulf certainly does not exist in Buddhist thought where 'feeling' as understood by us connotes a 'feeling judgment' and where 'knowledge' does not conflict with what we would call a 'mood' which in a certain sense is cognitive inasmuch as it constantly reveals the rough situation of which I am the centre and how it is going with me. Since knowledge is not like other phenomena in that it stands above them and interprets or illumines them all, the Sautrān-

tikas, taking notice of this circumstance, introduced the idea of what may literally be translated as 'self-knowledge' (*rang-rig*), a term which in course of time became misinterpreted. This was due to a purely linguistic accident. The term *rang-rig* looks formally like *gzhan-rig* which, on the anology of 'self-knowledge,' we may provisionally translate as 'other-knowledge.' But while the latter indicates such situations as expressed in statements like 'I see a chair,' or 'I am aware of something' (thus avoiding the ambiguity of the verb 'to see'), the former only refers to such a statement as 'I feel somehow' or 'I am aware somehow'; and while the latter can be stated to be a description of a non-referential event (which possibly has an objective constituent, although this event also may be 'purely subjective'), the former certainly is a referential event having both an epistemological object (the upholstery of a certain chair) and an objective constituent (a patch of a certain colour and shape). Confusion and misinterpretation set in when a possible objective constituent is equated with an epistemological object: a procedure easily prompted by the linguistic form of the term *rang-rig.* Those who do not recognize 'self-knowledge' link their rejection to the assumption that there are no non-referential events, but only referential ones, while actually it seems to be more likely that every mental state is at any moment never wholly non-referential and never wholly referential, and that both 'self-knowledge' (*rang-rig,* non-referential awareness) and 'other-knowledge' (*gzhan-rig,* referential awareness) are abstractions of a 'single event,' and these abstractions then habitually start leading an existence of their own.

'Cognizing' is a certain kind of determinable relation to an object and 'feeling towards' an object is another determinable relation. It is, however, possible to manage with only a single determinable relation to an object which may be called 'objective reference.' The difference between 'cognizing' and 'feeling towards' would in this case simply be a difference in the qualities of the term which stands at that moment in the relation of reference to an object. For instance, I may think of my wife and then love her. In both instances there is simply

a certain determinate form of the general relation of reference between my mind and my wife. Since I cannot love or hate or fear anyone or anything without having an idea of him or her or the object towards which I take this attitude, it is possible and even plausible to identify a cognitive relation with the general relation of objective reference, and to suppose that the validity of this relation goes together with the fact that the event involved in this relation has at that time a certain quality which determines whether the attitude is called 'love' or 'hate' or 'fear' or whatever. On this supposition the mind (*sems*) and mental events (*sems-byung*) are no longer separate 'substances' as postulated by the Vaibhāṣikas, but are just *one* 'substance' as is claimed by the Sautrāntikas.

This interest in epistemological questions was to dominate the whole line of thought of the Sautrāntikas, who in many respects foreshadowed the subsequent mentalistic development of Indian Buddhist philosophy. There also is one other point which ought to be mentioned at this stage. The Sautrāntikas' line of thought is not one man's philosophy but comprises a variety of theories, the uniting feature being the fact that all of them are essentially related to epistemology. Because of this interest, they asserted in the realm of what is that anything that can be perceived is an object (*yul*) for the mind, and they distinguished between being 'objective' and being 'objectifiable.' To be 'objective' means that a perceptual situation has an objective constituent, and being 'objectifiable' means being capable of corresponding to the epistemological object of some referential perceptual situation. Since *everything* is in principle epistemologically objectifiable, inasmuch as everything can be thought about and is thus capable of corresponding to the epistemological object of some thought-situation, everything is 'knowable.'

The Sautrāntikas' analysis of perceptual situations led them to a re-evaluation of the so-called two truths. In order to understand the Sautrāntikas' position it will be necessary to give a rapid survey of what is implied when we speak of perceptual and cognitive situations. It is the nature of any perceptual situation that whenever it arises we claim to be in cognitive

contact with something other than ourselves or our states, and this claim extends to those situations which are commonly believed to be veridical, as well as to those which are commonly held to be delusive. The two situations 'I am seeing a chair' and 'I am seeing a pink elephant' are exactly alike in having an epistemological object. The difference is that in one situation it is assumed that there also is an ontological object corresponding to the epistemological object, while in the other no such object obtains.

It is further assumed that in perceptual situations the epistemological object is of the physical kind and that its corresponding ontological object, if ever there should be one, must be a physical object.

But there also are situations which have an epistemological object of the physical kind but are not perceptual. For instance, the epistemological object of the two situations which I verbalize as 'I am seeing a jug' and 'I am thinking of a jug' is in both cases of the physical kind. Yet there is a difference; in the former case I seem to be in cognitive contact with the jug in a more direct and immediate way, while in the latter I seem to be at a distance. The perceptual situation, which may be termed 'intuitive,' is distinct by its directness from the thought-situation, which is 'discursive.' A further characteristic of a thought situation is that in it I can think of anything, regardless of whether it is held veridical or delusive in a perceptual situation.

The Sautrāntikas were clearly aware of these two kinds of cognitive situations, which we have described as 'intuitive' and 'discursive.' For them an 'intuitive' perceptual situation which common sense holds to be veridical was absolutely real, while a thought-situation was relatively real and, insofar as it was only relatively real, from the viewpoint of the absolutely real, it could even be claimed to be delusive. We shall see in a subsequent chapter that this conclusion was actually put forward by certain Buddhist philosophers. Although the trend towards considering thought-situations as delusive or relatively real was very marked, the Sautrāntikas by virtue of their penetrating analysis of cognitive situations did not com-

mit the mistake of equating the epistemological object of a thought-situation with the latter's relative validity. The epistemological object of, say, a jug, is as real as that of a 'centaur,' but while the former fulfills the expectation of there being something denoted by the phrase 'the jug,' which forms an essential factor in a perceptual situation, and therefore is absolutely real, the latter is not so, precisely because it does not fulfill this expectation.

Due to their analysis of perceptual situations the Sautrāntikas were at once faced with the question: 'What is the relationship between the objective constituent, which accurately corresponds to the epistemological object of a perceptual situation, and the physical object which we are said to perceive in this situation?' Their answer was that there is a certain *sensum* (*rnam-pa*) which, as the objective constituent, has a certain characteristic and which stands in a certain relation to a certain physical object. By virtue of this relation the sensum is an 'appearance of' the physical object. This relation was then described as a many-one relation, that is to say, many different sensa can be appearances of one physical object, while no one sensum can be an appearance of several physical objects. According to the Sautrāntikas' view, the objective constituents of perceptual situations are particular existents of a peculiar kind; they are not literally parts of the perceived object, although they resemble physical objects as ordinarily conceived. They are more like mental states in their privacy and dependence on the mind of the observer. The full force of this implication, however, was realized by the subsequent mentalistic schools of Buddhism, who argued that the sensible form and size and distance of objective constituents was determined by the individual's predominant interests and beliefs. Nevertheless, the Sautrānikas' analysis of perceptual situations already left the existence of physical objects highly hypothetical. It was certainly a mere concession to the uncritical common-sense view, rather than a critical assessment, on the part of some Sautrāntikas when they claimed that, regardless of whether the situation is veridical or totally delusive, the situation does have an objective constituent, and

that, where the situation is commonly held to be coinciding with what is assumed to be real, the objective constituent or the sensum has been created by the hypothetical object, which as the emitting region is the *dependently* necessary condition of the sensum and its specific characteristic. Where the situation is totally delusive and where there is no emitting region at all, as in visual situations such as dreams and hallucinations, it was held that the sensum was due to the *independently* necessary condition, which in either case is a living body with a suitable brain or mind.

The Sautrāntikas in this way accepted three kinds of perceptual situations: the first corresponded to what common sense holds to be a veridical situation in which the existence of an ontological object corresponding to the epistemological one is assumed; the second was of an illusory character; and the third was of a visionary or hallucinatory nature, recognized as a regular phenomenon in religious living.[1]

Inasmuch as every cognitive situation is made up of a subjective and an objective factor which together determine the particular cognition, and inasmuch as the subjective factor makes us speak of 'being aware,' while the objective factor as the epistemological object of the cognitive situation seems to be the 'appearance' (or 'semblance') of what we are aware of, the Sautrāntikas correctly epitomized the character of every cognitive situation in the words: "The subjective factor constitutes the clear experiencing; appearance [standing in the relation of] similarity [to the sensum] constitutes the epistemological object. Therefore, every cognitive situation presents itself as the difference between the subjective factor experiencing the epistemological object [and the epistemological object being experienced]."[2]

Another significant contribution towards the development of Buddhist philosophical thought by the Sautrāntikas was their critique of the Vaibhāṣikas' substantive-substantialism. The so-called 'disjunct entities,' which essentially were schemata of interpretation, were for the Vaibhāṣikas entities existing *substantialiter*, but for the Sautrāntikas they had merely a nominal existence and heuristic significance. Yet, while they

were able to expose the naive assumptions of the Vaibhāṣikas' substantive-substantialism, they themselves were still hampered by their desire to retain much of what common-sense believes and, therefore, in claiming for these entities an *existence,* though only a nominal one, they failed to realize that the problem of existence, if it is one, is not solved by substituting *'subsistence'* for it. However, it was from the time of the Sautrāntikas that in Buddhist philosophy the distinction between '(particular) existents' (*dngos-po*) and 'subsistents' (*dngos-med*) was made, and while the former were transitory (*mi-rtag pa*) the latter were everlasting (*rtag-pa*).* This had important consequences for the conception of Nirvāṇa. While the Sautrāntikas agreed with the Vaibhāṣikas that it meant the cessation of phenomenal existence and could not be determined as being either this or that, they differed from them in claiming that the ultimate status of this state of extinction was that of subsistence and not of existence, because for them 'particular existent' was tautologous with 'transitoriness' and 'concreteness,' all of which was not applicable to Nirvāṇa.

Apart from contributing to and developing the logical method of philosophical inquiry, the Sautrāntikas were the first to generalize the idea of temporal sequence in a cause-effect situation. In talking about causality in Buddhism, it is of the utmost importance to be aware of the points of divergence from our ways of thinking. The conceptual framework of Buddhist associative and co-ordinative thinking was something different from the traditional European causal and nomothetic thinking. In the Buddhist universe events did not happen because of fiats issued by a supreme creator and despotic lawgiver. Nothing whatsoever has been created in the universe. Events come about because they fit into the pattern of a universe based on order, and these events cooperate in perfect freedom and not in obedience to some super-will, nor to some mathematically expressible regularity depending upon some cause which can be isolated. Causality, if such a term is ever applicable, posits an interlocking system of hierarchically fluctuating cause-factors. That is to say, the cause-

* See chart on page 38.

situation was already a 'network' of interdependent, co-existent and freely co-operating forces, and in this network at any given time any one factor may take the highest place in a hierarchy of causes and effect. The Sautrāntikas, who generalized the idea of temporal sequence, did not, however, repudiate the idea of interdependence. They merely criticized the Vaibhāṣikas' assumption of causal co-existence in the realm of the noetic. For the Vaibhāṣikas, mind and mental events were different substances existing simultaneous with each other, the one being a function of the other; for the Sautrāntikas, they were one substance; hence any total noetic situation was anteceded or followed by another noetic situation, which implies temporal sequence and not co-existence. Here again we note the pre-eminent interest in psychological and cognitive processes, which, in turn, had a moral-ethical reference. Not only did the virtues and vices, i.e., the mental attitudes, of an individual inescapably result in the endowment with which he or she began his or her subsequent phase of being, they also had their inescapable effects upon man's natural environment. Human morality remained bound up with the phenomena of non-human nature. After all, man is part of the universe. It is he who as 'causal agent' creates his world which, in turn, is a 'causal agent' creating him. This is so, because 'causality' in Buddhism is, as has been noted, an interlocking system and not a linear sequence of cause and effect.

Since no major works by Sautrāntika philosophers have been preserved in the Indian original, *The Jewel Garland*'s impartial account of their epistemological interests and their contribution to the development of Buddhist logic is particularly welcome. Furthermore, since the author clarifies the relationship of Sautrāntika thought with subsequent philosophical systems, we are enabled to see the organic development of Buddhist philosophy.

The Summary, on the other hand, singles out the assumptions which in course of time had become the target of criticism. It is also to be noted that the author links the Pratyekabuddhayāna, the spiritual pursuit of self-styled Buddhas,

with the Sautrāntika philosophy. In so doing, however, he does not simply equate a philosophical system with a certain attitude towards life. Rather, since a Pratyekabuddha is superior in intelligence to a Śrāvaka but inferior to a Bodhisattva, and since the development of the subsequent philosophical systems and the emphasis on the Bodhisattva ideal coincided with the spread of the Mahāyāna, with which he is so much in favour, he had to place the Pratyekabuddhayāna in between the beginnings and the climax of philosophical speculation.

FROM

THE SUMMARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

YID-BZHIN GRUB-MTHA' BSDUS-PA

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I

THE PHILOSOPHICAL tenets of the Sautrāntikas are, on the whole, the same as those of the Vaibhāṣikas. Their special tenets are:

1) Four generating cause-factors.
2) Appearance being [phenomenal] mind.
3) The hypothetical nature of the object.[6]
4) The spacelessness of atoms.
5) The causal efficiency of the sensory functions.
6) The disjunct entities being labels, and
7) Nirvāṇa being subsistence.

These seven topics do not constitute a correct philosophical view, because they all have the defects inherent in a view accepting particular existents.

1) The (basic) cause situation represents a mere capability of assisting [the production of] an effect; it sets up the facticity (*ngo-bo*) [of a situation]. The dominant cause-factor [in the situation] represents a mere absence of hindrances; it sets up the specificity [of a situation]. The referential cause-factor represents any object before the knowing mind. The similar-immediate cause-factor sets up a subsequent cognitive [situation] similar to the antecedent one immediately after the latter has ceased.

The basic cause situation comprises five causes (aspects): associate, [hierarchically] universal, similar, initiative, and co-existent.

Within this framework mind and mental events originate from four cause-factors; the two attainments of the suspension of attitudinal and functional operations and of induced unconsciousness do so from three, the referential cause-factor being absent; and the disjunct entities as well as the whole of the physical-material from two, the basic cause-situation and the dominant cause-factor.[7]

2) In claiming that all that appears, such as visions, illusions, and ontological objects, is actually one's mind, the Sautrāntikas are similar to those who hold *sensa* to be coinciding with what is assumed to be real.[8]

3) While there is no ontological object corresponding to what appears as a vision or an illusion, that which appears to be a real or ontological object is but a *sensum* before the mind [in the sense] that the [alleged] external object transmits a replica of itself [i.e. the *sensum*] to the mind. An object such as a jug is never actually observed. The appearance of a jug, and the place where this appearance is believed to exist, are indistinguishably hypothetical. We speak in common parlance of a cognition experiencing an object, because we are made aware of a likeness when, in the first instance, the three causal factors of object, sensory capacity, and cognition combine, and when subsequently a sensum [believed to be] an object is sensed, [which is a process] similar to the reflection in a mirror.[9]

4) Since it is irrelevant whether the atoms operate with or without intervals between them when building up the physical universe, it is further claimed that there are no spaces between them in their conglomerate. This is believed to be true either because no actual contact exists in such a conglomerate due to the absence of any intervals, or because there is no conglomerate with contact due to the fact that, although in the absence of intervals a conglomerate [is said to] occur, there is no [actual] conglomerate.[10]

5) The substance [representing] a sensory function is a capacity which can generate the appropriate sensation in a live sense organ such as the eye. It is claimed to be proved by circularity, due to the fact that the sensory awareness such as

a visual sensation arises in dependence upon this capacity, which itself has come into existence by virtue of an antecedent sensory awareness.

6) Since the disjunct entities such as origination, annihilation, and the rest are neither identical with nor different from the physical-material, the mind, and the mental events, they are postulates and mere names like a mountain or a fence.

7) The three spiritual pursuits agree that in Nirvāṇa the psychophysical constituents together with their potentialities [of re-appearing] have ceased to operate and that this cessation of the objectively given, which is like clouds disappearing in the sky, is just its indivisibility from the sphere of absolute reality. The Sautrāntikas' claim that this is just nothing is similar to that of the Vaibhāṣikas. However, the Sautrāntikas do not claim this substance, devoid of the objectively given, to have an existence in its own right.

The critique of these tenets is as follows:

1) When we examine what brings about an effect or its absence, be it by cause and effect meeting or not meeting each other or by simultaneity or non-simultaneity, by resorting to any of the four alternatives such as origination by itself [or by something else or by both alternatives together or by neither], origination ultimately does not proceed from cause-factors [postulated *ad hoc*].

2–3) If appearance is [phenomenal] mind and if an object is hypothetical, it is difficult to make a valid distinction between that which is immediately given and that which in knowledge is hypothetical. Even if an object were not hypothetical, it would not exist as a real external object, because of its apparent character.

4) If there are no spaces between the atoms, it logically follows that they coalesce into a single [atom], and if they do not touch each other or do not conglomerate, it follows equally that there are spaces between them. There is no third alternative.

5) A sensory function capacity is refuted in the ultimate sense by the refutation of its being a function, and while it suffices to say that the sensory function produces the sensory

awareness, there is no special need to label this as a capacity.

6) If the disjunct entities are nothing but postulates, the tenet of the eternalistic Vedāntic theory follows, because impermanence would not be inherent in the knowable.[11]

7) Nirvāṇa is not mere subsistence in which concrete existence has ceased. The Hīnayāna Nirvāṇa is not something absolutely ultimate, because the [intellectual] veil has not yet been torn, and Buddhahood is not discontinuity, because there is no reason that working for sentient beings should remain incomplete and that transcendent awareness [of Buddhahood] should cease.

II

The Pratyekabuddha [self-styled Buddha] is a man of medium intelligence. When by virtue of what he has learned by previous experiences, in his last life in this world, he objectively looks at what is real by means of the Pratītyasamutpāda,[12] he becomes aware of the non-existence of an individual self and of the fact that whatever is apprehendable has no reality in itself; but although he understands one and a half of what is implied by the non-existence of an ontological principle and although he achieves his goal, the saintly status of a Pratyekabuddha, he is still classified as lower than the Mahāyāna follower.

All the entities of reality, be they of the within or the without, come into existence in interrelation. Just as outwardly a sprout shoots forth from a seed, there is inwardly the concatenation from unknowing to old age and death. Motivation is the stock of karmic activity available in this life due to the presence of unknowing which has failed to become aware of what is real in a previous life. From motivation comes conscious activity, which is both the cause projecting a [future] life-form and the result of the projection. From conscious activity through the successive stages of embryonic growth, develop the psycho-physical constituents subsumed under the headings of 'four "names" and form.'[13] From here the six cognitive 'fields' related to the eye and the rest of the senses come into being, and when from this stage

onwards a rapport situation has been formed in which the sense-object, the sensory function, and the sense-awareness combine, feeling follows. From feeling comes the desire, then comes the self-identification with the objective situation, and from this comes the life-form possibility with its available karmic energy; from this comes the [actual] existence in one of the six forms of life, and from and with it old age and death.

Of these twelve topics, unknowing, desire and self-identification represent emotivity; motivation and life-form possibility represent karmic activity; the remaining seven represent the mass of frustrating unsatisfactoriness. In this way, out of emotivity comes karmic activity and from this in turn comes frustration, and since from frustration emotivity and karmic activity take their origin, the concatenation leading from one life-possibility to another will revolve until this trend of unknowing has been reversed.

The meditational method of the Pratyekabuddha is as follows: He looks at a skeleton in a cremation ground and becomes aware of the fact that it has come about through death. This has been due to birth and in this way he goes back to the [original source of] unknowing. Realizing that this unknowing is abolished by a discrimination which intuitively understands the non-existence of an individual self, he applies this cognitive process to himself. By thinking of the stages in this development of old age and death from birth, the former being the quintessence of frustration, he intuitively grasps the truth of frustration. By thinking of the process by which old age and death cease to be relevant when [repeated] birth has come to an end, he arrives at the truth of the end of frustration. By thinking of how motivation and what follows arise from unknowing, the source from which frustration takes its origin, he intuitively grasps the truth of the origin of frustration. By thinking of how motivation and what follows will come to an end when unknowing has ceased to operate, he will in one session realize his goal either of a Prateykabuddha living in a crowd [of similarly minded persons] or of a Prateykabuddha of the lonely wolf type. This is due to

his realization that the essence of the truth of the path [towards the abolishment of frustration], consisting of the conscious cultivation of the idea of the non-existence of an individual self and other topics as the counter-agent of the origination of frustration, is [the development of his own] cognitive capacity.

The Pratyekabuddha type is not the last word [in spiritual development] because there are others destined for the one and ultimate course. The Pratītyasamutpāda also is nothing in itself, because origination through mutual meeting and other topics are not found anywhere. If the apprehendable is nothing real, then the apprehending [agent] also is nothing real, because the apprehendable and the apprehender are on the same level. Delighting in solitariness is not the behaviour of a highly cultured man. Ultimately, there is neither solitariness nor nonsolitariness. A mind bent on tranquility in [individual] solitude does not represent a noble intention, and since [such a] goal is not something ultimate, the Pratyekabuddha's path is an inferior one.

CHAPTER FOUR

MENTALISTIC-PHENOMENALISTIC TRENDS

THE ALMOST inevitable 'next step' from the analysis of perceptual situations as performed by the Sautrāntikas is the mentalistic view, which denies that there are external physical objects to cause our sensations and perceptions. This view is known as the Yogācāra teaching and the use of the word *yoga* here emphasizes the importance of introspective techniques. The adherents of this view are generally referred to as 'those who think that mind alone counts' (*sems-tsam-pa*). Now in Buddhist philosophical thought 'mind' (*sems*) does not mean a typical idealized mind or an actual super-mind of which all other minds would be constituents. It is therefore extremely misleading to equate this Buddhist line of thought with 'idealism,' be it of the subjective or objective variety. In order to avoid confusion, the term 'idealism,' which even in Western philosophical thought is a misnomer, will be used only when reference to ideals is involved, and when it characterizes the doctrine that the nature of the universe is such that those characteristics which are most valuable will either be present eternally, or will be manifested in even greater intensity and wider extent as time goes on. In contradistinction, the term 'mentalism' will be used when the view is expresed that the relatively permanent conditions of interrelated sensa are minds. Furthermore, since the Buddhist term for 'mind' (*sems*) is wider in scope than what may be called 'a particular mind-entity,' according to the systems which use it, the word 'mind' must be understood not only as a symbol for such a particular entity, but also as a symbol for the particular experience which, in those persons who

have had it, has brought forth the peculiar response expressed in the proposition that 'mind alone counts' (*sems-tsam*). Consequently, it will be necessary to restrict the use of the term 'mentalism' even further, and to employ it only when epistemological problems are involved.

Before proceeding with the mentalistic system, it will be useful to give a rapid survey of the terms used for what we call 'mind.' It will have been observed from the foregoing chapters that Buddhism developed a functional, rather than a static, interpretation of mind, and described it by three different terms: *sems, yid,* and *rnam-(par) shes-(pa)*. Of these terms, the last one denotes man's perceptions; the middle one the co-ordination of the data of his senses and his 'thoughts.' The first one describes man's responsiveness and indicates the fact that all awareness is intentional or relational, from a subjective pole to an object of some sort; in other words, it names the bipolar structure of immediate experience. While the Vaibhāṣikas had emphasized the intentional or relational and referential character of this responsiveness (*sems*), the Sautrāntikas drew attention to the fact that there also is a nonreferential aspect to mind. Consequently the structure of 'mind' in Buddhist philosophy can be shown diagrammatically as follows:



All schools of Buddhism accepted this structure of mind except that the Vaibhāṣikas and Prāsangikas did not recognize the non-referential aspect. The former probably based their attitude upon their object-orientated analysis of perceptual and cognitive situations, while the latter must be accused of either having confused *in*spection with *intro*spection, or having demanded of introspection something which no one would demand of inspection.

The mentalists claimed that we can and do have introspective knowledge of such situations as sensing a coloured patch or feeling a pain. The Prāsangikas at once objected that in such cases when we try to *intro*spect this situation we merely *in*spect the coloured patch or the pain itself. Against their objection it has to be said that, assuming that there actually is such an objective situation as sensing a coloured patch or feeling a pain, it must consist of at least two constituents which are related in a specific way by an asymmetrical relation, so that one constituent occupies the special position of *objective* constituent and the other the equally special one of subjective constituent. It further has to be noted that the relating relation in a *complex* of the kind just mentioned, for which introspective knowledge is claimed, is never a constituent of this complex in the same way as the terms are. The complex itself *is* the objective situation of sensing a coloured patch or feeling a pain, and we have direct and non-inferential knowledge of its relating relation which makes this complex of such and such a structure. If, however, we did nothing but inspect each constituent we would never know them to be constituents of a complex whole. So much for what may be called introspective knowledge of our states.

Taking their cue from the Sautrāntikas' non-referential aspect of mind, the mentalists developed it into aesthetic experience *simpliciter* or pure sensation. Here, the intuitive apprehension of a coloured patch would be 'objective' and 'non-referential' inasmuch as it would have an objective constituent but no epistemological object. Some of the mentalists seem to have been inclined to hold the view that apparently coloured patches were literally mental events

which, on the basis of this view, would be both non-objective and non-referential in the same way as a feeling as such would be. Such an event would then be 'purely subjective.' A natural outcome of the mentalists' position of emphasizing the non-referential character of 'mind' was the distinction between being 'epistemologically objectifiable' as developed and discussed by the Sautrāntikas, and being 'psychologically objectifiable,' which means to be capable of being an objective constituent of some objective mental situation. If, as some of the mentalists seem to have believed, a coloured patch is a non-objective mental event, it nevertheless becomes an objective constituent of a mental situation whenever it is sensed or used for perceiving.

In course of time the mentalists were accused of upholding pure subjectivism and of being unable to go beyond it. They certainly advocated causal subjectivity by which anything is defined as subjective when it is assumed to have as a necessary condition of its being the occurrence of a percipient event. The conclusion that anything generated by a percipient (mental) event is ipso facto mental does not follow, as the critics of the mentalists have pointed out. For a thing is *not* proved to be mental in any ordinary sense, even if it is proved that the sole necessary conditions of its existence are mental. Although the mentalists claimed causal subjectivity, they did not subscribe to existential subjectivity by which is implied that anything that owes its being to a percipient event occurring in me, exists only *for* me (solipsism). It is logically possible that even if the occurrence of a percipient event is essential for the generation of its character as a particular, the latter may persist after its perception has ceased.

The situation is complicated still further by the fact that the mentalists were divided as to whether what we perceive or sense and feel is veridical or delusive. The term used to denote that which we directly sense and are aware of is *rnam-pa*, which admits of various terms in English, those of 'observable quality,' 'particular character' and 'sensum' being the most accurate ones. These sensa are not essences, timeless and ingenerative entities, but particular data; not universals

characterizing particular existents, but attributes of the 'object,' which must be understood as being capable of having particulars as attributes. This is possible when the 'object' is itself not another concrete particular, but an 'event'—a region of space at a given time. In other words, the particular or character which is my sensum (*rnam-pa*), though generated by the percipient event in me, exists at the present time 'out there' in a certain determinate region of space at a certain determinate time, and, insofar as this is the case, may be credited with an attributive objectivity or veridicalness.

A number of theories of perception are mentioned in this context in the indigenous works, but it is extremely difficult to extract some definite and distinctive meaning out of them and to relate them to similar theories in Western philosophies, because their initial intentions had already become problematic by the time that they were codified and transmitted in the Tibetan works summarizing the main trends of Buddhist philosophy. Only in this way can the fact be accounted for that under one and the same title quite divergent views are enumerated, some of which certainly could never have been proposed by the mentalists. The following remarks, therefore, do not pretend to be more than tentative propositions about Buddhist problems of perception.

One of the major problems seems to have involved the question whether my perceptual datum, e.g., red, is or is not a duplicate or representation of a character or observable quality of the 'object,' but *is* just that character itself. Another problem seemingly dealt with the fact that not all experiences with which we are acquainted are sensations. There are images, thoughts, feelings, pleasures, and pains. The ways in which a man becomes acquainted with colours, sounds, smells, or pains need not involve his being sensitive in any other way than that he be capable of simple detection or inspection of such things. This in effect would explain the having of sensations as the *not* having any sensations (there being no sensa/sensation). Lastly, perception seems to have been recognized as a unique pattern of relationships, quali-

ties, and properties that cannot be broken up without being altered at the same time.

Whatever the various theories may have specifically implied, the obvious difficulties that attach to the problem of the veridicalness and attributive objectivity of sensa are not solved by declaring the latter to be delusive, as was done by some mentalists. First of all, inasmuch as sensa are assumed to owe their being to a percipient event and hence are 'causally subjective' and, in all probability, also 'existentially subjective' it is rather unlikely, if not impossible, that the one constituent should be delusive while the other is and remains veridical. Furthermore, this type of reasoning seems to be prepared to admit in advance that there is an absurdity inherent in the very idea of knowledge and then, in order to escape the implications, invokes an Absolute Mind of which it is said that its knowing is not subject to the infirmities of ordinary human knowing.

Here two types developed, a weaker one which attempted to preserve some semblance of what is ordinarily understood by perception, and a stronger, absolutistic one. Whatever the validity or fallacy of their epistemological theories may have been, there can be no doubt that these two types paved the way to a new conception of ontology and of metaphysics.

Although in a certain sense the mentalists did not escape subjectivism, they greatly contributed to a genetic theory of mind, developing the idea of a 'substratum awareness,' a stratum of being (*kun-gzhi*) which has been interpreted in different ways by two of the four major traditions in Tibet, the rNying-ma-pas and the dGe-lugs-pas. The latter took this stratum to be a homogenous interiority, capable of retaining structures and their modifications (*bag-chags*). Its status was both '(existentially) uncompromised' and '(ethically) neutral' yet it was being disrupted by a thrust of consciousness to its object in a sort of *cogito* which is still prereflective. In this upsurge the stratum loses its status of being 'uncompromised' and also of being 'neutral' although it does not become '(ethically) positive' or 'negative.' In other words, it becomes

'individuated' and the background of all subsequent reflective conscious activity. There are thus two consciousnesses involved: a reflective consciousness-*of* and a consciousness reflected-*on*. This is to say, while every consciousness is a consciousness *of* something, it is not a thetic consciousness of itself, and explicit positing of itself; it rather remains a non-positional consciousness (of) itself. But in this upsurge of consciousness to its object it constitutes an other as the 'real' I; i.e., the non-positional consciousness is presented in an act to a consciousness-*of*, as having a certain noematic objective sense which is claimed to be 'the self.' This act initiates a 'compromised mind' because the mind's initial status has become disintegrated and has been robbed of its integrity. It is now a real *cogito* whose status is 'dimmed,' 'obscured,' 'compromised' (*bsgribs*) due to its evolving egoness. But insofar as this status is just the *being* of consciousness it is still 'neutral.' Only by entering the habitual reflective and cognitive levels it makes itself experienced as ethically varied ('good' and 'evil').

It is quite obvious that the *kun-gzhi* was treated both as a process of becoming conscious-*of* and as a stratum of being, the difference between epistemology and metaphysics was not clearly in focus.

The rNying-ma-pas must be credited with having clarified this problem and having made a singular contribution to the development of Buddhist philosophy. For them there exists in man a faculty which is capable of discerning the ultimate, and in order to be able to discern the ultimate, man must, in some way, partake of the ultimate. The latter is known by its Indian designation *dharmakāya* (*chos-sku*) and the faculty that is capable of discerning it is known as *rig-pa*, which is best translated by 'aesthetic experience' or 'intrinsic perception,' as it refers to the apprehension of the full intrinsic perceptual being *and* value of the object or field, and brings into action, in a specific way, the total being of the percipient. It is contrasted with ordinary perception (*sems*) which is essentially a means to a metaperceptual end. The nature of man as a partaker in the absolute is known as his

'constitutional ability to become enlightened' which, as it were, acts as a mediator between man's absolute nature and his individual nature of a conscious and perceptual being. It is this latter nature that is tied up with the *kun-gzhi* inasmuch as 'being a (human) being' is tantamount to 'being compromised'; man is a 'fallen' being, not from the fact that he has committed such and such a sin, but simply because he has 'fallen,' 'gone astray' into the world, into the midst of things. More properly speaking, a man *qua* man represents a continuously on-going act of 'falling' or going astray. The *kun-gzhi* therefore is an '(existentially) compromising' force, even when it is still '(ethically) neutral.' It is 'compromising' by the very fact that it forms the basis of the experientially initiated potentialities of experience which operate through every sense and by means of which an individual's animate organism becomes the most immediate actualization of his or her volitional activity and of emotional habits.

Viewing the rNying-ma-pas' fully developed conception of the *kun-gzhi* as a whole, it is evident that it is an extremely complex one and that it developed from the reflective observation of the continuously on-going embodiment of the flux of mental life. In other words, first of all we have the *kun-gzhi* as the phenomenon of a continuously on-going act of going astray. This act has no 'beginning' because it is the functionality of the *kun-gzhi* and because there is no 'before.' The going astray implies a process of singling out, which gives the individual the experience of 'my body' and 'me-as-acting'; this experience is tied up with some kind of 'feeling' which is both 'perceiving' and 'emotionally active and reactive' (*bag-chags*). The disclosure of my 'being active' focuses attention on the individual's body as an orientational centre in relation to which the world and its multiple objects are organized. Lastly, an individual's being is a synthetically organized system of what is commonly spoken of as body and mind.

The growing interest in metaphysics, which characterized the whole mentalistic movement, carried forward the attempt to bridge the gulf between the wordly and the transworldly,

to blend the sensible with the supersensible, the human with the transcendental or, as the Tantras would say, the divine. In passing it may be noted that the mentalistic movement was the motivating power behind the flowering of Buddhist art which is the embodiment of the fundamental ideas, concepts, and values in metaphysics.

Metaphysical considerations are prominent in the mentalists' assumption of three 'absolutely specific constitutive principles':

1. The 'notional-conceptual' corresponds to what we would call a formal sign whose whole function is a meaning, a signifying of something else to a knowing power, particularly in a conversational setting. Its hallmark is universality, because it is impossible for us to say or think about anything without using formal signs or concepts that are universal. Thus, the jug in front of me is conceived of as a jug, made of clay, brown in colour, fragile, etc. Yet the notion 'jug' does not apply just to this particular jug, but to any and all jugs, and the same is true of any other notions such as 'brown in colour,' 'fragile,' 'in front of me' and so on. Further, we must have the concept "jug" in order to become aware of a jug, but it is not necessary to be aware of the concept 'jug' in order to become aware of what it signifies, its *significatum*. "Apart from merely being a tag (a being of reason) used and created by apprehending something while verbalizing a non-ideal universality, the notional-conceptual is not something having an ontological status; it is like a sky-flower having no essence." [1] Since formal signs are nothing but meanings or intentions, it is possible to distinguish between first and second intentions. This is to say, the jug as it is in itself is an object of first intention, while the jug as it is in a condition of being known or of being an object before the mind is an object of second intention.

The nature of the notional-conceptual may be restated in the following way which would account for its being conceived as an absolutely specific constitutive principle. If I express a feeling with a word, the word is meant to be an indication of the reality which evokes within myself, let us say, the

power of my loving. The *word* 'love' is meant to be a symbol for the *fact* 'love,' but as soon as it is spoken it tends to assume a life of its own, it becomes a 'reality.' Consequently I come under the spell of the illusion that the saying of this word is the equivalent of the experience, and soon I say the word and feel nothing, except the *thought* of love which the word expresses. All this is a complete deviation from intrinsic perception.

2. The 'relative' refers to certain experiences or 'states' with which everyone of us is familiar, but which our language can only describe by the stimulus which produces these states. This is because human language developed from references to what are believed to be the concrete things around us, but not from what goes on in referring to them. There are no words which at the same time cover the within and the without. Only indirectly can we say 'the state which would occur if a person saw a jug.' It is precisely this state that is indicated by 'the relative,' not the relation that holds between two terms or connects two events. It is a state in which subject and object are given together, because subject *qua* subject means to 'function,' and to 'function' means to 'relate' oneself to an object which is given, together with the subject, as the possibility of positive and negative judgments. To relate oneself to something means that the subject is constantly varying its relation to the object, but while the subject-object relation is unequivocal, its functionality reveals the plurality of objects. "Mountains, wells, plots of land, houses, residences and other 'objects' of the world, as well as the sentient beings as the 'subjects' therein, seem to each of us at every moment to be mutually apart and distant from each other, and this is the mode of things appearing as objects external to the observer. However, since this mode of appearing is itself not something empirically verifiable, objects external to the observer do not exist [apart from functionality]. What then is the mode of being or of existing of mountains, wells, houses, sentient beings and so on, which constitutes 'the relative'? When the eye sees a figure, the ear hears a sound, the nose smells a fragrance, the tongue tastes a flavour, the skin feels a touch, and

the mind thinks a thought, the noetic (*shes-pa*) performing all these activities is like a crystal, shining in all the colours with which it comes into contact. In this sense the 'relative' exists really, being one substance, one fact and one state in the same way as the dream-consciousness and the house we dream of are one event." [2]

3. The 'ideally absolute' is said to rest on the 'relative' in in the sense that the former is the presential value of the latter. It is therefore not something above or behind the 'relative,' but the 'relative' in its aesthetic immediacy from which further intellectual and other abstractions may in turn be made. Still there is a difference between the 'relative' and the 'ideally absolute,' which can best be illustrated by what happens in and characterizes aesthetic experience. Here, it is necessary to distinguish between (a) aesthetic experience *simpliciter* as it exists only at the first instant in consciousness, distinguishing within itself the aesthetically valid from the aesthetcally invalid, and (b) aesthetic experience enriched by other experiences which have been put back into the crucible from which aesthetic experience emerges and upon which aesthetic intuition imposes its presential value. Thus in the moment of the validity or enjoyment of our aesthetic intuition of, say, a jar (the 'ideally absolute'), we can apprehend it aesthetically as a jar (the 'relative'). In other words, when a man looks at a jar, he has both aesthetic and intellectual activity, but he usually does not make a clear intellectual abstraction from aesthetic experience, put it back into the crucible, and then become clearly aware of a new intellectually clarified object. Rather he tends to contaminate his experience with the superficial fictions of some practical concern (the 'notional-conceptual'), which are characteristic of what may be termed 'ordinary' perception as contrasted with the richness and liveliness of aesthetic awareness. In ordinary perception a man uses perception as a means to a metaperceptual end, rather than as an end in itself.

From this account we are now in a position to understand the mentalists' definition of the three absolutely specific characteristics and their interaction:

"The 'ideally absolute' is the [aesthetic] content of the process of unerringly [and aesthetically] apprehending the phenomenal, that is, the 'relative' and the 'notional-conceptual' as well as its presential value in its own right. It is the [convincing] knowledge that the appearance of whatever constitutes the 'relative' and the awareness which makes the presential value [in the 'relative'] self-manifesting, exist as one event; and it is the intuitive awareness that any perceptual phenomenon of the 'relative,' although it appears as an external object, does not so exist as an object of practical concern, [as regards which] its *negandum* becomes the fiction of negation and that which cannot be negated by any means whatsoever, although it is merely postulated by words and concepts, that of affirmation." [3]

Both the 'ideally absolute' and the 'relative' are said to be real in an ultimate sense, while the 'notional-conceptual' is stated not to be so. This is to say that only the 'ideally absolute' and the 'relative' are significant as a means of self-growth, because as aesthetic experience they create an affection for appreciation and contemplation as against possessiveness, cultivate a sense of worth and dignity by changing things into the intrinsically interesting and intrinsically valuable. The Tantras express this by saying that the whole world is a divine (intrinsically valuable) mansion and every sentient being therein a god or goddess (an intrinsically dignified being). It is this aesthetic perception that sharply curtails the sensory, intuitive, imaginative, emotional, and intellectual processes in the interest of some ulterior end. While aesthetic perception allows a new freedom to these processes, so that they may attain their own ends and develop themselves as fully as possible, 'ordinary' perception is more likely to destroy the possibility of growth than to further it, and hence is of no significance at all. The emphasis on the aesthetic element is related to the rich world of art which is intimately linked with the mentalist movement in Buddhist philosophy. From a purely philosophical point of view the mentalists initiated a metaphysics which did not claim to reveal truths about a world that lies beyond the reach of the senses and hence no-

where; rather were they concerned with how to deal with what happens here and now, how to get the things of the world into perspective.

The fact that as metaphysicians the Buddhist mentalists saw the world in a new way and in unusual lights accounts for their drawing unusual and new conclusions in the sphere of conduct. Their conclusions constituted an essential part of the premises on which they were based. The mentalists were convinced that knowledge, Buddhahood, was a basic factor, pervading the whole world of man and the whole nature of man. To the extent an individual approximated to his very foundation of being, different 'types' were recognized. Some of them were closer to their real being, others were less so. In course of time the so-called 'cut-off' type, which at first had been considered to comprise those who would never realize their Buddha-nature, was reinterpreted as referring to those who would need a long time to grow up to be human. This re-interpretation was due to both logical and humane considerations. If every individual is capable of realizing Buddhahood because every individual is a potential Buddha, then the assumption that some will not be able to realize their true being is self-contradictory; and if every individual is a potential Buddha, then this very fact constitutes his value and thus his ultimate value cannot be disputed.

The conviction in the ultimate Buddhahood of man has found its expression in the idea of Three Kāyas. It is tempting to see in them metaphysical principles and to misunderstand their logical character in viewing them as basic premises or in concretizing them, as is evident from their lexical (and hence utterly misleading) translations by 'bodies.' The three Kāyas are value-experiences and principles of interpretation.

The Dharmakāya refers to the presence of Buddhahood as a possibility of actual being. It is a model of possible actuality; therefore, unless the very possibility of such being can be concretely envisioned, there can be no actual and concrete grasp of the essential realities with which a person growing up

to Buddhahood is concerned. Logically, also, the Dharmakāya is not only prior to the other Kāyas, but also is the structural process taking shape in the concrete. As process it is known as Dharmajñānakāya;[4] viewed ontologically it becomes the Svābhāvikakāya.

The Sambhogakāya is empathetic Buddhahood. It brings into prominence the factors of imagination and feeling. In this empathetic state the tendencies on which the perception of Buddhahood is based are not merely noted cognitively but also performed imaginatively by the percipient. Such imaginative and affective appreciation of the significance of Buddhahood is similar to the best aesthetic experience as a means of apprehending most vividly what is there for intrinsic, value-sustained perception. In this state the percipient allows himself to be transformed by the object's (Buddhahood's) intrinsic value and being, which is the aim of aesthetic experience. To this end empathy is a vitalizing factor.

The Nirmāṇakāya is embodied Buddhahood. This means that an individual becomes the concrete actualization of Buddhahood. The individual 'expresses' Buddhahood, as speech expresses thought, in an originatory way; the individual is both the 'expression' and the 'expressed.' In other words, Buddhahood, absolute in itself (*dharmakāya*), manifests (expresses) itself in the body-proper of an individual, and is manifested (expressed) by the animatedness of the body-proper of an individual, and is manifested (expressed) by the animatedness of the body-proper (*nirmāṇakāya*).

Both *The Jewel Garland* and *The Summary* agree in presenting the mentalistic-phenomenalistic trends in Buddhist philosophy as the continuation of the epistemological interests of the earlier systems both in India and Tibet. They also bring out the renewed interest in metaphysics, but they differ in its interpretation. *The Jewel Garland* remains the 'traditionalist,' merely re-stating the more or less generally accepted Indian position; *The Summary* clearly distinguishes between epistemology and metaphysics. Historically speaking, it was metaphysics that enabled Buddhism to spread to China, Korea, and Japan.

FROM

THE SUMMARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

YID-BZHIN-MDZOD-KYI GRUB-MTHA' BSDUS-PA

foll. 18b ff.

THE MENTALISTS claim that all entities of reality are subsumed under mere experience, and that the cognitive event devoid of both an objective and a subjective determinant exists really in an absolute sense.

There is a common philosophical position adopted by mentalists and a specific one which depends on their acceptance of sensa as either veridical or delusive.

COMMON PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

The common position of all the branches of this school is that the noetic, insofar as it is not divided into an objective and subjective determinant factor, is a non-referential, self-luminous event existing really in an absolute sense, while the notional-conceptual, the relative, and the ideally absolute are three absolutely specific constituent principles which define all entities of reality.

This philosophy, in brief, comprises the reality of the given, the method of acting, and the goal realized.

THE REALITY OF THE GIVEN

This comprises (a) 'types of persons' as the auspicious foundation [of philosophical-spiritual life], (b) five basic topics as the operational ground for philosophical looking, and (c) the two kinds of the non-existence of an ontological principle as the operational ground for meditative (self-) development.

(a) It is claimed that there are three types exemplary of the three spiritual courses, as well as an undecided type and a 'cut-off' type.

(b) The physical-material realm: Although external objects do not actually exist as inert things, there is an appearance of objects existing externally by virtue of the maturation of the experientially initiated potentialities of experience in the substratum [of all experiences], and the status of external objects is claimed to be like horses and elephants in dreams.

The mind: It comprises six sensory functions, an emotively-toned ego-consciousness, and a substratum—eight facets in all.

Of these the substratum is the basis of the experientially initiated potentialities of experience and becomes aware of the mere haecceity of an object. It forms a series of homogenous instants. It divides into a maturation and a germinal part, both of which constitute a mutual cause-effect relationship. It is essentially-existentially 'compromised,' but ethically neutral. It is attended by the five ever-present functions such as rapport and the rest.[30] Its objective reference, the world as a container and the sentient beings as the latter's content, is indistinct and taken broadly.

Therefore the seven [remaining] aspects of mind, together with their attendant functions, do not originate from their own series [of instants]; it is rather that a potentiality, by which a subsequent experience similar to the previous one is effected, pervades the substratum and originates with each instant of the substratum like the shadow of a jar. Since this forms the basis of the motivating power of Saṃsāra as well as the ethically positive, negative, and neutral aspects of all concrete reality, together with the cognition-groupings, it is called the substratum of the various experientially initiated potentialities of experience.

The Buddhahood of man, pure in itself, and the immanent metaphysical reality, is the real substratum because it is not apart from the qualities of Nirvāṇa, the uncreated, and [its] facticity.

In the philosophy under consideration 'substratum' is used

in the sense of the sum total of the experientially initiated potentialities of experience forming the basis of Saṃsāra.

The emotively-toned ego-consciousness takes the substratum as its self. Accompanied by nine features such as the belief in a self, it is present in every phase of mental life except the concentration on the noble path and the attainment of the cessation of phenomenal existence.

The six functional cognitions are the ones which are so well known.[31]

The mental events attending the mind: they are the fifty-one events discussed in a previous section.[32]

The twenty-three disjunct entities are merely second intentions and do not exist *substantialiter*.

In addition to the three [commonly accepted] absolutes the mentalists add three others so that they accept a total of six. The three others are (i) the unconditional suchness of the non-existence of [the two types of] an ontological principle, (ii) the stable cessation when in this suchness-absolute the entities of the world of sensuality do not arise, and (iii) the cessation of ideas and feelings when in this suchness-absolute the seven cognition factors do not arise. Five are classified according to what specifically is absent in the suchness-ultimate.

In addition to all these differentiating items they accept three absolutely specific constitutive principles: the *notional-conceptual* is that which apart from being a postulate has no specific characteristic of its own. It is everything that allows us to speak intelligibly about what appears in the duality of subject and object and about what we become involved with. The *relative* is that which comes into existence in dependence upon causes and conditions. It is the noetic as it manifests itself in various pure and impure appearances by virtue of various experientially initiated potentialities of experience. The *ideally absolute* is that which remains when the relative has been divested of everything fictional as the notional-conceptual. It is present as that which is by nature devoid of the two types of an ontological principle.

The notional-conceptual is twofold: (a) hypothetical, i.e., that which is objectively impossible but postulated by mind

ad hoc, as, for instance, an ontological status for a self or for the entities other than the self, and (b) delusory, i.e., that which, though non-existent, appears before a mind, as, for instance, a double moon and the like. An illusion, a vision, and whatever can be named are all of this nature.

The relative is twofold: (a) an impure one in which a world-bound mind and its attendant functions are concerned with (ordinary) objects, and (b) a pure one in which a world-transcending mind with its attendant functions at its subsequent [aesthetic *post*-immediate] stage is concerned with the unfolding of the Buddha realms and so on.

The ideally absolute is twofold: (a) unchanging or the suchness of the objective situation and (b) incontrovertible or the primordial awareness of the owner of the objective situation.

In this system the physical-material, twenty-three mental events beginning with rapport, and suchness exist as substances, while twenty-nine mental events beginning with care, all disjunct entities, space, and the five [types of] cessation exist as labels. Moreover, the relative as partaking in authentic reality and the ideally absolute as authentic reality are claimed to be ultimately real, while the notional is relatively real. Therefore all the statements in the Sūtras to the effect that all the entities of reality have no nature of their own are made in view of the objects conceived of and postulated as [constituting] the (aesthetically) apprehendable object and the (aesthetically) apprehending subject; while of the three absolutely specific constituent principles the notional-conceptual has no essence whatsoever, the relative no self-originated essence, and the ideally absolute no particular-thing-essence; the quintessence of Buddhahood is claimed to be nothing other than this mentalism, because the noetic in its mere self-illumininingness is undeniable due to its being the source of Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa.

(c) Meditative (self-) development means to make the individual mind enter the non-referential sphere which is free from the ontological principle of a self and from any ontological principle belonging to what is other than the self, i.e.,

the (aesthetically) apprehendable object and the (aesthetically) apprehending subject.

THE METHOD OF ACTING

The method of acting is to practice the six 'perfections'[33] for a period of three 'incalculable' aeons with reference to the countless beings who are a mere series of mind-instants which is conceived as 'sentient being.'

THE GOAL REALIZED

Goal attainment is an awareness incomprehensible [by a fiction-ridden mind]; it is due to a change in attitude, beautified by limitless Buddha-fields, Buddha-existences and Buddha-activities.

The critique of the above tenets:

While it will be readily admitted that external objects do not really exist, the existence of the noetic is not *eo ipso* guaranteed, because on the apparent level as expressed in propositions it equals existence, and in the presence of the ultimately real it equals nonexistence, due to its not being veridical.

A type is not something self-existent, because the noetic is not self-existent. There cannot be any 'cut-off' type because any person is capable of change by such conditions as intelligence and dullness and so on; because mind being naturally resplendent, its accidental blemishes can be removed; and because nothing is ever lost by resorting to the pure counter-agents.

The relative is not [independently] real since it has originated from conditions, and likewise the substratum, being a series of instants, is not a real solid stream and therefore has not the slightest essence, because its objective inference, its 'seeds,' and all its maturations are multiple.

In the same way the emotively toned ego-consciousness and the six sensory functions and all the cessations are mutually related and merely interdependent, and therefore are not found in any way as real [independent] entities.

Specific Subdivisions

Although there are two groups distinguished according to whether they claim *sensa* to be either coincident with what is assumed to be real (verdical) or delusive, in their assumption that whatever appears as an external object is the inner noetic itself, neither can be said to have understood the problem properly, and each merely propounds his private opinion, because they [both agree in saying] that consciousness is self-illumining and really existent.

SENSA ARE VERIDICAL

In this group the Brahmin Śankarānanda and others claim that what appears as the (aesthetically) apprehendable part [in the cognitive process] is the mere facticity of the noetic in its act of (aesthetically) apprehending, and since [the noetic] is illuming and cognitive, [object-cognition] is like the experience of pleasure and pain.

There are three kinds of interpretation offered by this group: (a) the separateness of the noetic and the sensa, (b) an equal number of sensa [and (aesthetic) apprehensions], and (c) the non-duality of the multiple.

(a) While the appearance of such genuine objects of knowledge, such as mountains and so on, may be noetic, that which appears as the (aesthetically) apprehendable part and that which appears as the (aesthetically) apprehending part of the noetic are different in the same way as are the white and the yellow in a boiled egg. Since it is believed that the appearance of blue and the perception of this appearance of blue are veridical as two aspects in a straightforward way, those who hold this view are also referred to as 'the two halves of an egg.'

(b) Just as one can account for a large number of *sensa*, so one can also account for a large number of (aesthetic) apprehensions. It is therefore claimed that two (or more) sensa cannot appear in a single apprehending noetic because the five

fingers as five apprehensions are veridical, but not as one apprehension.

(c) It is claimed that although many appearances such as blue and yellow appear in a single noetic [moment] the noetic in being one is veridical.

The problem in this line of thought is that when one determines the external object as the noetic by the [latter's] characteristics of illumination and cognition, the [predication of] 'cognizable particular existent' and 'being merely cognizable' equally applies when it is assumed that there are external objects. That the object *is* the illuminating and cognizing noetic is not established by asserting *as* fact what *has* to be established as fact. Even if one asserts that indeed it is the noetic which is illumining and cognizing, by pointing out that [the assumption of a] 'relation' in the case of the simultaneity of the cognizable object and the cognizing act [by the subject], and [the assumption of] 'similarity' in the case of the non-simultaneity of the cognizable object and the cognizing act [by the subject] are both untenable, then it still has not been established that the apparent object is identical with the noetic, which is claimed to be coinciding with what is assumed to be real, even if [by this procedure] the existence of external objects should have been proved to be delusive. The following may serve as an illustration: even if it is established that the reflection of the face in the mirror is not the face, it still is not the mirror.

Moreover, (a) in the case of those who hold 'the two halves of an egg' theory, it has to be noted that if the existence of an external object is delusive, it follows that the noetic, being one with it, also must be delusive, or, if it is veridical, it must be found as an object just as it appears. If then there exists a noetic appearing as an external object, but different from the inner (aesthetically) apprehending noetic, several consequences follow, all of them militating against [this claim]: consciousness must be objectively found outside the body [which it animates]; colours and so on belong literally to the mind; mountains and so on must be cognitive of us, and just as there are many different appearances at one

and the same time so also many minds must be present in one individual. This is so because if consciousness is veridical each appearance of an object is a noetic.

(b) In the case of those who believe in 'an equal number of the (aesthetically) apprehendable and the (aesthetically) apprehending [events]', the following has to be noted: the concrete appearance [of something] which is [said] to be at one and the same time seen as something multicoloured would break down, because each apprehension would be different [from the other] and as such veridical. In the same way as there is the idea of the being of many people, because taken in itself no one being is something else, so also something multiple can appear instantaneously in the noetic, because the noetic is not really existing as a multiple of different things, even if it is not one when there is the appearance of something multiple.

(c) In the case of those who assert the non-duality of the multiple, it has to be pointed out that if one designates as one that which appears as many, the designation of the five colours and so on as many breaks down, because there is no other means of asserting a difference than this very appearance as the many. Therefore, even if it is appropriate to speak of merely one perception in connection with the sensing of something multi-coloured, yet it is not really one because it is applied to what is the many.

For this reason there are other fallacies involved if, apart from making propositions about what appears, appearance is claimed to be something. [On such reasoning] a Buddha and an ordinary sentient being would be one and the same because a sentient being appears as a Buddha and, if something appearing as something else is really this other thing, everything then would be everything else, so that a blazing fire would be real water.

Therefore, if the problem is thoroughly investigated, it is important to realize that precisely because of the fact that both the object and the noetic are not veridical, the object and the noetic may appear in various ways as subject and object, but do not so exist really.

SENSA ARE DELUSIVE

The thesis that sensa are delusive is held by the teacher Dharmottara and others. It is claimed that what appears as an external object is neither an external object nor the noetic, but merely a hallucination just like hairs in the air, due to the power of un-knowing, and that the noetic is devoid of sensa or observable qualities, like a bright crystal.

(a) Those who hold that the noetic is sullied, claim that, as long as there is the operation of mind, consciousness exists really in an ultimate sense as eight group-patterns, and since even on the Buddha-level there is the distinct appearance of the world and the beings in it; sensa (observable qualities) are not contradictory, although they do not exist really.

(b) Those who accept an immaculate nature of the mind, the 'purists,' claim that, as long as there is the working of the mind, the noetic with its even incidental group-patterns is relatively real, and that the substratum-awareness in its ultimate nature called the 'genuine noetic' is ultimately real because this substratum neither increases nor decreases and has no (aesthetic) apprehensions unsuited [to its nature]. It is further claimed that if there does not appear anything else but mind [itself] and this mind is felt as being free from all sensa and as devoid of any thought-constructions, because on the Buddha-level the experientially initiated potentialities of experience have ceased, just as the dream-images have stopped when one wakes up, then the presence [of this mind] as pure sensation (mere self-awareness) and self-luminousness is the Dharmakāya. What appears out of its sustaining power as the omniscience concerning the world and the beings therein, on the part of those to be led, although not existing as some particular existent, and as the proclamation of the Dharma and the enactment of the Buddha acts, is the Rūpakāya.[34]

While their claim that whatever appears as an external object is unreal may be endorsed, their statement that consciousness is real is inadmissible. Although on the side of error[35] there is the appearance of the noetic as the owner of the ob-

jective situation, as there also is appearance of an objective situation, neither the noetic as owner nor what is owned by it is found if investigated, nor is there in the last analysis any non-referential awareness found. If then the noetic is [said] to exist because it is felt, by the same argument the objective situation [should be said to] exist.

Mind and mental events, constituting the realm of the relative, are nowhere found when one searches for them, any more than the notional is found, so also the substratum does not exist, just as one does not find the incidental seven group-patterns when one investigates them.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MĀDHYAMIKAS

As THE ANALYSIS of the preceding philosophical trends has shown, at the centre of each system there lay a certain intuition and imaginative picture from which the philosopher started and to which he constantly returned. Thus, at the centre of the Vaibhāṣikas' and Sautrāntikas' systems lies the picture of reality as a vast assemblage of substances of variable duration, entering into various combinations which constitute our phenomenal world. Similarly the Yogācārins envisaged reality as the operation of *a* or *the* mind. Because of the misleading way in which the main contentions concerning 'material' and 'mental' substances were commonly formulated, it is tempting to see in Buddhist philosophy something like materialism and idealism comparable with traditional Western philosophies. The point to note is that none of the Buddhist philosophies conceived of matter or mind as names either of something palpable and familiar, or of a remote kind of stuff which is not accessible to immediate experience. What these philosophers actually wanted to say was that things had to be taken in a certain way if we were to make sense of them. None of them ever claimed to be able to reveal truths about a world which lay beyond the reach of the senses or experience. The Vaibhāṣikas at the one end of the philosophical spectrum and the Yogācārins at the other, therefore, were not so much expounding an account of what there is, as offering a thesis about the proper way to take things. The key proposition of these two, apparently so divergent, lines of thought might be put as follows: it is out of the question that there should be anything that cannot be satisfactorily explained in substantival terms, regardless of whether these terms imply materiality or mentality. Such a proposition is

not a factual thesis of any sort. It is merely the claim to be able to get into perspective, or to understand, things and events with which everyone either is or could be familiar, and it is also the desire to urge upon us a point of view which maintains that it alone has the answer.

Another point to note is that the above systems attempted to be both descriptive and explanatory; they professed to cover both *what* there is and *why* it takes the form it does. It is here that the confusion between (supposed) facts and their interpretation entered. The metaphysical principles of materiality on the one hand, and of mentality on the other, tended to be mistaken for basic premises on which other assertions were to be based. It was not clearly realized that no amount of scrutiny of the evidence can establish a principle of such unrestricted generality. It was also not seen that the decisive factor in interpretative, metaphysical thinking is not the premises the philosopher starts from, but the principles of interpretation he brings to bear. Each of us confronts the same world, but each differs from the other in his way of taking it. The basic judgments of a metaphysical thinker derive from some particular type of experience, e.g., intellectual, aesthetic, or moral, which seems to provide a clue towards developing a philosophical attitude or 'world perspective.' The impetus to the development of a particular interpretaion comes from an experience which gives rise to a sense of importance which, in turn, imposes a perspective and thereby rises above the level of merely cataloguing items of reality. It was an interest in the nature of metaphysical thought that gave rise to the Mādhyamika philosophies.

The Svātantrikas

There are two major divisions within the Mādhyamika movement: the Prāsangikas and the Svātantrikas. The former may be said to represent a more radical type of metaphysician, the latter a more moderate one. Inasmuch as in metaphysical thinking the premises from which a philosopher starts are less decisive than the way in which he interprets things, it is only natural that, as we can see in the case of the

Svātantrikas who accept the Sautrāntika premises and the Svātantrikas who accept those of the Yogācārins, the Svātantrikas divide into Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas. Although metaphysics is neither deductive nor inductive, metaphysical thinkers make constant use of deductive inference. It was by drawing attention to the constitutive conditions of valid inference which they considered absolute or categorical, i.e., not to be deduced from further truths nor to be established empirically even if experience suggests them, that they styled themselves Svātantrikas ('independents').

What the Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas wanted to emphasize was that all human experience, inasmuch as it is experience and not mere propositions or the like, is an insight into reality, an awareness of coherence which is not its own authentication of reality, but reality itself. Insofar as it is reality, it is not a 'presentation,' which in the Mādhyamikas' terminology is 'error' in the special sense of 'error' itself being quite real. This is evident from their interpretation of the 'two truths,' which basically is a development of inherent implications of the two truths. The distinction into 'higher' (absolute) and 'lower' (conventional) means that 'truth' is a matter of criticism. That is to say, truth (absolute) is the experience of a satisfied critical imagination, while truth (conventional) is the lack of this satisfied imagination manifesting itself in various degrees. At what we may call the lowest level we have that which is described as an illusion as, for instance, the water in a mirage. By this it is meant that we do not see the reflection of the sky on the pavement of a highway across a stratum of hot air as the sky's reflection but as a pool of water, and therefore do not see it as we *ought* to see it. A little further critical investigation should make it clear that this view is itself an illusion. It assumes naively that the water in a river is the real or standard water and, at the same time, this view fails to realize that in a world where perceptions occur under varied and varying conditions, a standardized way of seeing things is nothing but a useful convention.

Still there is a conceivably higher stage of awareness in

which this 'ought' proves itself to be doubtful. If a man were under all circumstances immediately conscious of the medium of vision and of its effect upon the image of the object, he would immediately be able to see the precise effect of substituting any other medium. He would be like a skilled musician who can play in one key what is written in another without transcribing the score (of what there is into what there ought to be). For him one key is as good as another, just as for a perceptive person one medium is as good as another. The only thing he must not do is mixing the keys or the media. The real difficulty then would be in conveying experience. Without experience what the Mādhyamikas have to say remains a mere form of words, a series of pictures. Therefore a critique of the Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas' views often does not penetrate to the core, which is unassailable because as experience it is reality itself; the critique falls short because it merely deals with the periphery, the use of picture-language. In their attempt to convey their experience the Svātantrikas had to use pictures which seem to 'represent' their object necessarily and inevitably, but without the activity of imagination (which is an image-making power) a picture is not a picture and 'represents' nothing. To say that the universe is of an apparitional nature is to use picture-language, but such a use does not validate the naive assumption that pictures are somehow natural conveyors of knowledge. The fact that the 'presentation' of the experience is liable to be distorted by what we have termed the mixing of keys and media, and that 'presentation' becomes open to critique which, like the presentation it attacks, is not the experience, is therefore subject to further critique.

In continuing and developing the metaphysical trend in Buddhist philosophy, the Mādhyamikas as a whole realized that it is impossible to have a metaphysics which asks whether ideas expressed in such a system are true 'of reality,' because there is no relation between this system of thought and a reality outside it. Consequently they insisted on coherence and self-consistency, rather than on correspondence, especially since we can only be aware of anything to the extent

that we know it through the interpretative forms of our experience. This realization prompted them to throw over the 'thing'-concept because, as a matter of fact, we have no warrant for supposing any relation of representation or likeness between the interpretative and symbolic forms of thought and things-in-themselves, which by definition fall outside experience. Still, the Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas preserved the notion of 'things,' although they, too, did not assume any view as to the intrinsic nature of a 'thing' which might be anything. They needed this concept of 'things' as a testimony to the conviction that as living persons they were concerned with something besides a mere nexus of logical relations. They were concerned with understanding how conceptual interpretations arise out of a background of 'responsive' activities. Such 'things' by their impingement on us produce certain types of responsive activities. We may say that our perceptual experience is a kind of 'projection' of events in our environmental world (external as well as internal), preserving, in spite of its distortion, some sort of variation concomitant with its differential conditions in the environment. Here we touch upon the central problem of Buddhism, that of self-development without a prejudged nature of the self. The vision of the Mādhyamika-Svātantika does not provide a premise on which to build; it rather suggests an interpretative scheme in which 'things' are concepts drawn by analogy from interpretations of experience. 'Things' are therefore hypotheses symbolizing a possible way in which events may be connected and are drawn from types of relations which are intelligible due to their having occurred in familiar settings. In the process of self-development I become aware not of objects ('things') but projects, of myself as I am going to be, and I recognize the projecting act as my own. In uncritical being, that is, where no self-development is attempted, I am always involved in my projects which are never without alternatives, or, as the texts declare, there is always something that directly or indirectly arouses affective states which have a disrupting effect upon the individual. But to state the matter so is already a step in

the direction of detachment and non–involvement, of an unrestricted perspective and authentic being, that is, satisfied critical imagination. The technique is first to bring one's biased and hence distorted project clearly before one's eyes or, in psychological terms, to tackle the disturbing affect-situation and in the cognition of this situation for what it is, to be freed from it. In practise this often may mean to resort to the antidote of the affect-situation, as when a person overcomes his feeling of hatred by one of love. But the antidote is itself an indirect affect-situation, hence the distinction between the immediately present affect-situation and its 'purification,' both of which have to be depleted of their power if ever authentic being is to be realized. Over and above, in being aware of my projects, I am also aware of myself projecting, that is, I can distinguish between my projects and myself conceiving and judging them. These acts can be manifested clearly and sharply by so-called second intentions, and no range of being is closed to such apprehension. It is when that which divides man at the very root of his being has lost its power to do so by an awareness that any object or 'project' (*gzung*) must involve a subject and 'acts of projection' (*'dzin*) of some kind ('conceptualizing' and 'reifying') that the unrestricted perspective or enlightenment is realized. In this process perception plays an important role, and the Svātantrikas divided ordinary perception as it operates in the conventional setting of an individual's world into two kinds. The more common one involves the beliefs we have about the common-sense objects and, for this reason, is a means to a metaperceptual end. It is harnessed to these metaperceptual ends and reduced to an extremely economical recording of qualities and events significant for these specific ends. The other is not concerned with such metaperceptual ends and is essentially a means to the apprehension of the full intrinsic perceptual being and value of the object freed from specific practical connections and considerations. It may be called aesthetic perception whose main aim is the elaboration of intrinsic perception, which then may turn into 'absolute' per-

ception in which the critical examination has been satisfied, as pointed out above.

Intrinsic or aesthetic perception is important for self-development, as it fosters appreciation as against possessiveness and exploitation. Thereby it extends the value range and provides a vision of human purpose in an ideal embodiment that can serve as a guide for both personal and group life. Such an ideal embodiment is The Buddha, whether he is envisaged as the Absolute, that is, an absolute value, or as a means to change things and persons into the intrinsically interesting and intrinsically fine and noble, or whether a human being is seen as the embodiment of Buddhahood and thereby is given dignity. Aesthetic perception has both a spiritual and cultural value.

Undoubtedly, the greatest Buddhist thinkers in India belonged to the Svātantrika group within the Mādhyamika movement. This is clearly brought out both by *The Jewel Garland* and *The Summary*. By linking the Svātantrika philosophers with the various trends in philosophical thought and thus revealing the ever growing richness of Buddhist philosophy, these two authors clarify many problems that beset a student of Buddhist philosophy. Usually passed over in silence or dismissed with a few non-committal words because the original works are either lost in their Sanskrit version or merely preserved in fragments, the Svātantrika philosophy is here dealt with as a whole and, in the case of *The Summary*, critically assessed.

FROM

THE SUMMARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

YID-BZHIN-MDZOD-KYI GRUB-MTHA' BSDUS-PA

foll. 22b sq.

THE MĀDHYAMIKA-SVĀTANTRIKAS, by assigning all entities of reality to two truths, demolish all arguments such as that these entities can be established as having true existence in themselves but no existence as assumed by common sense. Nevertheless, in spite of their profound analysis of appearance as encountered by common sense, those who represent the earlier and the later philosophies, deviate from the calm of Reality, because they give too much credit to the maze of their judgments.

THE EARLIER SVĀTANTRIKAS

The earlier Svātantrikas are (a) those who hold everything to be an apparition, and (b) those who hold appearance and nothingness to be separate entities.

(a) The former are represented by the teacher Samudramegha and others. They declare that all entities participate in the two truths by having no essence, only an apparitional nature. Since the appearance of the common-sense world is unreal and like an apparition, and since the ultimate, though nothing as such, does not cease appearing as the interdependence [of causes and conditions constituting our common-sense world], it is by the accumulation of the two requisites, which are like an apparition, that the goal or enlightenment, which is like an apparition, is attained; and while this appari-

tional [reality] as such forever remains what it is, it is through an [equally] apparitional activity that care is taken of the needs of the apparition-like sentient beings. Therefore, through the interrelation of causes and conditions, all appearance is like an apparition, that is to say, deviant appearance is an apparition, and translucently incessant appearance, in view of the fact that the proliferation into an apparent object before an error-free awareness has stopped, is an apparition. In brief, the whole of the ground, the path and the goal is like an apparition.

The critique is that since they do not pass beyond the maze of their postulates which make the ultimate originate and fade like an apparition and imply that an apparition resists any further attempt to analyse it, their conception cannot be the Buddha's ultimate meaning.

(b) Those who hold appearance and nothingness to be separate entities are represented by the teacher Śrīgupta and others. Because ultimately nothing whatsoever is found, to speak of an illusion has no foundation. Jars and other objects of knowledge in the conventional way are not [such a] nothingness, because they appear to be efficacious and are true enough. In the ultimate analysis they are nothing because nothing whatsoever is found. Therefore the ultimate resists any further analysis, the conventional does not, and hence the thing and its predicates do not, coincide; otherwise the ultimate would be as transitory as the conventional, and, in the same way that the ultimate does not originate and come to an end, the conventional would not. Therefore, appearance or the conventional as something qualified and nothingness or the ultimate as something in itself are found only in relation to each other.

In dividing the conventional into erroneous and reliable, the earlier Svātantrikas are like the later ones.

The critique: A nothingness which is not an appearance cannot partake of the two truths, because if there is nothing to appear before someone there is no observable quality at all, and even the conventional would become non-existent like the horn of a hare. One also does not find appearance apart from

nothingness, because when one examines whatever appears it is not found [as an entity]. If the ultimate is not something that can be investigated by becoming an appearance, it cannot be something that can be understood. If it can be investigated and expressed in words, it must appear with observable qualities. If not, it cannot be comprehended. The ineffable is not similar to it, because it transcends the extremes of either appearance or nothingness.

If [this postulated] nothingness is to be envisaged apart from appearance, something impossible is demanded. The meditation on a nothingness different from appearance is not the path, because it is unable to abolish the obscurations, and also cannot serve as the agent that abolishes them. When one gets angry at an enemy, it is of no use to know that the sky is nothing. The so-called 'nothingness' is not found anywhere, because whatever becomes an object before the mind in space and time has observable qualities.

The Later Svātantrikas

The later Svātantrikas are represented by Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and others.

Although the ultimate and ever-present reality is beyond all judgments, because the ultimate conceived of as apparition and as mere nothing does not withstand a critical investigation, it is assumed that the things as they incidentally appear to common-sense have their essence and are incontestible, but when critically investigated they do not in the least exist in truth, hence their nothingness and nominal ultimacy are on the same level. Accepting this thesis they establish their own theory and refute others by means of syllogisms [whose elements] they consider to be constituted by themselves. Also accepting origination from something other, as was done by the previous systems, they distinguish between a true conventional which is efficacious, as for instance the moon in the sky, and an illusory conventional which is not so efficacious, as for instance two moons. Further, the illusory conventional exists until the pure levels of spirituality have been reached. In the post-concentrative state of the spiritually advanced, one speaks of a 'pure

world.' Knowing the two truths not to be contradictory, they accumulate the two prerequisites and realize the two Kāyas.[8]

The critique: Ultimately the true conventional as well as the illusory conventional are of the same level, both owing their origin to causes and conditions. If one examines the appearance as an object, the statement that, because of its similarity with the non-existing, the object exists by its essence, is merely to use a label in the joy of making judgments. On closer inspection nothing of this sort is found. Origination from something else is similar to origination from itself, because both turn out to be impossible when properly investigated. If they say there is an origination from something else dissimilar to this, though found in common sense, the answer is that when one examines whether such a common-sense object as the seed and the sprout originate, or do not originate, by themselves or from others, one cannot find anything of this sort, because apart from it one cannot postulate an origination from something else ultimate.

Then how does a sprout come from the seed in common-sense conception? The appearance of a sprout as effect coming from the seed as the cause in an infallible progression must be accepted as origination by relations, but the four alternatives need not be accepted.[9]

Inasmuch as these alternatives need not be accepted, the mere appearance of thing originating in relation [to causes and conditions] has no essence whatsoever even in common sense, and inasmuch as all such judgments as self-origination, origination by something else, origination and non-origination are all erroneous, there is no need to accept any of them.

Further, when one examines whatever appears, it is never found as such, and likewise the ultimate also is not found, because if there is no appearance, there is also no nothingness. Both being identical in the sense of not being found apart from being labels, the division into two truths exists only mentally, and not in actuality. Inasmuch as even the most subtle analysis of appearance, postulated by the demands of a philosophical thesis, becomes the cause of an irreversible subtle judgment, one must enter the 'initially pure,' the great middle where all

appearance is pure from the beginning because the fallacies of reason have never entered the fact of self-sameness.

The Prāsangikas

While all the philosophical movements discussed so far tried to 'explain' reality, rather than merely to interpret it, and in this attempt at explanation were forced to set up various hypotheses, the Prāsangikas abandoned the temptation to explain and were pre-eminently concerned with pointing out the inherent shakiness of every postulate. Their main target was the notion of 'existence' with its implicit assumption of the thingness of what is claimed to exist. 'Things,' as we have seen, are hypotheses symbolizing possible ways in which events may be connected, but precisely because of their being hypotheses there is no need to introduce a distinction between veridical and delusive aspects which are but concretizations into things of what at best are possibilities. This does not mean that there is no difference between veridical and delusive situations. The difference is purely pragmatic, not existential. Similarly, there is no need to distinguish between the absolute and its conceptual presence. Such a distinction, far from being invalid, merely tends to reduce the absolute to a concrete entity which then would have to be 'explained' in one way or another. Such an explanation would involve the acceptance of a thesis as a basic premise on which other assertions can be based. It is obvious from this critique of the other schools that for the Prāsangikas philosophy was a movement and that they attempted to keep the philosophical spirit alive. The high praise that traditionally has been bestowed on the Prāsangikas is due to their radical objection against any kind of reductionism. In order to point out the fallaciousness of any determinate thesis, they developed a formidable technique of argumentation which was designed to pull the rug from under the opponent's feet.

The significance of the Prāsangikas as critics and opponents of the reductionist trend in philosophizing lasted until they themselves succumbed to the temptation of accepting certain premises. It is well nigh impossible to say when this happened. But it did happen, as we can learn from rGyal-tshab's statement that the Prāsangikas accepted and rejected four theses respectively. "Concerning the ground they [the Prāsangikas] do not accept, even propositionally, (1) the idea of a substratum and (2) the idea of a thing-as-such, but recognize (i) external objects; concerning the path they do not accept (3) categorical conditions and (4) self-validating non-referential cognitions, in the intuitive perception of the absolute, but recognize (ii) the disposal of the two kinds of obscuration [emotional and intellectual] and (iii) the apprehension by both Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas of the non-essence character of what there is; and concerning the goal they recognize that (iv) the Buddhas have an awareness of reality as it is manifested." [10]

Although the Prāsangikas are claimed to represent the climax of Buddhist philosophy, this does not mean that the development of Buddhist philosophy has come to an end. On the contrary, the movement from the Vaibhāṣikas to the Prāsangikas is merely the preparatory step from 'speculative philosophy' to 'philosophy lived individually.' This step is possible because Buddhist philosophy has never been purely speculative. The subsequent development is due to a shift in emphasis.

While the Prāsangikas are traditionally held to represent the climax of Buddhist philosophy. Mi-pham 'Jam-dbyangs rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho makes it abundantly clear that they merely represent the climax of Buddhist epistemology and that the next step in the philosophical quest is the one from epistemology to Being. Therefore he is the only one who deals with Tantrism in his *Summary,* while *The Jewel Garland* lets philosophy end here with epistemology.

FROM

THE SUMMARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

YID-BZHIN-MDZOD-KYI GRUB-MTHA' BSDUS-PA

foll. 24b ff.

THE PEAK of epistemological courses is the Prāsangikas, the real essence of the ultimate meaning of the Buddha's message. They dispense with all judgments such as existence, non-existence, being (this or that), and not-being (this or that).

That which is ultimately not found as some thing or other and is beyond the reach of the intellect, is existentially present as the absolute indivisibility of the [two] truths, pure from the beginning. Without presenting any theory about it of their own, the Prāsangikas demolish all other theories concerning its substantival existence by exposing the [fallacies of the] implications of these theories. In this way all that exists in appearance originates merely in relations; entities come about in relations; and non-entities are postulated in relations.

Thus all entities subsumed under relational existence have no essence, for if they had an essence they would not originate in relations, but because they originate in relations there is not so much of anything which could be found as an identity or difference and of origination by any of the four alternatives. It is by way of things not existing in truth, but being like an apparition and devoid of the slightest trace of permanence or annihilation, that the Prāsangikas 'absolutize' the incidental way and the ultimate goal. In order to establish the non-existence of an essence they use five syllogisms named (a) *gcig-du bral,* (b) *rdo-rje gzegs-ma,* (c) *yod med skye bral,* (d) *don-byed 'gog-pa,* and (e) *rten-'brel chen-po.*

(a) That which appears as a thing implies that it does not exist as a thing or a non-entity, because, just like the reflexion of the moon in water, it is neither one nor many.

(b) Anything in the manner in which it appears has no essence, because it does not come about through itself, by something else, by both together, or without any cause, like a dream. If it came about by itself, there would be no need for its coming about and it would be useless; if it came about from something else, anything could come about from anything; and if from both, there would be at once the fallacy of both alternatives; and if without a cause, there would never be any appearance and prerequisite, for a result would have been absent. Since the growth of a sprout from a seed is merely relational, the seed and the sprout not being found as either something identical or different, seed or sprout does not refer to anything.

(c) The variety of what appears as things has no essence, because whatever is not an entity is free from origination. Because that which exists has already come into existence, it follows that it does not come into existence, and since non-existence is contrary to existence, it cannot become existence.

(d) The knowable is not found as a thing because it is not efficacious. An (instantaneous) moment cannot act in this way because it has already ceased when it would start acting, and a series cannot do so because the idea of a series and of an (instantaneous) moment contradict each other.

(e) Mere appearance is not a thing because it is relational, like a mirror-image. Moreover, if a thing had an essence, it would not come about in relations, because the thing *is* already.

That which comes about in relation [to causes and conditions] entails its nothingness. Just as from the time that an apparitional horse and elephant make their appearance they are nothing but horse or elephant and are not found as something coarse or subtle, so also that which incontestibly appears by causes and conditions appears while being nothing, and if investigated, is not found anywhere and need not be accepted.

Further there are three syllogisms by which the four pos-

sibilities of eternity and imperishableness, change and no-change are refuted.

(a) That which merely appears does not exist as a substance, because it does not exist as either a thing past or not past. If the jug existed as something past, it would be past in either case of existence or non-existence. It is not past when it exists, because this is contrary to the past, and when it does not exist it need not be past. It also does not exist as imperishable or eternal, because it is momentary.

(b) That which merely appears is not a substance, because it neither changes nor does not change. If a thing would change, an old man should become a youth, and change itself should be either eternal or non-eternal, but it is not found when properly investigated. If it did not change, a young man could not become an old man.

(c) If birth, age, duration, and disappearance come about gradually they cannot be fully present in a single moment, and if they come about at one and the same time they would fall under the contradiction that birth and death, as well as age and youth, come about simultaneously. This fallacy has already been discussed in the dissertation on the Śrāvakas.

Thus, being certain that no entity whatsoever has any essence, one has to demolish all judgments concerning an essence in all one's actions and to remain in utter all-alikeness. Even so, without denying appearance in the ordinary way, the Ground is the two truths, the Path that of the two requisites, and the goal that of the two Kāyas.[18]

THE GROUND

While neither the object before the ordinary mind nor the object of transcendent awareness beyond the ordinary mind is found as an essence in their facticity, the two truths are interpreted in such a way that appearance in the ordinary sense is not false as far as the errant mind goes, and that the ultimate to be achieved, as well as the path and the goal, are not false. The reason is that what does not pass beyond the ordinary mind does not withstand a critique, while that which does

so is beyond all reference. The inadmissibility of its withstanding a critique has been refuted before.

Both [truths] are not found separately, the thing and its nature are the same and beyond judgments and beyond mind and characteristics.

When one posits the two truths, that which is in conformity with worldly use and which appears as an object to the senses when they are unimpaired is the true conventional, but what appears before the senses impaired, like the vision of hairs in a certain eye-disease, is an illusory conventional.

THE PATH

The Path is, ordinarily, the practice of the six perfections and, ultimately, the meditation on the unity of radiant light and transcendent awareness.

The method of the practice of concentration is to sit cross-legged and first to take refuge and to develop an enlightened attitude; then, with a mind utterly relaxed to remain, without the fluctuations of mentation, in a steady radiant brilliancy, in a realm into which no dichotomic thought enters as there is no thinking of and about anything whatsoever, such activity having been cut off, as it were, by the vision of reality; when thereby all referential perceptual situations have faded away because there is neither affirmation nor negation in a mind engaged in meditation devoid of external objects and of the projects before a mind and acts of projection, then perceptiveness, internally freed from judgmental activity due to the cessation of the operations of the phenomenal mind and its mental events, becomes the contemplation of radiancy as individual intrinsic perception. In the post-concentrative stage one engages in the accumulation of the merits on behalf of the beings who are like an apparition, without attachment and involvement.

THE GOAL

When finally the ten levels have been scaled and the cause of Saṃsāra, i.e., the mind and the mental events with their experientially initiated potentialities of experience, has come

to rest and is submerged in the ultimate, the Dharmakāya as the unity of knowledge and its field, as well as the two form patterns deriving from it,[19] spontaneously act for the welfare of the world.

While it does not follow that the Prāsangika does not hold any thesis and yet accepts everything observable, there is this difference concerning the existential mode of what is beyond judgments in concentration and of the appearance of differentiation in the post-concentrative state: while the former is not concerned with holding any thesis, the latter is so concerned, as can be known from the *rNam-dbye rigs-mdzod.*

In this way the epistemological varieties of the Mahāyāna have been discussed.

NOTES

Notes to Chapter I

[1] The four qualities stand for the ways in which a person behaves. He may be one who is victorious by the path, who points out the path, who lives by the path, and who makes a mockery of the path. See *Abhidharmakośa* IV 39.

[2] These are mentioned in the *Vinaya,* the *Milindapañha,* the *Visuddhimagga.* There is, however, no evidence that they were ever widely adopted. The Pāli texts usually enumerate thirteen practices.

[3] See *Mahāyānasūtrālankāra* xx–xxi 16, for the thirty-seven topics. The five paths are: the path of preparation, the path of linking one's preparations with the path of seeing, the path of seeing itself, the path of attending to what has been seen, and the path of no-more-learning. The three poisons are: passion-lust, hatred-aversion, and infatuation-bewilderment.

[4] The three types are the misery of conditioned existence, the misery of change, and the misery of misery in itself. See H. V. Guenther, *sGam.po.pa—The Jewel Ornament of Liberation,* pp. 55 ff.

[5] See above note 3.

[6] This is the Sautrāntikas' conception of Nirvāṇa. They have often been equated with the Pratyekabuddhas.

[7] This refers to the famous story that Māra appeared before Upagupta in the guise of the Buddha.

[8] The four axioms are: everything is transitory; everything transitory is frustrating; nothing has or constitutes a principle through which something is what it is; and Nirvāṇa is bliss.

[9] The word 'countless' indicates a certain number in the number mysticism that was current in ancient India.

[10] The two prerequisites are merits and knowledge.

Notes to Chapter II

[1] This name covers a number of 'schools' and their subdivisions. However, tradition is not unanimous. According to Étienne Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien. Dès origines à l'ère Śaka,* (Louvain 1958) pp. 578, the *Sarvāstivādins* comprised:

1. The Vātsīputrīyas and their subdivisions: Dharmottarīya, Bhadrayānikas, Sāṃmitīyas, Saṇṇagarikas;
2. The Mahīśāsakas and their subgroup: Dharmaguptakas;
3. The Kāśyapīyas (or Suvarṣakas); and
4. The Sautrāntikas.

This last group may not have been identical with the later Sautrāntikas.

[2] Hence their name Sarvāstivadins (*sarvam asti*).

[3] See Chapter IV.

[4] The Mahīśāsakas listed as the fourth particular existent the state of mental immobility (*āniñjya*); and the forerunners of the Yogācāras also included the state in which sensation and feeling have ceased to be operative (*samjñāveditanirodha*). See Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang*, p. 678.

[5] The analysis here follows the exposition of Klong-chen rab-'byams-pa in his *Theg-pa mtha'-dag-gi don gsal-bar byed-pa grub-pa'i mtha' rin-po-che'i mdzod*, fol. 37a. (In the following this work will be referred to in the abbreviated form *Grub-mtha'-mdzod*).

[6] *Grub-mtha'-mdzod*, fol. 37b.

[7] The qualification 'of what there is' is to distinguish the use of 'ontology' in the Buddhist context from the customary Western use of the word.

[8] This does not mean that the one borrowed from the other. Rather, this concretistic type of thinking was 'in the air.'

[9] It is on this 'path' (*mthong-lam*) or at this moment that the Four Noble Truths are 'seen,' and this vision initiates the actual process of spiritual growth.

[10] The later count is given on page 56 f. The earlier count is found on the table facing p. 72 in Junjiro Takakusu, *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, Honolulu 1956.

[11] The term *shes-pa*, translated here by 'the noetic,' is not an exact equivalent of the Sanskrit word for mind, *citta*, which in Tibetan is *sems* and which is more adequately rendered by 'responsiveness' than by the traditional translation of 'mind.' What we understand by 'mind' is a total state of responsiveness and those mental events and processes which give it a determinate and specific character. The subtle difference between *sems* (*citta*), *sems-byung* (*caitta*), and *shes-pa* (*jña*) can be stated as follows: responsiveness (*sems*) and mental events (*sems-byung*) entail the noetic (*shes-pa*), but the noetic does not entail responsiveness, because a mental event is the noetic but not responsiveness.

For the Vaibhāṣikas the noetic is a particular existent. Similarly, mental events are not derivatives or states of a mind, but separate particular existents.

[12] For the importance of being a human being see H. V. Guenther, *Tibetan Buddhism without Mystification*, pp. 4 ff. Man can work out his way of growth only as man, but this does not entail the fallacious argument that man is the measure of all things. This psychology of excessive dominance is absent in Buddhism.

[13] See *Abhidharmakośa* VII 31 ff.

[14] dKon-mchog 'Jigs-med dbang-po in his *Grub-pa'i mtha'i rnam-par bzhag-pa rin-po-che'i phreng-ba*, fol. 4b states: "If someone declares that the Vātsīputrīyas should not be counted as Buddhists because they recognize a self, the objection is unfounded. The non-absolute character of the entities of reality, which is mentioned as one of the four axioms [lit.: seals], is recognized by the five schools of the Sāṃmitīyas [that is, the Gokulikas, Dharmaguptikas, Bhadrayānikas, Vātsīputrīyas and Dharmottarikas], for whom this non-absolute character is merely the non-existence of an eternal, single, and sovereign Pure Ego, while the self which they recognize is of the nature of a self-sufficient substance."

[15] Colour-form (*gzugs*), feeling, sensation-ideation, motivation, and perceptual processes.

[16] Accumulation of merits and perfection of knowledge are the beginning of the 'Path' (*lam*) which is a name for man's spiritual growth. The central phase of this growth is the 'Path of Seeing' reality as it is, which means not to expect more of it than it can offer. Viewed from this central phase the accumulation of merits and perfection of knowledge are peripheral and must be 'linked' to the centre if the aim of the individual's growth, integrity, is to be fulfilled. This 'linking' is the second phase of the 'Path.' However, these stages, preparation, and linking, are marked by endeavour, and every kind of endeavour is bound to arouse affective states due to the feeling of success or failure. Every affective state disrupts the integrity of man's being and prevents him from seeing himself and his world properly, because it makes him biased.

[17] The qualifying adjectives 'coarser' and 'subtler' refer to the evaluative division of the universe into a world of sensuality, (aesthetic) forms, and formlessness. Each subsequent 'world'-experience in this schema is more subtle than the preceding one. Meditative concentration and attention is considered as a fluctuation between these three worlds.

[18] Names (*ming*), words (*tshig*, inflected nouns and verbs), and letters (*yi-ge*) are the material out of which significant patterns are built. This material itself is not a significant form or pattern (*gzugs*). Insofar as the Buddha-word conveys meaning it is significant form; insofar as it consists of letters and elements of speech it is a disjunct entity.

[19] See above note (14).

[20] They are: passion-lust (*'dod-chags*), aversion-hatred (*zhe-sdang*),

and bewilderment-error (*'kkrul-pa*). They derive their names from their overt manifestations but are not merely these. 'Error' does not imply culpability but describes man's straying away from his authentic nature into a world of 'things.' See n. 3, chap. I.

[21] The four patterns are: (a) one does not understand the profoundness and subtleness of the Buddha's teaching, (b) one does not know what is going on at a distance, (c) one does not know the past nor the future, and (d) one does not understand the manifoldness of reality.

[22] They are those of (a) Śrāvakas, (b) Pratyekabuddhas, and (c) Bodhisattvas.

[23] The Truth of the Path is what is otherwise known as the Noble Eightfold Path. While for all other schools this path was knowledge, the Vaibhāṣikas recognized only five of its eight members as being of the nature of knowledge. Right speech, right action, and right livelihood were for them 'significant form' (*gzugs*). 'Form' (*gzugs*) was a particular existent different from the 'noetic' or 'knowledge' (*shes-pa*).

[24] The Path of Preparation, consisting of the accumulation of merits and the perfection of knowledge, is of an inferior, mediocre, and superior quality. The practises which belong to each grade have been pointed out in H. V. Guenther, *sGam.po.pa—The Jewel Ornament of Liberation*, London 1959, p. 233.

[25] Six types of saints were recognized. Only the highest one would not fall from his height. However, although the five lower saints might fall, they would not fall so low as to find themselves on the level of an ordinary being. See *Abhidharmakośa* VI 56 ff. 'Rejection' is the relinquishing of all affective states, and 'attainment' is the state of happiness operating in the present, because the disturbing affective states have been eliminated.

[26] The twenty varieties of Śrāvakas are enumerated in *Abhisamayālankāra* I 23–24. There are eighty-one affective states or potentialities that can be overcome by the truth one has seen. They distribute as follows: nine belong to the world of sensuality and sensuousness, thirty-six to the world of aesthetic forms (nine to each of its four levels), and thirty-six to the world of formlessness with also nine to each of its four levels. According to the Vaibhāṣikas each of the eighty-one affective states is overcome in succession, starting with the first belonging to the world of sensuality, then its second, and so on, until one arrives at the last one which belongs to the world of formlessness. A person who overcomes nine at a time is one who abandons the first of each of the nine affective patterns belonging to the nine levels of the three world-spheres. Then he overcomes the second nonary and so on up to the ninth nonary.

[27] The Buddha-marks are enumerated in *Abhisamayālankāra* VIII

13–17. This is the well-known episode in the life of the Buddha before enlightenment. The conquest of Māra (*Devaputramāra*) is essentially a spiritual phenomenon. Māra is a shorthand term for the feeling of pleasure through meditative exercises which are so easily misunderstood as a means of producing this feeling rather than as the vehicle by which one passes beyond affective states. Meditation, in whatever sense of the word we may understand it, is a step into another world which we cannot but designate divine (having both benign and fearful features). Hence, in personalistic terms one speaks of gods (*deva, devaputra*) or, when there is a strict dualism, of heaven and hell. The divine, however, has meaning only in relation to the humane; it is not superior in an absolute sense, although its superior power is often too much for human beings. Whether man is involved in 'blunt facts' or lives in a world of 'gods' does not alter his being at the mercy of dark powers. The preoccupation with the things of this world is in no way different from the preoccupation with the world of gods. To be so involved in either aspect of reality is technically known as Saṃsāra, and Saṃsāra is synonymous with Māra. Thus, in the conquest of Māra man casts off his shackles and finds freedom as a mode of being.

[28] There are twelve episodes of particular significance in the life of a Buddha; however, the count varies. They are: (i) the resolve to be born in the world of man (since this happens in another realm this incident is sometimes not counted as a Buddha-act); (ii) the descent from the Tuṣita heaven; (iii) entering the mother's womb; (iv) physical birth (however, if no. i is counted, nos. iii and iv are taken together as one incident); (v) accomplishment in worldly arts; (vi) a life of pleasure with women; (vii) withdrawal from it; (viii) ascetic exercises; (ix) sitting under the Bodhi-tree; (x) conquest of Māra; (xi) becoming a Buddha; (xii) promulgating the teaching; (xiii) passing into Nirvāṇa.

[29] The *Grub-mtha'-mdzod*, fol. 37a offers the clearest presentation. Discussing the nature and number of relatively stable patterns (*gzugs*) its author says: "Relatively stable patterns that can be shown and present [certain] limitations are as follows: The atoms of earth-solidity, water-cohesion, fire-temperature, and wind-movement, being indivisible, are ultimately real particular existents. Out of their collocation which retains intervals between them, the 'coarse' physical-material [universe] is set up. "Relatively stable patterns that cannot be shown while presenting [certain] limitations are the following: the five senses of sight, hearing, smelling, tasting and the tactile organ (the body) as well as [their referents], colour, sound, taste, fragrance and touch.

"Relatively stable patterns that can neither be shown nor have

[any] limitations are discipline, absence of discipline, and that which is neither the one nor the other, all three pervading the whole body like a raging fire."

[30] The *Grub-mtha'-mdzod*, fol. 37b states: "Mind is the six sensory perceptions: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and intellectual. When the five sense organ functions (*dbang-po*) sense their respective objects and the five sensory perceptions (*rnam-shes*) perceive their respective objects, it is the intellect (*yid-kyi rnam-par shes-pa*) that interprets [the perceptions] as to past, future, particular existent and so on. Otherwise intellectual perception would have to be claimed to *sense* objects which are concealed, because of its nature of not being limited." This passage shows that perceiving and conceiving begin when we select and attend to connections which have already been 'thought' in sensory awareness, although they have not yet been 'thought about.'

[31] This difficult passage is clarified in the *Grub-mtha'-mdzod*, fol. 38: "(1) Each perception (*rnam-par shes-pa*) as the primary factor has its own objective reference by relating itself to one object; (2) it has its own observable quality as it investigates qualities similar to it [i.e., in the case of colours it will observe their nuances, but not timbre which belongs to sound]; (3) it operates simultaneously because perception occurs at one time; (4) it operates from its specific basis because it starts from its specific sense-organ [which give perception its sensory name]; and (5) it has its substantial foundation because in a certain person (*gang-zag*) it does not start from visual perception alone nor from one of the attendant functions."

[32] In the Sāṃkhya system time is the mode of constituting things in their different stages of becoming manifest in the course of their evolution (*adhvan*). For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas it was a substance (*dravya*) existing by itself which in accordance with the changes of things reveals itself as past, present, and future.

[33] The four points are: being, non-being, both being and non-being and neither being nor non-being.

Notes to Chapter III

[1] Thus Klong-chen rab-'byams-pa in his *Theg-pa chen-po'i man-ngag-gi bstan-chos Yid-bzhin rin-po-che'i mdzod-kyi 'grel-pa padma dkar-po*, vol. VAM, foll. 36a f. (In the following abbreviated as *Yid-bzhin-mdzod*).

[2] *Grub-mtha'-mdzod*, foll. 40b.

[3] In this school the essential works on Buddhist logic originated. They are: *Pramāṇavārttikā; Pramāṇaviniścaya; Nyāyabinduprakaraṇa; Hetubinduprakaraṇa; Sambandhaparīkṣaprakaraṇa; Codanānāmaprakaraṇa;* and *Santānāntarasiddhi*.

[4] For the Vaibhāṣikas only the first fifteen moments were the 'Path of Seeing'; the sixteenth moment, because it could only repeat itself, was already the path of attending to what had been seen.

[5] The 'Path of Seeing' consists of three phases; the first is an obstacle-removing one, the second a free progress, and the third cannot be predicated as either of the two former.

[6] *lKog-gyur, lKog-na yod-pa*, lit.: 'existing in hiding.' The Sautrāntikas were, comparatively speaking, closer to the phenomenalists in European philosophy than to the critical realists. Phenomenalism declares that a physical object can exist even if it is not actually perceived. It is enough that it is capable of being perceived. To speak of a physical object that could not be seen, heard, smelt, tasted and touched, even under any specifiable conditions, would be a contradiction. It remains unintelligible how Western interpreters could impute Kant's unknowable thing-in-itself to the Sautrāntikas. This is against all evidence. As a matter of fact, the Sautrāntikas clearly state that that which is not apprehended in direct sensing, can be inferred as 'knowable.' Certainly 'to be invisible' or 'to be hidden' and 'to be unknowable' do not mean the same. 'To be invisible' may well mean 'available.'

[7] *Yid-bzhin-mdzod*, VAM, foll. 36a f. quotes *Abhidharmakośa* II 61–62 is support of this explanation. It then explains a perceptual situation as follows: "The cause situation of visual perception is what was a germinal state of the noetic in the antecedent noetic moment. The similar immediate cause-factor is the cessation of the antecedent noetic moment. The referential cause-factor is a colour-form; and the dominant cause-factor is the eye.

[8] Those who held this view are discussed in Chapter IV.

[9] See also *Yid-bzhin-mdzod*, VAM, foll. 37a.

[10] This account is presented from a later viewpoint which effectively pointed out the fallacies in assuming 'atoms.' The difference between the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas was that the former accepted spaces between the punctiform atoms, while the latter did not.

[11] 'Impermanence' is distinguished here from the 'momentariness' of the particular existents. Strictly speaking, 'impermanence' and 'momentariness' are identical. If 'impermanence' is considered merely as an interpretative schema, then it would contradict the very instantaneousness or momentariness of the other particular existents, and the eternalistic Vedāntic theory about mind (*cit*) would follow.

[12] The theory of interdependent origination.

[13] The four 'names' are feeling, sensation-ideation, motivation, and conscious perception.

Notes to Chapter IV

[1] *Tibetan Buddhist Studies of Kloṅ-rdol bla-ma Ṅag-dbaṅ-blo-bzaṅ*, ed. from the Lhasa xylograph by Ven. Dalama. Laxmanpuri, Mussoorie 1963, Vol. I p. 244.

[2] *ibid.*, p. 243.

[3] *ibid.*, p. 244.

[4] Indian texts do not always distinguish clearly between Dharmakāya and Dharmajñānakāya. This has created considerable misunderstanding on the side of those who came to Buddhism from without. Many Western translations will have to be retranslated in view of the ambiguous use of 'Dharmakāya,' and reinterpreted according to the functional and ontological implications of this term.

[5] He was a famous Lama of Sera monastery, who lived from 1350–1425 A.D.

[6] This account does not necessarily imply an atomistic view: we do not see several disjunct colours and then infer from them that it must be a butterfly's wing; we directly see the butterfly's wing in all its coloured splendour. Another point to note is that the use of the word 'sensation' is a very loose one. Usually we tend to use 'sensation' to stand for certain mental contents or experiences. In so doing, we uncritically take over the legacy of idealism, which confuses an experience with the object of that experience. True, we have visual and auditory sensations, but we see a butterfly's wing and hear a Bach sonata. The Tibetan term, *rnam-pa* (*ākāra*), is used to stand for what we directly see or hear: colours and sounds. They are what we experience, and this is what phenomenalism calls 'sense-datum' (usually in the plural 'sense-data') or 'the given,' which includes the data of dreams and imagination. Naturally the question remains, what is actually given and what is added to it by interpretation. Nevertheless, something is given on which we base our interpretation. This shows that the translation of this term by 'representation' is wrong. To begin with, we say that in our 'perceptual' world the 'physical' world is 'represented,' 'symbolized.' But the mentalists say that there is no 'physical' world *apart* from the 'perceptual' world. So what is it of which we are supposed to have a 'representation'? It seems that many Western interpreters and their Eastern imitators in their eagerness to *force* Western ideas upon Eastern doctrines confused something which could not so easily be equated with idealism or mentalism (although it was quickly labelled 'idealism'), with representative realism with which it unfortunately has nothing to do.

[7] This seems to be an attempt to describe what happens when a person intuits an object without his being in any way sensorily

affected. All that would be needed would be his capacity and capability of simple detection and inspection.

[8] This seems to be a critique of the seemingly atomistic views of the previous theories.

[9] IV 53a ff. Of particular importance is the qualifying attribute 'suitable' (*rigs-mthun*). This is to say, the colours of a butterfly's wing are, to be sure, a function of the observer, of the rods and cones in his eyes, just as they are equally surely a function of the character of the butterfly's wing.

[10] *Grub-mtha' chen-mo* IV 52b. This is essentially the attempt to solve the age-old problem of reconciling the 'perceptual' world with the 'physical world,' the 'analytic' processes with the 'integrative' ones. On this problem see W. Russel Brain, *Mind, Perception and Science* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 60 ff.; Judson C. Herrick, *The Evolution of Human Nature* (Austin, 1956), p. 273 with reference to further literature on this subject.

[11] *Grub-mtha' chen-mo* IV 54b. This seems to refer to a purely aesthetic and intuitive experience.

[12] The eight are the 'substratum-awareness' (*kun-gzhi rnam-par shes-pa ālaya, vijñāna*), the 'human constant' (*yid, manas*), and the six perceptive functions, five of which are sensory and the last one abstractive-intellectual. As so often, the terminology has given rise to different interpretations. The dGe-lugs-pas defined the 'substratum-awareness' as an indeterminate cognition, and insisted on the unitary character of the eight awarenesses. Other schools, such as the rNying-ma-pas, distinguished between a 'substratum-awareness' and a 'substratum.' They also conceived of the eight awarenesses in a genetic way. All these problems have been discussed from the dGe-lugs-pa point of view by Tsong-kha-pa in his *Yid dang Kun-gzhi'i dka'-gnas rgya-cher 'grel-pa legs-bshad rgya-mtsho* (Collected Works, Tashilhunpo, ed., vol XVIII, no. 3). The six are the perceptive and abstractive-intellectual processes with the exception of the 'substratum-awareness' and the 'constant' or 'seventh' awareness.

[13] *sems-kyi ngo-bo*. The term *ngo-bo*, often translated by 'essence,' does not mean what is understood by 'essence' in classical and traditional philosophy, as that which marks one finite thing off from another. This would be *rang-gi mtshan-nyid* but not *ngo-bo* nor even *ngo-bo-nyid*. *Ngo-bo* corresponds to our notion of 'facticity.'

[14] 'Deviant' is to be understood as a movement away from real Being. *'khrul-pa* (*bhrānti*) emphasizes the going astray. The translation 'deviant' is preferred to 'erring' because it does not convey the implication of culpability.

[15] The Five Divisions are: *Yogacaryābhūmi, Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi* as the First Division; *Yogacaryābhūmiviniś-*

cayasaṃgraha as the Second; *Yogacaryābhūmau vastusaṃgraha* and *Yogacaryābhūmau vinayasaṃgraha* as the Third; *Yogacaryābhūmau parāyasaṃgraha* as the Fourth; and *Yogacaryābhūmau vivaraṇasaṃgraha* as the Fifth. The Seven Treatises on Logic are: *Pramāṇavārttikā; Pramāṇaviniścaya; Nyāyabinduprakaraṇa; Hetubinduprakaraṇa; Sambandhaparīkṣāprakaraṇa; Codanānāmaprakaraṇa;* and *Santānāntarasiddhi.*

[16] 'Awareness,' *rjes-thob, pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna.* Its nature varies according to the spiritual pursuits of Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas. This varying character is discussed in the extensive, but hitherto neglected, literature on the 'spiritual levels and paths' (*sa-lam*). See *Abhisamayālankāra* viii 13 ff. for Buddha-marks.

[17] That is, the metaphysical absolute in and as itself.

[18] *stong-(pa)-nyid, śūnyatā.* See note 4 to chapter V.

[19] That is, feeling, sensation-ideation, motivation, conscious perception.

[20] Acts are both individual and collective. The former lead to a life as a particular individual being, the latter condition the environment in which each individual being will find himself.

[21] The five function patterns are the complexity of any momentary situation (*sparśa*) (the rapport that exists between the various components of a situation), directiveness of the process (*manaskāra*), feeling-tone or mood of the situation (*vedanā*), sensation-ideation (*saṃjñā*), and qualitative conditioning (*cetanā*). The 'seventh' awareness, which is constantly disturbing the substratum-awareness, and in so doing originates the subject-object dichotomy, deserves the name 'constant' for two reasons: it is constantly disturbing the substratum-awareness, and it is constantly present in all our conscious acts which are but a segment of the total psyche.

[22] Reality is not mere facts, it especially comprises value. Seen as value it is triple: wholesome (positive), unwholesome (negative), and neither (indeterminate). The latter is of two kinds: uncontaminated-indeterminate and contaminated-indeterminate. The latter, psychologically speaking, is contaminated because it is about to develop into emotively toned actions and reactions, but indeterminate insofar as the determinate emotively toned response or the affect content is not yet at hand.

[23] See note 13 to Chapter II.

[24] For the six primary affective patterns and the twenty secondary patterns, see page 64.

[25] See *Abhisamayālankāra* I 23–24.

[26] One 'countless aeon' consists of as many human years as would be expressed by a 1 followed by 140 zeros.

[27] That is, Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya.

[28] This is the *Ārya-saṃdhi-nirmocanasūtrasya vyākhyāna,* the most exhaustive commentary on the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra.*

[29] 'Incidental' has the meaning of a free possibility. It does not imply that something from some other source can affect the purity. It is not to say that the 'incidental stains' can be wiped off and dumped somewhere, leaving something blank behind.
The Svābhāvikakāya, which is here conceived of as cognitive absoluteness (*sems-nyid*), may be viewed from two angles, either as what it is in itself, or what it is when realized. The former is 'pure in being-itself,' the latter is 'pure as regards incidental stains.' From the Prāsangikas' point of view the Svābhāvikakāya is 'nothingness' (*stong-pa-nyid, śūnyatā*) in the sense of explicit negation (*med-dgag*): Nothing whatsoever exists ontologically.

[30] See above note (21).

[31] See above note (12).

[32] See chapter II.

[33] See H. V. Guenther, *Tibetan Buddhism without Mystification,* pp. 19 ff.

[34] This collective term comprises the individualized Sambhogakāya and Nirmānakāya.

[35] 'Error,' *'khrul-pa.* That is, the process of straying into a world of 'things' which are but fictions of the mind, comprising a subject and an object believed to exist in their own rights.

Notes to Chapter V

[1] *ngo-bo-nyid med-par smra-ba.* This is short for *bden-grub-kyi ngo-bo-nyid med-par smra-ba.* The current rendering is to use the Sanskrit term: *niḥsvabhāvavādin.* This term is usually left untranslated or, if a translation is attempted, it is based on the mistaken assumption that words are understood by their etymology instead of by their use due to stipulation. Moreover, lexical translations have singularly failed to adduce any reason why the Sanskrit term *svabhāva* should be translated into Tibetan as *rang-bzhin* in one case, and as *ngo-bo-(nyid)* in another. The fact that the Tibetan translators of Sanskrit texts thought about what might be intended by the texts which they translated—which lexical translators painstakingly avoid doing—forced them to use different words for one term. The term *rang-bzhin* is similar to our concept of 'essence,' 'being-itself.' In distinction to *rang-bzhin* we have *rang-gi mtshan-nyid* 'being-what-something-is' indicating the constitutive principle through which something is what it is. Quite different is *ngo-bo-(nyid)* which corresponds to our 'fact' and 'facticity.' The Mādhyamikas did not deny the 'fact' of things, but they denied that this fact was itself something existing as such (*bden-grub*). In other

words, they most vigorously eschewed any substantival kind of ontology.

[2] *rtags, linga.* In a general way this term is used in the same way as we use the 'middle' in logic. However, the wide range of application of the term *rtags* has been obscured by the fact that in dealing with Buddhist logic one has thought too much in Aristotelian terms, rather than considering it in its own right.

The first principle that has to be satisfied is the triple relation of identity, that is to say, *S* can be *P* only because of something else that *S* is, namely *M*. Moreover, "if S is P because it is M, this can only be because of what M is and not because of what it is not. More specifically, what M must be is P, if one is ever to demonstrate that S is P through the fact that it is M" (Henry Babock Veatch, *Intentional Logic*, p. 310). The second principle can best be expressed symbolically:

$$(x).\Phi x \supset \Psi x.$$

The third principle is what is known as the obverted contrapositive.

[3] Duality is of three kinds. The first is the subject-object division against the background of nothingness; the second is the dialectic of negation; and the third is the conventionally true as against the absolutely true.

[4] The sixteen types of nothingness are frequently mentioned in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. The four types bear the following names: *'dus-byas stong-pa-nyid, 'dus-ma-byas stong-pa-nyid, rang-gi ngo-bo stong-pa-nid,* and *gzhan-gyi ngo-bo stong-pa-nyid.* These descriptive terms mean that there is nothing concrete that exists in truth, nor anything abstract, nor any fact by itself, nor any fact other than itself. The rejection of the translation of *stong-pa-nyid* (*śūnyatā*) by 'emptiness' or 'void' is based on the following consideration: *śūnyatā* is not a container that can be emptied nor is there anything that could be taken out of *śūnyatā.* The choice of the term 'emptiness' dates back to the time when under the influence of idealism mind was conceived as a container of ideas, and when the ideal seemed to be to leave an empty blankness. Something like this must have inspired the doctrine of Jo-nang-pa Dol-po Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan (1292–1361 A.D.) who spoke of what is technically known as *gzhan-stong* 'empty of something else.' This doctrine has been generally rejected, particularly so by the dGe-lugs-pas. While for this doctrine the term 'emptiness' would have been appropriate, it should have been avoided where it did not apply.

Of course, 'nothingness' is also not a very helpful term, but it may assist in abolishing the attendant notion of 'thingness' in talking about the things of the world and of our experiences. For the Dge-lugs-pas *stong-nyid* (*śūnyatā*) is explicit negation

(*med-dgag*): things do not exist as such apart from our labelling them to be this or that.

[5] Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna.

[6] 'Continuity concentration' is a state in which everything that is heard is of the nature of the Buddhist teaching being proclaimed. 'Most sublime reality,' *mchog-gi sprul-sku,* lit.: 'most sublime Nirmāṇakāya.' Nirmāṇakāya is essentially a name for the manifestation of Buddhahood in its active aspect through sentient beings; it signifies living a life of authenticity in the world of man. Three types are distinguished: *skyes-pa sprul-sku* or the various forms through which the later Buddha passed previous to his enlightenment (described in the collection of *Jātakas* or 'birth stories'); the *bzo-pa sprul-sku* or gifted artist; and lastly the *mchog-gi sprul-sku* 'He who performed the twelve Buddha-acts.'

[7] The four patterns are known by their Indian names: Svābhāvikakāya, Dharmakāya, Sambhogakāya, and Nirmāṇakāya.

[8] Dharmakāya and Rūpakāya, the latter consisting of both Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya.

[9] The four are: being, non-being, both being and non-being, neither being nor non-being.

[10] rGyal-tshab, *dbU-ma rtsa-ba'i dka'-gnas chen-po brgyad-kyi brjed-byang* (*Collected Works,* Vol. I, No. 6).

[11] The three factors are: the cognizing agent, the object of cognition, and the act of cognition.

[12] For the Sautrāntikas, Yogacāras and Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas only the present was a 'particular existent' and a 'thing,' while for the Vaibhāṣikas and Prāsangikas the past and the future were both a 'particular existent' in the sense of a not-now.

[13] There are two types of impermanence: (a) coarse, or the impermanence of the living and (b) subtle, the impermanence of the material world.

[14] With the exception of comparative judgment the other three types are recognized by the Svātantrikas and others. What I have translated as 'existential judgment' means that here we pass to a new symbolic formulation of the same existent fact; for instance, in recognizing impermanence we also recognize the concrete nature of that which is impermanent. 'Metaphorical judgment' is to understand that 'Phoebus' means the sun, and 'doctrinal judgment' is to understand the proposition that generosity brings satisfaction. See also Tsong-kha-pa, *Collected Works,* Vol. xviii, No. 5, fol. 6b.

[15] That is to say, concepts, propositions, arguments, fictitious beings have absolutely no existence apart from or independent of the psychological operations that produce and give rise to them. This emphasis on the psychological processes distinguishes the

Prāsangikas from the Svātantrikas who made the distinction, known also in scholasticism, between the logical and the real. For the Svātantrikas a concept of a jug is necessarily such as to intend a jug, but the real jug which is thus intended does not intend anything else; it is, and it is what it is.

[16] Passion-lust, aversion-hatred, bewilderment-error.

[17] The Prāsangikas follow here the *Sha-ri'i bu-la rjes-su zlos-pa'i mdo* which declares that, when a Śrāvaka or Pratyekabuddha saint in utter composure concentrates on nothingness (*stong-pa-nyid*), there is no residue of the misery of the world to be found, and the experience of Nirvāṇa is that of the non-residual one. But when he comes out of this state of composure, the misery of the world reasserts itself and the experience of Nirvāṇa that lingers on is that of the residual one.

[18] See above note 8.

[19] Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya.

Notes to Chapter VI

[1] *Guhyasamājatantra*, p. 153.

[2] *rGyud rgyal gsang-ba snying-po'i 'grel-pa*, foll. 14a ff.

[3] *lta-ba*. This is essentially an unbiased perspective from which things are seen as they are, rather than being dealt with by a distorted view of them which demands more from them than they can possibly offer.

[4] For a detailed analysis of these technical terms see H. V. Guenther, *The Life and Teaching of Nāropa*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963, pp. 268 ff.

[5] *Theg-pa'i mchog rin-po-che'i mdzod*, foll. 60a ff.

[6] *Theg-pa'i mchog rin-po-che'i mdzod*, fol. 60a.

[7] *ibid.* fol. 60a.

[8] The 'four lamps' are symbolic terms for certain mystical experiences.

[9] *Theg-pa'i mchog rin po-che'i mdzod*, fol. 61b.

[10] This situation has been summed up by Aristotle in his *Nichomachean Ethics*, ed. H. Racsham, Loeb Classical Library, No. 73, II, VI, 14: "Evil is a form of the unlimited, and good of the limited." In his dialogue *The Timaeus*, Plato tells us that the aesthetic factor, in his later books called *eros*, is the female principle in the nature of things, while the *logos* is the male one. When he brands the female principle as evil and the male one as good, he does not proceed 'quite arbitrarily,' as F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West. An Inquiry concerning World Understand* (The Macmillan Company, New York 1949) states (p. 59), but follows the pre-Socratic conception of the *peras* 'the limited and formed' as good and the *apeiron* 'the unlimited' as evil.

CUTTING THROUGH APPEARANCES

The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism

Geshe Lhundup Sopa
Jeffrey Hopkins

Associate editor for Part Two: Anne C. Klein

With a Foreword by His Holiness The Dalai Lama

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Part Two

THEORY: SYSTEMS OF TENETS

Annotated translation of Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's

Precious Garland of Tenets

Associate editor: Anne C. Klein

Material indented or within brackets is explanation added by the translators.

3 *General Exposition of Buddhist Tenets*

The King of the Shākyas, a peerless teacher, initially generated an attitude of dedication to attaining highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. Then, [in order to actualize this wish] he amassed the collections of merit and wisdom for three countless aeons. Finally, in the vicinity of Bodhgayā, he became perfectly enlightened.

At Varaṇāsi he turned the wheel of doctrine of the four noble truths for the five good ascetics [who had previously practiced asceticism with him]. Then, on Vulture Peak [so called because it is shaped like a heap of vultures] he turned the wheel of doctrine of characterlessness [that is, phenomena's not possessing establishment by way of their own character]. Then, at Vaishāli and other places, he extensively turned the wheel of doctrine of good differentiation.

> The third wheel is called the wheel of good differentiation because it differentiates well be-

tween what is and is not established by way of its own character. The fundamental idea of the first wheel was that all phenomena without exception are established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses and that in this respect there is no cause for differentiation among them. The fundamental idea of the second wheel was that all phenomena without exception are not established by way of their own character and that in this respect there is no cause for differentiation among them. When Buddha was questioned about the apparent conflict between these two teachings, he taught the third wheel in which he explained that thoroughly established natures,[1] that is, emptinesses, and other-powered natures,[2] such as houses, trees, and persons, are established by way of their own character, but that imputational natures,[3] such as uncompounded space, cessations, and phenomena's being the referents of conceptual consciousnesses, are not established by way of their own character. Thus, the third wheel is the teaching that differentiates well what is and is not established by way of its own character.

This way of categorizing the three wheels of doctrine is found in the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought*.[4] It says that the first wheel consists of teachings of the four noble truths and the like,

[1] *yongs grub, pariniṣpanna.*
[2] *gzhan dbang, paratantra.*
[3] *kun btags, parikalpita.*
[4] *dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo, saṃdhinirmocanasūtra.* For an edited Tibetan text and translation into French, see Étienne Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra: l'explication des mystères,* (Louvain, Paris, 1935). The topic of the three wheels of doctrine is found in chapter seven of that sūtra, the 'Questions of Paramārthasamudgata'.

which were taught for the sake of trainees of the Lesser Vehicle; that the second wheel consists of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the like, which were taught for the sake of trainees of the Great Vehicle; and that the third wheel, which includes the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought* itself, was taught for the sake of both Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle trainees. The *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought* teaches that the third wheel is the highest and most direct. However, this teaching is for Proponents of Mind Only; the Consequence School, which is considered by most Tibetan orders to be the highest system of tenets and which follows the second wheel, holds that this presentation of the three wheels itself requires interpretation.

All inferior proponents of tenets, the six teachers of the Forders[1] and so forth were quelled by Buddha's magnificence; and his precious teaching, a source of help and happiness, flourished and spread widely. Later on, commentators explained individually the thought of the three wheels, and thus the four schools of tenets arose. Of these four, the two schools that propound [truly existent external] objects [the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] follow the first wheel. The Proponents of Non-Entityness[2] [Proponents of the Middle Way School] follow the second wheel; and the Yogic Practitioners[3] [Proponents of Mind Only] follow the third wheel. All four schools make definitive presentations of the three—basis, paths, and fruits—following their respective wheels.

The number of schools of tenets that follow our teacher is definitely four: the two Lesser Vehicle

[1] *mu stegs pa, tīrthika.*
[2] *ngo bo nyid med par smra ba, niḥsvabhāvavādin.*
[3] *rnal 'byor spyod pa ba, yogācāra.*

schools, Great Exposition School and Sūtra School, and the two Great Vehicle schools, Mind Only School and Middle Way School.

> The order of the schools, as presented by almost all orders of Tibetan Buddhism, is, from top to bottom:

Great Vehicle

- Middle Way School
  - Consequence School
  - Autonomy School
- Mind Only School
  - Followers of Reasoning
  - Followers of Scripture

Lesser Vehicle

- Sūtra School
  - Followers of Reasoning
  - Followers of Scripture

Great Exposition School – eighteen subschools

This is so because it is said that there is no fifth system of tenets apart from these four and that there is no fourth vehicle apart from the three vehicles [Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva vehicles]. Vajragarbha's *Commentary on the Condensation of the Hevajra Tantra*[1] says:

> It is not the Subduer's thought that a fourth [vehicle]

[1] *kye'i rdo rje bsdus pa'i don gyi rgya cher 'grel pa, hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā.* The *Hevajra Tantra* itself has been translated by David L. Snellgrove in *The Hevajra Tantra, A Critical Study,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), Parts 1 and 2.

> Or a fifth [school of tenets] exists for Buddhists.

When the [other] Buddhist schools—the Autonomy, Mind Only, Sūtra, and Great Exposition Schools—are weighed by the Consequence School, they are all found to fall to extremes of permanence and annihilation. However, the Autonomists and below each maintain that their own system is a middle [way school] because they claim that they assert a middle free from the two extremes of permanence and annihilation. Moreover, each of the four schools of tenets has a different way of avoiding the extremes of permanence and annihilation.

> To hold an extreme of permanence is to superimpose existence on what actually does not exist, as in holding that a unitary and independent self exists. To hold an extreme of annihilation is to deny the existence of something that actually does exist, as in holding that there is no liberation from cyclic existence or that phenomena do not exist at all.

The Proponents of the Great Exposition maintain that they avoid the extreme of permanence because [they assert that] when an effect is produced, its causes cease. They say that they also avoid the extreme of annihilation because [they assert that] an effect arises after the termination of a cause.

The Proponents of Sūtra say that they avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that the continuum of a compounded phenomenon exists continuously.

> For example, they assert that when a table is burned, even though the continuum of similar type of the compounded phenomenon—namely the continuum of a specific table—is severed, a continuation of the substance is not severed because ashes remain.

The Proponents of Sūtra maintain that they are also free from the extreme of permanence because [of their assertion that] compounded phenomena disintegrate from moment to moment.

The Proponents of Mind Only say that they avoid the extreme of permanence by [asserting that] imputational natures do not truly exist. They say that they also avoid the extreme of annihilation through [asserting] the true existence of dependent natures.

The Proponents of the Middle Way School maintain that they are free from the extreme of annihilation because [they assert] the conventional existence of all phenomena. They consider that they are free from the extreme of permanence because [they assert that] all phenomena whatsoever are without ultimate existence.

Although those tenets of the lower schools that are not shared by the higher schools are refuted by the higher schools of tenets, an understanding of the lower views is an excellent method for gaining an understanding of the higher views. Therefore, you should not despise the lower tenets just because you hold the higher tenets to be superior.

The definition of a proponent of Buddhist tenets is: a person who asserts the four seals which are the views testifying that a doctrine is Buddha's. The four seals are:

1 All compounded phenomena are impermanent.
2 All contaminated things are miserable.
3 All phenomena are selfless.
4 Nirvana is peace.

> Each of the Buddhist schools has its own particular interpretation of these four. The following interpretation is accepted by all four schools: Compounded phenomena are things such as chairs and tables that are produced in dependence on an aggregation of major and minor causes. Uncompounded phenomena are phenomena such as space that are not produced in dependence on major or minor causes. Contaminated things are those phenomena that are under the influence of contaminated actions and afflictive emotions. Phenomena are selfless in the sense that they are empty of being a permanent, unitary, independent self or of being the objects of use of such a self. Nirvana is peace because peace is not bestowed by Indra, or anyone else, but is achieved by one's own individual passing beyond the afflictions of desire, hatred, and ignorance.

Objection: In that case, the Vātsiputrīyas [a subschool of the Great Exposition School] would not be proponents of Buddhist tenets because they assert a self of persons.

Answer: There is no such fallacy because the self that they assert is a self-sufficient, substantially existent self whereas the selflessness of the four seals refers to the absence of a permanent, unitary, independent self and that [selflessness] is asserted even by the five Saṃmitīya schools [—the Vātsiputrīyas being one of the five—although they do assert an inexpressible self].

> In his *Great Exposition of Tenets*[1] Jam-ȳang-shay-ba, who is identified as Gön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-bo's previous incarnation, does not accept that the Vātsiputrīyas assert a self-sufficient, substantially existent person because they, like the other Proponents of a Person,[2] hold that the person is inexpressible as either substantially existent or imputedly existent, or as the same as or different from the aggre-

[1] *kha* 8b.8-10b.1.
[2] *gang zag smra ba, pudgalavādin.*

gates, whereas a self-sufficient, substantially existent person is necessarily able to stand by itself separate from the aggregates. Thus, although Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo agrees with Jam-yang-shay-ba that the selflessness mentioned in the four seals refers to 'the absence of a permanent, unitary, independent self', he does not agree with Jam-yang-shay-ba's position that the Vātsīputrīyas do not assert a substantially existent person. In holding that the Vātsīputrīyas assert a substantially existent person, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo is probably following his teacher, Jang-gya Röl-bay-dor-jay, who, in his *Presentation of Tenets*,[1] gives a long refutation of Jam-yang-shay-ba on this topic. However, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo does not accept Jang-gya's conclusion[2] that the Vātsīputrīyas, though Buddhist, are not actual proponents of Buddhist tenets. Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo maintains that they are actual proponents of Buddhist tenets by holding—as does Jam-yang-shay-ba, as mentioned above—that the selflessness indicated in the four seals refers to 'the absence of a permanent, unitary, independent self'. In this way, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo does not agree completely with either his previous incarnation, Jam-yang-shay-ba, or with his teacher Jang-gya; his critical stance devoid of partisan allegiance is typical of much of his and many others' scholarship and stands in contrast to the work of some scholars whose main aim, it seems, is to uphold their own College's assertions.

[1] 77.5-84.12.
[2] 84.4.

4 *The Great Exposition School*

The presentation of the tenets of the Proponents of the is in four parts: definition, subschools, etymology, and assertions of tenets.[1]

DEFINITION

The definition of a Proponent of the Great Exposition is: a person propounding Lesser Vehicle tenets who does not accept self-cognizing consciousness[2] and who asserts external objects as being truly established.

> This definition must be qualified because it does not exclude Proponents of Sūtra Following Scripture, who also do not assert self-cognizing consciousness but assert truly established external objects. A self-cognizing consciousness is, roughly speaking, a mind's awareness of itself simultaneous with its awareness of an object.

[1] Herbert V. Guenther also has translated this and the remaining chapters in *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972).
[2] *rang rig, svasaṃvedana.*

SUBSCHOOLS

There are three groups of Proponents of the Great Exposition: Kashmiris, Aparāntakas, and Magadhas.

> There are generally renowned to be eighteen subschools divided, according to various accounts, from two, three, or four basic subschools.[1]

ETYMOLOGY

There is reason for calling the master Vasumitra a 'Proponent of the Great Exposition' [or a 'Proponent of the Particularist School'][2] because he propounds tenets following the *Great Detailed Exposition*[3] and because he propounds that the three times [past, present, and future objects] are particulars [or instances] of substantial entities.[4]

> Their assertions on the three times are discussed in more detail below.

ASSERTIONS OF TENETS

This section has three parts: their assertions on the basis,[5] paths,[6] and fruits.[7]

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[1] For an excellent discussion of the subschools, see André Bareau, *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (Saigon: 1955). For a brief presentation of the modes of division, see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 713-719.
[2] In accordance with the second etymology about to be given.
[3] *bye brag bshad mtsho chen mo, mahāvibhāṣā.* This text was not translated into Tibetan but was translated into Chinese.
[4] *rdzas, dravya.*
[5] *gzhi, sthāpana.*
[6] *lam, mārga.*
[7] *'bras bu, phala.*

ASSERTIONS ON THE BASIS

This section has two parts: assertions regarding objects[1] and assertions regarding object-possessors[2] [subjects].

> A subject (or object-possessor) can be an object of another consciousness, and thus all phenomena, including subjects, are included within objects.

Assertions Regarding Objects

This system asserts that all objects of knowledge[3] are included within five basic categories: appearing forms,[4] main minds,[5] accompanying mental factors,[6], compositional factors not associated [with either minds or mental factors],[7] and uncompounded phenomena.[8]

> Forms are of eleven types: the five sense objects, the five sense powers, and non-revelatory forms. The five sense objects are: (1) colors and shapes, (2) sounds, (3) odors, (4) tastes, and (5) tangible objects. The five sense powers are: (6) eye sense, (7) ear sense, (8) nose sense, (9) tongue sense, and (10) body sense. Non-revelatory forms are, for example, the subtle form of the absence of a vow as in the case of the subtle form of non-virtuous deeds that a butcher would always possess even when not actually engaged in killing.
>
> A main mind is a consciousness apprehend-

---

[1] *yul, viṣaya.*
[2] *yul can, viṣayin.*
[3] *shes bya, jñeya.*
[4] *gzugs, rūpa.*
[5] *sems, citta.*
[6] *sems byung, caitta.*
[7] *ldan pa ma yin pa'i 'du byed, viprayuktasaṃskāra.*
[8] *'dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta.*

ing the general object, such as an eye consciousness apprehending a table. Mental factors accompany main minds and apprehend the particulars of an object, for example, the pleasantness or unpleasantness of a table. Ten mental factors accompany all main minds: feeling, intention, discrimination, aspiration, contact, intelligence, mindfulness, mental engagement, interest, and stabilization.

Illustrations of compounded phenomena that are not associated with minds or mental factors are the four characteristics of compounded phenomena: production, aging, duration, and disintegration. Etymologically speaking, these are phenomena that are not associated (*ldan min, viprayukta*) with minds or mental factors; more specifically, they are neither form nor consciousness and thus are a separate category.

Moreover, these five objects are 'things'.[1] The definition of a thing is: that which is able to perform a function. Existent,[2] object of knowledge,[3] and thing[4] are mutually inclusive [i.e., whatever is the one is the other].[5] Uncompounded phenomena are considered to be permanent things; forms, consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors [which are neither form nor consciousness] are considered to be impermanent things.

[1] *dngos po, bhāva.*
[2] *yod pa, sat.*
[3] *shes bya, jñeya.*
[4] *dngos po, bhāva.*
[5] *don gcig, ekārtha.* 'Mutually inclusive' does not indicate that these are necessarily just different names for the same thing, as would be the case with synonyms (*ming gi rnam grangs*); rather, it indicates that whatever is the one is necessarily the other—they are mutually pervasive.

Among the four Buddhist tenet systems, only this system asserts that a permanent phenomenon such as uncompounded space is able to perform a function and thus is a thing. For instance, the lack of obstructing contact that space affords performs the function of allowing movement to take place. Since both permanent and impermanent phenomena are asserted to be 'things' in this system, functionality is not limited to producing causal sequences; instead, as with uncompounded space, functionality can refer to *allowing* or *opening the way* for something to happen.

All things are necessarily substantially established,[1] but they are not necessarily substantially existent.[2]

It is clear that if something is substantially existent, this does not necessitate that it is a substance, since impermanence is substantially existent but not a substance. Rather, to be substantially existent means (in accordance with the definition of an ultimate truth given below) that when the object is either broken physically or mentally divided into parts, the awareness of that object is not cancelled.

This is so because they assert that ultimate truths[3] and substantial existents are mutually inclusive and that conventional truths[4] and imputed existents[5] are mutually inclusive.

There are divisions of objects into the two truths and

[1] *rdzas grub, dravyasiddha.*
[2] *rdzas yod, dravyasat.*
[3] *don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya.*
[4] *kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya.*
[5] *btags yod, prajñaptisat.*

into the contaminated[1] and uncontaminated.[2] Also [with regard to this discussion of objects] there is a teaching of other ancillary topics.

The two truths

The definition of a conventional truth is: a phenomenon which is such that when it is broken up or mentally separated into individual parts, the awareness apprehending that object is cancelled. A clay pot and a rosary are illustrations[3] of conventional truths because, if a clay pot is broken with a hammer, the awareness apprehending that object as a clay pot is cancelled; and, if the beads of a rosary are separated, the awareness apprehending that object as a rosary is cancelled.

> With respect to the term 'illustration', the Sanskrit term *lakṣya* also translates into Tibetan as *mtshon bya*, 'definiendum'. In the triad of definition, definiendum, and illustration, the definition of a thing (*dngos po, bhāva*), for example, is: that which is capable of performing a function.[4] The definiendum is thing. An illustration is a pot. As can readily be seen, the definiendum and an illustration are markedly different. Technically speaking:[5]
>
> > An illustration is defined as: that which serves as a basis for illustrating the appropriate definiendum by way of its definition.[1] ... [An illustration] cannot be such that understanding [it] ...effectively serves as understanding all of the essential characteristics of the illustrated object. That is, in order to be a valid illustrator (*mtshon byed*) of something, a phenomenon must be such that although someone might have realized the illustration, that person would not necessarily have realized that which it illustrates. For instance, a gold pot is a proper illustration of a functioning thing because it is a functioning thing and merely through having ascertained a gold pot with valid cognition, one would not necessarily have ascertained functioning thing itself with valid cognition. ... A gold pot indicates functioning thing by way of being able to perform a function; thus, it *illustrates* or *demonstrates* the meaning of functioning thing.
> >
> > On the other hand, a gold pot is not a proper illustration of a pot because, although it is a pot, if someone has ascertained a gold pot with valid cognition, that person must have ascertained pot with valid cognition. It is not possible for one to know the meaning of a gold pot and not know the meaning of pot.

Thus, it is clear that an illustration not only is not the definiendum itself but also is not constituted merely by instances of an object. This distinction was a Tibetan development, and thus, when *mtshan gzhi* refers to an illustration and not to the definiendum, it is clearly not

[1] *zag bcas, sāsrava.*
[2] *zag med, anāsrava.*
[3] *mtshan gzhi, lakṣya.*
[4] *don byed nus pa, arthakriyāśakti/ arthakriyakāritva.*
[5] Daniel Perdue, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhist Education* (forthcoming from Snow Lion Publications), Part 3, pp. 12ff.

[1] *mtshan nyid kyis skabs su bab pa'i mtshon bya mtshon pa'i gzhir gyur pa.*

suitable to translate it as 'definiendum' by referring back to the Sanskrit which does not make this distinction.[1]

The definition of an ultimate truth is: a phenomenon which is such that when it is broken up or mentally separated into individual parts, the consciousness apprehending that object is not cancelled. Illustrations of ultimate truths are directionally partless particles, temporally partless moments of consciousness, and uncompounded space.

In this system, the smallest units of matter are asserted to be directionally partless, but this does not mean that they are partless in general; even the smallest particle has factors relating to its production, duration, and cessation and factors relating to the production of effects, and so forth. Similarly, the smallest temporal unit of consciousness is temporally partless but is not partless in general; for example, one instant of an eye consciousness can have many parts that apprehend the various colors of a tile floor.

For, Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* says:[2]

[1] Dzong-ka-ba speaks to this issue in his *Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'(dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho)*, (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, no date), 141.14-141.20.

[2] *chos mngon pa'i mdzod, abhidharmakośa*; VI.4: *yatra bhinnena tadbuddhiranyâpohe dhiyā ca tat/ ghaṭâmbuvat saṃvṛtisat paramârthasadanyathā//*. For a Sanskrit edition, see *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭârtha Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*, Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Bauddha Bharati Series no.5. (Banaras: Bauddha Bharati, 1970). For a translation into French, see Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* (Paris: Geuthner, 1923-31). Vasubandhu flourished around 360 C.E.

A thing which is such that, if broken or mentally separated into others [i.e. parts],
An awareness of it no longer operates,
Such as a pot or water, is conventionally existent.
[All] others are ultimately existent.

Since a single minute particle of water is an ultimate truth, Vasubandhu's reference must be to a quantity of water, such as in a cup or even a river.

Therefore, it is asserted that conventional truths are not ultimately established,[1] although they are truly established.[2] This is because this system asserts that all things are necessarily truly established.

The contaminated and the uncontaminated

The definition of a contaminated object is: a phenomenon that is amenable to the increase of contaminations from the point of view of being either an object of observation[3] or an [afflicted] concomitant. The five mental and physical aggregates[4] are illustrations of contaminated objects.

However, not all phenomena included in the five mental and physical aggregates are illustrations of contaminated phenomena because, for instance, true paths—the fourth of the four noble truths—are included in the five aggregates but are not contaminated objects.

A table, for example, is a contaminated phenomenon not because it possesses the afflictive

[1] *don dam par grub pa, paramārthasiddha.*

[2] *bden par grub pa, satyasiddha.*

[3] *dmigs pa, ālambana.*

[4] *phung po, skandha.*

emotions[1] of desire, hatred, or ignorance but because it can act as an object of observation that increases those afflictive emotions, especially desire, in the perceiver. An afflicted concomitant can be an afflicted main mind that accompanies afflicted mental factors or an afflicted mental factor that accompanies an afflicted main mind or other afflicted mental factors. An illustration is the mental factor of desire that accompanies the perception of an attractive object and could increase the afflictive emotions of the main mind and other mental factors accompanying it.

All phenomena that are contaminated objects from the viewpoint of being afflicted concomitants are also contaminated from the viewpoint of being objects of observation because they can increase afflictive emotions in other beings who take cognizance of them, or they can increase one's own afflictive emotions if one should take cognizance of them at a later time, as in the case of desire. However, all phenomena that are contaminated objects from the viewpoint of being objects of observation are not necessarily contaminated from the viewpoint of being afflicted concomitants, such as an attractive table which could never be an afflicted concomitant because it is not a mind or a mental factor.

The definition of an uncontaminated object is: a phenomenon that is not amenable to the increase of contaminations from the viewpoint of being either an object of observation or a mental concomitant. True paths and uncompounded phenomena are illustrations, for,

[1] *nyon mongs, kleśa.*

Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* says,[1] 'Except for true paths, all compounded phenomena are contaminated'; and,[2] 'The uncontaminated consists of true paths and the three uncompounded phenomena.'

When true paths are objects of observation or mental concomitants, they destroy contamination and do not increase it. Uncompounded space as an object of observation cannot destroy contamination, but does not increase it. The three uncompounded phenomena are: non-analytical cessations, analytical cessations, and uncompounded spaces. A non-analytical cessation is a cessation that occurs as a result of the incompleteness of the conditions for its production, such as the lack of hunger at the time of intensely concentrating on conversation. Once the moment has passed, the fact that one had no desire for food at that time will never change, and for this reason, its cessation is said to be permanent. An analytical cessation is an eradication of an obstruction such that it will never occur again, as in the case of a complete cessation forever of a particular type of desire through meditation on the four noble truths.

All contaminated objects are to be abandoned, for [even] the two paths of accumulation and preparation,[3] are to be abandoned.

The paths of accumulation and preparation are not actual antidotes to afflictive emotions and

[1] I.4b-c1: *saṃskṛtā mārgavarjitāḥ sāsravāḥ.*
[2] I.5a-b: *anāsravā mārgasatyaṃ trividhaṃ cāpyasaṃskṛtam.*
[3] *tshogs lam, saṃbhāramārga; sbyor lam, prayogamārga.* More literally, the latter is translated as 'path of connection' or 'path of linking' since it connects or links the practitioner to the path of seeing.

thus do not eliminate them; they are virtues of common beings and, therefore, suitable to increase desire.

The path of seeing[1] is completely uncontaminated.

The path of seeing consists solely of direct contemplation of the four truths and occurs only in one meditative session; thus, it is only uncontaminated.

Paths of meditation[2] and paths of no more learning[3] both have instances of contaminated and uncontaminated paths.

On both the path of meditation and the path of no more learning there are instances when yogis cultivate worldly paths, such as the eight absorptions, for the sake of increasing their mental capacity. These worldly paths are paths of meditation. They are contaminated from the viewpoint of being objects of observation because, through taking cognizance of them, afflictive emotions not only are not eliminated but also are suitable to increase in the sense that someone could become desirous of these states. One who has attained the path of no more learning no longer has any afflictive emotions; therefore, training in the eight absorptions could not increase afflictive emotions for that person, but these worldly paths could increase the desire of others who notice them. Worldly paths in the continuum of one who has attained the path of no more learning are, therefore, contaminated from the viewpoint of

[1] *mthong lam, darśanamārga.*
[2] *sgom lam, bhāvanāmārga.*
[3] *mi slob lam, aśaikṣamārga.*

being objects of observation but not from the viewpoint of being afflicted concomitants because they themselves are not afflicted in the sense that desire, for instance, is afflicted.

All superior[1] paths are necessarily uncontaminated, but the paths in the continuum of a Superior are not necessarily uncontaminated. This is because a path that is in the continuum of one on the path of meditation and has the aspect of reflecting on the peacefulness [of higher levels] and the coarseness [of the present level] is contaminated [as in the case of generating the eight absorptions in their mundane form].

All Buddhist schools, except the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School Following Scripture, maintain that a superior path and a path in the continuum of a Superior are mutually inclusive—whatever is the one is the other. The Great Exposition School, however, states the example of one who meditates on the advantages of the First Concentration, such as peacefulness and long life, and on the disadvantages of the Desire Realm, such as coarseness, ugliness, and short life, in order to do away with manifest desire for the objects of the Desire Realm. By meditating thus, a yogi can attain a higher state of concentration and can suppress manifest afflictive emotions, but cannot get rid of the seeds of the afflictive emotions. Many non-Buddhists attain their 'liberation' through this means; however, because of the fault of not destroying the seeds of desire by means of analytical cessation, such 'liberation' is only temporary. In the specific case mentioned in the text, the meditator is a

[1] *'phags pa, ārya.*

Superior on the path of meditation. On this path, those of greater intelligence simultaneously rid themselves of the afflictive emotions together with their seeds, level by level in nine stages (see chart p. 213). However, the Superiors being discussed here are of duller faculties and suppress manifest afflictive emotions first by means of a worldly path, which can serve to increase afflictive emotions in the ways mentioned earlier. Only afterwards do they go on to rid themselves of the seeds of those afflictive emotions.

Other ancillary topics

The three times [past, present, and future objects] are asserted to be substantial entities because the Proponents of the Great Exposition maintain that a pot exists even at the time of the past of a pot and that a pot exists even at the time of the future of a pot.

Yesterday's pot exists today as a past pot. The past of a thing occurs after its present existence, that is, after its present existence has passed. Tomorrow's pot exists today as a future pot. The future of a thing occurs before its present existence, that is, when its present existence is yet to be. Today's pot exists as a present pot today.

Although they assert that both negative phenomena[1] and positive phenomena[2] exist, they do not accept the existence of non-affirming negatives[3] because they

[1] *dgag pa, pratiṣedha.*
[2] *sgrub pa, vidhi.*
[3] *med dgag, prasajyapratiṣedha.*

assert that all negatives are necessarily affirming negatives.[1]

A positive phenomenon such as a table does not require the explicit negation of its being non-table in order for that table to appear to a conceptual consciousness, but a negative phenomenon such as non-table entails an explicit negation of table in order for it to appear to a conceptual consciousness. The Proponents of the Great Exposition consider that there is always something affirmative about a negative because their system always deals with substantially established entities. This emphasis on substantiality sets in relief the tendency of the higher schools to become less and less substance oriented, and these variations are especially significant as regards the schools' different modes of arriving at their interpretations of emptiness.

The Kashmiri Proponents of the Great Exposition accord with the Proponents of Sūtra in asserting that the continuum of consciousness is the base that connects actions (*las, karma*) with their effects.

Every Buddhist system has to deal with the issue of providing for an uninterrupted base to connect karmic cause with karmic fruit. The Kashmiris say that the continuum of the mental consciousness[2] is the base that allows the continued chain of actions and their fruits to prevail from life to life. This is because the mental consciousness, unlike the other five consciousnesses, functions even in deep sleep and in the meditative absorption of cessation.

[1] *ma yin dgag, paryudāsapratiṣedha.*
[2] *yid kyi rnam shes, manovijñāna.*

All Proponents of the Great Exposition, except for the Kashmiris, assert that a compositional phenomenon that is neither form nor consciousness is the base that connects actions with their fruits. This is an obtainer[1] and a 'non-wastage'[2] which is like a seal that guarantees a loan [preventing the loan from becoming a loss to the lender].

Both this system and the Consequence School assert that actions of body and speech have form.

> The other Buddhist systems assert physical and verbal actions (*las, karma*) to be mental. Proponents of the Great Exposition and Consequentialists reason that speech is sound and that sound is form; therefore, speech is form. Also, there is coarse and subtle form. Speech that has coarse form is, for example, that heard when a person speaks. Speech that has subtle form is, for example, the pure speech manifested by a monk who, even when silent, is keeping a vow not to speak lies and so forth. Although unheard by either himself or others, it nevertheless exists. Examples of bodily actions that have subtle form are the ethical deeds of a Superior in meditative equipoise. These would not be seen by others, but could be seen by someone with high clairvoyance, such as a Buddha.
>
> The Proponents of Sūtra, Proponents of Mind Only, and Autonomists maintain that actions of body and speech are actually mental factors of intention.[3]

All compounded phenomena are necessarily impermanent but do not necessarily disintegrate moment by moment; for the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that following production there is the activity of duration, and then the activity of disintegration occurs.

[1] *thob pa, prāpti.*
[2] *chud mi za ba, avipraṇāśa.*
[3] *sems pa, cetanā.*

> All Buddhist schools agree that coarse impermanence is the production of a thing such as a table, its lasting for a period of time, and finally its disintegration such as its being consumed by fire. Buddhist schools also assert a subtle impermanence that, except for developed yogis, is not accessible to direct experience. For example, death, which is an instance of coarse impermanence, is clearly experienced, but the momentary aging of a person, which is a subtle impermanence, is not.
>
> The Proponents of the Great Exposition differ from the other Buddhist schools in asserting that the factors of production, abiding, aging, and disintegration are external to the entity that undergoes these. All other systems hold that production itself is a cause or sufficient condition for disintegration; disintegration begins *with*, and not after, the very first moment of production. In all systems except the Great Exposition School, that which is produced is that which abides and that which disintegrates. This is because production is understood to be the arising of a new entity due to certain causes; abiding is the continued existence of that type of entity; disintegration is its quality of not lasting a second moment; and aging is the factor of its being a different entity from the entity of the previous moment. In this way, the four can occur simultaneously. The Great Exposition School, however, asserts that the factors of production, duration, aging,

and disintegration act on the object and occur in series, one after the other.

Assertions Regarding Object-Possessors [Subjects]

This section has three parts: [the Great Exposition School's] assertions regarding persons, consciousnesses, and terms.

Every consciousness has an object and thus is an object-possessor. Every name or term expresses a meaning that is its object, and thus is an object-possessor. Every person possesses objects and is an object possessor in this sense.

Persons

The mere collection of the mental and physical aggregates[1] that are its basis of imputation is an illustration of a person.

'Illustration of a person'[2] refers to what is found upon analyzing what a person is. Thus, even the subschools of the Great Exposition School which hold that there is no substantially existent person assert that the mere collection of mind and body is the person.

Some of the five Saṃmitiya subschools assert that all five aggregates are an illustration of a person.

There is controversy on whether this means that they assert that *each* of the five aggregates individually can be an illustration of a person or whether only all five *together* can.

[1] *phung po, skandha.*
[2] *gang zag gi mtshan gzhi.*

The Avantakas assert that the mind alone is an illustration of a person.

Consciousnesses

This section has two parts: the [Great Exposition School's] assertions regarding prime cognitions[1] and assertions regarding non-prime consciousnesses.[2]

'Consciousness' is used here as a general term referring both to minds and mental factors.

PRIME COGNITIONS

There are direct prime cognitions[3] and inferential prime cognitions.[4]

Buddhist psychological terms that signify a consciousness that perceives an object are often rendered in English by words such as 'perception' or 'cognition' which tend to indicate either the act or object of perception and cognition rather than the agent. Therefore, it is important to remember that these terms are understood as referring to the perceiving consciousness, the cognizing consciousness as agent.

With regard to direct prime cognitions, they assert sense direct perceptions, mental direct perceptions, and yogic direct perceptions [such as direct cognitions of the four noble truths and their sixteen attributes, impermanence and so forth]. They do not accept self-cognition as

[1] *tshad ma, pramāṇa.* As will be explained in the next chapter, the *pra* of *pramāṇa* is taken to mean 'new' and thus has been translated as 'prime'.
[2] *tshad min gyi shes pa, apramāṇabuddhi.*
[3] *mngon sum gyi tshad ma, pratyakṣapramāṇa.*
[4] *rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma, anumānapramāṇa.*

a direct perception.

> Sense direct perceptions are the five sense consciousnesses. For a brief discussion of mental direct perceptions, see the next chapter. Self-cognition refers to a consciousness that is non-dualistically aware of a consciousness. Roughly speaking, it is that part of a consciousness which is aware of its own cognizing activity; all systems that accept this type of consciousness assert that it is the same entity as the consciousness that it knows and that it cognizes the consciousness in a non-dualistic manner. For this reason, self-cognition is rejected by the Proponents of the Great Exposition, Proponents of Sūtra Following Scripture, Sūtra Autonomists, and Consequentialists, for they maintain that agent and object would be confused if such existed. The other schools assert the existence of self-cognition mainly on the basis of common experience in which the seer of an object is remembered as well as the object that was seen, thus showing that the subjective element is registered in awareness. For, if the subjective element were not experienced, there would be no memory of the subjective side of a cognition.

[Unlike the other schools] the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that a sense direct prime cognition is not necessarily a consciousness because a physical eye sense is a common locus of being matter [not consciousness], of being a perception, and of being a prime cognition.

> They do not assert that a sense power[1] alone can perceive an object, nor do they assert that a sense consciousness alone is capable of doing so. They maintain that the two together perceive an object; and consequently they, unlike all other Buddhist schools, assert that both sense powers and sense consciousnesses are perceivers.

[1] *dbang po, indriya.*

They assert that a sense consciousness comprehends its object nakedly, without taking on the aspect of that object. Also, they assert that even a physical eye sense power which is the base [of an eye consciousness] perceives form, for they say that if a consciousness alone were the seer, then one would see forms that are obstructed by walls and so forth.

> Because a consciousness does not have form, it is not obstructed by form; however, because the support of the eye consciousness is a physical sense power, the seer also incorporates form and so is obstructed by form.

A mind and its mental factors are asserted to be different substantial entities.

> A mind and its accompanying mental factors are each instances of consciousness and possess five similar qualities. An example of this is an inferential consciousness cognizing that a sound is an impermanent thing. Here the main mind is a mental consciousness, and the accompanying mental factors include the ten omnipresent factors: feeling, intention, discrimination, aspiration, contact, intelligence, mindfulness, mental engagement, interest, and stabilization. The five qualities that this mind and its accompanying mental factors share are: (1) they have the same basic object, the sound; (2) they have the same 'aspect object', the impermanent sound; (3) they have the same sense as

their base, namely, the mental sense which is a previous moment of the mental consciousness; (4) they are simultaneous; (5) their entities are the same in number—the mental consciousness is only one and the feeling, for instance, that accompanies it is only one. Only the Proponents of the Great Exposition say that a mind and its mental factors are different substantial entities; the other schools assert that they are the same entity.

[NON-PRIME CONSCIOUSNESSES

Non-prime consciousnesses are wrong consciousness and so forth.][1]

There are five types of consciousness that are not new and/or incontrovertible cognitions: wrong consciousness, doubt, subsequent cognition, correctly assuming consciousness, and a consciousness to which an object appears without being noticed (see the next chapter).

Terms

Mere sounds in general are divided into two types, sounds arisen from elements conjoined with consciousness and sounds arisen from elements not conjoined

[1] This line (*gnyis pa ni tshad min gyi shes pa la log shes sogs yod do*) is missing in the Collected Works edition (501.4), the Peking edition (10a.5), the Go-mang 1980 edition (23.14), and the Tibet Go-mang 1987 edition (8b.4) but is in the Dharamsala 1967 edition (23.10) and the Teacher Training edition (23.7), from which it is incorporated into Mimaki (80.10). The Go-mang 1980 edition (2.6) reports that the line has unnecessarily been added and does not appear in any of the three editions that they used. We agree that the line is a later addition for the sake of symmetry and completeness, and thus we have included it but in brackets since it clearly was not in the original.

with consciousness. An example of the first is the voice of a sentient being. An example of the second is the sound of a river.

Sounds arisen from elements conjoined with consciousness and sounds arisen from elements not conjoined with consciousness are each divided into two types: sounds that intentionally indicate meaning to sentient beings and sounds that do not intentionally indicate meaning to sentient beings.

An example of a sound arisen from elements conjoined with consciousness that intentionally indicates meaning is the spoken expression 'house'. An example of a sound arisen from elements conjoined with consciousness that does not intentionally indicate meaning is the sound of a spontaneous hiccup. An example of a sound arisen from elements not conjoined with consciousness that intentionally indicates meaning is the sound of the great drum in the Heaven of the Thirty-Three which conveys the message of impermanence and so forth to its listeners. An example of a sound arisen from elements not conjoined with consciousness that does not intentionally indicate meaning is the sound of an ordinary running brook.

Sound that intentionally indicates meaning to sentient beings, sound that reveals meaning through speech, and expressive sound are mutually inclusive. Sound that does not intentionally indicate meaning, sound that does not reveal meaning through speech, and non-expressive sound are mutually inclusive.

This requires qualification because there are sounds that intentionally indicate meaning to sentient beings, such as the sound of the drum in the Heaven of the Thirty-Three, but do not

reveal meaning through speech.

The word of Buddha and the treatises[1] are both asserted to be entities that are collections of letters, stems, and words.[2] They are accepted as generic images of sounds[3] and as non-associated compositional factors.[4] Therefore, one wonders whether in this system matter and non-associated compositional factors are not mutually exclusive.

> About the word of Buddha, Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge*[5] says:
>
> Those eighty thousand bundles of doctrine
> Which were spoken by the Subduer
> Are names and are included among [non-associated] compositional factors.
>
> Since names are sounds and sounds are material forms, it appears that the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that the words of Buddha are both material and non-associated compositional factors.[6]

[1] *bstan bcos, śāstra.*

[2] 'Stems' (*ming, nāma*) are uninflected, whereas 'words' (*tshig, pāda*) are inflected.

[3] *sgra spyi, śabdasāmānya*; literally, sound-generalities.

[4] *ldan min 'du byed, viprayuktasaṃskāra.* In the other systems, generic images are not asserted to be non-associated compositional factors, which are impermanent, but instead are asserted to be permanent; for discussion, see the next chapter.

[5] I.25: *dharmaskandhasahasrāṇi yānyaśītiṃ jagau muniḥ/ tāni vāñ nāma ve'tyeṣāṃ rūpasaṃskārasaṃgraḥ//.*

[6] As Ngak-wang-bel-den's *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets'* (*dngos*, 48.1) says, it is difficult to posit that something could be both obstructive (*thogs bcas*) due to being material and unobstructive (*thogs med*) due to being a non-associated compositional factor. Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo is most likely taking his lead from Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (*kha* 13b.1) where he indicates just such an assertion.

> An apparent complication is that Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo has interpreted Vasubandhu's reference to 'names' as generic images of sounds, which are not material. Also, if 'names' are merely generic images of sounds, it could be asked whether the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that the sounds heard from the mouth of Buddha, which are forms and thus material phenomena, are not the word of Buddha, for the word of Buddha would be comprised of the generic images of the sounds that appeared to Buddha's mind before he expressed the particular sounds. For instance, before one says the word 'tree' the generic image of the sound 'tree' first appears, and then the sound is spoken. This image of the sound 'tree' is asserted to be a non-associated compositional factor and thus neither form (matter) nor consciousness. One might then wonder whether the Proponents of the Great Exposition would say that the sounds heard from the mouth of Buddha are not the word of Buddha.

ASSERTIONS ON THE PATHS

This section has three parts: the Great Exposition School's assertions regarding the objects of observation of the paths, objects abandoned by the paths, and the nature of the paths.

Objects of Observation of the Paths

The objects of observation are the sixteen attributes of the four truths, impermanence and so forth.

> There are four attributes to each of the four truths. The attributes of the first, true sufferings, are impermanence, misery, emptiness,

> and selflessness. The attributes of the second, true origins, are cause, origin, strong production, and condition. The attributes of the third, true cessations, are cessation, pacification, auspiciousness, and definite emergence from a portion of the obstructions. The attributes of the fourth, true paths, are path, suitability, achievement, and deliverance.

Subtle selflessness and subtle selflessness of persons[1] are asserted to be mutually inclusive.

> All selflessnesses are either of persons or of phenomena, and since the Proponents of the Great Exposition do not assert a selflessness of phenomena,[2] for them a subtle selflessness is necessarily a selflessness of persons.

The subtle selflessness of persons is asserted to be a person's emptiness of being substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient. From among the eighteen subschools of the Great Exposition School, the five Saṃmitīya subschools do not assert that a person's emptiness of being substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient is the subtle selflessness because they consider that a substantially existent or self-sufficient person exists.[3]

The Proponents of the Great Exposition do not assert a presentation of coarse and subtle selflessnesses of phenomena because they hold that all established bases [i.e., such as mind, body, house, and so on] have a self of phenomena [that is, they truly exist and have a difference of entity of subject and object].

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[1] *gang zag gi bdag med, pudgalanairātmya.*
[2] *chos kyi bdag med, dharmanairātmya.*
[3] See the end of the previous chapter (pp. 177-178) for discussion of the author's partial agreement and partial disagreement with Jam-yang-shay-ba on this issue.

> When the Proponents of the Great Exposition speak of a subtle self of persons, they mean a person that is seen as having a character different from the mental and physical aggregates. This definition of 'self' applies only to persons because phenomena are not conceived this way. Therefore, within the context of their own perspective, it is possible for the Proponents of the Great Exposition to maintain the existence of a self of phenomena, such as their true existence, and to deny the existence of a self of persons.

Objects Abandoned by the Paths

There are two types of ignorance to be abandoned through the path: afflictive ignorance and non-afflictive ignorance. The first, afflictive ignorance, mainly prevents the attainment of liberation. Illustrations of afflictive ignorance are a consciousness conceiving a self of persons and the three poisons [desire, hatred, and ignorance] which arise on account of this conception, as well as their seeds.

Non-afflictive ignorance mainly prevents the attainment of all-knowingness. Illustrations of non-afflictive ignorance are the four causes of non-knowingness, such as the non-afflictive obstruction that is the ignorance of the profound and subtle qualities of a Buddha.

> The other three causes of non-knowingness are ignorance due to the distant place of the object, ignorance due to the distant time of the object, and ignorance due to the nature of the object, such as the subtle details of the relationship of karmic causes with their effects.
>
> The all-knowingness mentioned here is not a Buddha's quality of omniscience as it is under-

stood by the Great Vehicle tenet systems. All-knowingness here simply means that if a Buddha thinks about objects, seen or unseen, a Buddha will know those things one by one. The Great Vehicle tenet systems, however, assert that a Buddha can know all things simultaneously and instantaneously, without exerting any effort of thought. The Proponents of the Great Exposition do not accept such omniscience, and, therefore, they do not assert obstructions to omniscience; they merely distinguish between afflictive and non-afflictive ignorance. The Great Vehicle tenet systems distinguish between an ignorance that is an afflictive obstruction and a non-afflictive ignorance that is an obstruction to omniscience.

With respect to the obstructions, aside from obstructions to liberation and non-afflictive ignorance, the Proponents of the Great Exposition do not accept the designation 'obstructions to omniscience'.[1]

Nature of the Paths

With respect to the paths of the three vehicles [Hearer,[2] Solitary Realizer,[3] and Bodhisattva[4]] they assert a presentation of the five paths—path of accumulation,[5] path of preparation,[6] path of seeing,[7] path of meditation,[8] and path of no more learning.[9] However, they do not

[1] *shes sgrib, jñeyāvaraṇa.*
[2] *nyan thos, śrāvaka.*
[3] *rang rgyal/ rang sangs rgyas, svajina/pratyekabuddha.*
[4] *byang chub sems dpa', bodhisattva.*
[5] *tshogs lam, sambhāramārga.*
[6] *sbyor lam, prayogamārga.*
[7] *mthong lam, darśanamārga.*
[8] *sgom la, bhāvanāmārga.*
[9] *mi slob lam, aśaikṣamārga.*

accept the exalted wisdoms of the ten [Bodhisattva] grounds.[1]

They assert that the first fifteen of the sixteen moments of forbearance and knowledge constitute the path of seeing, and that the sixteenth moment, which is called subsequent knowledge of the path, is [the beginning of] the path of meditation [see chart, next page].[2]

The path of seeing is the time when direct cognition of the four noble truths first occurs. The paths of forbearance are so called because one develops facility, or non-fear, with respect to the object of meditation; they are also called uninterrupted paths[3] because they lead without interruption into paths of release[4] in the same meditative sitting. These paths of release are the paths of knowledge, or the knowledge that certain afflictive emotions have been abandoned.

They assert that the generation [of these sixteen moments] occurs no other way than serially [one step at a time], like a goat walking over a bridge.

[1] *sa, bhūmi.* These are ten stages or levels that, according to the Great Vehicle tenet systems, begin with the path of seeing. They are called 'grounds' because, just as the earth or ground is the basis of all the forests and so forth that depend on it, they serve as bases for the production of a Bodhisattva's increasingly marvelous qualities.
[2] Among the seven editions of the text used, five (Collected Works, 503.2; Peking edition, 11a.4; Go-mang 1980 edition, 26.5; Tibet Go-mang 1987 edition, 9b.1; and Mimaki, 81.20) read *sgom lam yin la* whereas two (Teacher Training edition, 25.17 and Dharamsala 1967 edition, 26.3) read *sgom lam yin pas.* Both make sense since the latter would mean that *since* they hold that the sixteenth moment marks the beginning of the path of meditation, the sixteen *must* be serially generated. The former, however, most likely represent the original reading.
[3] *bar chad med lam, ānantaryamārga.*
[4] *rnam grol lam, vimuktimārga.*

They envision the process in this way: The four noble truths are the objects contemplated on the path of seeing. For each noble truth there is a path of forbearance and a path of knowledge in relation to the Desire Realm;[1] there is also a path of subsequent forbearance and a path of subsequent knowledge in relation to the higher

Sixteen Moments of Forbearance and Knowledge
(read from bottom to top)



[1] *'dod khams, kāmadhātu.*

realms, the Form and Formless Realms[1] which are here included in one category. When meditators complete the paths of the first truth in relation to the Desire Realm, they then pass on to the paths of the first truth in relation to the Form and Formless Realms. The sixteenth moment is the time of entering the path of meditation. Other schools say that the eight forbearances can occur simultaneously and that the eight knowledges can occur simultaneously.

True paths are not necessarily consciousnesses because the Proponents of the Great Exposition maintain that the five uncontaminated mental and physical aggregates are true paths.

Except for the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School Following Scripture, all schools assert that true paths are consciousnesses. The Proponents of the Great Exposition include within true paths the five mental and physical aggregates at, for example, the time of the fifteenth moment of the path of seeing. However, it is not the case that every instance of the five aggregates included within a Superior's continuum is a true path and hence uncontaminated. The point is that there *are* instances of each of the aggregates that are true paths and thus uncontaminated. These uncontaminated phenomena are those associated with a Superior's uncontaminated path. Illustrations are a Superior's mental consciousness, the accompanying mental factors of feeling and discrimination, the subtle forms which restrain certain faults and which naturally arise whenever a

[1] *gzugs khams, rūpadhātu; gzugs med khams, arūpyadhātu.*

Superior is in meditative equipoise in an uncontaminated path, and the predispositions established by this path. All these are uncontaminated objects and are truth paths.

ASSERTIONS ON THE FRUITS OF THE PATHS

Those of the Hearer lineage become familiar with the sixteen attributes [of the four noble truths], impermanence and so forth, during three lifetimes or more. By relying on the vajra-like meditative stabilization[1] of the Hearer path of meditation, they finally abandon the afflictive obstructions by ceasing their obtaining causes [the potentialities that cause one to have those afflictive emotions].

A 'vajra' (*rdo rje*, literally, 'foremost of stones') is a diamond which, being viewed as unbreakable, is a suitable metaphor for a meditative state that is able to overcome the final object of abandonment.

They then manifest the fruit of becoming a Foe Destroyer.

On the great path of accumulation[2] and below, rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizers practice the realization that the person is empty of substantial existence in the sense of being self-sufficient. They do this in conjunction with amassing a collection of merit for one hundred great aeons and so forth; and then, in one sitting, they actualize the stages from the heat level of the path of preparation through to and including the path of no more learning.

Solitary Realizers are those who have met with

[1] *rdo rje lta bu'i ting nge 'dzin, vajropamasamādhi.*
[2] The path of accumulation is divided into three periods—small, middling, and great.

teachers and listened to their teaching of the doctrine in previous lives but in their final life live in the Desire Realm peacefully and by themselves, like a rhinoceros. They do not meet with teachers or study doctrine in that life. Great Vehicle tenet systems also assert another type of Solitary Realizers who meet and study with a teacher early in their final lifetime but later achieve their goal alone.

According to the Great Exposition School, Solitary Realizers, having accumulated merit for one hundred great aeons over the path of accumulation, pass in one meditative sitting through the four levels of the path of preparation—heat, peak, forbearance, and supreme mundane qualities—and then the paths of seeing, meditation, and no more learning.

Furthermore, the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert the existence of types of Foe Destroyers who degenerate, etc., because there are Lesser Vehicle Foe Destroyers who fall from their abandonment [of the obstructions] and their realizations [of the four truths], whereupon they become Stream Enterers.[1]

The Proponents of the Great Exposition maintain that there are five types of fallible Foe Destroyers and a sixth type who is not capable of degeneration. Only this sixth type would be considered an actual Foe Destroyer by the other schools.

With respect to Hearers, they enumerate a presentation of the twenty members of the spiritual community[2] along with the eight Approachers and Abiders; however, they do not assert that anyone simultaneously

[1] *rgyun zhugs, śrotāpanna.*
[2] *dge 'dun, saṅgha.*

[abandons the afflictive emotions].

The twenty members of the spiritual community represent a classification of the location and number of lives remaining for practitioners on the way to attaining the fruits of Stream Enterer, Once Returner,[1] Never Returner,[2] and Foe Destroyer.

The Eight Approachers and Abiders are beings who are approaching to or abiding in the fruits of Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner, or Foe Destroyer. The four Abiders refer to persons who have fully accomplished, or who abide in, these fruits. A Stream Enterer is one who will never again be reborn as a hell-being, hungry ghost, or animal. A Once Returner will be reborn once more in the Desire Realm. A Never Returner will never be born again in the Desire Realm. A Foe Destroyer has overcome the afflictive emotions and thus is completely liberated from cyclic existence.

Cyclic existence is divided into three realms and nine levels. The first level is the Desire Realm. The next four levels are the four divisions of the form realm, called the Four Concentrations. The last four levels are divisions of the Formless Realm. Each level has nine series of obstacles that are to be abandoned; big big, middle big, and small big; big middle, middle middle, and small middle; big small, middle small, and small small (see chart next page). Thus, if trainees proceed serially, they have to pass through eighty-one steps, that is, through a series of nine steps on each of the nine levels.

[1] *lan gcig phyir 'ong, sakṛdāgamin.*
[2] *phyir mi 'ong, anāgamin.*

Path of Meditation
(read from bottom to top)



> Simultaneous abandonment refers to the simultaneous overcoming or abandoning of, for example, each of the big big of the nine levels. Thus, one who passes through the path of meditation with simultaneous abandonment has only nine steps to accomplish instead of eighty-one. The Proponents of the Great Exposition do not accept any such simultaneous abandonment.

They maintain that the eight types of Approachers and Abiders are necessarily Superiors.

> This means that even Approachers to the fruit of Stream Enterer have attained the path of seeing, from which point they are no longer ordinary beings but Superiors. Other systems maintain that an Approacher to the fruit of Stream Enterer is on the path of preparation.

Bodhisattvas [such as Shākyamuni] complete their collections [of merit and wisdom] over three periods of countless great aeons during the path of accumulation. Having done this, they achieve the causes of the excellent marks [of a Buddha] over one hundred aeons, and then, in their final life vanquish the array of demons[1] at twilight while seated beside the tree of enlightenment. At midnight, while in meditative equipoise, they actualize the three paths of preparation, seeing, and meditation. Later, just prior to dawn, they actualize the path of no more learning [and become a Buddha].

Therefore [from among the twelve deeds of a Buddha] they consider that the taming of the demons at twilight and the preceding deeds are performed when a common being and that the three Bodhisattva paths of preparation, seeing, and meditation are all only meditative equipoise [because they occur only during meditative sitting]. Of the twelve deeds, the first nine are asserted to be the deeds of a Bodhisattva, and the last three are asserted to be the deeds of a Buddha.

> The twelve deeds are: descent from the Joyous Pure Land,[1] conception, birth, mastery of the arts, sporting with the retinue, renunciation, asceticism, meditation under the tree of enlightenment, conquest of the array of demons, becoming a Buddha, turning the wheel of doctrine, and nirvana (death).

The Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that a wheel of doctrine[2] is necessarily a path of seeing and that a verbal wheel of doctrine is necessarily a wheel of doctrine of the four truths.

The Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that the Seven Treatises of Manifest Knowledge[3] were spoken by Buddha [and written down by Foe Destroyers]. They say that Buddha's word is always literal.[4] Apart from the eighty thousand bundles of doctrine, they do not assert a presentation of eighty-four thousand bun-

[1] *lha'i bu'i bdud, devaputamāra*; literally, demons that are children of gods.

[1] *dga' ldan, tuṣita.*

[2] The Go-mang 1980 edition (2.15) points out that the word *rtogs pa'i* ('realizational'), as found in the Dharamsala 1967 edition (28.2), does not appear in any of the three editions that they used and is a later addition. Following the Dharamsala 1967 edition, the clause would read, 'a realizational wheel of doctrine is necessarily a path of seeing.' Mimaki (82.19) accepts this new reading, duly noting its origin, but we think it best to avoid incorporating into Gön-chok-jik-may-ɷang-bo's text what are clearly modern accretions by an editor who thought to improve the text. The phrase appears in none of the other editions used by Mimaki or us.

[3] *mngon pa, abhidharma.*

[4] Again, Gön-chok-jik-may-ɷang-bo disagrees with his previous incarnation, Jam-ɣang-shay-ba, who cogently holds (*Great Exposition of Tenets, kha* 13b.2) that this is true only of *some* Proponents of the Great Exposition and that others hold that there are both definitive and interpretable passages among Buddha's word.

dles of doctrine. This is because Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* says:[1]

> Those eighty thousand bundles of doctrine
> Which were spoken by the Subduer ...

> The doctrine is arranged into bundles like wheat that has been cut and bound at harvest time. A bundle signifies a teaching of variable length which, if thoroughly realized, is capable of overcoming one affliction. Those schools asserting eighty-four thousand bundles say that there are twenty-one thousand bundles for each of the three afflictive emotions—desire, hatred, and ignorance—and a fourth bundle of twenty-one thousand for the three of these together.

The place where Bodhisattvas actualize enlightenment during their last lifetime is definitely just the Desire Realm; therefore, the Proponents of the Great Exposition do not assert a presentation of a Heavily Adorned Highest Pure Land[2] or an Enjoyment Body.[3]

> According to the Great Vehicle systems, a Highest Pure Land is where an immortal Enjoyment Body resides and preaches the Great Vehicle path to Bodhisattvas on the path of seeing and above. Ordinary beings are not found in this type of pure land although they do exist in the pure lands of Emanation Bodies.[4] Most Great Vehicle systems also hold that Bodhisattvas attain full enlightenment in a Highest Pure Land.

[1] I.25.
[2] *'og min stug po bkod pa, akaniṣṭaghanavyūha.*
[3] *longs sku, saṃbhogakāya.*
[4] *sprul sku, nirmāṇakāya.*

Not only this, but they also do not accept omniscience [because they only assert all-knowingness, as mentioned above].

All Foe Destroyers of the three vehicles have a nirvana with remainder[1] because they assert that when one attains a nirvana without remainder[2] there is a severing of the continuum of consciousness, like the extinction of a flame.[3] Hence, they assert that there are three final vehicles.

Some propound that the Teacher [Buddha] merely withdrew a creation of his body from the sight of certain trainees when he passed from suffering [entered *parinirvāṇa*, that is, at the time of his 'death'] and did not actually pass from suffering [or completely vanish]. This is similar to a confusion of fish and turnips.

> Fish and turnips are both long and white but clearly different. For this reason, they are used metaphorically to indicate an absurd state of confusion. The author appears to hold that it is inconsistent for proponents of a system—that asserts a complete severance of the continuum of consciousness in a nirvana without remainder—to assert that such did not actually happen upon Shākyamuni Buddha's death. Jam-ȳang-shay-ba[4] speaks of just such an assertion as being reported by a transmission stemming from Atisha. Gön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-bo seems to question even the existence of such an assertion, as does Jam-ȳang-shay-ba's annotator, Ngak-w̄ang-bel-den,[5] but Jam-

[1] *lhag bcas myang 'das, sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa.*
[2] *lhag med myang 'das, nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa.*
[3] The simile is of an flame that goes out because of the exhaustion of it fuel; the comparison is not made to blowing out a flame.
[4] See Jam-ȳang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets, kha* 12b.5.
[5] *Annotations, dngos* 47.8.

> ȳang-shay-ba cogently makes reference, albeit briefly, to the mere fact of the eighteen subschools (and thus a wide variety of opinion) and to the presence of supportive scripture, but he does not cite it.

Buddha Superiors have abandoned all sufferings and their origins without exception, and yet, it is not contradictory that true sufferings exist within their continuum. This is because when all afflictive emotions that take true sufferings as their objects are abandoned, this is posited as the abandonment of true sufferings.

> When all afflictive emotions have been removed, even if one still possesses true sufferings in one's continuum, they do not give rise to afflictive emotions, and thus from this perspective it is said that all true sufferings have been abandoned.

A Buddha's physical body is included in the same lifetime as the physical base of a Bodhisattva on the path of preparation. Therefore, they assert that this body is not a Buddha Jewel [an object of refuge] although it is Buddha.

> In this system Bodhisattvas are said to pass from the path of preparation to the path of no more learning in one meditative sitting; therefore, when they achieve Buddhahood, their body is the same body with which they, as Bodhisattvas, began the path of preparation. Since it is still an ordinary body, it cannot be an immaculate Buddha Jewel. Many scholars also say that a Buddha's body is not Buddha because it is a true suffering.[1]

[1] This is the opinion of Jam-ȳang-shay-ba, whose *Great Exposition of Tenets* (*kha* 15a.7) says, 'The form aggregate [of a Buddha] is not that

The Buddha Jewel is asserted to be the wisdom of extinction [of the obstructions] and the wisdom [that the obstructions] will never be produced again which exist in the mental continuum of a Buddha.

> When one takes refuge or bows down to the Buddha Jewel, one bows not to the Buddha's body but to the Buddha's wisdom. With regard to the two wisdoms, the degenerating types of Foe Destroyer attain only the wisdom of extinction of afflictive emotions; they do not attain the wisdom of the future non-production of the afflictive emotions.

Similarly, because Learner Superiors [those on the paths of seeing and meditation] are beings who have contamination, they are not considered to be the Community Jewel although they are of the spiritual community. It is the true paths in the mental continuum of[1] Learner Superiors which are asserted to be the Community Jewel. There also is a presentation of the Doctrine Jewel because nirvanas and true cessations in the continuums of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Buddhas are all Doctrine Jewels.

> A nirvana refers to the true cessation of all afflictive emotions, whereas a true cessation can be a cessation of any affliction, such as any one of the eighty-one abandonments on the path of meditation.

[i.e., Buddha]; Buddha is only the qualities of non-learning,' (*gzugs phung de min sangs rgyas mi slob chos*).

[1] In the Peking edition (12b.5) read *rgyud kyi* for *rgyud kyis* in accordance with the other six editions used—Collected Works (505.4), Teacher Training edition (29.11), Go-mang 1980 edition, 29.13, the Dharamsala 1967 edition (29.16), the Tibet Go-mang 1987 edition (10b.4), and Mimaki (83.13).

* * *

Stanza between sections:

May the youthful with clear minds enjoy
This festival of fresh ambrosia of eloquence,
Taken from the ocean of the system of the Great Exposition
With the golden vessel of my mind's analysis.

5 *The Sūtra School*

The presentation of the tenets of the Proponents of Sūtra is in four parts: definition, subschools, etymology, and assertions of tenets.

DEFINITION

The definition of a Proponent of Sūtra is: a person propounding Lesser Vehicle tenets who asserts the true existence of both external objects and self-cognizing consciousness.

> This definition must be qualified because it does not take into account Proponents of Sūtra Following Scripture, who do not assert self-cognizing consciousness. Also, the definition is perhaps subject to a more general fault. According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, external objects are not limited to material objects or even to impermanent phenomena but include permanent phenomena such as uncompounded space. Since permanent phenomena are not

held, in the Sūtra School Following Reasoning, to be truly established and since, when a category contains both permanent and impermanent phenomena, permanence predominates, external objects in general cannot be said to be truly established according to the system of the Sūtra School Following Reasoning.[1] Still, there is general agreement in all branches of the Sūtra School that impermanent external objects are truly established.

Proponents of Sūtra and Exemplifiers[2] are mutually inclusive [i.e., whoever is the one is the other].

SUBSCHOOLS

There are two types of Proponents of Sūtra—Proponents of Sūtra Following Scripture and Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning. The former are [mainly] Proponents of Sūtra who follow Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* and the latter are [mainly] Proponents of Sūtra who follow Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition.[3]

[1] A-ku Ḷo-drö-gya-tso (*a khu blo gros rgya mtsho*), a follower of Jam-ÿang-shay-ba, finds fault with the definition from both of these points of view. A-ku Ḷo-drö-gya-tso says that Gön-chok-jik-may-ẅang-bo, in setting the definition of a Proponent of Sūtra this way, is following the old textbook literature of the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic University by Gung-ru Chö-jung (*gung ru chos 'byung*) whose works were supplanted by Jam-ÿang-shay-ba's. For this discussion, see A-ku Ḷo-drö-gya-tso, *Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'The Essence of the Good Explanations, Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings': A Precious Lamp* (*drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel rin chen sgron me*), (Delhi: Kesang Thabkhes, 1982), 105.4 and 104.1.

[2] *dpe ston pa, dārṣṭāntika.*

[3] Dharmakīrti lived during the seventh century; for a listing of this set of seven renowned works, see the Bibliography.

ETYMOLOGY

There are reasons for their being called Proponents of Sūtra and Exemplifiers. They are called 'Proponents of Sūtra' because they propound tenets chiefly in reliance on the Supramundane Victor's sūtras without following the *Great Detailed Exposition*. They are called 'Exemplifiers' because they teach all doctrines by way of examples.

ASSERTIONS OF TENETS

This section has three parts: their assertions on the basis, paths, and fruits.

ASSERTIONS ON THE BASIS

This section has two parts: assertions regarding objects and assertions regarding object-possessors.

Assertions Regarding Objects

The definition of an object[1] is: that which is suitable to be known by an awareness. The definition of an object of knowledge[2] is: that which is suitable to be an object of an awareness. Object, existent,[3] object of knowledge, and established base[4] are mutually inclusive.

Objects are divided into the two truths; into specifically characterized and generally characterized phenomena; into negative phenomena and positive phenomena; into manifest phenomena and hidden phenomena; into the three times; and into the single and the different.

[1] *yul, viṣaya.*

[2] *shes bya, jñeya.*

[3] *yod pa, sat.*

[4] *gzhi grub, *vastu.*

The two truths

The definition of an ultimate truth is: a phenomenon that is able to bear reasoned analysis from the point of view of whether it has its own mode of subsistence without depending on imputation by terms or conceptual consciousnesses. [Functioning] thing,[1] ultimate truth, specifically characterized phenomenon,[2] impermanent thing,[3] compounded phenomenon,[4] and truly existent phenomenon[5] are mutually inclusive.

The definition of a truth-for-an-obscured[-awareness][6] is: a phenomenon that only exists through being imputed by a conceptual consciousness. Non-functioning phenomenon,[7] truth-for-an-obscured[-awareness], generally characterized phenomenon,[8] permanent phenomenon,[9] uncompounded phenomenon,[10] and false existent[11] are mutually inclusive.

There are etymologies for the two truths. Uncompounded space is called a truth-for-the-obscured because it is a truth for an obscured awareness. 'Obscured' here refers to a conceptual consciousness, which is called obscured because it is obstructed from the direct perception of specifically characterized phenomena.

> An uncompounded space, i.e., an absence of obstructive contact, cannot be cognized directly; it is cognized only by a conceptual consciousness. A conceptual consciousness is said to be obscured because it cannot perceive impermanent things directly; it can perceive them only through the medium of conceptual images.

[1] *dngos po, bhāva.*
[2] *rang mtshan, svalakṣaṇa.*
[3] *mi rtag pa, anitya.*
[4] *'dus byas, saṃskṛta.*
[5] *bden grub, satyasiddha.*
[6] *kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya.*
[7] *dngos med kyi chos, abhāvadharma.*
[8] *spyi mtshan, sāmānyalakṣaṇa.*
[9] *rtag pa, nitya.*
[10] *'dus ma byas kyi chos, asaṃskṛtadharma.*
[11] *brdzun par grub pa.*

However, this is only an etymology [and not a definition, because it is too wide]. Everything that is a truth for a conceptual consciousness, that is, for an obscured awareness, is not necessarily a truth-for-the-obscured. This is because a pot, for example, which is an illustration of an ultimate truth, is also a truth for a conceptual consciousness, that is, for an obscured awareness. Furthermore, although a self of persons and a permanent sound, for instance, are truths for conceptual consciousnesses, that is, for obscured awarenesses, these do not exist even conventionally.

A pot is called an ultimate truth because it is a truth for an ultimate awareness. This ultimate awareness is a consciousness that is not mistaken with regard to its appearing object.[1]

> A conceptual consciousness is always mistaken with respect to its appearing object, i.e., a generic image, because a generic image of a house, for instance, appears to be an actual house. Hence, even an inferential conceptual consciousness, such as a consciousness that realizes the impermanence of a house, is mistaken with regard to its appearing object, the image of a house; however, it is not mistaken

[1] *snang yul, *pratibhāsaviṣaya.* An 'appearing object' is not just the object that appears to a consciousness because it is asserted that a pot, for instance, appears to a conceptual consciousness apprehending a pot but a pot is not the appearing object of that consciousness. The 'appearing object' of a conceptual consciousness is a 'meaning-generality' (or conceptual generic image) of the object.

with regard to its conceived object[1] or object of engagement,[2] which is the impermanence of the house and which it conceives correctly. A direct prime cognition, however, is not mistaken with regard to either its appearing object or its object of engagement. Direct prime cognitions are the ultimate consciousnesses that are referred to by the word 'ultimate' in the term 'ultimate truth'.

The *appearing object* of a conceptual consciousness is a generic image, an image from memory, an imaginary construct, or in some cases an after-image of an object apprehended by a sense consciousness. This generic image is the same entity as the conceptual consciousness itself.

The *conceived object* of an inferential cognition is not a generic image of an object, but the actual object itself. For example, when one realizes the subtle impermanence of a chair, the appearing object is a generic image of the impermanence of a chair, and the conceived object is the actual impermanence of a chair, but it is apprehended or gotten at through the medium of a generic image. When one perceives the image of the horns of a rabbit, the appearing object is a generic image of the horns of a rabbit; however, the conceived object, actual horns of a rabbit, does not exist. This distinction between 'appearing object' and 'conceived object' is made only with regard to conceptual consciousnesses.

The generic image of fire, for instance, in a given person's mind operates in the identification of the many fires that the person perceives; therefore, that image is 'generic'. Another person would have a different image of fire, the form of which might depend on the initial identification of fire made in the present life. Thus, generic images are not general or universal in the sense that one image serves for all beings. Also, a person's generic image might shift during his or her lifetime. Thus, a generic image is an imputation by a conceptual consciousness; it does not exist in and of itself and, therefore, is not a specifically characterized phenomenon and not impermanent. Though permanent, a generic image does not eternally exist, available for occasional usage by beings, nor does it exist eternally in individual minds, sometimes noticed and sometimes unnoticed. Rather, a generic image which represents the elimination of everything that is not a particular object is formed at some time and then dwells in latency until the proper conditions are assembled, such as a person's catching sight of a fire. At that time, a conceptual consciousness is produced with a generic image as its appearing object. The generic image *seems* to be the actual object even if it is understood not to be the actual object, much as a mirror image of a face can be said to *seem* to be a face even if one continuously understands that it is not a face. In this sense, consciousnesses that have generic images as their appearing objects are said to be mistaken.

Generic images are permanent, have parts, and are individual for each sentient being. They should not be confused with the permanent, partless, independent universals of other

[1] *zhen yul.*
[2] *'jug yul, pravṛttiviṣaya.*

philosophical systems. The permanence of a generic image is that of occasional permanence. Another example of an occasional permanence is the space associated with a physical object. When the object is destroyed, the space is no longer suitable to be designated. Also, the space associated with the object does not change moment by moment and thus cannot be called impermanent. It is an occasional permanence because it does not exist forever and yet it does not disintegrate momentarily as do all impermanent phenomena.

Generic images are not just images of memory that are used for the identification of objects. They are also after-images. For instance, it is said that when one actually sees an object, the object manifest before one is a specifically characterized phenomenon. An eye consciousness is produced in the image of the object, much as if a tiny mirror inside the orb of the eye were reflecting an object. The object—for example, a table—exists one moment previous to the eye consciousness that is produced in its image; nevertheless, the table of the preceding moment is the object of the eye consciousness because nothing intervened between the moment of the object and the moment of the eye consciousness that apprehends the object. The specifically characterized phenomenon, table, is therefore perceived directly. If a mental consciousness is produced through the influence of that eye consciousness, the mental consciousness has one moment of direct perception of the object and thus for that moment is a mental direct perception. In all succeeding moments

> the appearing object is a generic image that is an after-image.

This way of presenting the two truths is the system of the Sūtra School Following Reasoning. The Sūtra School Following Scripture asserts a presentation of the two truths that accords with that of the Great Exposition School.

Specifically and generally characterized phenomena

The definition of a specifically characterized phenomenon is: a phenomenon that is ultimately able to perform a function. A pot is an illustration of a specifically characterized phenomenon. The definition of a generally characterized phenomenon is: a phenomenon that is ultimately unable to perform a function. Uncompounded space is an illustration of a generally characterized phenomenon. Imputed phenomena, such as generality and instance, one and different, mutually exclusive and related, and so forth, are generally characterized phenomena; however, something that is any of these is not necessarily a generally characterized phenomenon. This distinction should be made.

> For example, one itself is a generally characterized object, but one pot is a specifically characterized object because it exists by way of its own specific nature. When we refer to a pot and say, 'It is one,' that oneness is not a phenomenon that exists by way of its own specific nature because from another point of view the designation 'different' can be applied as, for example, when we refer to the pot as being different from a table. The designations 'one' and 'different' are dependent on imputation by conceptuality; and, therefore, although they might have their base in a specifically charac-

terized phenomenon, they themselves are generally characterized phenomena.

The terms *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, which here mean 'specifically characterized phenomenon' and 'generally characterized phenomenon', are also sometimes used with a different meaning. They then refer to 'exclusive characteristic' and 'general characteristic'. An example of an exclusive characteristic is the definition of consciousness—that which is luminous and knowing; impermanence, on the other hand, is a general characteristic of consciousness that is shared with other compounded phenomena which are not consciousnesses, such as forms.

Negative and positive phenomena

The definition of a negative phenomenon[1] is: an object that is realized through the explicit elimination of an object of negation.

> Because objects of knowledge are being divided into the negative and the positive, 'negative' here does not refer to the act of negation. It refers to an object that is the negative, or absence, of an object of negation. For example, a negative object such as non-cow is not an act of negation nor either a statement of negation or what is negated. Non-cow is known through explicitly eliminating cow and thus is a negative phenomenon. Non-cow includes all phenomena other than cow—house, fence, person, and so forth. (Although cow is not non-cow, when one says or thinks 'cow', conceptuality does not need *explicitly* to eliminate non-cow, and thus cow is a positive phenomenon.)

[1] *dgag pa, pratiṣedha.*

Negative object and exclusion-of-the-other[1] are mutually inclusive.

> In 'exclusion-of-the-other, the 'other' is the object negated.

There are two types of negative phenomena, non-affirming negatives[2] and affirming negatives.[3] The definition of a non-affirming negative is: an object realized by an awareness that explicitly realizes [that negative object] within the context of only eliminating its negated element. An example is Brahmins' not drinking beer.

> The statement that Brahmins should not drink beer indicates a non-affirming negative because only the negated element, drinking beer, is eliminated, and nothing, no other type of food or drink, for example, is affirmed in its place. Though Brahmins, being humans, must drink something, Brahmins' not drinking beer does not imply this in place of the negation of drinking beer. Also, Brahmins, though existent, are not implied in place of the negation of the object of negation; Brahmins are the base of the negation.[4]

The definition of an affirming negative is: [a negative

[1] *gzhan sel, anyāpoha.*

[2] *med dgag, prasajyapratiṣedha.* The two types of negations seem to have their origin among the Mīmāṃsakas, who used the terms to refer to types of injunctions—when something was just forbidden and when something positive was implied in place of what was forbidden. See J.F. Staal, 'Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought' (London, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. XXV: Part 1, 1962), especially pp. 56-66.

[3] *ma yin dgag, paryudāsapratiṣedha.*

[4] *dgag gzhi.*

that] implies some other phenomenon, whether a positive phenomenon or another affirming negative [or both], in place of the negation of its own negated element by the awareness that explicitly realizes it. An example is the fat Devadatta's not eating food during the daytime.

> In this case, the negation of eating food *during the daytime* implies that Devadatta, given his corpulence, eats at night.

The definition of a positive phenomenon is: a phenomenon that is not realized through the explicit elimination of its own negated element by the awareness explicitly realizing it. An example is a pot.

> When a conceptual consciousness knows or identifies a pot, it is not necessary for it *explicitly* to eliminate non-pot.

Manifest and hidden phenomena

The definition of a manifest phenomenon[1] is: an object that is explicitly realized by a direct prime cognition.

> In all systems except the Consequence School, a prime cognition is both new and non-delusive. The second moment of prime cognition is no longer new, and thus is a subsequent cognition, a non-prime cognition.

Manifest phenomenon and [functioning] thing[2] are mutually inclusive.

> From the point of view of direct cognition all functioning things are manifest phenomena.

[1] *mngon gyur, abhimukhī.*
[2] *dngos po, bhāva.*

The definition of a hidden phenomenon[1] is: an object that is explicitly realized by an inferential prime cognition. Hidden phenomenon and object of knowledge are mutually inclusive.

> From the point of view of conceptuality, all objects of knowledge, including functioning things, are hidden phenomena because conceptuality cannot perceive them directly; it can perceive them only through the medium of a generic image. Therefore, in this system, manifest phenomenon and hidden phenomenon are not mutually exclusive. All manifest phenomena are hidden phenomena, but all hidden phenomena are not manifest phenomena; for example, uncompounded space can only be cognized conceptually by sentient beings (i.e., non-Buddhas) and thus is not a manifest phenomenon.

The three times

The definition of a pastness [of an object] is: that state of destructedness [which exists] in the next period after the time of an object—the object being a [functioning] thing that is other [than its own pastness].

> For example, the time of the existence of a pencil—which is an existent that is other than the phenomenon of the state of destruction of the pencil—is its own time of existing as a pencil, say for three months. Let us say that at the end of the three months it was burned. The pencil's next period begins with its burning, its destruction. The destructedness of the pencil is then unchangeable, and since it does not disinte-

[1] *lkog gyur, parokṣa.*

grate moment by moment, the destructedness, or pastness, of the pencil is said to be permanent.

The definition of the futureness of an object is: that state of non-production of a [functioning] thing—which is other [than its future]—in some time and place, due to the non-completion of subsidiary causes, although the main cause for its production is present.

The futureness of an object comes into being when that object's main cause is present but the object itself is not present; therefore, the futureness of an object exists prior to the present of that object. The futureness of an object is a mere absence that is due to the non-completion of contributing causes; hence, the Sūtra, Mind Only, and Autonomy Schools hold that a futureness—as well as a pastness—are not functioning things but are permanent, non-disintegrating. For the Consequence School, they are functioning things and impermanent.

The definition of a present object is: that which has been produced and has not ceased.

A pastness and a futureness are both permanent [because they are mere absences and do not undergo momentary change].

There are two types of permanence, occasional permanence and non-occasional permanence. An occasional permanence, such as the pastness of a table, depends upon the destruction of the table, but once the destruction occurs, the pastness of the table—which is the state of its having ceased—exists unchangeably. General uncompounded space, which is a lack of obstructive contact, is a non-occasional permanence; it exists forever unchangeably without a

beginning, although the uncompounded space associated with a specific object comes into existence with that object and goes out of existence with its destruction.

Present object and [functioning] thing are mutually inclusive. Moreover, these features should be known: the pastness of a thing occurs after that thing; the futureness of a thing occurs prior to that thing.

The single and the different

The definition of the single is: a phenomenon that is not diverse. An example is a pot. The definition of the different is: those phenomena that are diverse. An example is pillar and pot.

The single is what appears as single to a conceptual consciousness. For example, pot is single; also pot and pot are single because the term is the same and the meaning is the same. The different are what appear to a conceptual consciousness to be different. Pillar and pot are obviously different, from the point of view of both the terms and their meanings. However, dog and its Tibetan equivalent *khyi* are different, even though their meaning is the same because the terms themselves are different. The mention of 'dog' does not necessarily evoke '*khyi*' for a conceptual consciousness; therefore, the two are different, but not different entities. Similarly, product and impermanent thing are mutually inclusive—whatever is the one is the other—but different.

Dog and pot are different and mutually exclusive because there is no one thing that is both a pot and a dog. However, dog and pot are not a dichotomy, that is, a set that includes

all phenomena, because if something is not a pot, it is not necessarily a dog. Permanent phenomenon and impermanent phenomenon are a dichotomy because, if something exists, it must be either one or the other.

Product and pot are different, are not mutually inclusive, i.e., whatever is the one is not necessarily the other, are not mutually exclusive (since something such as a copper pot can be both a product and a pot), and are not a dichotomy.

The mutually inclusive are always the same entity, but they are different within this sameness of entity. Mutually exclusive phenomena such as a table and its color can be the same entity but different within this sameness of entity. Mutually exclusive phenomena such as dog and pot are simply different entities.

Phenomena that are different entities are necessarily different isolates.[1]

For example, dog and pot are different entities and different isolates. 'Isolates' are conceptually isolatable factors.

However, different isolates are not necessarily different entities because product[2] and impermanent thing [which are mutually inclusive] are one entity but different isolates.

The isolate of product is identified as opposite from being one with product, and the isolate of impermanent thing is identified as opposite from being one with impermanent thing. Product and impermanent thing are the same entity; since they are mutually inclusive, but are different isolates, since for a conceptual consciousness the one term does not evoke the other.

[1] *ldog pa*. The Teacher Training edition (35.9) should be corrected to *kyis khyab* from *kyis ma khyab* in accordance with the Ngawang Gelek Collected Works edition (509.3), etc.
[2] *byaspa, kṛta*.

Furthermore, they assert directionally partless particles and temporally partless moments of consciousness in accordance with the Proponents of the Great Exposition.

Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra Following Scripture assert these as ultimate truths because they are irreducible, whereas the Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning assert them as ultimate truths because they are ultimately capable of performing the function of creating effects.[1]

However, the Proponents of Sūtra are not similar to the Proponents of the Great Exposition in all respects because the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that all existents are substantially established [as having their own autonomous entity that is not dependent on conceptuality] whereas the Proponents of Sūtra do not accept this. Also, both the Proponents of the Great Exposition and the Consequentialists assert that non-revelatory forms[2] are fully qualified forms, but the Proponents of Sūtra, Proponents of Mind Only, and Autonomists do not accept these as fully qualified forms.

[1] This comment has been added in accordance with the thought of the author, Čön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo. Some contemporary followers of Jam-yang-shay-ba, however, hold that, within the Sūtra School, only the Sūtra School Following Scripture asserts that directionally partless particles and temporally partless moments of consciousness exist; they maintain that the Sūtra School Following Reasoning, being followers of Dignāga and Dharmakirti, refute the existence of such partless phenomena.
[2] *rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i gzugs, avijñaptirūpa*.

> Certain forms are called non-revelatory because their presence does not affect ordinary communication. An example is the subtle form of a monk's speech that is the opposite of lying and so forth but cannot be heard by others. It could, however, be perceived by those with special auditory clairvoyance.

This is not the only difference between the Proponents of the Great Exposition and the Proponents of Sūtra because the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert [some] cause and effect as being simultaneous, whereas the Proponents of Sūtra and above do not assert this.

> According to the Proponents of the Great Exposition, a main mind and its accompanying mental factors are simultaneously and mutually supportive, like the legs of a tripod, and thus simultaneously each other's causes and effects. The Proponents of Sūtra and above do not assert this to be a case of simultaneous cause and effect because, for them, a cause must precede its effect. They maintain that the previous moment of one mental factor aids the later moment of another mental factor.

Assertions Regarding Object-Possessors [Subjects]

This section has three parts: persons, consciousnesses, and terms.

Persons

The Followers of Scripture assert that the continuum of the aggregates is an illustration of a person [i.e., the continuum of the aggregates is the person]. The Followers of Reasoning assert that the mental consciousness is an illustration of a person.

> The Followers of Reasoning assert that the actual person is a subtle neutral type of mental consciousness because this consciousness exists continuously—through deep sleep, during meditative equipoise, and from lifetime to lifetime.

Consciousnesses

Prime cognitions and non-prime awarenesses are the two types of consciousnesses.

> A prime cognition is defined as a new and incontrovertible knower.[1] A prime cognition, therefore, must be *both* new and valid; later moments of cognition after the initial period of a prime cognition, which are called 'subsequent cognitions', are, therefore, not prime cognitions. Despite being valid, they are not new and thus are not prime cognitions.

There are two types of prime cognitions, direct prime cognitions[2] and inferential prime cognitions.[3]

Direct prime cognitions are of four types: direct prime cognitions that are sense direct perceptions,[4] mental direct perceptions,[5] self-cognizing direct perceptions,[6] and yogic direct perceptions.[7]

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[1] *gsar du mi slu ba'i rig pa*. See Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider and Company, 1980; Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1980), pp. 31 and 116. The requirement of both newness and incontrovertibility (non-delusiveness) is based on Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compendium of [Teachings on] Valid Cognition'*, II.2.

[2] *mngon sum gyi tshad ma, pratyakṣapramāṇa.*

[3] *rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma, anumānapramāṇa.*

[4] *dbang po'i mngon sum, indriyapratyakṣa.*

[5] *yid kyi mngon sum, mānasapratyakṣa.*

[6] *rang rig mngon sum, svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa.*

The Followers of Scripture do not accept that there are self-cognizing consciousnesses.

The physical senses [such as an eye sense] are not suitable to be prime cognitions because, lacking being luminous and knowing, they are incapable of comprehending their objects.

There are five types of non-prime awarenesses: subsequent cognition,[1] wrong consciousness,[2] doubt,[3] correct assumption,[4] and an awareness to which an object appears without being noticed.[5]

Non-prime awarenesses are either not new or not valid or both. Subsequent cognitions are moments of direct or conceptual cognition of an object that follow the moment in which that object was newly cognized by a direct or inferential cognition; they are valid but not new and thus are not prime cognitions (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*).[6]

A wrong consciousness is any consciousness that is mistaken as to its object of engagement; for example, due to a fault of the eye, a wrong consciousness that perceives the moon as double is produced. A wrong consciousness should not be confused with a mistaken consciousness,[7] which is so called because it is a consciousness that is mistaken with respect to its appearing object. The appearing object of an

[7] *rnal 'byor mngon sum, yogipratyakṣa.*
[1] *bcad shes/ dpyad shes, *paricchinnajñāna.*
[2] *log shes, viparyayajña.*
[3] *the tshom, vicikitsā / saṃśaya.*
[4] *yid dpyod, *manaḥparīkṣā.*
[5] *snang la ma nges pa'i blo, *aniyatapratibhāsabuddhi.*
[6] For more on this topic, see the chapter on the Consequence School.
[7] *'khrul shes, bhrāntijñāna.*

inferential cognition that realizes a sound to be impermanent is a generic image of impermanent sound; its conceived object is impermanent sound. All inferences are mistaken with regard to their appearing object because the generic image of their object *appears* to be the actual object. However, an inferring consciousness does not *conceive* that the generic image and the actual object are one; it does not expressly determine, 'This generic image of impermanent sound is actual impermanent sound.' The generic image merely *appears* to an inferring consciousness to be actual impermanent sound. Therefore, although an inferential consciousness is mistaken in the sense that an image appears to it to be the actual object, it is not mistaken with respect to its object of engagement or conceived object, as in the case of understanding a sound to be impermanent. A wrong consciousness, on the other hand, is mistaken with respect to its object of engagement in the sense that, for instance, it sees a single moon as double or conceives sounds to be permanent.

Doubt, the third of the five non-prime awareness, is of three types. The first is doubt tending toward what is wrong—for example, a consciousness that has not decided whether sound is permanent or not but tends toward the wrong view that sound is permanent. The second is doubt that is equally divided between what is right and what is wrong—for example, a consciousness that tends toward both the wrong view that sound is permanent and the right view that it is impermanent. The third is doubt tending toward what is right, such as a consciousness that has no certainty as to

whether sound is permanent or impermanent but tends toward the right view that sound is impermanent. These three stages of doubt are often experienced successively in the process of passing from wrong views, or ignorance, to correct views, or wisdom.

A correct assumption is a conceptual consciousness (not a sense consciousness, for instance) which 'decides' that, for instance, sound is impermanent but does not have unshakeable conviction. Usually, even when many proofs demonstrating the subtle impermanence of compounded phenomena are given, a valid and unshakeable inference of the momentary impermanence of sound is not immediately generated. Most persons first gain only a correct assumption, which is not entirely unshakeable, and later, after familiarization with correct reasoning, gain an inference.

The fifth non-prime awareness is an awareness to which an object appears without being noticed. This refers to a consciousness which, due to lack of interest and so forth, does not have sufficient power to draw the mental consciousness into noticing the perception. For example, when one has great interest in seeing a beautiful object, the conversation of someone close by might not be noticed. Technically, the conversation is heard, but it is not noticed and cannot be remembered.

Among these, two—direct perceptions and awarenesses to which an object appears but is not noticed—are necessarily devoid of conceptuality and are unmistaken, and three—inferential, correctly assuming, and doubting awarenesses—are only conceptual consciousnesses

[because they never perceive their objects directly].[1]

Subsequent cognitions and wrong consciousnesses can be either conceptual or non-conceptual awarenesses.

When a consciousness comprehends an object, it realizes it within the context of having been generated in the image of its object. Also, minds and mental factors are asserted to be one substantial entity.[2]

Terms

The definition of a term is: an object of hearing that causes the meaning that is its own object of expression to be understood. If terms are divided from the viewpoint of their objects of expression, there are two types, terms that express types and terms that express collections. An example of the first is the term 'form'; an example of the second is the term 'pot'.

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[1] The Dharamsala 1967 edition (37.11) mistakenly reads *snang la ma nges pa'i blo dang lnga yod pa las the tshom dang yid dpyod gnyis ni rtog pa kho na yin no*, whereas it should read *snang la ma nges pa'i blo dang lnga'o// de dag las mngon sum dang snang la ma nges pa'i blo gnyis la rtog bral ma 'khrul bas khyab cing/ rjes dpag/ yid dpyod/ the tshom gsum ni rtog pa kho na yin no* in accordance with the Collected Works edition (510.3), the Go-mang 1980 edition (37.5), the Peking edition (15b.3), the Tibet Go-mang 1987 edition (12b.6), and Mimaki (87.16). The Teacher Training edition (37.2) has an even more confused reading that starts in the previous sentence: *tshad min gyi blo la/ bcad shes/ log shes/ the tshom/ yid dpyod/ the tshom gsum ni rtog pa kho na yin no.*

[2] For more reading on the topic of consciousness in the system of the Sūtra School Following Reasoning, see Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider and Company, 1980; Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1980). For a more historical presentation, see Leonard van der Kuijp, *Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1983).

> Terms that express types and terms that express collections are not mutually exclusive. For, the term 'pot' expresses both a type and a collection since pot is a type and is a collection composed of parts. 'Table and vase' is a term that expresses a collection but not a type.

Again, if terms are divided from the viewpoint of their manner of expression, there are two types: terms that express qualities and terms that express qualificands. An example of the first type is the term 'impermanence of sound';[1] an example of the second type is the term 'impermanent sound'.[2]

ASSERTIONS ON THE PATHS

This section has three parts: objects of observation of the paths, objects abandoned by the paths, and nature of the paths.

Objects of Observation of the Paths

The sixteen aspects of the four truths, impermanence and so forth,[3] are the objects of observation of the paths. The Proponents of Sūtra assert that the subtle selflessness and the subtle selflessness of persons are mutually inclusive.

> These are mutually inclusive because the Proponents of Sūtra do not assert a selflessness of phenomena as do the Great Vehicle schools.

A person's emptiness of being a self that is permanent [non-disintegrating], unitary [partless], and independent [not depending on the mental and physical aggregates] is asserted to be the coarse selflessness of persons. A person's emptiness of being substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient [i.e., able to exist by itself] is asserted to be the subtle selflessness of persons.

[1] *sgra'i mi rtag pa.*
[2] *sgra mi rtag pa.*
[3] For a listing of these sixteen aspects, see pp. 203-204.

Objects Abandoned by the Paths

Like the Proponents of the Great Exposition, the Proponents of Sūtra [when referring to the objects abandoned by the path] use the vocabulary of the conception of a self of persons, afflictive ignorance [which obstructs liberation from cyclic existence], and non-afflictive ignorance [which obstructs the all-knowingness of a Buddha]. Aside from merely those, the Proponents of Sūtra and the Proponents of the Great Exposition do not assert a conception of a self of phenomena, nor do they assert obstructions to omniscience, etc.

Nature of the Paths

They make a presentation of the five paths of the three vehicles. They assert that all sixteen moments of the eight paths of forbearance and the eight paths of knowledge[1] are the path of seeing.

Because the appearing object of direct perception must be a specifically characterized object, the Proponents of Sūtra do not assert that the subtle selflessness of persons is the object of the mode of apprehension by an uninterrupted path of a Hearer's [or anyone's] path of seeing. This is because they assert that the subtle selflessness of persons is realized *implicitly* by Hearers [and so forth] through *explicit* comprehension of compositional phenomena [the mental and physical aggregates] that are devoid of a self of persons.

[1] For discussion of these, see pp. 207-209.

The object comprehended by an uninterrupted path belonging to a path of seeing or a path of meditation must be perceived directly. Whatever is perceived directly must be a specifically characterized phenomenon, and such are always compounded phenomena. An emptiness, however, is an uncompounded phenomenon and, therefore, not a specifically characterized phenomenon. Since an emptiness cannot be cognized directly, it is asserted that a yogic direct perception does not *explicitly* cognize selflessness. Rather, it cognizes the mind and body as no longer qualified with such a self. Thus, it is compounded phenomena, the mental and physical aggregates, that are directly cognized, and thereby the emptiness of a self of persons is *implicitly* realized. This fact greatly distinguishes the Proponents of Sūtra from the Great Vehicle schools, which assert direct cognition of emptiness itself.

ASSERTIONS ON THE FRUITS OF THE PATHS

The Proponents of Sūtra assert that there is no Foe Destroyer who falls from abandonment [of all afflictions] or from realization [of the subtle personal selflessness]. They also assert that the form aggregate of a Buddha is Buddha. Other than this, the Sūtra School's assertions on the ways of actualizing the fruits of the three vehicles and so forth are similar to those of the Great Exposition School.

In the chapter on the Great Exposition School, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo said, 'A Buddha's physical body is included in the same lifetime as the physical base of a Bodhisattva on the path of preparation. Therefore, they assert that

this body is not a Buddha Jewel [an object of refuge] although it is Buddha.' Hence, he seems to contradict himself here by saying that the assertion by the Proponents of Sūtra that the form aggregate of a Buddha is Buddha is not shared with the Proponents of the Great Exposition.

Both the Proponents of the Great Exposition and the Proponents of Sūtra maintain that the scriptural collections [i.e., discipline,[1] sets of discourses,[2] and manifest knowledge][3] of the Great Vehicle are not the word of Buddha. However, it is said that there are later Proponents of the Great Exposition and later Proponents of Sūtra who do assert them to be the word of Buddha.[4]

* * *

Stanza between sections:[5]

A festival of delight should be had by those propounding reasoning
In this expression of the secret words of reasoning
Of the Exemplifiers Following Reasoning,
Accurate from having trained well in the texts of reasoning.

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[1] *'dul ba, vinaya.*
[2] *mdo sde, sūtrānta.*
[3] *chos mngon pa, abhidharma.*
[4] For more reading on the tenets of the Sūtra School, see Anne C. Klein, *Knowing, Naming, and Negation.* Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1989; and Anne C. Klein, *Knowledge and Liberation: A Buddhist epistemological analysis in support of transformative religious experience: Tibetan interpretations of Dignaga and Dharmakirti* (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1986).
[5] The author uses the word 'reasoning' (*rigs pa*) in all four lines to indicate the emphasis on reasoning in the Sūtra School Following Reasoning.

6 The Mind Only School

The presentation of the tenets of the Proponents of Mind Only is in four parts: definition, subschools, etymology, and assertions of tenets.

DEFINITION

The definition of a Proponent of Mind Only is: a person propounding Buddhist tenets who asserts the true existence of other-powered natures but does not assert external objects.[1]

> Other-powered natures are phenomena that are under the influence of causes and conditions that are other than themselves; therefore, other-powered natures are impermanent. They are held to be truly established by this system but not by the Middle Way School. External objects are objects that are different entities from the consciousness apprehending

[1] *phyi don, bāhyārtha.*

> them. That the Mind Only School refutes external objects means that they refute that a form, for instance, and the valid cognition apprehending it are different entities; still, this school holds that forms are the same entity as the consciousness that perceives them—both the form and the consciousness apprehending it being produced from a single predisposition contained within the mind. This school is, nevertheless, not solipsistic; it accepts that there are other beings who are different entities from oneself.

SUBSCHOOLS

Proponents of Mind Only are of two types, True Aspectarians[1] and False Aspectarians.[2] Differences exist between these two groups because (1) an appearance of a blue [patch] as blue to an eye consciousness perceiving blue is the 'aspect' that is the basis of debate between the True and False Aspectarians and (2) True Aspectarians assert that an appearance of blue as blue to an eye consciousness apprehending blue exists as it appears whereas False Aspectarians maintain that an appearance of blue as blue does not exist as it appears to an eye consciousness apprehending blue .

> It is important to determine just what 'aspect' (*rnam pa, ākāra*) is being discussed in a passage, for there are many meanings to this word. In general, 'object-aspect' (*yul rnam, viṣaya-ākāra*) means the object itself; 'that which has (taken on) the aspect of the apprehended' (*gzung rnam, grāhya-ākāra*) means the perceiving subject; 'apprehending aspect' (*'dzin rnam, grāhaka-*

[1] *rnam bden pa, satyākāravādin.*
[2] *rnam brdzun pa, alīkākāravādin.*

ākāra) means the perceiver of the apprehending subject, that is, a self-cognizing consciousness. However, sometimes 'that which has the aspect of the apprehended' (*gzung rnam*, *grāhyaākāra*) refers to the object rather than the subject. Here, 'aspect' refers to a mode of appearance of the object.

The True Aspectarians hold that a blue patch that appears as a gross or coalesced object does in fact exist as a gross or coalesced object in the manner in which it appears, whereas the False Aspectarians say it does not. Being Proponents of Mind Only, the True Aspectarians agree with the False Aspectarians that the appearance of a blue patch as an external object is false. However, unlike the False Aspectarians, the True Aspectarians maintain that, within the context of this false appearance, the portion of the appearance as a gross object is correct. The False Aspectarians, on the other hand, hold that there is a sense of grossness beyond what is actually there.

The above presentation is correct because:

1 Both the True and False Aspectarians are similar in asserting that blue appears as blue to an eye consciousness apprehending blue.

This means that both accept that there are eye consciousnesses that perceive blue as blue and not as yellow, for there are objects that are the same entity as a perceiving consciousness even though there are no external objects. Similarly, both agree that there are eye consciousnesses that perceive blue as yellow, due to some fault in the eye.

2 They are also similar in asserting that blue appears as

a gross object[1] to an eye consciousness apprehending blue and that blue [falsely] appears to be an external object.

Both True and False Aspectarians agree on the undeniable point that a patch of blue appears to be a gross object—something composed of many particles and not just a single particle—and that even to valid sense consciousnesses objects appear falsely as if they were entities external to the perceiving consciousness.

3 However, the True Aspectarians assert that an appearance of blue as an external object to an eye consciousness apprehending blue is polluted by ignorance, but that an appearance of blue as blue and an appearance of blue as a gross object are not polluted by ignorance, whereas the False Aspectarians assert not only that an appearance of blue as an external object is polluted by ignorance, but also that an appearance of blue as blue[2] and an appearance of blue as a gross object is polluted by ignorance.

Therefore, the definition of a True Aspectarian Proponent of Mind Only is: a Proponent of Mind Only who asserts that an appearance of a gross object to a sense consciousness exists as it appears. The definition of a False Aspectarian Proponent of Mind Only is: a Proponent of Mind Only who asserts that an appearance of a

[1] In the Dharamsala 1967 edition (41.6), read *dang/ sngon po rags par snang ba dang/ sngon po phyi* for *dang/ sngon po phyi* in accordance with the Collected Works edition (512.5), etc. This misprint (or editorial 'correction') is pointed out in the Co-mang 1980 edition (3.8).

[2] In the Dharamsala 1967 edition (41.11), read *zad/ sngon po sngon por snang ba dang/ sngon po rags* for *zad/ sngon po rags* in accordance with the Collected Works edition (512.5), etc. This misprint (or editorial 'correction' by the publisher of the Dharamsala 1967 edition) is pointed out in the Co-mang 1980 edition (3.8).

gross object to a sense consciousness does not exist as it appears.

There are three types of True Aspectarians: Proponents of an Equal Number of Subjects and Objects,[1] Half-Eggists,[2] and Non-Pluralists.[3]

> Only in the Mind Only and Yogic Autonomy systems do object and subject exist simultaneously. One latency[4] or seed[5] simultaneously produces both object and subject. For instance, one latency would produce the mottle of colors on the wing of a butterfly as well as the eye consciousness that apprehends these colors. Since the object appears to the perceiving consciousness, there is a question of whether just one aspect of the object, the mottle, appears to the subject, or whether many aspects of the object, such as the blue, yellow, red, and so forth, appear to the subject. Also, every school except the Great Exposition School asserts that the perceiving subject, such as an eye consciousness, comes to be like its object, much as a mirror comes to be like an object set before it. Thus, a similar question is asked: does an eye consciousness come to be produced in the many aspects of the object, an aspect of red, an aspect of blue, an aspect of yellow, and so forth? The question is this: at any one moment are there many eye consciousnesses that perceive the individual aspects of the object or is there one eye consciousness that perceives the object in general?

[1] *gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa.*
[2] *sgo nga phyed tshal pa.*
[3] *sna tshogs gnyis med pa.*
[4] *bag chags, vāsanā.*
[5] *sa bon, bija.*

If there are many eye consciousnesses each moment, it would seem to contradict scripture which says that a plurality of consciousnesses of *similar type* does not occur at the same moment, even though an eye consciousness, an ear consciousness, a nose consciousness, a tongue consciousness, a body consciousness, and a mental consciousness may exist at the same moment. On the other hand, if there is only one eye consciousness every moment, how are all the individual aspects of the object perceived?

A few possible 'solutions' are:

(1) there are many eye consciousnesses each moment equal in number to the number of aspects belonging to the object;
(2) there is one general eye consciousness that apprehends the mottle, and there are many parts of this eye consciousness that individually apprehend the individual colors;
(3) there is only one eye consciousness each moment, and moment by moment the various aspects are serially apprehended.

All three of these are represented in the Sūtra School where external objects are asserted. The Proponents of Mind Only offer another set of three which are given below in accordance with three different sets of interpretations by Tibetan scholars. The amount of attention that Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo devotes to this topic suggests that despite the supposedly decisive analysis of this topic in the *Great Exposition of Tenets* by his previous incarnation, Jam-yang-shay-ba, he was not convinced. Perhaps, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo found the various

interpretations a convenient means for stimulating interest in issues of perception.

The assertions of scholars with regard to the differences between these three do not agree. Gung-ru Gyel-tsen-sang-b̄o[1] explains in his *Distillation of the Middle Way*[2] that:

1 Proponents of an Equal Number of Subjects and Objects are so called because they assert that when an eye consciousness apprehending the mottled colors on the wing of a butterfly apprehends that mottle, from the side of the object, aspects of each of the different colors—blue, yellow, and so forth—are cast [to the perceiving consciousness] and also from the subject's side, aspects of the each of the different colors—blue, yellow, and so forth—are produced in the manner of being true aspects.

It is doubtful that any Proponent of Mind Only would assert that an object is known through its 'casting its aspect' toward the perceiving consciousness. This is the language of schools that assert external objects. In the Mind Only School, objects are known through the activation of internal predispositions for perception.

2 Half-Eggists are so called because they assert that, when the mottled colors on the wing of a butterfly are apprehended, from the side of the object, aspects

[1] *gung ru rgyal mtshan bzang po*; Herbert Guenther (*Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, n.5 p. 220) gives his dates as 1350-1425 and identifies him as associated with Se-ra Monastic University. 'Gung-ru' is the name of a house unit both in Se-ra Monastic University and in Dre-b̄ung Monastic University.

[2] *dbu ma'i stong mthun*. The term *stong mthun*, also spelled *stong 'thun*, is a frequently used as a title for texts; more properly, it should be spelled *stong thun*, which has the sense of a distillation of the manifold into something more manageable.

of each of the different colors—blue, yellow, and so forth—are cast [to the perceiving consciousness] and from the subject's side, aspects of the each of the different colors—blue, yellow, and so forth—are produced in an aspectless manner.

3 Non-Pluralists are so called because they assert that, when the mottled colors on the wing of a butterfly are apprehended, from the side of the object, aspects of each of the different colors—blue, yellow, and so forth—are not cast [to the perceiving consciousness] but the aspect of only the mottle is cast, and from the subject's side, aspects of the each of the different colors—blue, yellow, and so forth—are not produced in an aspectless manner but the aspect of only the mottle is produced in an aspectless manner.

Drung-chen Lek-b̄a-sang-b̄o,[1] Paṇ-chen Sö-nam-drak-b̄a,[2] and so forth explain that:

1 Proponents of an Equal Number of Subjects and Objects are so called because they assert that just as the blue and the yellow, which appear to a sense consciousness apprehending a mottle, are different substantial entities, so within the eye consciousness apprehending the mottle there are many eye consciousnesses that are different substantial entities.

2 Half-Eggists are so called because they assert that, although in general a [patch of] blue and an eye consciousness apprehending the blue are of the entity of consciousness, they are different substantial entities.

It would seem that in this interpretation they are called Half-Eggists because they are one

[1] *drung chen legs pa bzang po*.

[2] *paṇ chen bsod nams grags pa*, 1478-1554. He is the author of the textbook literature of the Lo-sel-ling College of Dre-b̄ung Monastic University and of the Shar-dzay College of Gan-den Monastic University.

half like the Proponents of Sūtra in that they maintain that subject and object are different entities and one half like the Proponents of Mind Only since in general they hold that subject and object are one entity. It is highly doubtful that any Proponent of Mind Only would assert that subject and object are different entities.

3 Non-Pluralists are so called because they assert that just as the blue and yellow of a mottle are one substantial entity, so the sense consciousnesses that apprehend the blue and the yellow and are within the eye consciousness apprehending the mottle are one substantial entity.

Jam-ȳang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets*[1] explains that:

1 Proponents of an Equal Number of Subjects and Objects are so called because they assert that when an eye consciousness apprehending the mottle [of colors on the wing of a butterfly] looks at the mottle, consciousnesses of similar type equal in number to the number of colors—blue, yellow, and so forth of the mottle—are produced simultaneously.
2 Half-Eggists are so called because they assert that although the blue and an eye consciousness apprehending the blue are serial in terms of the time of their coming into existence, they are one substantial entity

[1] Jam-ȳang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets, nga* 52a.5ff. Jam-ȳang-shay-ba is the author of the textbook literature the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic University and the previous incarnation of the author of this text, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-po. It is particularly interesting that, despite Jam-ȳang-shay-ba's supposedly having settled this issue in a decisive way, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-po does no more than list it as the third of three possibilities, after which he advises his readers to choose whatever seems most suitable to them.

in terms of the time of their observation.

They maintain that the object exists before and helps to produce the perceiving consciousness, but they hold that at the same time that the object is observed by the eye consciousness, the eye consciousness is observed by a self-cognizing consciousness.

3 Non-Pluralists are so called because they assert that it is not the case when an eye consciousness apprehending a mottle looks at its object, consciousnesses of similar type equal in number to the number of colors—blue, yellow, and so forth of the mottle—are produced simultaneously. Rather, they assert that the mere eye consciousness apprehending the mottle is the sense consciousness apprehending the blue, yellow, and so forth of the mottle.

Since [there are these different interpretations], one should hold whatever is most appealing.

Proponents of an Equal Number of Subjects and Objects are of two types: those who assert eight consciousnesses [the five sense consciousnesses, a mental consciousness, an afflicted mind,[1] and a mind-basis-of-all];[2] and those who assert six consciousnesses [the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness]. Non-Pluralists are said to be of two types, proponents of six consciousnesses and proponents of a single consciousness.

It is said that the False Aspectarians are of two types, Tainted False Aspectarians and Non-Tainted False Aspectarians. It is said that Tainted False Aspectarians are so called because they assert that the nature of the mind is polluted by the latencies of ignorance and that Non-Tainted False Aspectarians are so called because they as-

[1] *nyon mongs can gyi yid, kliṣṭamanas.*
[2] *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, ālayavijñāna.*

sert that the entity of the mind is not in the least polluted by the latencies of ignorance. Or [according to another interpretation] it is said that the Tainted False Aspectarians are so called because they assert that although there is no ignorance at Buddhahood, there are mistaken appearances and that Non-Tainted False Aspectarians are so called because they assert that because there is no ignorance at Buddhahood, there are also no mistaken appearances.

> The great Mongolian savant, Ĵang-ğya Röl-ƀay-dor-jay[1] rejects both interpretations of Tainted False Aspectarians saying that there is no Buddhist system which asserts that the nature of the mind itself is polluted or that a Buddha perceives false appearances.

Further, Proponents of Mind Only can be divided into two types: Followers of Scripture and Followers of Reasoning. The former are followers of Asaṅga's Five Treatises on the Grounds,[2] and the latter are followers of Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition.

ETYMOLOGY

Why are they called 'Proponents of Mind Only'? They are called 'Proponents of Mind Only'[3] and 'Proponents of Cognition'[4] because they propound that all phenomena are of the mere entity of the mind. Also, because they settle the practice of the deeds of the path from the

[1] Ĵang-ğya, *Presentation of Tenets*, 212.17.
[2] Asaṅga lived during the fourth century; for a list of these texts, see the Bibliography.
[3] *sems tsam pa, cittamātrin.*
[4] *rnam rig pa, vijñaptika/vijñaptivādin.*

yogic point of view,[1] they are also called 'Yogic Practitioners'.[2]

ASSERTIONS OF TENETS

This section has three parts: their assertions on the basis, paths, and fruits.

ASSERTIONS ON THE BASIS

This section has two parts: assertions regarding objects and assertions regarding object-possessors.

Assertions Regarding Objects

The Proponents of Mind Only assert that all objects of knowledge are included in the three characters.[3]

> These are other-powered characters,[4] thoroughly established characters,[5] and imputational characters.[6] The three characters are also called the three natures.[7]

This is so because they assert that all compounded phenomena are other-powered characters, that the real natures of all phenomena [emptinesses] are thoroughly established characters, and that all other objects of knowledge are imputational characters.

> Except for emptinesses, all permanent phe-

[1] In the Go-mang 1980 edition (45.5), read *rnal 'byor pa'i gzhi'i* for *rnal 'byor pa'i bzhi'i* in accordance with Collected Works (515.4), Peking (18b.4), the Dharamsala 1967 (45.15), the Teacher Training (46.8), the Tibet Go-mang 1987 (15a.6), and Mimaki (91.18).
[2] *rnal 'byor spyod pa pa, yogācāra.*
[3] *mtshan nyid gsum, trilakṣaṇa.*
[4] *gzhan dbang, paratantra.*
[5] *yongs grub, pariniṣpanna.*
[6] *kun btags, parikalpita.*
[7] *rang bzhin gsum/ ngo bo nyid gsum, trisvabhāva.*

nomena such as uncompounded space are imputational natures. All emptinesses are thoroughly established natures. All impermanent phenomena are other-powered natures. In this way, all phenomena are included within the three natures.

Imputational natures are of two types, existent and non-existent. Except for emptinesses, all permanent objects of knowledge, such as uncompounded space, are included in the category of existent imputational natures. Non-existent imputational natures are not objects of knowledge, and thus they are not phenomena. For example, a permanent self or a table that is a separate entity from the consciousness perceiving it do not exist at all; these are non-existent imputational natures.

They assert that the three natures exist in their own right[1] and exist inherently.[2]

> If a class has both existent and non-existent members, the class itself is considered to be existent. Thus, imputational natures in general are existent even though some imputational natures, such as a permanent self, do not exist. Since in the Mind Only School whatever exists necessarily inherently exists—i.e., can be found when sought among its bases of designation, even imputational natures, as a class, exist inherently.

However, there are differences with regard to whether the natures truly exist or not, because the Proponents of Mind Only assert that imputational natures do not truly exist and that both other-powered natures and thor-

[1] *rang ngos nas grub pa, svarūpasiddha.*
[2] *rang bzhin gyis grub pa, svabhāvasiddha.*

oughly established natures are truly established.

The definition of an imputational nature is: that which does not ultimately exist but exists for a conceptual consciousness. When divided, imputational natures are of two types, enumerated [or existent] imputational natures and imputational natures whose character is nihil [i.e., non-existent imputational natures]. An example of an existent imputational nature is object of knowledge.

> As generalities, object of knowledge, one, different, and so forth are permanent because their instances are both permanent and impermanent. In determining the classification of a category, existence predominates over non-existence and permanence predominates over impermanence.

Examples of non-existent imputational natures are the two selves.

> The two selves are a self of persons and a self of phenomena. Persons are empty of being self-sufficient, substantial entities, and phenomena are empty of being subjects and objects that are different entities. Thus, a non-existent imputational nature is something that exists for a conceptual consciousness, such as a substantially existent person, but does not actually exist at all. Existent imputational natures, on the other hand, do actually exist but only in dependence on a conceptual consciousness, as in the case of uncompounded space which can only be realized through conceptually eliminating obstructive contact.

The definition of an other-powered nature is: that which arises in dependence upon the power of others, that is, causes and conditions, and which is a base of a thoroughly established nature [an emptiness].

All compounded phenomena are other-powered natures because they arise in dependence on the major and minor causes that produce them. An other-powered nature is a base of a thoroughly established nature because it is empty of being a separate entity from a consciousness that perceives it and hence is a substratum of the quality of that emptiness. Thus every product is a base of emptiness.

When divided, there are two types of other-powered natures, pure and impure. Pure other-powered natures are, for instance, the wisdom of Superiors subsequent to meditative equipoise and the major and minor marks of a Buddha.

Superiors (those who have attained a path of seeing) directly cognize emptiness during meditative equipoise. Their wisdom at that time is a pure other-powered nature. When they rise from meditation, they have a second type of wisdom; this is the knowledge that although subject and object appear to be different entities, they are not different entities. This knowledge is indirect or conceptual, whereas during meditative equipoise they had direct cognition of emptiness.

Impure other-powered natures are, for instance, the mental and physical aggregates that are appropriated through contaminated [actions and afflictive emotions].

The definition of a thoroughly established nature is: a suchness that is an emptiness of either of the two selves [a self of persons or of phenomena].

There is controversy among Ge-luk-ba colleges as to whether a selflessness of persons is a thoroughly established nature. Jam-yang-shay-ba, who is the author of the textbook literature

of the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic University and the previous incarnation of the author of this book, holds that it is.

When divided, there are two types of thoroughly established natures, non-perverse and immutable. An example of the first is a Superior's wisdom during meditative equipoise. An example of the second is the real nature of phenomena. Although non-perverse thoroughly established natures are stated as a division of thoroughly established natures, they [actually] are not thoroughly established natures. This is because they are not final objects of observation of a path of purification through observation of which obstructions are extinguished.

A Superior's wisdom consciousness of meditative equipoise is not an emptiness simply because it is a consciousness; it is a cognition of emptiness in the mode of being fused with emptiness. The two are fused like fresh water in fresh water, but they are nevertheless different for a conceptual consciousness. Therefore, it cannot be said that this wisdom itself is an emptiness, and thus it cannot serve as an object of meditation that would remove obstructions.

Again, objects of knowledge can be divided into the two, conventional truths and ultimate truths. The definition of a conventional truth is: an object found by a prime cognition that is a correct consciousness distinguishing a conventionality. Falsity,[1] conventional truth,[2] and nominal truth[3] are mutually inclusive.

All objects except emptinesses are falsities be-

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[1] *brdzun pa, mṛṣā.*
[2] *kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya.*
[3] *tha snyad bden pa, vyavahārasatya.*

cause they do not exist the way they appear, that is, as separate entities from a perceiving consciousness. However, in this system, impermanent phenomena and emptinesses truly exist, because the Proponents of Mind Only maintain that if these phenomena exist, they necessarily truly exist.

The definition of an ultimate truth is: an object found by a prime cognition that is a correct knower distinguishing an ultimate. Emptiness,[1] element of [a Superior's] qualities,[2] thoroughly established [nature],[3] ultimate truth,[4] limit of reality,[5] and thusness[6] are asserted to be mutually inclusive.

Ultimate truths necessarily exist by way of their own character, but conventional truths do not necessarily exist by way of their own character. This is because other-powered natures exist by way of their own character, but imputational natures [which are also conventional truths] do not exist by way of their own character [although they inherently exist and exist in their own right].

Existent imputational natures, such as uncompounded space, are conventional truths, but non-existent imputational natures, such as a permanent self or a table that is a separate entity from a perceiving consciousness, are not even conventional truths because they do not exist.

[1] *stong pa nyid, śūnyatā.*
[2] *chos dbyings, dharmadhātu.* Because emptiness is that through meditation on which the qualities of a Superior are generated, it is called the 'element of [a Superior's] qualities'.
[3] *yongs grub, pariniṣpanna.*
[4] *don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya.*
[5] *yang dag mtha', bhūtakoṭi.*
[6] *de bzhin nyid, tathatā.*

Falsities do not necessarily falsely exist, for, although other-powered natures are falsities, they do not falsely exist.

In the Mind Only School, other-powered natures are falsities, but they do not falsely exist. This is because, if they did not truly exist, they would not exist at all. Nevertheless, they are false in the sense that, due to the predispositions that exist in the mind of the perceiver, they appear to exist as entities separate from a perceiving consciousness. Realization of the fact that they truly exist prevents extreme views of non-existence, and realization of their falseness in the sense of appearing one way but existing another prevents extreme views of exaggerated existence.

Proponents of Sūtra, Proponents of Mind Only, and Autonomists all agree in their presentations of the three times and of non-affirming negatives.

These three schools assert that a pastness and a futureness are permanent phenomena, that is, mere absences, and that present functioning things are impermanent. They, along with the Consequentialists, agree that negatives do not necessarily imply something in place of the objects that they negate.

The five sense objects—forms and so forth—do not exist as external objects because they are produced within the substantial entity of an internal consciousness through the power of predisposing latencies established by common and[1] uncommon actions in the mind-basis-

[1] In the the Dharamsala 1967 edition (48.15) and the Teacher Training edition (49.7) read *du thun mong dang thun mong ma yin* for *du thun mong ma yin* in accordance with the Collected Works edition

of-all.

The True Aspectarians assert that the five sense objects—forms, and so forth—are not external objects but do exist as gross objects. The False Aspectarians maintain that, if such were the case, then forms and so forth would have to be external objects; therefore, they assert that the five types of sense objects do not exist as gross objects [although they do, of course, accept part and whole].

Assertions Regarding Object-Possessors [Subjects]

The Followers of Scripture [mainly the followers of Asaṅga] assert eight consciousnesses; therefore, they assert that the mental consciousness and[1] the mind-basis-of-all is the person. The Followers of Reasoning [mainly the followers of Dharmakīrti] assert that the mental consciousness is the illustration of a person [i.e., is the person].

> This does not mean that all mental consciousnesses are the person, for there are many types of mental consciousnesses, desire, hatred, and so on. The mental consciousness

(517.3), the Peking edition (19b.6), the Go-mang 1980 edition (47.16), the Tibet Go-mang 1987 edition (16a.5), and Mimaki (93.2).

[1] In the Dharamsala 1967 edition (49.6) and the Teacher Training edition (49.16) read *'dod pas yid kyi rnam par shes pa dang kun* for *'dod pas kun* in accordance with the Collected Works edition (517.6), the Peking edition (20a.2) the Go-mang 1980 edition (48.8), the Tibet Go-mang 1987 edition (16b.1), and Mimaki (93.10). As with other variations noted earlier, the deletion of the reference to the mental consciousness reflects an editor's attempt to improve the text. Indeed, it is unusual to assert that both the mental consciousness and the mind-basis-of-all are held to be the person in the system of the Proponents of Mind Only Following Scripture; it is more commonly said that when the person is sought among his/her bases of designation, one finds the mind-basis-of-all, and thus the mind-basis-of-all is posited as the illustration of a person.

> that is the actual person is a subtle, neutral form of the mental consciousness which exists unceasingly throughout the whole life. It is called the mental consciousness that is the base of the name of the person. It is much like the mind-basis-of-all but is not separated off as a different entity from the other forms of the mental consciousness.

The Followers of Scripture assert that a mind-basis-of-all observes [the five senses, the five objects, and] the internal latencies.

> The actual objects of observation of a mind-basis-of-all are the five senses and the five types of objects which are apprehended by the five sense consciousnesses. The mind-basis-of-all does not actually observe the latencies, but it is *said* to observe them because all perceptions are produced by the latencies.

A mind-basis-of-all has the aspect of not discriminating its objects [it does not notice its objects and cannot induce another consciousness to notice objects], and its entity is undefiled and neutral. It is a constant main mind, associated only with the five omnipresent mental factors.

> The five omnipresent mental factors are contact, feeling, discrimination, intention, and mental activity.

Moreover, from among the two possibilities of being defiled or non-defiled, it is non-defiled and neutral.

> It is non-defiled because it is not accompanied by afflictive mental factors.

A mind-basis-of-all is not virtuous because it exists in the continuum of one whose roots of virtue are severed. It is also not non-virtuous because those of the

upper realms [the Form and Formless Realms] have a mind-basis-of-all; [therefore, it is neutral].

> In the Form and Formless Realms, even the mental factors of pride and so forth are not non-virtuous but neutral.

The object of observation of an afflicted mind[1] is a mind-basis-of-all.

> However, it does not perceive the actual entity of the mind-basis-of-all as it is, for if it did, it would not perceive it as a self-sufficient person.

Its aspect is that of considering the mind-basis-of-all to be [a substantially existent or self-sufficient] I. Its entity is defiled and neutral.

> An afflicted mind has nine accompanying mental factors, the five omnipresent mental factors and four mental factors that defile it: attachment to self, obscuration about self, pride in self, and view of self. When these four defiling mental factors are cleared away, the entity of an afflicted mind still exists, but it is then pure. At Buddhahood an afflicted mind is transformed into a wisdom of equality which views all objects equally as not different entities from the consciousness perceiving them.

Their way of presenting the six operative consciousnesses agrees with the general [Buddhist presentation of these six].

Both Followers of Scripture and Followers of Reasoning] assert that prime cognitions are of two types, direct and inferential, and they also assert a presentation of four types of direct prime cognition [sense, self-cognizing, mental, and yogic prime cognitions]. Self-cognizing

[1] *nyon yid, kliṣṭamanas.*

direct perceptions and yogic direct perceptions are necessarily non-mistaken consciousnesses [because they are not infected by the false appearance of subject and object as different entities].

True Aspectarians assert that an eye consciousness in the continuum of the short-sighted [an ordinary being] that apprehends blue is a non-mistaken consciousness.[1]

> Etymologically, the term 'short-sighted' or 'one who looks near-by' refers to one who does not see beyond ordinary worldly appearances.

According to the False Aspectarians, all sense direct perceptions in the continuum of the short-sighted are necessarily mistaken consciousnesses. Also, they assert that mental direct perceptions in such a continuum are of two types, mistaken and non-mistaken.

> Other scholars assert that all instances of both sense direct perceptions and mental direct perceptions in the continuum of an ordinary being are mistaken because objects appear to these consciousnesses to be separate entities from the perceiving consciousness.

ASSERTIONS ON THE PATHS

This section has three parts: objects of paths, objects abandoned by the paths, and the nature of the paths.

Objects of Observation of the Paths

The sixteen aspects of the four noble truths are imper-

[1] The Dharamsala 1967 edition (50.8) adds 'with respect to the portion of the appearance of blue as blue' (*sngon po sngon·por snang bas* [sic] *cha la*). The editor of this edition clearly wanted to make small adjustments in the text without indicating that such had been made.

manence and so forth (see pp. 203-204). The coarse selflessness of persons is a person's emptiness of being permanent, unitary, and independent. The subtle selflessness of persons is a person's emptiness of being substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient.

There are two subtle selflessnesses of phenomena:

1 a form and its prime cognition's emptiness of being separate substantial entities;
2 a form's emptiness of being established by way of its own character as the basis adhered to by the conceptual consciousness apprehending it.

> A form is not a separate entity from a consciousness apprehending it, and a consciousness of a form is not a separate entity from its object. Also, forms, consciousnesses, and so forth are not established by way of their own character as the referents of either conceptual consciousness or their respective terminology. The two types of emptiness are said to be intimately related.

Both subtle selflessnesses [of persons and of phenomena] are asserted to be emptinesses. However, an emptiness is not necessarily either of these, for both true cessations and nirvanas are asserted to be emptinesses.

> This is a technical point. A true cessation is an emptiness of the mind of one who has utterly extinguished an obstruction, and it must be either of the two selflessnesses. But once it can be either, in general it is neither.

Compounded phenomena are asserted to be the same substantial entity[1] as the prime cognitions that apprehend them. Uncompounded phenomena are asserted to

[1] *rdzas gcig, ekadravya.*

be the same entity[1] as the prime cognitions that apprehend them.

Objects Abandoned by the Paths

The objects abandoned by the paths are the afflictive obstructions[2] and the obstructions to [simultaneous cognition of all] objects of knowledge.[3]

> Less literally, these are the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence and obstructions to omniscience.

The obstructions to liberation are, for instance, consciousnesses conceiving a coarse or subtle self of persons, together with their seeds, as well as the six root afflictive emotions and twenty secondary afflictive emotions.

> The six root afflictions are desire, anger, pride, ignorance, doubt, and afflictive view. The twenty secondary afflictions are belligerence, resentment, concealment, spite, jealousy, miserliness, deceit, dissimulation, haughtiness, harmfulness, non-shame, non-embarrassment, lethargy, excitement, non-faith, laziness, non-conscientiousness, forgetfulness, non-introspection, and distraction.

The obstructions to omniscience are, for instance, consciousnesses conceiving a self of phenomena, together with their predisposing latencies.

Bodhisattvas take the obstructions to omniscience as their main object of abandonment; they do not take the obstructions to liberation as their main object of abandonment. Lesser Vehicle Learners [Hearers and Solitary

[1] *ngo bo gcig, ekavastu.*
[2] *nyon sgrib/ nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa, kleśāvaraṇa.*
[3] *shes sgrib/ shes bya'i sgrib pa, jñeyāvaraṇa.*

Realizers on the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, and meditation] take the obstructions to liberation as their main object of abandonment and do not take the obstructions to omniscience as their main object of abandonment.

Nature of the Paths[1]

A presentation of the five paths—the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation, and no more learning—is made for each of the three vehicles. The Proponents of Mind Only also assert a presentation of the ten Bodhisattva grounds for the Great Vehicle.

> The first of the ten grounds begins with the Great Vehicle path of seeing which is also the beginning of the Superior's path. Roughly speaking, the remaining nine grounds are the path of meditation.

ASSERTIONS ON THE FRUITS OF THE PATHS[2]

Those whose lineage is definite as that of the Lesser Vehicle take as their main object of meditation the thoroughly established nature in terms of the selflessness of persons.

> The three natures can be presented either in terms of the selflessness of persons or in terms of the selflessness of phenomena. The former

[1] All editions of the text (Collected Works, 519.4; Peking edition, 21a.3, etc.) read 'presentation of the paths' (*lam gyi rnam bzhag*); we have used 'nature of the paths' for the sake of consistency with the other chapters and thus accessibility.

[2] All editions of the text (Collected Works, 519.5; Peking edition, 21a.4, etc.) read 'actualization of the fruits' (*'bras bu mngon du byed tshul*); we have used 'assertions on the fruits of the path' which accords more with the title announced earlier.

> presentation is for practitioners of the Lesser Vehicle, whereas the latter is for practitioners of the Great Vehicle. From among the three natures, in both presentations other-powered natures are impermanent phenomena produced in dependence upon causes and conditions, but the imputational nature, in terms of the selflessness of persons, is a person's substantial establishment in the sense of being self-sufficient whereas, in terms of the selflessness of phenomena, it is the establishment of objects by way of their own character as the bases adhered to by the conceptual consciousness apprehending them (or a difference of entity between subject and object). Similarly, the thoroughly established nature, in terms of the selflessness of persons, is a person's not being substantially established in the sense of being self-sufficient, whereas, in terms of the selflessness of phenomena, the thoroughly established nature is objects' not being established by way of their own character as the bases adhered to by the conceptual consciousness apprehending them (or the absence of a difference of entity between subject and object).

When familiarity with the thoroughly established nature is complete, then in dependence on the vajra-like meditative stabilization of the Lesser Vehicle path of meditation, they abandon all the obstructions to liberation and simultaneously actualize the fruit of a Lesser Vehicle Foe Destroyer.

There is not even the slightest difference between Hearers and Solitary Realizers regarding the selflessness that is their object of meditation, or regarding the afflictive emotions that are their objects

of abandonment. Therefore, the presentation of the eight Approachers and Abiders applies to both. However, Solitary Realizers only live in the Desire Realm [and do not exist in the Form or Formless Realms]; therefore, the arrangement of the twenty members of the spiritual community does not apply to them.

Still, it is not the case that there are no differences at all between Hearers and Solitary Realizers. It is asserted that Hearers are inferior and Solitary Realizers are superior from the point of view that a Solitary Realizer extends the amassing of the collections of merit for one hundred aeons, whereas a Hearer does not. The fruits that arise for Solitary Realizers and Hearers through the force of these practices are also respectively superior and inferior.

The Mind Only Followers of Scripture do not assert that a Lesser Vehicle Foe Destroyer who is solely directed to peace ever enters the path of the Great Vehicle. However, they assert that a Foe Destroyer whose enlightenment becomes transformed [into that of a Bodhisattva] enters the path of the Great Vehicle. This entry is from a nirvana with remainder. There is no entry from a nirvana without remainder because they assert that there are three final vehicles.

> A remainderless nirvana is asserted to be a severance of the continuum of form and consciousness, like the extinguishing of a lamp. Thus, it would be impossible to enter the Great Vehicle at that point.

The Mind Only Followers of Reasoning assert that all Lesser Vehicle Foe Destroyers enter into the Great Vehicle because they assert that there is [only] one final vehicle.

Those who have the Great Vehicle lineage take as their main object of meditation the thoroughly established nature in terms of the selflessness of phenomena. They practice meditation on the selflessness of phenomena in conjunction with [amassing] the collections of merit over three periods of countless aeons and gradually traverse the five paths and the ten grounds. By means of the uninterrupted path at the end of their continuum [as a sentient being who still has obstructions to be abandoned], they completely abandon the two obstructions, thereby attaining Buddhahood in a Highest Pure Land.[1] They attain a Truth Body,[2] the abandonment of obstructions and realization of selflessness that is the perfection of their own welfare, and attain the two Form Bodies [Complete Enjoyment Body[3] and Emanation Body[4]], the perfection of activities for others' welfare.

According to some followers of Asaṅga's *Compendium of Manifest Knowledge*,[5] it is evident that complete enlightenment also can occur in a human life.

> They maintain that Buddhahood can be attained in a human body, not just with the special body of one in a Highest Pure Land.

Regarding the word of Buddha, Proponents of Mind Only accept the distinction of definitive[6] scriptures and scriptures requiring interpretation.[7] For they assert that the first two wheels of doctrine as described in the *Sūtra Unravelling of the Thought* are sūtras requiring interpre-

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[1] *'og min, akaniṣṭa.*
[2] *chos sku, dharmakāya.*
[3] *longs sku, saṃbhogakāya.*
[4] *sprul sku, nirmāṇakāya.*
[5] *mngon pa kun btus, abhidharmasamuccaya.* For a translation of this text into French, see *La compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga*, translated by Walpola Rahula, (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1971).
[6] *nges don, nītārtha.*
[7] *drang don, neyārtha.*

tation and that the final wheel is comprised of definitive sūtras.

> The term 'sūtra' can refer either to a whole text or to scriptural passages. For a brief discussion of the three wheels of doctrine, see chapter three, pp. 171-173.

They posit a scripture whose explicit teaching is not suitable to be accepted literally as a sūtra requiring interpretation. They posit a scripture whose explicit teaching is suitable to be accepted literally as a definitive sūtra.

There are three types of nirvanas: with remainder, without remainder, and non-abiding[1] (see the next chapter). There are Three Bodies of a Buddha, Truth Body, Complete Enjoyment Body, and Emanation Body. A Truth Body is of two types, a Nature Body[2] and a Wisdom Truth Body.[3] Also, there are two Nature Bodies, a Nature Body of natural purity and a Nature Body of freedom from peripheral defilements.

> A Wisdom Truth Body is a Buddha's omniscient consciousness, and a Nature Body is the emptiness of a Buddha's omniscient consciousness. In the sense that a Buddha's mind has always been *essentially* free of the defilements, the emptiness of that mind is called a naturally pure Nature Body. In the sense that a Buddha's mind has become free of peripheral defilements, the emptiness of that mind is called a Nature Body as freedom from peripheral defilements.

[1] *ni gnas pa'i myang 'das, apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa.*
[2] *ngo bo nyid sku, svabhāvikakāya.*
[3] *ye shes chos sku, jñānadharmakāya.*

Because they assert these points, the Proponents of Mind Only are called proponents of Great Vehicle tenets.

* * *

Stanza between sections:[1]

It is right for the discriminating to enter here with joy
To the tenets of those propounding cognition-only
Who follow the word of the Subduer, the Leader,
Since this was stated in accordance with the word of many sages.

[1] The poetic play of this stanza revolves around use of the term *rnam* in all four lines—either as an intensifier or as meaning 'aspect'—but it is untranslatable.

7 The Middle Way School 1: The Autonomy School

The presentation of the tenets of the Proponents of Middle Way School,[1] the Proponents of Non-Entityness,[2] is in four parts: definition, etymologies, subschools, and descriptions of the individual subschools.

DEFINITION

The definition of a Proponent of the Middle Way School is: a person propounding Buddhist tenets who asserts that there are no truly existent phenomena, not even particles.

The Middle Way School refutes true existence[3]

[1] *dbu ma pa, mādhyamika.* This chapter and the next have also been translated (with romanized Tibetan of the Collected Works edition) by Shotaro Iida in *Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism* (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1980), pp. 27-51.
[2] *ngo bo nyid med par smra ba, niḥsvabhāvavādin.*
[3] *bden par grub pa, satyasiddhi.*

with respect to all phenomena even down to particles. This means that through reasoning this school shows that things are not established as their own mode of subsistence, or are not their own reality. The final mode of being of a table, for instance, is not the table but its emptiness of being established as its own reality.

According to Ge-luk-ba expositions, in the Middle Way Autonomy School phenomena are not established by way of their own uncommon mode of existence without being posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness.[1] Although objects seem to have their own unique self-established mode of being, they do not; they exist from their own side but also depend, for their existence, on appearing to a non-defective awareness. In the Middle Way Consequence School, however, the refutation of true existence includes refutation of a phenomenon's existing from its own side or existing inherently, due to which objects exist only imputedly. Since, in both sub-schools, phenomena are held to exist, the refutation of true existence does not mean that things actually do not exist; rather, they seem to be their own mode of subsistence whereas they are not and thus are falsely established.

ETYMOLOGIES

Why are they called Proponents of the Middle Way School? They are called Proponents of the Middle Way

[1] *blo gnod med la snang ba'i dbang gis bzhag pa ma yin par rang gi thun mongs ma yin pa'i sdod lugs kyi ngos nas ma grub pa.*

School because they assert the middle that is free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. They are called Proponents of Non-Entityness because they propound that phenomena have no entityness,[1] that is, no true existence.

> 'Entityness' or 'inherent nature' (*ngo bo nyid/ rang bzhin, svabhāva*) has three usages: (1) the conventionally existent nature of a phenomenon, such as the heat of fire; (2) the real or final nature of a phenomenon, that is, its emptiness or absence of true existence; and (3) true existence—an object's being established as its own final mode of being. All Proponents of the Middle Way School assert the existence of the first and second and refute the third.

SUBSCHOOLS

There are two types of Proponents of the Middle Way School: Proponents of the Middle Way Autonomy School[2] and Proponents of the Middle Way Consequence School.[3]

> This chapter deals with the Autonomists; the Consequentialists are the subject of chapter eight.

DESCRIPTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL SUBSCHOOLS

This section has two parts: descriptions of the systems of the Autonomists and of the Consequentialists.

[1] *ngo bo nyid med pa, niḥsvabhāvatā.*
[2] *dbu ma rang rgyud pa, svātantrikamādhyamika.*
[3] *dbu ma thal 'gyur pa, prāsaṅgikamādhyamika.*

THE AUTONOMY SCHOOL

This section has four parts: definition, etymology, subschools, and assertions of tenets.

DEFINITION

The definition of an Autonomist is: a Proponent of Non-Entityness who asserts that phenomena exist by their own character conventionally[1] [although not ultimately].

ETYMOLOGY

Why are they called Proponents of the Middle Way Autonomy School? They are called such because they refute truly existent things through relying on a correct logical sign whose three aspects exist from their own side.

> A correct logical sign[2] or reason[3] must have three qualities: the sign must be a property of the subject; the sign must be pervaded by the predicate, i.e., the predicate must be something that is always true of the reason; and the opposite of the predicate must be pervaded by the opposite of the sign. For example, in the syllogism, 'A person does not truly exist because of being a dependent-arising,' 'person' is the subject, 'does not truly exist' is the predicate, and 'dependent-arising' is the sign or reason. The reason is a property of the subject because a person is a dependent-arising. The predicate

[1] *tha snyad du, vyavahāratas.*
[2] *rtags, liṅga.*
[3] *gtan tshigs, hetu.*

pervades the reason because all dependent-arisings do not truly exist, i.e., do not exist as their own mode of subsistence. The counter-pervasion also is true because, hypothetically speaking, a truly existent object could not be a dependent-arising. The Autonomists assert that a correct reason inherently possesses these three aspects within the context of not ultimately existing. That they do not ultimately exist means that they are not established by way of their own uncommon mode of existence without being posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness.

SUBSCHOOLS

There are two divisions, the Yogic Autonomy Middle Way School[1] and the Sūtra Autonomy Middle Way School.[2]

The definition of a Proponent of the Yogic Autonomy Middle Way School is: a Proponent of the Middle Way School who asserts self-cognizing consciousness and does not assert external objects. An illustration is the master Shāntarakṣhita[3] [who is considered to be founder of this subschool].

The definition of a Proponent of the Sūtra Autonomy Middle Way School is: a Proponent of the Middle Way School who does not assert self-cognizing consciousness and who asserts that external objects exist by way of their own character. An illustration is the master

[1] *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa, yogācārasvātantrika-mādhyamika.*

[2] *mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa, sautrāntikasvātantrika-mādhyamika.*

[3] Shāntarakṣhita lived during the eighth century; he visited Tibet and is renowned, along with Padmasambhava, as one of the great early disseminators of Buddhism in Tibet.

Bhāvaviveka[1] [who is considered to be the founder of the Autonomy School and of this subschool].

There are also etymologies. Proponents of the Yogic Autonomy Middle Way School are so called because they assert a presentation of the basis in accordance with the Proponents of Mind Only [i.e., Yogic Practitioners]. Proponents of the Sūtra Autonomy Middle Way School are so called because, like the Proponents of Sūtra, they assert external objects that are composites of minute particles.

Moreover, Proponents of the Yogic Autonomy Middle Way School are of two types, those who accord with True Aspectarians and those who accord with False Aspectarians. Instances of the first are Shāntarakṣhita, Kamalashīla,[2] and Āryavimuktisena.[3] Instances of the second are the masters Haribhadra,[4] Jetāri,[5] and Kam-

[1] Bhāvaviveka lived during the sixth century. He criticized Buddhapālita's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* (*dbu ma'i bstan bcos, madhyamakaśāstra*) which was later defended by Chandrakīrti, whereby the split between the Autonomy and the Consequence Schools developed.

[2] Kamalashīla lived during the eighth century; he was a student of Shāntarakṣhita and is famed for coming to Tibet and defeating a Chinese monk in debate at Sam-yay (*bsam yas*) in the latter part of the eighth century. The outcome of the debate set the predominantly Indian-oriented tone of Tibetan Buddhism.

[3] Āryavimuktisena flourished during the first half of the sixth century; he is said to have been a student of Dignāga, Bhāvaviveka, and also Vasubandhu; see David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), p. 87.

[4] Haribhadra flourished during the later part of the eighth century (see Ruegg, p. 101); he is famed for his commentaries on Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* (*mngon rtogs rgyan, abhisamayālaṃkāra*). Tāranātha (p. 277) explains that Haribhadra was a student of Shāntarakṣhita.

[5] Ruegg (p. 100, n. 312) relates that there are two scholars by the name of Jetāri (or also Jitāri), one who lived during the ninth century and another who lived during the eleventh century.

balapāda.[1] It is explained that Jetāri accords with the Tainted False Aspectarians, and Kambalapāda accords with the Non-Tainted False Aspectarians.

ASSERTIONS OF TENETS

This section has two parts: the system of Yogic Autonomy Middle Way School and the system of the Sūtra Autonomy Middle Way School.

TENETS OF THE YOGIC AUTONOMY MIDDLE WAY SCHOOL

This section has three parts: their assertions on the basis, paths, and fruits.

ASSERTIONS ON THE BASIS

This section has two parts: assertions regarding objects and assertions regarding object-possessors.

Assertions Regarding Objects

They maintain that any established base [i.e., object] necessarily exists by way of its own character, because they assert that, regarding any phenomenon, if the imputed object is sought, it is findable.

> The Consequence School asserts just the opposite; they maintain that when an imputed object—any phenomenon—is sought, it cannot be found and thus does not exist by way of its own character.

[1] Kambalapāda probably flourished during the first part of the eighth century, if Tāranātha's placing him as an approximate contemporary of Jñānagarbha is correct (see Ruegg, p. 106).

Therefore, they assert that inherently existent,[1] existing by way of its own character,[2] existing by way of its own mode of subsistence,[3] and existing in its own right[4] are mutually inclusive.

> The Autonomy School affirms these of all phenomena whereas the Consequence School refutes these of all phenomena.

When objects of knowledge are divided, they are twofold—ultimate truths and conventional truths. The definition of an ultimate truth is: an object that is realized in a non-dualistic manner by a direct prime cognition that directly realizes it.

> When an ultimate truth, an emptiness, is directly realized in meditative equipoise, it is realized in an utterly non-dualistic manner without any appearance of subject and object, conventionalities, conceptual image, difference, or true existence. It is only an ultimate truth that can be non-dualistically cognized in this way.

The definition of a conventional truth is: an object that is realized in a dualistic manner by a direct prime cognition that directly realizes it.

> Duality here refers to an appearance of subject and object, which in this system are conventionally one entity.

A pot's emptiness of true existence is an illustration of an ultimate truth. A pot is an illustration of a conventional truth.

If an extensive division of ultimate truths is made,

[1] *rang bzhin gyis grub pa, svabhāvasiddha.*
[2] *rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa, svalakṣaṇasiddha.*
[3] *rang gi sdod lugs kyi ngos nas grub pa.*
[4] *rang ngos nas grub pa, svarūpasiddha.*

there are sixteen emptinesses. Or, in brief, there are four emptinesses.

> The four emptinesses are of compounded phenomena, uncompounded phenomena, self, and other.

There are two types of conventional truths, real conventional truths and unreal conventional truths. An example of the first is water; an example of the second is a mirage.

> A mirage exists but is commonly known to be unreal because it appears to be water but is not.

This system asserts that any consciousness is necessarily a real conventionality.

Assertions Regarding Object-Possessors [Subjects]

Both Yogic Autonomists and Sūtra Autonomists assert that [a subtle, neutral] mental consciousness is an illustration of [i.e., is] the person. Also, both subschools do not assert a mind-basis-of-all or an afflicted mind but assert six consciousnesses. There are two kinds of awarenesses, prime cognitions and non-prime awarenesses. There are two types of prime cognitions, direct prime cognitions and inferential prime cognitions.

[For the Yogic Autonomists][1] there are four types of direct perception: sense, mental, self-cognizing, and yogic. They assert that all self-cognizing and yogic direct perceptions are unmistaken consciousnesses.

> These are not mistaken either with respect to the non-difference of entity of subject and object or with respect to the absence of true existence.

[1] This qualification is necessary because, as the author himself later says of the Sūtra Autonomists, '... this system asserts external objects and does not assert self-cognizing consciousness'.

Since they do not accept external objects, they maintain that a direct perception apprehending a blue [patch] and the blue [patch] itself are one substantial entity.

ASSERTIONS ON THE PATHS

This section has three parts: objects of observation of the paths, objects abandoned by the paths, and nature of the paths.

Objects of Observation of the Paths

The Yogic Autonomists assert that a person's emptiness of being permanent, unitary, and independent[1] is a coarse selflessness of persons. They assert that a person's emptiness of being substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient is a subtle selflessness of persons.[2]

> The coarse selflessness of persons is also applicable to phenomena in the sense that all phenomena are empty of being objects of use of a permanent, unitary, and independent user. The subtle selflessness of persons similarly applies to phenomena in that all phenomena are empty of being objects that are used by a substantially existent or self-sufficient user. Thereby it is seen that, according to the Autonomists, the base of the emptiness of persons is not just the person but all

[1] *gang zag rtag gcig rang dbang can gyis stong pa, nityaikasvatantrikaśūnyapudgala.*

[2] These two assertions apply not only to this school but to all schools except the Consequence School and the five subschools of the Great Exposition School that assert an inexpressible person.

phenomena. Also, the bases of the emptiness of phenomena are not just phenomena (excluding the person) but also the person. Thus the bases of the two emptinesses are the same; however, the object negated in, for instance, the subtle selflessness of persons is substantial existence, whereas the object negated in the subtle selflessness of phenomena is true existence. Thus, for the Autonomists the bases of the emptiness of a self of persons and the bases of the emptiness of a self of phenomena are the same, but the object negated, or that of which the bases are empty, is different. 'Base of emptiness' here means an object that is empty of a negated element and should not be misunderstood as a physical base out of which phenomena are produced. Still, it can be said that emptiness is the base of all phenomena because if phenomena were not empty of true existence, they could not be produced or destroyed.

The Yogic Autonomists assert that a form's emptiness of being an entity other than the prime cognition apprehending the form[1] is a coarse selflessness of phenomena. They assert that the emptiness of true existence of all phenomena is the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

Objects Abandoned by the Paths

The Yogic Autonomists assert that consciousnesses conceiving [the coarse and subtle versions of] a self of persons are the obstructions to liberation. They assert that consciousnesses conceiving [the coarse and subtle versions of] a self of phenomena are the obstructions to omniscience.

[1] *gzugs 'dzin tshad ma, *rūpagrāhakapramāṇa.*

There are two types of obstructions to omniscience. They assert that a consciousness conceiving an otherness of substantial entity of apprehended object and apprehending subject[1] is a *coarse* obstruction to omniscience and that a consciousness conceiving the true existence of phenomena, such as the mental and physical aggregates, is a *subtle* obstruction to omniscience.

Nature of the Paths

The Yogic Autonomists assert the five paths of the three vehicles, making fifteen paths, just as the other systems do. The difference is in their assertion that an uninterrupted path and a path of release of a Solitary Realizer must have the aspect of realizing an emptiness of duality [of subject and object].

> An uninterrupted path is the meditative equipoise vanquishing the obstructions of that level. It leads directly, without interruption, to the attainment of a path of release—the experience of having vanquished those obstructions.
>
> 'Emptiness of duality' here refers to subject and object's emptiness of being different entities. The aspect of a path is its mode of apprehension. A path is a consciousness which, when actualized, will lead one to high attainments.

ASSERTIONS ON THE FRUITS OF THE PATHS

Solitary Realizers take as their main object of abandonment the coarse obstructions to omniscience [the conception that subject and object are different entities]. Therefore, the presentation of the eight Approachers and Abiders is not applicable to Solitary Realizers.

[1] *gzung 'dzin, grāhya-grāhaka.*

> Because Solitary Realizers strive mainly to abandon the coarse obstructions to omniscience, the eight Approachers and Abiders, which deal with abandoning the obstructions to liberation, do not apply to them.

However, the eight Approachers and Abiders[1] are asserted with respect to Hearers.

Those firm in the Hearer lineage take as their main object of meditative cultivation the view realizing the selflessness of persons.

> To be 'firm in the Hearer lineage' means to enter the Hearer path and complete it without switching to the path of a Solitary Realizer or a Bodhisattva.

Finally, in dependence on the vajra-like meditative stabilization of their path of meditation, they abandon all obstructions to liberation and simultaneously[2] actualize the fruit of Hearer Foe Destroyer.

Those firm in the Solitary Realizer lineage take as their main object of meditative cultivation the view that apprehending subject and apprehended object are empty of duality. Finally, in dependence on the vajra-like meditative stabilization of their path of meditation, they entirely abandon the obstructions to liberation as well as all the coarse obstructions to omniscience and simultaneously attain the fruit of Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer.

Lesser Vehicle nirvanas are of two types, those with

[1] The text (Collected Works, 525.2; Peking edition, 24b.4, etc.) literally reads 'eight half-pair persons' (*gang zag ya brgyad*) referring to the four pairs of Approachers and Abiders. For a brief discussion of the eight, see pp. 207-209.

[2] In the Peking edition (24b.5) read *dus mnyam du* for *'dus mnyam du* in accordance with the Collected Works edition (525.3), the Go-mang 1980 edition (60.7), Mimaki (100.2), etc.

remainder[1] and those without remainder.[2] The first is a nirvana having the remainder of miserable [mental and physical] aggregates that were wrought by former [contaminated] actions and afflictive emotions. The second type is asserted to be a state devoid[3] of miserable mental and physical aggregates. A Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer will necessarily enter the Great Vehicle because they assert only one final vehicle.

Therefore, in this system, due to a difference in the objects of abandonment and in the type of realization of Hearers and Solitary Realizers, there is also a distinction of inferiority and superiority with respect to the fruits that they attain.

Those firm in the Great Vehicle lineage generate a mind of altruistic aspiration to highest enlightenment.[4] Then, during the great level of the path of accumulation [from among the division of this path into small, middling, and great levels], in dependence on the meditative stabilization of the stream of doctrine[5] they actually listen to preceptual instructions[6] from supreme Emanation Bodies. When, in dependence on their practicing the meaning of these instructions, they first produce the wisdom arisen from meditation[7] which observes emptiness, they pass on to the path of preparation.

Then at the time of heat[8] [the first of four levels in the path of preparation], the manifest conception of thor-

[1] *lhag bcas myang 'das, sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa.*

[2] *lhag med myang 'das, nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa.*

[3] In the Peking edition (25a.2) read *bral ba'i* for *'bral ba'i* in accordance with the Collected Works edition (525.6), the Go-mang 1980 edition (61.2), Mimaki (100.10), etc.

[4] *byang chub mchog tu sems bskyed, bodhicittaparamotpāda.*

[5] *chos rgyun gyi ting nge 'dzin, srotānugatasamādhi.*

[6] *gdams ngag, avavāda.*

[7] *sgom byung gi shes rab, bhāvanāmayīprajñā.*

[8] 'Heat' (*drod, ūṣmagata*) indicates that the fire of the non-conceptual wisdom of the path of seeing will soon be generated.

oughly afflicted objects [as truly existent objects of use] diminishes.

> An example of this is the apprehension of a cup as an object of use (e.g., drinking) that truly exists. That only the *manifest* conception of this diminishes indicates that the seeds of these obstructions are not abandoned at this point; thus, these obstructions still exist latently.

At the time of attaining peak[1] [the second level of the path of preparation], the manifest conception of pure objects [such as true cessations and true paths as truly existent objects of use] diminishes. When forbearance[2] [the third level of the path of preparation] is attained, the manifest conception [of a truly existent user] with regard to a subject [i.e., consciousness] that apprehends objects as substantially existent diminishes. When highest mundane qualities[3] [the fourth and last level of the path of preparation] is attained, the manifest conception [of a truly existent user] with regard to a subject [i.e., consciousness] that apprehends objects as imputed diminishes. These four conceptions are abandoned by the path of seeing.

The four—heat, peak, forbearance, and highest mundane qualities—are respectively called the meditative stabilization of achieving perception [of emptiness],[4] the meditative stabilization of the increase of the perception

[1] 'Peak' (*rtse mo, mūrdhagata*) indicates that one has reached the peak, or end, of the instability (susceptibility to destruction) of roots of virtue.
[2] 'Forbearance (*bzod pa, kṣānti*) indicates a meditative serviceability with emptiness, a lack of fear of emptiness, etc.
[3] 'Highest mundane qualities' (*chos mchog/ 'jig rten pa'i chos mchog, laukikāgradharma*) indicates that this level is the supreme of levels while one is still an ordinary being, for the next level is the path of seeing, at which point one becomes a Superior (*'phags pa, āryan*).
[4] *snang ba thob pa'i ting nge 'dzin, ālokalabdhasamādhi.*

[of emptiness],[1] the meditative stabilization which understands suchness one-sidedly,[2] and the uninterrupted meditative stabilization.[3]

> The meditative stabilization which understands suchness one-sidedly is so called because for the first time yogis have attained clear conceptual perception of the emptiness of *objects* but have not yet gained such perception of the emptiness of *subjects*; thus, their concentration is one-sided with respect to emptiness. The uninterrupted concentration is so called because in the same session the yogi will proceed, without interruption, to a path of release of a path of seeing.

Right after that, the acquired obstructions to liberation[4] and the acquired obstructions to omniscience,[5] together with their seeds are removed by an uninterrupted path of the path of seeing. A path of release [of the path of seeing] and a true cessation [of the acquired obstructions] are then actualized.[6]

[1] *snang ba mched pa'i ting nge 'dzin, ālokavṛddhisamādhi.*
[2] *de kho na nyid kyi phyogs gcig la zhugs pa'i ting nge 'dzin, tattvārthaikadeśānupraveśasamādhi.*
[3] *bar chad med pa'i ting nge 'dzin, ānantaryasamādhi.*
[4] *nyon sgrib kun btags, parikalpitakleśāvaraṇa.*
[5] *shes sgrib kun btags, parikalpitajñeyāvaraṇa.*
[6] In the Dharamsala 1967 edition (63.11) read *nyon sgrib kun btags dang/ shes sgrib kun btags sa bon dang bcas pa spangs nas rnam grol lam dang 'gog pa'i bden pa gnyis mngon du byed do// sgom lam skor dgus sgom spang nyon mongs bcu drug gi sa bon dang sgom spang shes sgrib* for *nyon sgrib kun btags brgya dang bcu gnyis dang / mthong spang shes sgrib brgya dang brgyad kyi sa bon cig car du spong / sgom lam gyi gnas skabs su sgom spang shes sgrib* in accordance with the Peking edition (25b.3), the Collected Works edition (526.5), the Go-mang 1980 edition (62.7), Tibet Go-mang 1987 edition (20b.4), and Mimaki (100.30). Similarly, in the Teacher Training edition (64.16) read the same for *nyon sgrib kun btags dang/ sgom spang shes sgrib*. The latter is merely an omission, whereas the former shows

> Acquired obstructions to liberation refer to superimpositions of a self of persons that are not inborn but intellectually acquired. Such conviction is gained through teachings and proofs of, for instance, a substantially existent, self-sufficient person. Acquired obstructions to omniscience refer to superimpositions of a self of phenomena that derive from conviction gained through the teachings and proofs of a difference of entity of subject and object or of true existence.
>
> The path of release here is the state of having vanquished the acquired obstructions. True cessation here is the state of cessation, completely and forever, of the acquired obstructions.

It is said that, through the nine steps of the path of meditation, the seeds of the sixteen afflictive emotions and the seeds of the one hundred and eight obstructions to omniscience—which are to be abandoned by the path of meditation—are gradually abandoned. Finally, in dependence on the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum [of existence as a sentient being] the innate afflictive emotions and the innate obstructions to omniscience are simultaneously abandoned. In the next moment highest enlightenment[1] is attained.

> Upon the attainment of Buddhahood one is no longer a 'sentient being' (*sems can, sattva*), but this does not mean that a Buddha has no mind. The term 'sentient being' specifically refers to a

creative editing, which again suggests that the Dharamsala 1967 edition may have been based on the Teacher Training edition and was creatively edited to make more sense.

[1] *bla na med pa'i byang chub, anuttarasambuddha.*

> being who has obstructions yet to be overcome, and thus because a Buddha does not have obstructions yet to be abandoned, a Buddha is not a 'sentient being'. The innate obstructions are the consciousnesses conceiving a self of persons and a self of phenomena that derive from the beginningless habit of viewing persons and phenomena as, for instance, truly existent. The term 'innate' or 'inborn' means that these obstructions are produced along with the mental and physical aggregates without the need of conviction gained through teachings and proofs.

This is the way the fruit is manifested by those who are firm in the Bodhisattva lineage.

They assert that a Great Vehicle nirvana and a non-abiding nirvana[1] are mutually inclusive.

> In a non-abiding nirvana, due to wisdom there is no abiding in cyclic existence, and due to compassion there is no abiding in solitary peace.

They assert that the number of Bodies of a Buddha is definitely four. Even though Āryavimuktisena and Haribhadra debated about the teachings regarding the Bodies of a Buddha [in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization*], they did not debate about the number being limited [to four].

> The Four Bodies of a Buddha are Nature Body, Wisdom Body, Complete Enjoyment Body, and Emanation Body.

With respect to the word of Buddha, a presentation of definitive sūtras and sūtras requiring interpretation is made. For, sūtras requiring interpretation are those that

[1] *ni gnas pa'i myang 'das, apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa.*

teach within taking conventional truths as the main object of their explicit teaching,[1] and definitive sūtras are those that teach within taking ultimate truths as the main object of their explicit teaching.[2]

> For a scripture to be definitive, it also must be literally acceptable, without qualification. For instance, even a passage teaching that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence requires interpretation; though the main object taught is an ultimate truth, the passage cannot be accepted without the qualification 'ultimately' (*don dam par, paramārthatas*), that is, all phenomena are *ultimately* empty of inherent existence.

With respect to the wheels of doctrine as explained in the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought*, the first wheel requires interpretation; the last two wheels are both asserted to have two types, definitive and requiring interpretation.

TENETS OF THE SŪTRA AUTONOMY MIDDLE WAY SCHOOL

ASSERTIONS ON THE BASIS

Except that this system asserts external objects and does not assert self-cognizing consciousness, their presenta-

[1] The editor of the Dharamsala 1967 edition (64.9) has improved the definition by adding 'those which either are not suitable to be asserted literally or' (*dang sgra ji bzhin du khas blang du mi rung bas* [sic] *mdo gang rung de*). See the indented explanation.
[2] The editor of the Dharamsala 1967 edition (64.12) again has improved the definition by adding 'suitable to be asserted literally' (*sgra ji bzhin du khas blang du rung ba'i*). For a brief discussion of this point, see the indented explanation.

tion of the basis mostly resembles that of the Yogic Autonomy Middle Way School.

ASSERTIONS ON THE PATHS

With respect to differences regarding the paths, the Sūtra Autonomy Middle Way School asserts that those firm in the lineages of Hearers and of Solitary Realizers do not realize the selflessness of phenomena. Also, they do not assert a wisdom that realizes that subject and object are empty of being different substantial entities, and they do not assert that a conceptual consciousness apprehending external objects is an obstruction to omniscience.

ASSERTIONS ON THE FRUITS OF THE PATHS

The obstructions that Hearers and Solitary Realizers abandon and the selflessness that they realize do not differ in coarseness or subtlety; hence, there is no difference in their type of realization. The Sūtra Autonomists make a presentation of the eight Approachers and Abiders for both Hearers and Solitary Realizers.

They assert that those firm in the Great Vehicle lineage abandon the two obstructions serially. For, Bhāvaviveka explains in his *Blaze of Reasoning*[1] that, at the time of achieving the eighth ground, the obstructions to liberation are exhaustively abandoned. However, unlike the Consequentialists, they do not assert that one begins to abandon the obstructions to omniscience only when the obstructions to liberation have all been removed.

[1] *rtog ge 'bar ba, tarkajvālā*. This is Bhāvaviveka's commentary on his *Heart of the Middle* (*dbu ma snying po, madhyamakahṛdaya*). For a partial English translation of the latter (chap. III.1-136), see Shotaro Iida, *Reason and Emptiness*. For modern editions of the Sanskrit, see Ruegg, pp. 127-128.

> The Sūtra Autonomists say that Bodhisattvas on the first ground simultaneously begin to rid themselves of the obstructions to liberation and the obstructions to omniscience but that the final removal of the two obstructions does not take place simultaneously. The completion of the abandoning of the obstructions to liberation takes place at the beginning of the eighth Bodhisattva ground, and the completion of the abandoning of the obstructions to omniscience takes place at Buddhahood.

Except for only these differences, the Sūtra Autonomy Middle Way School's presentation of the basis, paths, and fruits mostly accords with that of the Yogic Autonomy Middle Way School.[1]

* * *

Stanza between sections:[2]

O, those whose own wish is to be wise, take up this exposition
Expressing well, without my own fabrication, all the distinctions
In tenets of the Proponents of Own-Power who assert that things,
Though existent by way of their own character, do not truly exist.

[1] For more reading on the tenets of the Autonomy School, see Donald S. Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika* (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1986).
[2] The author uses the term 'own' (*rang*) in all four lines—'own character' (*rang mtshan*), 'own power' (*rang rgyud*) which has usually been translated as 'autonomy', 'own fabrication' (*rang bzo*), and 'whose own wish is to be wise' (*rang nyid mkhas 'dod*). Most likely, he is emphasizing the Autonomists' assertion that objects exist from their own side.

8 *The Middle Way School 2: The Consequence School*

The presentation of the tenets of the Consequentialists is in three parts: definition, etymology, and assertions of tenets.

DEFINITION

The definition of a Consequentialist is: a Proponent of Non-Entityness who does not assert that phenomena exist by way of their own character even conventionally. Illustrations are Buddhapālita, Chandrakīrti, and Shāntideva.[1]

[1] Buddhapālita lived around 470-540, as tentatively indicated in Ruegg, p. 58. Chandrakīrti was a seventh century scholar who came to the defense of Buddhapālita's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* which had been criticized by Bhāvaviveka. Shāntideva was an eighth century scholar and poet whose view is held to be that of a Consequentialist.

ETYMOLOGY

Why are they called 'Consequentialists'?[1] They are called Consequentialists [i.e., Those Who Use Consequences] because they assert that an inferring consciousness that realizes the thesis[2] [that phenomena do not inherently exist can be] generated in the continuum of other parties just by [presenting that person with an absurd] consequence [of their own position].

> The Consequentialists maintain that the mere consequence, 'It follows that a person is not a dependent-arising because of inherently existing,' can generate in another—who is properly prepared—the understanding that a person does not inherently exist (because of being a dependent-arising). The other systems hold that, after presenting a consequence, it is necessary to state *explicitly* its import in syllogistic form in order to cause an opponent to realize the intended thesis. Thus, it is not that the Consequentialists do not accept syllogistic reasoning; rather, they hold that it is not *necessary* to state a syllogism for another to generate an inferential understanding of emptiness.

ASSERTIONS OF TENETS

This section has three parts: their assertions on the basis, paths, and fruits.

ASSERTIONS ON THE BASIS

[This section has two parts: assertions regarding objects and assertions regarding object-possessors (subjects).]

[1] *thal 'gyur pa, prāsaṅgika.*
[2] *bsgrub bya, sādhya.*

Assertions Regarding Objects

They assert that whatever is an established base [i.e., whatever exists] necessarily does not exist by way of its own character. This is because they assert that all objects[1] are only imputed by conceptuality and that the word 'only' in the term 'only imputed by conceptuality' eliminates the existence of objects by way of their own character. Established base, object, and object of knowledge are mutually inclusive.

Objects are divided into the manifest and the hidden, and they are divided into the two truths.

The manifest and the hidden

The definition of a manifest object is: a phenomenon that can be known through the power of experience, without depending on a logical sign. Obvious object,[2] manifest object,[3] sense object,[4] and non-hidden phenomenon[5] are mutually inclusive and synonymous. Illustrations are forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects.

The definition of a hidden object is: a phenomenon that must be known through depending on a reason or sign. Hidden object,[6] non-obvious phenomenon,[7] and

[1] Literally, 'whatsoever established bases' (*gzhi grub tshad*). *tshad* here does not refer to valid cognition (*tshad ma*) but to 'measure' as in 'whatsoever measure' or 'whatsoever extent'.
[2] *mngon sum, pratyakṣa.* Only the Consequentialists assert that this term primarily applies to objects; the other schools use the term primarily to refer to directly perceiving consciousnesses.
[3] *mngon gyur, abhimukhi.*
[4] *dbang po'i yul, indriyaviṣaya.*
[5] *lkog tu ma gyur pa'i chos, aparokṣadharma.*
[6] *lkog gyur, parokṣa.*
[7] *mngon sum ma yin pa'i chos.*

object of inferential comprehension[1] are mutually inclusive and synonymous. Illustrations are the impermanence of a sound and a sound's selflessness of phenomena.[2]

> These definitions are taken from the point of view of ordinary beings because there are no hidden objects for a Buddha, who realizes everything directly. Also, although an ordinary being who has a yogic direct perception that directly realizes the subtle impermanence of, for instance, a sound must depend on inference before directly cognizing it, a Superior can directly perceive the impermanence of a sound without first depending on an inference. Thus the impermanence of sound is not always a hidden object; it can be perceived directly as under the above conditions. Consequently, the synonyms given are only roughly mutually inclusive because what is an object of inference for one person could be an object of direct perception even for another ordinary being. The point here is that a hidden object is something

[1] *rjes dpag gi gzhal bya, anumānaprameya.*

[2] All seven editions of the text (e.g., Peking edition 27b.1) read 'a sound's selflessness of persons' (*sgra gang zag gi bdag med*) whereas it seems that they should read 'a sound's selflessness of phenomena' (*sgra chos kyi bdag med*). The reason for this is that the author himself says below that the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena apply, respectively, only to persons and to other phenomena:

> The two subtle selflessnesses [of persons and of phenomena] are differentiated from the point of view of the bases that are predicated by emptiness [persons and phenomena]. They are not differentiated from the point of view of the object of negation.

Therefore, but with some trepidation, we have taken the liberty of amending the translation.

> that an ordinary being can *newly* cognize *only* through inference. It can be understood from the illustrations that the author gives—the impermanence of a sound and a sound's selflessness of phenomena—that hidden objects are not *propositions* about phenomena inaccessible to an ordinary being's experience but are such phenomena themselves.

Therefore, in this system a manifest object and a hidden object are mutually exclusive [for ordinary beings]. Also, the three spheres of objects of comprehension [the manifest, the slightly hidden, and the very hidden] are asserted to be mutually exclusive.

> Slightly hidden objects, such as an emptiness of inherent existence, are amenable to realization by the usual type of inference. The very hidden, such as the layout of the universe, are known through such means as inference based on valid scriptures.

The two truths

The definition of something's being a conventional truth [or, more literally, a truth for a concealing consciousness] is: an object that is found by a valid cognition distinguishing a conventionality and with respect to which a valid cognition distinguishing a conventionality becomes a valid cognition distinguishing a conventionality. An illustration is a pot.

> A definition of a conventional truth sufficient to apply to anyone but a Buddha is: an object found by a valid cognition that distinguishes a conventionality (that is, any existent except an emptiness). However, a single consciousness of a Buddha distinguishes both conventionalities (everything except emptinesses) as well as the

final nature of those phenomena (emptinesses). Thus, a Buddha is said to have a valid cognition that distinguishes conventional phenomena only from the point of view of the object, such as a pot. Similarly, a Buddha is said to have a valid cognition that distinguishes the final nature only from the point of view of the object, such as the emptiness of a pot. Thus, relative to different objects, a Buddha is said to have valid cognitions that distinguish conventional phenomena and that distinguish the final nature. However, a Buddha's valid cognition that distinguishes conventional phenomena also distinguishes the final nature of phenomena, and a Buddha's valid cognition that distinguishes the final nature also distinguishes conventional phenomena. Therefore, with respect to a Buddha, an object found by a valid cognition that distinguishes conventional phenomena is not necessarily a conventional phenomenon. Similarly, with respect to a Buddha, an object found by a valid cognition that distinguishes the final nature is not necessarily a final nature. The second part of the definition, therefore, is given for the sake of including the objects of a Buddha's cognitions within the framework of the definition.

Conventional truths are not divided into real conventionalities and unreal conventionalities. This is because there are no real conventionalities, for conventionalities are necessarily not real since conventionalities are necessarily unreal [in the sense that they appear to be inherently existent but are not inherently existent]. However, *relative to an ordinary worldly consciousness*, conventional truths are divided into the real and the unreal. For relative to a common worldly consciousness, a

form is real, and relative to a common worldly consciousness, the reflection of a face in a mirror is unreal. [Still] whatever is real relative to a common worldly consciousness is not necessarily existent because truly existent forms are real relative to a common worldly consciousness [but are totally non-existent].

> Although forms exist, *truly existent* forms do not exist at all.

The definition of something's being an ultimate truth is: an object found by a valid cognition distinguishing a final nature [an emptiness] and with respect to which a valid cognition distinguishing a final nature becomes a valid cognition distinguishing a final nature. An illustration is a pot's absence of inherent existence. The divisions of ultimate truths are as given above [p. 287].

Furthermore, a pastness, a futureness, and a disintegratedness are asserted to be [functioning] things [capable of producing an effect, rather than permanent phenomena as the Proponents of Sūtra, Proponents of Mind Only, and Autonomists assert]. Also, the Consequentialists assert external objects because they assert that apprehended object and and apprehending subject are different entities.

Assertions Regarding Object-Possessors [Subjects]

Persons

The Consequentialists assert that a person is the mere I that is imputed in dependence upon its bases of imputation, which are either the five mental and physical aggregates [in the Desire and Form Realms] and or the four aggregates [in the Formless Realm].

> In the Consequentialist system, a person is the dependently imputed I, not the mental consciousness, nor the composite of aggregates,

nor a mind-basis-of-all as the other systems say.

Persons are necessarily compositional factors that are neither form nor consciousness.

A person is not any of his/her bases of designation and shares the qualities of all the mental and physical aggregates. Therefore, persons are included in the fourth aggregate, among non-associated compositional factors. Though a person is thus technically an instance of the fourth aggregate, a person is still not any of the aggregates that serve as that person's bases of imputation.

Awarenesses

Awarenesses are of two types, valid and non-valid. Valid cognitions are of two types, direct and inferential. Direct valid cognitions are of three types, sense, mental, and yogic direct perceptions. The Consequentialists do not accept self-cognizing direct perceptions.

All sense consciousnesses in the mental continuum of a sentient being are necessarily mistaken consciousnesses.

Sense consciousnesses of sentient beings are necessarily mistaken in that objects *appear* to them to exist inherently even if they do not *conceive* those objects to exist inherently. This type of mistake is limited to 'sentient beings', those who have minds with obstructions yet to be removed; thus, the term 'sentient being' includes all conscious beings except Buddhas. Only *sense* consciousnesses of sentient beings are said to be mistaken because Bodhisattvas in meditative equipoise on emptiness perceive emptiness directly with their mental consciousness in a unmistaken manner. They are sentient beings because they have obstructions yet to be removed, but their mental consciousness at the time of directly cognizing emptiness is totally unmistaken. Therefore, not all consciousnesses but all *sense* consciousnesses of sentient beings are mistaken; still, except for those directly realizing emptiness, all other consciousnesses—sense and mental—of sentient beings are mistaken in that there is a conflict between how things appear and how they exist. Even when Bodhisattvas (or Hearers or Solitary Realizers) rise from meditative equipoise on emptiness, their sense and mental consciousnesses again come under the influence of previously acquired predispositions that make objects appear as if inherently existent.

Yogic direct perceptions are of two types, mistaken and unmistaken. A yogic direct perception that is in uncontaminated meditative equipoise [on emptiness] is unmistaken, and a yogic direct perception of a short-sighted person[1] that directly realizes subtle impermanence is a mistaken consciousness.

The latter is mistaken because impermanence falsely *appears* to it to be inherently existent even though it does not *conceive* impermanence to be inherently existent. Subtle impermanence is the moment by moment disintegration of compounded phenomena and is difficult to realize. Illustrations of coarse impermanence are death, the breaking of an object, and so on, which can be realized very easily.

[1] Literally, 'one who looks nearby' (*tshur mthong*), i.e., someone who has not realized emptiness.

It follows that a yogic direct perception of a short-sighted person is a mistaken consciousness because it is a consciousness in the mental continuum of a common being.

> All sense and mental consciousnesses of common persons are mistaken, whereas with regard to sentient beings (a term that includes Superiors) only *sense* consciousnesses are necessarily mistaken, because a mental consciousness—in the continuum of a Superior—directly cognizing emptiness is unmistaken. Conversely, all consciousnesses of a Buddha are unmistaken. This means that a Buddha's consciousness—sense or mental—neither perceives nor conceives objects as being inherently existent whether in or out of meditative equipoise.

All subsequent cognitions are necessarily direct valid cognitions. For, the second moment of an inferring consciousness that realizes that a sound is impermanent is a conceptual direct valid cognition and the second moment of a sense direct perception apprehending a form is a non-conceptual direct valid cognition.

> In the Consequentialist system the term *pramāṇa* (*tshad ma*)—which is translated here as 'valid cognition' but in other contexts as 'prime cognition'—does not refer to a cognition that *newly* realizes its object in such a manner that its cognition is incontrovertible. Rather, in accordance with worldly usage of the term, *pramāṇa* refers just to a valid, right, or incontrovertible cognition that is not mistaken with respect to its prime or main object; it is not necessarily perceiving its object for the first time. Thus, for the Consequentialists, a valid cognition is an incontrovertible knower of its main object, but it is not necessarily new as the other systems maintain.

To understand what the other systems mean by 'new', consider the following. Often because of intense concentration on an object one does not notice other objects that nevertheless appear. For instance, when watching a particularly interesting object of sight, one might not notice what was said within hearing range. The ear consciousness heard the sound, but what was heard was not noticed by the mental consciousness at that time, nor could it be remembered in the future. Such a consciousness is not a *pramāṇa* because, although the object appeared to it clearly, no notice was taken of what was perceived. Thus, even though one might be in contact with an object for some time, one might not notice the object due to lack of attention. Also, a consciousness of an ordinary being cannot apprehend a single instant of an object. Whether attention is intense or not, it takes many instants before an ordinary being can notice an object.

If the object of a consciousness is not noticed, that consciousness is not a *pramāṇa*. For a consciousness to be a *pramāṇa*, there must be a noticing of the object. Thus, according to the non-Consequentialist use of the term, a 'sense direct prime/valid cognition' refers to a correct sense consciousness at that period of time when its object is initially noticed. The subsequent moments of consciousness in the same continuum of attention to that object, during which no other noticed perceptions intervene, are called subsequent cognitions. This is because in those moments an object that was

formerly noticed is being cognized again through the power of the former cognition. In all systems except that of the Consequentialists, a subsequent cognition is not a *pramāṇa* because it does not *newly* realize its object. However, the Consequentialists do not gloss the *pra* (prime/valid) of *pramāṇa* as 'first' or 'new'; they gloss it as 'valid', 'right', or 'main'; and thus, for them a subsequent cognition is a *pramāṇa*, a valid cognition, or even 'prime cognition' in the sense that it is a cognition that is valid with respect to its *prime* or *main* object.

The same holds true for an inferential consciousness. Once an inference has been produced, its subsequent moments are subsequent cognitions that the Consequentialist system alone accepts as a *pratyakṣapramāṇa*, a *direct* valid cognition. Since the subsequent moments of an inferential consciousness do not rely again on a reason in order to cognize the object, the second period is no longer inferential but direct. This is because it remembers the object already inferred without renewed reliance on a logical reason. Therefore, in the Consequentialist system, unlike the other systems, a direct perception can be conceptual. A subsequent cognition of an already inferred object that does not rely again on a logical sign in its cognition is a conceptual direct perception. Even though direct, it nevertheless is conceptual because it cognizes its conceived object through the medium of a generic image. 'Direct' here means not relying on a logical sign; it does not imply that the consciousness is non-conceptual. A subsequent cognition that is the subsequent moment of a direct sense perception is a non-conceptual direct valid cognition.

Inference is of four types: inference by the power of a fact [that serves as a logical sign such as the presence of dependent-arising which is a sign of an absence of inherent existence]; inference by renown [such as coming to know that the term 'moon' is suitable to express that object]; inference through example [such as inferring what a cow without a dewlap is through knowledge of a cow with a dewlap]; and inference through correct belief [in which a scripture is realized to be incontrovertible with respect to what it teaches due to its not being implicitly or explicitly contradicted by other scriptures, inference, or direct perception].

Being mistaken with respect to an object and realizing that object are not mutually exclusive, because the Consequentialists assert that an inferential cognition realizing that a sound is impermanent is mistaken with respect to impermanent sound.

> Such an inferential cognition is mistaken in the sense that impermanent sounds *appears* to exist inherently. However, it does not *conceive* that impermanent sound inherently exists; furthermore, it correctly realizes the impermanence of a sound. Therefore, 'mistaken' here refers to the *appearance* of what does not inherently exist as inherently existent. Thus, a consciousness may correctly ascertain an object but may be mistaken in that the object *appears* to it to be inherently existent.

Dualistic consciousnesses are necessarily direct valid cognitions with respect to their own appearing object.[1]

[1] The text (e.g., Peking edition 28b.4) reads 'its own appearance' (*rang gi snang ba*), but we have taken this as referring to its own appearing object (*rang gi snang yul*).

This is because even a conceptual consciousness that [mis]conceives sound to be permanent is a direct valid cognition with respect to its appearing object.

> Its appearing object is merely a generic image of permanent sound; actual permanent sound does not even appear to it because permanent sound does not exist. The consciousness is valid *with respect to its appearing object* because it notices and can induce memory of this generic image, no matter how erroneous that image is.
>
> A conceptual consciousness that conceives sound to be permanent is not itself a valid cognition because it is not a correct knower. However, if one considers merely the conceptual appearance of its object, which is an idea or image of permanent sound, then it is valid with respect to this appearance because validity involves a noticing of the object and an ability to remember it. Thus, even a wrong consciousness is a valid cognition *with respect to its own appearing object*.

All consciousnesses [correct, wrong, conceptual, or non-conceptual] realize[1] their own objects of comprehension. For, a generic image of the horns of a rabbit is the object of comprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending the horns of a rabbit, and a generic

[1] In the Collected Works edition (531.5), the Peking edition (28b.5), and the Tibet Go-mang 1987 edition (23a.4) read *rtogs pas* for *rtog pas* in accordance with the Go-mang edition (69.16), the Dharamsala 1967 edition (71.9) the Teacher Training edition (72.14), and Mimaki (104.33). It should be noted that none of the old editions (either ours or Mimaki's) have the corrected reading. Without the correction, the sentence would read, 'All consciousnesses [correct, wrong, conceptual, or non-conceptual] conceptualize their own objects of comprehension.' Such an assertion would not merit mention and would not accord with a long tradition of Ge-luk-ba scholarship on what, with the correction, is a provocative assertion.

image of permanent sound is the object of comprehension of a conceptual consciousness apprehending permanent sound.

ASSERTIONS ON THE PATHS

Objects of Observation of the Paths

A person's emptiness of substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency is asserted to be a coarse selflessness of persons. Also, a person's emptiness of true existence is asserted to be the subtle emptiness of persons.

The two subtle selflessnesses [of persons and of phenomena] are differentiated from the point of view of the bases that are predicated by emptiness [persons and phenomena]; they are not differentiated from the point of view of the object of negation. This is because true existence is the object of negation, and a negative of true existence—the object of negation—in relation to a person as a base of negation is a subtle selflessness of persons and a negative of true existence—the object of negation—in relation to a mental or physical aggregate or the like as a base of negation is a subtle selflessness of phenomena. A subtle selflessness of persons and a subtle selflessness of phenomena do not differ in subtlety, and both are asserted to be the final mode of existence [of persons and other phenomena].

Objects Abandoned by the Paths

The coarse and subtle conceptions of self, together with their seeds, and the three poisons that arise through their influence, together with their seeds, are asserted to be the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence. This is so because the Consequentialists assert that a consciousness conceiving true existence is an obstruction to liberation. The latencies of the conception of true

existence, the mistaken appearances of [inherently existent] duality which arise through their influence, and the taints of apprehending the two truths as different entities are asserted to be the obstructions to omniscience.

> The *seeds* of the conception of true existence produce a *consciousness conceiving* that phenomena and persons truly exist, but the *latencies* of the conception of true existence produce an *appearance* of persons and phenomena as inherently existent. The taints of apprehending the two truths as different entities are what make it impossible for anyone but a Buddha to perceive directly both phenomena and their final nature, emptiness, at the same time.

Nature of the Paths

The Consequentialists present the five paths for each of the three vehicles. Also, relying on the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*,[1] they present the ten grounds for the Great Vehicle. The three vehicles do not have different types of wisdom because the Consequentialists assert that all Superiors directly cognize the selflessness of phenomena.

ASSERTIONS ON THE FRUITS OF THE PATHS

Those firm in the Lesser Vehicle lineage cultivate the view of selflessness merely through brief reasoning. In

[1] *mdo sde sa bcu pa, daśabhūmika.* For a Sanskrit edition, see *Daśabhūmikasūtram*, P.L.Vaidya, ed. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No.7 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967); for an English translation, see M. Honda, 'An Annotated Translation of the "Daśabhūmika"', in D. Sinor, ed, *Studies in Southeast and Central Asia*, Śatapitaka Series 74, (New Delhi: 1968), pp. 115-276.

dependence on this, they finally remove the conception of true existence, together with its seeds, through the vajra-like meditative stabilization of the Lesser Vehicle path of meditation and simultaneously actualize the Lesser Vehicle enlightenment.

The Proponents of the Middle Way Autonomy School and below assert that in order to attain a nirvana without remainder it is first necessary to attain a nirvana with remainder.

> This statement does not appear to cover the case of a person who is reborn in a pure land and who newly actualizes nirvana there. Since birth in a pure land is not due to contaminated actions and afflictions but is due to pure wishes, it would seem to be impossible for such a person first to actualize a nirvana with remainder, given that these 'lower' schools define a nirvana with remainder as having a remainder of aggregates that are impelled by contaminated actions and afflictions. It seems that such a person would actualize only a nirvana without remainder, and thus this would be a case of actualizing a nirvana without remainder without having first actualized a nirvana with remainder.

However, in the Consequentialist system it is asserted that prior to a nirvana with remainder it is necessary to attain a nirvana without remainder.

> The Consequentialists have a different meaning for the two terms. For them, a nirvana without remainder refers to the meditative equipoise on emptiness during which practitioners of the Lesser Vehicle finally become Foe Destroyers. At that time they have overcome the conception of inherent existence and

> thus possess a nirvana, a passing beyond sorrow, with 'sorrow' identified as the obstructions to liberation. Since at that time they are directly cognizing emptiness, they also are temporarily free of the appearance of inherent existence and thus are said not to have any 'remainder' of this false appearance. However, when they rise from equipoise, things falsely *appear* to exist inherently even though they never again will assent to this false appearance and thereby conceive things to exist inherently. Thus, Foe Destroyers first have a nirvana without remainder and then a nirvana with remainder. Gradually, Foe Destroyers enter the Great Vehicle and, after a great accumulation of merit, also purify their perception of the false appearance of inherent existence. They thereby eliminate the obstructions to omniscience and become Buddhas.

The Consequentialists assert[1] a presentation of the eight Approachers and Abiders for Hearers and Solitary Realizers, and they assert that all Approachers and Abiders are Superiors.

The way that the Great Vehicle enlightenment is actualized is this: Bodhisattvas extensively cultivate the view of selflessness through innumerable forms of reasoning and thereby remove the obstructions. Moreover, until the obstructions to liberation are exhaustively abandoned, they do not begin to abandon the obstructions to omniscience. They begin to abandon the obstructions to omniscience on the eighth Bodhisattva ground which is when Bodhisattvas who did not initially go on a Lesser Vehicle path exhaustively abandon the obstructions to liberation. Finally, through depending on the

[1] In the Teacher Training edition (75.3) read *khas len* for *khas mi len* in accordance with the Peking edition (29b.3), etc.

uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum [of being a sentient being with obstructions to be abandoned] they abandon, without residue, all obstructions to omniscience and simultaneously actualize the state of the Four Buddha Bodies.

The Consequentialists assert that all nirvanas and true cessations are ultimate truths.

> A nirvana is an emptiness of the mind in the continuum of one who has completely and forever abandoned all afflictions. A true cessation is an emptiness of the mind in the continuum of one who has completely and forever abandoned a portion of the afflictions.

The first and last of the three wheels of doctrine as described in the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought* are scriptures that require interpretation because they do not contain any passages that explicitly teach [the actual] emptiness.

> This refers only to the three wheels as set forth in the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought*. According to the Consequentialists' own way of setting forth the three wheels of doctrine, certain passages in the first and third wheels are also definitive because they teach emptiness, the final nature of phenomena, explicitly.

They assert that the middle wheel of doctrine, as described in the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought*, is composed of definitive scriptures because the *Heart Sūtra*[1] is a definitive scripture.

The main distinguishing feature of the Consequence School is that, based on the reason that internal and external phenomena are dependently imputed, they refute that phenomena exist by way of their own charac-

[1] *shes rab snying po, prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya.*

ter, but within their own system and without needing to rely on [the ignorance of] others they know how to establish—without fault—bondage and liberation, cause and effect, known and knower, and so forth, conventionally, only nominally, that is, as only imputedly existent.

> Some other interpretations of the Consequence School hold that Consequentialists posit bondage and liberation, etc., only in the face of others' ignorance. The author rejects this notion and maintains that Consequentialists posit these phenomena from their own point of view and that their doing so within the context of completely refuting inherent existence is, in fact, the chief distinguishing feature of the school.[1]

Nowadays, some who are vain about having high views say that phenomena are only mistaken appearances and take them to be utterly non-existent, like the child of a barren woman; then they hold that non-attention to anything is the supreme practice. They do not have even the scent of a Consequentialist in them.

Therefore, those who seek liberation, having seen all the marvels of cyclic existence as being like a whirlwind of fire, should abandon all bad views which are fabricated to look like doctrine and should value supremely the Middle Way Consequence School's own system, the highest of all systems of tenets.[2]

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[1] For extensive discussion of this point in the special insight section of Dzong-ka-ba's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, see Elizabeth Napper's *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1989).

[2] For more reading on the tenets of the Consequence School, see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983) and *Emptiness Yoga* (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1987).

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[Concluding stanzas:]

The depth [of the ocean] of terms and meanings,
gathered on the golden earth of the systems of doctrine, is difficult to fathom.
Successive waves of various reasonings move about, causing fear in the hearts of children of low intellect.
Splitting into a thousand rivers of manifold views, it is a place of sport for birds of clear intellect.
Who can measure all the particulars of the great treasure of water of outer and inner systems of doctrine?

However, the boat obtained through birth,
Impelled by a favorable wind arisen from endeavor,
Goes to the center of the ocean of tenets
And presently finds here this precious garland of eloquence.

The youthful groups of those with clear intellect
Wishing to spread the feast of eloquent song
Before millions of the best of the wise should make use
Of this condensation of the essence of our own and others' tenets.

O, the wonder of those nowadays vainly considering themselves to be wise,
Running off from the top of their heads, without training
A long time in the great books, assuming for the sake of wealth and respect
The tiring task of the dance of composition!

Thousands of rays of eloquence from the sky of analysis