A Drop of Reason Goes a Long Way
The Nyayabindu by Dharmakirti
With a Commentary by Dharmottara

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CLASSIFICATION OF PHENOMENA

OBJECTS
= knowable objects = existents
= established bases = objects of comprehension = phenomena

SUBJECTS
= mind
= consciousness
= awareness

METHODS THAT LEAD TO COGNITION OF OBJECTS AND SUBJECTS

- Contradictory phenomena
  - directly contradictory phenomenon
  - indirectly contradictory phenomenon
- Connected phenomena
  - identically connected phenomenon
  - causally connected phenomenon
- Negation
  - implicative negation
  - non-implicative negation
- Concrete phenomenon
- Generality
  - type generality
  - collection generality
  - term generality
  - object generality
- Particular
- One
  - one in isolate
  - one in entity
  - one in type
  - one in substance
- Different
  - different in isolate
  - different in entity
  - different in substance
- Definition, definiendum, and basis for definition

classified in terms of

WAYS THEY ARE TAKEN AS OBJECTS

Appearing objects
(or apprehended object)
Referent objects
Objects of engagement

ENTITY

THINGS
= conditioned phenomena
= impermanent phenomena
= specifically characterized phenomena

NON-THINGS
= nonconditioned phenomena
= permanent phenomena
= generally characterized phenomena

classified in terms of

ENTITY

MATTER

MATTER OF OUTER OBJECTS
Form-source
- color
  - 4 primary colors
  - 8 secondary colors
- shape

Sound
- conjoined sounds
- not conjoined sounds

Smell
- natural smells
- manufactured smells

Taste
Tangible objects
- tangible objects that are elements
- tangible objects composed of the elements

MATTER OF INNER OBJECTS
Eye sense faculty
Ear sense faculty
Nose sense faculty
Tongue sense faculty
Body sense faculty

CONSCIOUSNESS
= mind = awareness

NONASSOCIATED FORMATIONS

Nonassociated formation that is the person

Nonassociated formations that are not the person

FUNCTION

CAUSES
Classified in the terms of entity
- direct cause
- indirect cause
- substantial cause
- cooperative cause

Terminological classification
- enabling cause
- simultaneously arising cause
- cause of a similar outcome
- congruent cause
- omnipresent cause
- completely ripening cause

CONDITIONS
causal condition
immediately preceding condition
object condition
dominant condition

RESULTS
Classified in terms of entity
- direct result
- indirect result

Terminological classification
- completely ripened result
- dominated result
- result that accords with the cause
- result caused by persons
- result of separation

Prepared by Karl Brunnhölzl at Nitartha Institute, Mt. Allison, June 22, 1999. Revised June 2004, TW.

OVERVIEW OF MIND & ITS WORLD I

CLASSIFICATIONS OF MIND



RESULTS OF VALID COGNITION



THE THREE-PART SYLLOGISM
For Inferential Valid Cognition



Example: A = B because B = C and A = C

Potential Faults: A ≠ C or B ≠ C

SUBJECT		PREDICATE		REASON	Types of Reasons
1a. Sound	is	Impermanent	because it is	Compounded	Nature
1b. Self	is	Empty	because it is	Compounded & impermanent	
1c. Dharmas	are	Empty	because they are	Neither one nor many Dependently arisen	
2a. Deer		Live here	because	There are deer droppings	Effect
2b. Fire	is	On the mountain	because there is	Smoke on the mountain	
3a. Children of barren women		Do not exist	because	Barren women do not have children	Non-Observation
3b. Horn of a hare		Does not exist	because	Hares do not have horns	

Debate in Tibetan Buddhism.
Daniel Perdue. Snow Lion, Pp. 52-53

Table I: Components of a Syllogism

Sample Syllogism: The subject, *sound*, is an *impermanent phenomenon* because of being a *product*.
1 2 3

1 subject (*chos can, dharmin*): sound

2 predicate to be proven (*bsgrub bya'i chos, sādhya-dharma*): impermanent phenomenon

3 sign (*rtags, liṅga*): product

4 that which is to be proven (*bsgrub bya, sādhya*): sound is an impermanent phenomenon
Formulated in general: that subject is that predicate to be proven

5 predicate to be negated (*dgag bya'i chos, *pratiṣhedhya-dharma*): permanent phenomenon

6 that which is to be negated (*dgag bya, pratiṣhedhya*): sound is a permanent phenomenon
Formulated in general: that subject is non-that predicate to be proven

7 similar class (*mthun phyogs, sapakṣha*): impermanent phenomenon

8 dissimilar class (*mi mthun phyogs, vipakṣha*): non-impermanent phenomenon

9 property of the subject (*phyogs chos, pakṣha-dharma*): product
Defined: that which is ascertained (by a person for whom it has become the property of the subject in the proof of sound as an impermanent phenomenon by the sign, product) as just existing, in accordance with the mode of statement, with sound
Formulated in general: that subject is that sign
Formulated for the sample syllogism: sound is a product

10 forward pervasion (*rjes khyab, anvaya-vyāpti*): product
Defined: that which is ascertained (by a person for whom it has become the second mode of the sign in the proof of sound as an impermanent phenomenon by the sign, product) as existing in only the similar class in the proof of sound as an impermanent phenomenon
Formulated in general: whatever is that sign is necessarily that predicate to be proven
Formulated for the sample syllogism: whatever is a product is necessarily an impermanent phenomenon

11 counter-pervasion (*ldog khyab, vyatireka-vyāpti*): product
Defined: that which is ascertained (by a person for whom it has become the third mode of the sign in the proof of sound as an impermanent phenomenon by the sign, product) as just non-existent in the dissimilar class in the proof of sound as an impermanent phenomenon
Formulated in general: whatever is not that predicate to be proven is necessarily not that sign
Formulated for the sample syllogism: whatever is not an impermanent phenomenon is necessarily not a product

CLEAR THINKING 1

workbook

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THE FOUR RELATIONSHIPS

Four Relationships Between Any Two Phenomena

Gelwa	contradictory (mutually exclusive)	
Tönchik	synonymous (mutually inclusive)	
Musum	three possibilities (three permutations-one is a subset of the other)	
Mushi	four possibilities (four permutations - they overlap)	

SET THEORY

A set is a well-defined collection of objects. The objects are elements, members, or instances of the set. The set can also be called a *generality* and the members can be called *particulars*. The term *well-defined* means that the set is described in such a way that we can determine whether or not any given object belongs to that set. For example:

The set of all men in Texas today.

The set of all red Ford trucks not in Texas last week.

Some example of poorly defined sets are:

All well-known artists.

Three wealthy men.

The members of the set can be listed or you can define the characteristics that must be met by every member of the set.

The following sets have their members listed:

The set of my nuclear family of origin only includes my mother, my father, and my three siblings.

The set of all the food I ate for breakfast this morning only includes one serving of yogurt and one bagel with butter.

The following sets are defined by characteristics:

The set of all three-legged cats living in Canada in 2006.

The set of all citrus fruits.

VENN DIAGRAMS

John Venn was a nineteenth-century British philosopher and mathematician who introduced the Venn diagram in 1881.

The Four Sets

Inside each circle are all the particular instances of that set. Outside the circle are all the instances that are not members of that set.

Mutually Exclusive Sets

Two sets can hold no members in common. That is, the first set has no members in the second set, for example: steam and ice, apples and oranges, purple and yellow, cars and flowers.



Mutually Inclusive Sets

Two sets can be mutually inclusive, for example: plants and fauna, sofa and couch, home and domicile, car and automobile.



One Is a Subset of the Other

One set can completely hold the other, for example: puppies and dogs, oranges and citrus fruits, pine trees and trees, high-heeled pumps and shoes.



Overlapping Sets

Two sets can intersect and share particular instances, for example: women and Canadians, plants and food, children's books and sci-fi books, and cushions and red things.



MIND & ITS WORLD 1

sourcebook

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EXPLANATION OF INFERENTIAL VALID COGNITION FOR ONESELF

ĀCHĀRYA SHERAB GYALTSEN

There are two types of valid cognition: direct and inferential. We have finished the section explaining direct valid cognition, and we are now in the second section of valid cognition, the explanation of inferential valid cognition.[7]

INFERENTIAL VALID COGNITION

see Lorik: divisions of mind: inferential valid cognition

The text says:

> ***2.1.1.2.2. Explanation of inferential valid cognition***
> This has two parts:
> (1) Inferential valid cognition for oneself
> (2) Inferential valid cognition for others

Why do we need inferential valid cognition? It is because there are many things, many objects, that we cannot understand through sense direct valid cognition, mental direct valid cognition, or self-aware direct valid cognition. The means to understand things we cannot directly cognize is inferential valid cognition. If we wonder what things cannot be realized through direct valid cognition, we can just look at what the Buddha taught: that all compounded things are impermanent, that everything defiled causes suffering, that all phenomena lack a self-entity, and that nirvana is peace. This is an explanation of the abiding nature, or the actual way things are. However, we cannot understand this explanation through direct valid cognition; we need to use inferential valid cognition.

INFERENTIAL VALID COGNITION FOR ONESELF

see Lorik: divisions of mind: inferential valid cognition: inferential valid cognition for oneself

The text says:

> ***2.1.1.2.2.1. Inferential valid cognition for oneself***
>
> The definition of inferential valid cognition for oneself is "an awareness newly realizing that which is to be proven by a reason having the three modes."

Inferential valid cognition and inferential valid cognition for oneself are synonymous.

Definition of Inferential Valid Cognition for Oneself

The definition of inferential valid cognition for oneself is "an awareness newly realizing that which is to be proven from a reason having the three modes." An awareness newly realizing or newly understanding the probandum (that which is to be proven) is called an inferential valid cognition. In the same way as in the definition for a direct valid cognition—it had to be an awareness newly cognizing its object, a specifically characterized phenomenon—an inferential valid cognition also has to be an awareness newly realizing that which is to be proven.

Three Modes

The first thing we need to look at in the definition—what comes first in Tibetan, but last in English—is "the three modes." What are the three modes? We can use an example of a reasoning to show the three modes: "Sound is impermanent because it is compounded." We'll show how this reason has the three modes. The three modes are the subject quality, forward inclusion, and reverse inclusion.

7 Tib. rjes dpag tshad ma

The definition of inferential valid cognition for oneself is "an awareness newly realizing that which is to be proven from a reason having the three modes." What is a reason that has the three modes? Any reason that has the three modes is also called: "a correct reason," "a correct reasoning," "a correct syllogism." They are all the same.

First Mode: Subject Quality

The first mode is the subject quality. The definition of the subject quality is: "A reason that valid cognition has determined to be present in all instances of the flawless subject in question, in a corresponding formulation." In the example "Sound is impermanent because it is compounded," "sound" is the subject and "because it is compounded" is the reason. To have "a flawless subject in question," one first has to ascertain that the reason—in this case "being compounded"—applies to the subject, which is sound. So one first ascertains that the reason applies to subject, and second, the subject must be a subject in question, which means, it has to be something you want to know something about. In this case, "sound is impermanent" is the probandum, or what is to be proved. So you have to have some doubt about that, in order to set about proving it. You have to have some doubt as to whether sound is impermanent for it to be a subject in question.

The definition of the subject quality also says that it is "in a corresponding formulation." This is how you set up your reasoning. There are two ways you can formulate it, using two forms of the verb. This is the same as in the eight doors of pervasions. You have *yin* pervasions and *yö* pervasions. The verb *yin* means "to be" or "to have" and the verb *yö* means "to be present" or "to exist." When you formulate a reason, the verbs have to correspond in the two parts. You have to say, "Sound *is* impermanent because it *is* compounded,' or "On the smoky mountain pass, *there is* a fire present, because *there is* smoke present." There is a corresponding formulation between the probandum and the reason.

The definition also says "A reason that valid cognition has determined to be present in all instances of the subject in question." This means there has to be a *musum* relationship between the reason and the subject in question. The reason must be present in all instances of the subject in question. In the example of "sound being compounded," when you test this, you say, "Whatever is a sound is necessarily compounded." Yes, that works. The reason is present in all instances. All sounds are always compounded things.

Second Mode: Forward Inclusion

The definition is of the forward inclusion "a reason that has been determined to be present only in the concordant class." The definition of a concordant class is "that which accords in nature with the predicate." It is the class of things that are of the same nature as the predicate. If we look at our example again, the predicate is "impermanence," and the reason is "compounded." So the reason has to be determined to be present only in the concordant class, in this case, those things that are of the same nature as impermanence. Saying, "to be present only in that," means that it cannot be present in things that are not impermanent. Being compounded cannot apply to things that are permanent. The relationship between the reason and the predicate is either *tönchik,* or synonymous, or it can be *musum,* where the reason is a subset of the predicate. So whatever is compounded must necessarily be impermanent.

Another example that illustrates the relationship present in the forward inclusion is: "Given the sound of a conch, it is impermanent because it is produced through effort." This is an example of a *musum* relationship. Whatever is produced through effort is impermanent, but it is not the case that whatever is impermanent is produced through effort. So the reason is a subset of the predicate.

Third Mode: Reverse Inclusion

The definition of the reverse inclusion is "a reason that has been determined to be absent in all instances of the nonconcordant class." In our example, "sound is impermanent because it is compounded," the nonconcordant class is those things that are permanent. The reason "being compounded" has to be determined to be absent in all instances of those things that are permanent. Since that is the case, we have the reverse inclusion.

Divisions of Inferential Valid Cognition for Oneself

The text says:

> The three types of inferential valid cognition that arise in dependence upon the three reasons (result, nature, and nonobservation), as well as the ways in which inferential [valid cognition] arises in dependence upon the reasons that are subdivisions of those, will naturally be understood by knowing the *Presentation of the Classifications of Reasons*, which is the basis [for understanding] inferential [valid cognition].

Three Reasons

Inferential valid cognition arises on the basis of three types of reasons: 1) reasons of result; 2) reasons of self-nature; and 3) reasons of nonobservation.

If you wonder what is the cause, or what gives rise to inferential valid cognition, it is a correct reasoning, or a reasoning that has the three modes.

Correct Reasons of Result

The correct reason of result is "a reason of result with the three modes." The reason is the result of the predicate. The predicate will always be the cause that you are inferring from the result. For example, in the reason, "On a smoky mountain pass, there is a fire because there is smoke," you are trying to prove that there is a fire by means of its result, which is smoke. You say, because there is smoke, there is a fire. In result reasons, you are always reasoning by means of the result. So the reason part will always be a result.

Correct Reasons of Self-Nature

In a reason of self-nature, the reason part is always something with the same nature as the predicate, for example, "Sound is impermanent because it is compounded." "Impermanent" and "compounded" are the same nature or essence.

Correct Reasons of Nonobservation

The definition of a reason of nonobservation is "the presence of all three modes in the proof of the probandum, in this case, a negation," or you could say, "the presence of all three modes in the negation of that which is to be negated." An example of a reason by means of nonobservation is: "Given the subject, the horns of a rabbit, they do not exist because they are not observed by valid cognition." The probandum (what you are trying to prove) is that the horns of a rabbit do not exist, and you do this by means of the reason "because they are not observed by valid cognition." Because they are not observed by a valid cognizer, the horns of a rabbit do not exist.

What We Understand Through the Three Reasons

Through reasons of result, we can understand the relationship between cause and effect. We understand that all sentient beings have karma and mental afflictions as causes because we see that they presently experience suffering. As reasoning, we would say: "Given the subject, all sentient beings of the three realms, they have as causes, karma and mental afflictions, which they have previously developed or experienced, because they are pervaded by the result, the three types of suffering." Because we see that all sentient beings are pervaded by the three types of suffering, we can determine that they have the cause of this suffering, karma and mental afflictions.

This is an example of inferential valid cognition realizing a result, or understanding through a result.

With reasons of self-nature, one looks at phenomena that have the same nature. We use these types of reasonings to understand, for example, that our skandhas are impermanent. Our skandhas are impermanent, but we have not realized this. So we say, "Given our skandhas, they are impermanent because they are compounded." First we have to determine that our skandhas are compounded. We go through a process of analysis to determine that. Then we can say, "Given our skandhas, they are impermanent because they are compounded." We can understand that. We give rise to the inferential valid cognition based on reason of self-nature, and we come to determine that our own skandhas are impermanent.

To use this reasoning, "Our skandhas are impermanent because they are compounded," we need to have ascertained that our skandhas are compounded. If we have not done that, then we need to use another type of reason. We can say, "Our skandhas are impermanent because they arise." This uses something a bit coarser as something that we know. Nāgārjuna said, "Through understanding that phenomena arise, one understands that they cease, they disintegrate, they are destroyed. Through understanding that, one can understand that phenomena are impermanent. Once one has understood that, then one understands that phenomena are empty." So with this type of reasoning, we come to understand that all phenomena are empty, or lack a self-entity.

Student: Why is it a reason of self-nature?

ASG: The reason "arising" and the predicate "impermanent" are of the same nature.

To continue, inferential valid cognition also arises on the basis of reasons of nonobservation.

Student: Is a reason of nonobservation based on the expectation of observing something and then not observing it? Or is it based on not observing it from the beginning?

ASG: This type of reasoning is used to refute the probandum, and in your reason, you can use the nonobservation of something or not. A reason that negates the probandum is: "In a place where there is a large fire, like a place that is covered with fire, there is no sensation of cold, because it is pervaded by fire." In this example, your reason is not saying you do not observe something, but it is negating your probandum, which is "in a place covered with fire"

Many types of inferential valid cognition arise on the basis of these reasons, but we will not look at those now. However, if we want to summarize it, we can say that there are three types of inferential valid cognition that arise on the basis of the three types of reasons. If we want to summarize that even more, we say there is one type of inferential valid cognition that arises on the basis of correct reasons.

Also by Geshe Kelsang Gyatso

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Understanding the Mind

LORIG
AN EXPLANATION OF THE
NATURE AND FUNCTIONS
OF THE MIND

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Inferential Cognizers

DEFINITION OF INFERENTIAL COGNIZER

The definition of inferential cognizer is a completely reliable cognizer whose object is realized in direct dependence upon a conclusive reason.

There are three types of object: manifest objects, slightly hidden objects, and deeply hidden objects. In general, manifest objects are phenomena such as visual forms and sounds that can be perceived directly by ordinary beings; slightly hidden objects are phenomena such as impermanence and emptiness that can be known initially only by depending upon a conclusive reason; and deeply hidden objects are phenomena such as the specific workings of the laws of karma that can be perceived directly only by Buddhas. However, these three types of object are relative. Thus hell beings, for example, are deeply hidden phenomena from the human viewpoint, but manifest objects from the viewpoint of hell beings themselves. Manifest objects can be realized initially by direct cognizers, but both types of hidden object can be realized initially only by inferential cognizers.

Inferential cognizers are very common, and we normally have many during each day. For example, if we see a person go into a room that has only one entrance, and not leave by that entrance, we know with certainty that he is still in the room even though we cannot see him. Similarly, if we see smoke billowing from the chimney of a house, we know for certain that there is a fire in the house even though we cannot see the fire directly. These are both examples of inferential cognizers that realize their object in dependence upon conclusive reasons. Most scientific and historical knowledge

is based on inferential cognizers. For example, if an archaeologist finds a few bones, broken pots, and stone tools, he can infer many things about the life of the people to whom they originally belonged and, provided that he does not go beyond the evidence, his knowledge will be reliable.

There is one philosophical school, known as the Charavakas, that denies the existence of hidden objects and asserts that everything that exists can be realized directly by ordinary sense awarenesses. Thus, they do not accept inferential cognizers, and they deny that we can have reliable knowledge of anything that does not appear directly to one of our five sense awarenesses. This view is obviously incorrect because it is refuted by our everyday experiences. For example, if we stir sugar into tea we can know that the tea will be sweet without having to taste it to find out. Similarly, if we see a car we can know with certainty that there must have been a person or group of persons who manufactured it even though we may never have seen them ourself. We know these facts because we realize them with inferential cognizers.

Inferential cognizers are very important for our spiritual practice. Most of the essential topics explained in Dharma are hidden objects that can be realized initially only through inferential cognizers. Once we have realized these objects inferentially, if we continue to meditate on them we shall eventually realize them directly with a yogic direct perceiver, and then they will become manifest objects for us. There are some objects that are not presently manifest for us but that would become manifest for us if we were simply to move to a different position or just wait for something to happen. For example, we can establish that there is a fire inside a house simply by entering the house to have a look, or we can discover that a candle will eventually burn down simply by waiting for it to do so; but we cannot establish the existence of subtle objects such as emptiness or any other of the sixteen characteristics of the four noble truths in this way. The only way we can gain incontrovertible knowledge of these objects is by generating inferential cognizers in dependence upon conclusive reasons.

Whenever we realize something by means of a conclusive reason we use a special form of logical reasoning known as a 'syllogism'. An example of such syllogistic reasoning is, 'There is a fire in the house because there is smoke.' Like all syllogisms this has three parts – a subject, a predicate, and a reason. The subject is 'in the house', the predicate is 'there is a fire', and the reason is 'because there is smoke.' The combination of the subject and the predicate is known as the 'probandum'. In this case the probandum is 'There is a fire in the house', and it is this that we realize in dependence upon the reason.

A conclusive reason is a reason that is able to establish a probandum incontrovertibly. A conclusive reason must have a definite relationship with the predicate. Generally there are two types of relationship – natural relationships and causal relationships. A natural relationship obtains between objects that have the same entity, or nature. For example, there is a natural relationship between dog and animal because a dog is an animal. Similarly there is a natural relationship between re-cognizer and valid cognizer because whatever is a re-cognizer is necessarily a valid cognizer. A causal relationship obtains between objects when one is the cause of the other. Thus, causal relationships exist between acorn and oak tree, fire and smoke, and eye sense power and eye awareness. Because there are two types of relationship there are also two types of reason – those based on a natural relationship (which are known as 'nature reasons'), and those based on a causal relationship (which are known as 'effect reasons'). Examples of the first are the reason in the statement 'This white dog is an animal because it is a dog', and the reason in the statement 'The second moment of an inferential cognizer is a valid cognizer because it is a re-cognizer.' Examples of the second are the reason in the statement 'There is a fire in the house because there is smoke' and the reason in the statement 'A new-born baby's mind must have arisen from its previous continuum of awareness because it is a mind.'

The definition of conclusive reason is a reason that is qualified by the three modes. The three modes are: the property

of the subject, the forward pervasion, and the reverse pervasion; and any conclusive reason will be qualified by all three. We can understand these three modes by considering the syllogism stated above, 'There is a fire in the house because there is smoke.'

The first mode is called the 'property of the subject' because for a reason to be conclusive it must apply to, or be a property of, the subject. In this case, the reason is a property of the subject because there is smoke (reason) in the house (subject). The second mode is called the 'forward pervasion' because for a reason to be a conclusive reason it must be pervaded by the predicate. In this case, the reason is qualified by the second mode because wherever there is smoke (reason), there is fire (predicate). The third mode is called the 'reverse pervasion' because if the predicate does not apply the reason must also not apply. In this case, the reason is qualified by the third mode because if there is no fire there is no smoke.

If a reason lacks any of the three modes it is not a conclusive reason. Thus, if we were to say 'There is a fire in the house because there is a chimney', the reason would not be a conclusive reason because it would not be qualified by the second and third modes. Similarly the statement 'There is a fire in the house because fire is hot' also does not have a conclusive reason.

By considering examples like the one used here we can learn to identify the different components of a syllogism and to understand the three modes of a conclusive reason. Then once we understand these we can apply them to our Dharma practice. For example, to realize the sixteen characteristics of the four noble truths we must first generate inferential cognizers of them. Thus, to realize that our body is a true suffering we can begin by contemplating the syllogism, 'My body is a true suffering because it is a contaminated aggregate.' This reasoning is correct because the reason used is a conclusive reason. It is qualified by the first mode because our body is a contaminated aggregate, it is qualified by the second mode because whatever is a contaminated aggregate

is necessarily a true suffering, and it is qualified by the third mode because if something is not a true suffering it is necessarily not a contaminated aggregate.

Sometimes we might want to deepen our understanding by considering further one or other of the three modes. For example, if we are not sure whether or not our body is a contaminated aggregate we can use a separate line of reasoning to establish that this is the case. Thus, we can consider the syllogism, 'My body is a contaminated aggregate because it is produced from karma and delusion and because it is conducive to the development of delusions.'

DIVISIONS OF INFERENTIAL COGNIZER

There are three types of inferential cognizer from the point of view of the type of reason upon which they depend:

1 Inferential cognizers through the power of fact
2 Inferential cognizers through belief
3 Inferential cognizers through renown

Inferential cognizers through the power of fact realize slightly hidden objects. Examples are an inferential cognizer realizing that there is a fire in a house because there is smoke, and an inferential cognizer realizing that the body is impermanent because it disintegrates. Most of our inferential cognizers are of this type. We gain initial realizations of impermanence, emptiness, pervasive suffering, and so forth through such inferential cognizers.

Inferential cognizers through belief realize deeply hidden objects such as the specific law of karma that from giving comes wealth and from discipline comes happiness. Sentient beings cannot prove the existence of such deeply hidden objects through their own direct experience or through inferential cognizers through the power of fact. The only way we can know such objects incontrovertibly is by relying upon Buddha's scriptures, having already ascertained that Buddha is a thoroughly non-deceptive person.

For example, to realize that the scripture revealing 'From giving comes wealth, from discipline comes happiness' is a

completely reliable scripture we need to use the following reasoning: 'This scripture is completely reliable because it is free from contradiction by direct perception, free from contradiction by inferential cognizers through the power of fact, and free from contradiction by inferential cognizers through belief.' In dependence upon this reasoning we can generate an inferential cognizer realizing that this scripture is completely reliable. Then we can generate an inferential cognizer that realizes that from giving comes wealth and from discipline comes happiness because the scripture that reveals this is completely reliable. This inferential cognizer is an inferential cognizer through belief.

Inferential cognizers through renown realize the suitability of terms on the basis of renown, or convention. In principle any object is suitable to be called by any name because the suitability of a particular name arises not from characteristics in the object but simply from convention. Thus the white orb we see in the night sky is suitable to be called 'the moon' because that is how it is commonly known, but it could just as easily be known by any other name. Similarly the term 'moon' could be used to designate any other object. Thus, for example, if we had grown used to referring to the white orb in the night sky as 'the sun' and the yellow orb in the day sky as 'the moon', these terms would be entirely suitable because they would have been established by convention.

Inferential cognizers through renown realize a terminological suitability – that an object is suitable to be called anything because it exists among objects of conception. There is no natural relationship between objects and sounds. Thus, we can call a person 'Patience' even though a person cannot be patience because patience is a state of mind, not a person. Even so, it is suitable to call a person 'Patience' simply because that name is established by common usage. Moreover, since countless different languages exist, any object of a conceptual mind can be an object of any language, and so any object is suitable to be called anything.

In *Commentary to Valid Cognition* Dharmakirti says:

> An expressive sound is dependent upon the wish of whoever expresses it.

One person may say 'John is good' because that is his experience of John, but someone else, with a different experience of John, may say 'John is bad.' Thus, our speech has no freedom because what we say depends upon our mind. In the same text Dharmakirti says 'Sound is everywhere', which means that we can express a sound for anything.

There is also a twofold division of inferential cognizer from the point of view of how they are generated:

1 Inferential cognizers arisen from listening
2 Inferential cognizers arisen from contemplation

An example of the first is an inferential cognizer realizing that the body is impermanent simply in dependence upon listening to the statement 'The body is impermanent because it will finally die.' If we generate an inferential cognizer realizing the impermanence of the body principally through the force of our contemplating the meaning of such a statement, this is an example of an inferential cognizer arisen from contemplation.

When we first realize subtle objects such as impermanence in dependence upon inferential cognizers, we attain an intellectual understanding of them, but we should not be satisfied with this. We need to deepen our experience of the object through meditation. In this way we shall gradually attain a profound experience induced by meditation, and finally a yogic direct perceiver that realizes the object directly. Inferential cognizers are seeds of yogic direct perceivers. Until we attain an actual yogic direct perceiver realizing a particular object we need to continue to meditate on the continuum of the inferential cognizer realizing that object.

GENERATION OF INFERENTIAL COGNIZERS

As mentioned before, we can generate an inferential cognizer either in dependence upon listening or in dependence upon contemplation, but either way it is necessary for us to realize

fully the three modes. When it is said that a conclusive reason is qualified by the three modes, this means that for a reason to be conclusive for us we must realize all three modes. For example, if we simply think 'My body is impermanent because it will finally die', without realizing each of the three modes, this reason will not be a conclusive reason, and our understanding will not be an inferential cognizer. The reason will become conclusive and lead to an inferential cognizer only if we fully realize the three modes – that our body will finally die, that whatever finally dies is impermanent, and that whatever is not impermanent will not finally die.

APPLICATION OF INFERENTIAL COGNIZERS TO DHARMA PRACTICE

Most objects of meditation mentioned in the Sutras and Tantras are either slightly hidden objects or deeply hidden objects, and so we must realize them initially by generating inferential cognizers. This initial knowledge obtained through inferential cognizers is like a sprout that will later grow into an abundant crop of Dharma realizations. By repeatedly meditating on the continuum of these inferential cognizers, eventually we shall gain deep realizations of Sutra and Tantra, like a crop ripening into a rich harvest. Knowing this we should make a strong determination to generate these precious inferential cognizers in the way explained here, and then put this determination into practice.

Tibetan Logic

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10. The Text and Its Study

Pur-bu-jok's text on *Signs and Reasonings* is a manual for introducing Ge-luk-pa beginners to the principles, vocabulary, and concepts of the system of logic. The place of this topic in the Ge-luk-pa curriculum is shown by its title: *The Topic of Signs and Reasonings from the "Great Path of Reasoning" in the Magic Key to the Path of Reasoning, Explanation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Texts on Prime Cognition.* Valid cognition is one of the five main topics that make up the curriculum of the Ge-luk-pa monastic universities (the other four are perfection of wisdom, phenomenology, Madhyamaka philosophy, and monastic discipline).

A path of reasoning is a consciousness that has been trained in reasoned analysis until it can use analysis to realize, first, the meaning of religious texts and, eventually, the true nature of reality. The purpose of reasoning (logic) is to develop valid knowledge, and the study of this text is to lay a foundation for understanding how valid cognition is acquired. What is validity? How is valid knowledge acquired? What can be known? Further, and more specifically, what knowledge can be acquired through reasoning that will help lead one to self-transformation, to spiritual development, even to liberation, omniscience, and buddhahood?

The beginner is not dealing with these profound questions directly, but is laying a foundation of knowledge and experience that will serve as basis for their study. Pur-bu-jok's manual is "unlocking the door"—introducing fundamental vocabulary and concepts and laying the foundation for more difficult studies of valid cognition that will center on the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and Tibetan commentaries on them. The text is a very brief presentation of basic principles of logic. Teachers amplify it with explanations and examples. The students strengthen their grasp of the issues by debating them daily in lively sessions with their classmates. And they begin to apply the principles of reasoning in individual analysis and reflection. The correct (or prepared) opponent is one who is able to benefit from the reasoning; this may be an external opponent (in debate) or oneself (in meditation). In either situation, reasoning is used to bring new understanding of a thesis to a prepared "opponent."

Pur-bu-jok's logic manual is about reasons (signs) and their use. Signs are used in syllogisms, the phrasing of which, though very precise, is simple and easily mastered by the Ge-luk-pa student. The syllog-

ism is a statement of reasoning containing a subject, predicate, and sign. The thesis or probandum, that which is being proved, is made up of the subject and predicate. The negandum, that which is being eliminated, is the subject combined with the opposite of the predicate. For example, in the syllogism, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," that which is being proved is that sound is impermanent and that which is being eliminated is that sound is permanent.

Students also learn the nature of the two modes of statement, the copular (the subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product) and the ontological (the subject, on a smoky pass, fire exists because smoke exists). Then, having understood well the precise terminology and modes of statement in logic, they are ready for the two main lessons of this study: (1) What makes a sign valid—what are the requirements of a correct sign; what is an incorrect sign (a quasi-sign)? and (2) What are the varieties of correct signs?

Validity: The Nature of Correct Signs

A correct (valid) sign is used to prove something, x, that is hidden to the opponent, and for which he or she needs proof. It may be hidden by nature (something the ordinary person has no experience of) or by circumstance. Smoke is not usually a hidden phenomenon, it is usually ascertainable by direct perception; but in certain circumstances a reason may be needed to prove its presence or absence. On the other hand, impermanence and emptiness are said to be hidden phenomena (not ascertainable initially by direct valid cognition) that must initially be ascertained through reasoning. Tibetan Buddhism holds that direct (nonconceptual) valid cognition of these phenomena is possible and desirable; and the Ge-luk-pa school teaches that an important step on the way toward this direct valid cognition is inferential valid cognition, which arises from intellectual understanding—which must depend on a correct sign.

That is the purpose of Tibetan logic: to acquire understanding of something (a thesis) not previously understood. Something is hidden, and it may be ascertained in reliance on a reason. The manual sets forth very precise requirements for validity of reasons. A correct sign necessarily has three qualities—the three modes: the property of the subject, the forward pervasion, and the counterpervasion.

The First Mode: The Property of the Subject

The first mode, the property of the subject, requires that (1) the sign must relate to (be present in) the subject and (2) there must be a "flawless subject." In the syllogism, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," the sign must be present in the subject; that is, sound must in fact be a product. In the frequently occurring ontological example, "The subject, on a smoky pass, fire exists because smoke exists," the sign is present in the subject (is the property of the subject). This means primarily that there must in fact be smoke on that pass. Thus, validity depends in part on the *content* of the syllogism (that is, on the phenomena referred to and their relationship). If there is a fault in the content, then the sign cannot be correct. In the syllogism, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a nonproduct," the content is mistaken. Sound is not in fact a nonproduct; thus the reasoning is invalid.

In addition, the subject must be "flawless"—this means someone must be wondering about the thesis. Thus, validity does not depend on content alone; the sample syllogisms are considered to be only potentially correct. They become truly correct only when they contribute to *ascertainment* by a correct opponent. A fully prepared opponent is one who is able to benefit from the reasoning, able to achieve new understanding based on it. In the Tibetan view, therefore, validity is relative. If someone has not already realized that sound is a product, he is not ready for this reasoning; and if he has already ascertained that sound is impermanent he is not a proper recipient of this reasoning, because no proof is needed—for him. In both cases, the property of the subject is not established, the proof is futile, the sign is ineffective and thus is not correct.

In summary, the first mode, the property of the subject, is not established if the content is invalid or if ascertainment is invalid.

The Second and Third Modes: The Pervasions

The second and third modes (the forward pervasion and the counterpervasion) require that there be irrefutable and inevitable entailment between the predicate of the probandum and the sign. For the reasoning to generate understanding of the thesis, the sign must entail the predicate; for example, productness must entail impermanence. How is such entailment to be proved? One might try investigating products to see if any are permanent; but, finding none, could one conclude that none exists? Ge-luk-pa scholars say one could never be sure of having investigated all possible products. Their way to determine entailment without possibility of doubt is to establish the relationship between the

predicate and the sign. By thoroughly understanding the relationship between (for example) impermanent and product, one can arrive at a knowledge of entailment so powerful and complete that it is established irrefutably.

The establishment of the pervasions depends on relationship. This relationship is such that if impermanent is eliminated, product is also necessarily eliminated. In the proof of sound as impermanent, that which is being eliminated (the predicate of the negandum) is permanent. Permanent and impermanent are directly contradictory; if one is present the other must be absent. The presence of impermanent is thus strictly eliminated from the permanent. Because product is related with impermanent, whenever impermanent is eliminated, so is product eliminated. Since impermanent cannot exist in the permanent (no instance of impermanent is permanent)—so also product cannot exist in the permanent (there is no instance of product that is permanent). There can be no instance of permanent (that is, no permanent phenomenon) that is a product and no instance of product (that is, no product) that is permanent (in other words, product is empty of permanent and permanent is empty of product).

Beginners do not go into the subtleties of relationship. Pur-bu-jok's text presents the relationship between the predicate and sign in an uncomplicated way: the sign must exist in only the similar class (this is the forward pervasion) and must be just nonexistent in the dissimilar class (this is the counterpervasion). In the proof of sound as impermanent, the similar class is the impermanent and the dissimilar class is the nonimpermanent.

The similar class is the impermanent, and product exists in only the impermanent; this means that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent (that every instance of product is impermanent). The dissimilar class is the nonimpermanent, and product is just nonexistent in the nonimpermanent; this means that whatever is a product is necessarily not nonimpermanent (that there is no instance of product that is nonimpermanent). Thus "existing in *only* impermanent" means the phenomenon's existence is strictly limited to the impermanent; and "*just* nonexistent in nonimpermanent" means it is not existent at all in the nonimpermanent.

For the second and third modes (the pervasions) to be established, there must be (1) the proper relationship between the predicate and the sign and (2) ascertainment of that relationship by the opponent. Thus, once again, the validity of the reasoning depends both on the content and on ascertainment by the opponent.

An example of a syllogism in which the pervasions are not established is, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a nonproduct." Nonproduct is not related with impermanent; nonproduct is *not* existent in just the impermanent (in fact it is not existent in the impermanent at all); and nonproduct is not just nonexistent in the nonimpermanent (in fact it is existent in the nonimpermanent). The pervasions are not established; and thus nonproduct is an incorrect sign—a quasi-sign—in that proof.

On the other hand, in the potentially correct syllogism, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," if the opponent has not ascertained fully the relationship between product and impermanent, then the pervasions are not established. If the opponent still has doubt concerning whether product exists in only the similar class; or has not yet ascertained that permanent is utterly empty of product and that product is utterly empty of permanent; or does not see that there is no possibility of a common locus of permanent and product—then the pervasions are not established and the reasoning is invalid.

Another example of a syllogism in which the pervasions are not established is, "The subject, someone who speaks, is not omniscient because of speaking." An ordinary person has no experience of omniscience and so cannot be sure whether the omniscient speak or not; the relationship between speaking and omniscience cannot be fully ascertained. The reasoning cannot prove that thesis, because there is no way for the opponent to establish the relationship between the sign and the predicate. Thus the sign in that proof cannot bring ascertainment of the thesis and cannot be a correct sign.

In brief, the pervasions cannot be established (1) if the phenomena are not related appropriately or (2) if the opponent does not ascertain the relationship fully. Validity always depends on both *content* and *ascertainment*. Both must be valid; if either is invalid, the reasoning is invalid.

Proof Statements

The main features of the three modes are: the presence of the sign in the subject, the relationship between sign and predicate, and the existence of a correct opponent. But how are the three modes and the thesis ascertained? The Ge-luk-pa schools use proof statements to bring understanding of the three modes to a correct opponent. The positive proof statement is said to express the forward pervasion explicitly and

the counterpervasion to express it implicitly (while the negative proof statement expresses the counterpervasion explicitly and the forward pervasion implicitly). In "whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, as is the case with pot; sound also is a product," the statement, "whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent," explicitly expresses the forward pervasion and implicitly expresses the counterpervasion. In "whatever is permanent is necessarily a nonproduct, as is the case with uncompounded space; sound, however, is a product," the statement, "whatever is permanent is necessarily a nonproduct," explicitly expresses the counterpervasion and implicitly expresses the forward pervasion. By means of the proof statements, the opponent ascertains that "whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent" (the forward pervasion) and that "whatever is a product is necessarily not nonimpermanent" (the counterpervasion)—in relation first to the similar example, pot, and next to the sign, product.

At this point it is said that the opponent understands the relationship between product and impermanent in relation to product (any product whatsoever is impermanent) but has not yet directed this ascertainment to sound, the subject of the syllogism; and thus he is still wondering about the thesis. "Sound also is a product" and "sound, however, is a product" explicitly express the property of the subject. A fully prepared opponent is one who, having ascertained the three modes, is ready to ascertain the thesis. All that remains is for him to turn his attention to the subject and ascertain the pervasions in relation to it. Having ascertained the pervasions (that whatever is a product is impermanent and whatever is a product is not non-impermanent) in relation to sound, he has ascertained the thesis: that sound is impermanent.

Summary

The explanation of correct signs (that is, the explanation of the three modes of a correct sign) shows much about the Tibetan system of logic. The concept of validity includes both consciousness and content. In the Ge-luk-pa discussion of validity, there is little mention of formal considerations; the proper form of a syllogism, although important, can be quickly explained and then taken for granted; it does not feature in discussions. This is a point of contrast between Tibetan and Western logic systems. Western presentations of logic to beginners rely heavily on explanation of types of syllogistic statements; the emphasis is on form rather than on content or on what is in the mind of the person who is

to make use of the reasoning. In the Tibetan system of logic, the emphasis is on both content and consciousness; that is, on specific phenomena and their nature, and on what the correct opponent ascertains about them. The least possible attention is given to the structure of propositional statements.

In short, the most important factors that must be present in order for the sign in a proof to be valid and thus capable of producing inferential valid cognition in the mind of a prepared opponent are:

- The first mode, property of the subject. This requires that the sign be present in the proper way in the subject. Product is present in sound, in that sound is in fact a product and every instance of sound is a product.
- The second and third modes, the forward pervasion and counterpervasion. These require that the sign be related to the similar class in the strictly defined way: when impermanent is eliminated, product is also necessarily eliminated. This relationship is explained to beginners in terms of the similar and dissimilar classes.

There are only two types of relationship that enable the establishment of the pervasions—only two possible relationships between sign and predicate. These are:

- The relationship of cause and effect. This may also be called the relationship of provenance; the sign is in the relationship of provenance with the predicate (must be the effect of the predicate).
- The relationship of sameness of nature or entity. In this case, the sign is of the same nature as the predicate.

Unless there is one of these relationships between the sign and the predicate, the pervasions will not be established and the sign will not be valid.

Divisions of Correct Signs

The academic tone of these lessons in reasoning notwithstanding, Ge-luk-pa scholars consider the study to be immensely practical for someone whose goal is spiritual development. Signs are considered correct because they provide valid knowledge to prepared opponents; it must of course be knowledge they did not have before. What new knowledge will be most helpful to an opponent? Analysis of the Ge-luk-pas' primary way of classifying correct signs will show their answers to that question. There are several ways of dividing or categorizing correct signs,

but the one Pur-bu-jok discusses first and at greatest length is recognized as the "main division." (The rest are discussed under "other divisions.") The main division into correct effect, correct nature, and correct nonobservation signs draws attention to the importance of three fundamental concepts: cause and effect, impermanence, and emptiness.

THE MAIN DIVISION

Of the three types in the main division, Ge-luk-pa scholars say that effect signs were set forth to help students understand cause and effect; nature signs, to help them understand impermanence; and nonobservation signs, to help them understand emptiness. The criteria for this threefold division are (1) the type of relationship between the sign and the predicate of the probandum and (2) whether that predicate is a positive or a negative phenomenon.

When the predicate of the probandum is a positive phenomenon, the emphasis is on whether the relationship between sign and predicate is one of provenance or one of sameness of nature (the sign will be called an effect sign or a nature sign, respectively). If the predicate is a negative phenomenon, the sign is a nonobservation sign.

Effect Signs

In proofs using correct effect signs, the predicate is a positive phenomenon, and the sign is necessarily related with the predicate in a relationship of provenance. (The phenomenon used as the *sign* is the *effect* of the phenomenon used as the predicate.) An effect is a sign—of what? What can be inferred from the presence of an effect? This is the emphasis in the Ge-luk-pa presentation of effect signs. From the presence of an effect one can infer: (1) that it necessarily has a cause, (2) that it necessarily has its own actual cause (its direct cause), (3) that it necessarily has its own preceding cause, (4) that it necessarily has its full, complete cause (all the factors necessary for the arising of the effect); and (5) one can infer attributes of the cause.

An example Pur-bu-jok gives is, "The subject, on a smoky pass, fire exists because smoke exists"; smoke is a correct effect sign here. From the presence of an effect, smoke, one can infer (1) that it possesses a cause in general, (2) that it has a direct cause (fire), and (3) that it has an immediately preceding cause (the former moment of smoke). In the case of phenomena that depend on several causes, (4) one can infer the existence of each of the contributing causes; and, in the case of a phenomenon that depends on a complex cause (one possessing numerous

attributes), (5) one can infer the attributes of the cause. Examination of these various aspects of the cause-effect relationship makes clear the essential point: that from an effect one can infer a cause.

The deeper purpose of this study is to strengthen one's understanding of the Buddha's Four Noble Truths concerning suffering and the cessation of suffering. The student is to understand that suffering arises from causes—as do spiritual goals. To attain the goals of elimination of suffering, attainment of good qualities, and liberation, one must cultivate the full complete causes of those attainments. Without a cause, the effect cannot occur.

Nature Signs

In proofs using correct nature signs, the predicate is a positive phenomenon, and the predicate and sign are in a relationship of sameness of nature. The text presents nature signs in a way that emphasizes the understanding of impermanence.

Nature signs are divided depending on whether the terms expressing them indicate a causal agent or not. For example, in the syllogism, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being arisen from exertion," arisen from exertion is said to express a causal agent (exertion). In "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a thing," thing does not express a causal agent. Thing is a correct nature sign in the proof of sound as impermanent (whatever is a thing is necessarily impermanent and is necessarily a caused phenomenon)—but the term "thing" itself does not express an agent.

There are a number of potentially correct signs in the proof that something is impermanent: because of being a thing, because of being a product, because of being an effect, because of being arisen from exertion, etc. All impermanent phenomena are necessarily produced phenomena; and, being produced, they necessarily have causal agents, whether their names explicitly express those agents or not. The criterion for the two categories of nature signs—whether or not they are expressed by terms that indicate their own agent—reflects their main use: to help a student understand the meaning of impermanence.

Nonobservation Signs

In the case of effect and nature signs, the predicate of the probandum is necessarily a positive phenomenon. When the predicate is a negative phenomenon, the sign is a nonobservation sign. The predicate of the *probandum* (that which is being proved) is the *absence* of x. This phrase

can be reversed: the predicate of the *negandum* is "the *presence* of x"; and x (what one's mind is focused on) is "the object designated as the predicate of the negandum."

Pur-bu-jok covers these signs in much more detail than the others; he devotes three times as many pages to nonobservation signs alone as he does to effect and nature signs together. In general, nonobservation signs are said to have been set forth in order to prepare students for understanding emptiness. Emptiness is a hidden phenomenon and a negative phenomenon and thus must be ascertained initially through reliance on nonobservation signs.

Nonobservation signs (signs proving a negative phenomenon) are not divided according to the relationship between the predicate and the sign (as are signs proving a positive phenomenon—into effect and nature signs) but according to the nature of x, the object designated as the predicate of the negandum. The division depends on whether x is a supersensory object or not. If the object is supersensory, the sign is called a nonobservation sign of the nonappearing; if it is not supersensory, the sign is a nonobservation sign of the suitable to appear.

Nonobservation Signs of the Nonappearing

Certain phenomena are considered to be supersensory (which is defined as beyond the reach of one's senses, being either too subtle or too far away in space or time). Supersensory objects are beyond the reach of logic in one important respect: ordinary beings cannot ascertain their specific occurrence by either direct or inferential valid cognition. Many such objects are beings: gods, hell-beings, or (the example Pur-bu-jok uses) flesh-eaters, a type of demon. In addition, the deepest spiritual attainments of beings (omniscience, *bodhicitta*, etc.) are considered to be—in their specific occurrence—supersensory objects (although they are not so in general).

Working on nonobservation signs of the nonappearing shows the student how little can be known about supersensory objects. These are phenomena regarding which the opponent can have no specific knowledge, either by inference or by direct perception. The point made by this study is that nonobservation by valid cognition of a supersensory object (whether a being or a spiritual quality) does not prove its nonexistence. The nonexistence of valid cognition of x proves only the absence of whatever is related with that cognition—it proves nothing about x itself.

Pur-bu-jok's example is, "With respect to the subject, here in this

place in front, there does not exist a factually concordant subsequent cognition—ascertaining a flesh-eater—in the continuum of a person for whom a flesh-eater is a supersensory object because of the nonexistence of a prime cognition—observing a flesh-eater—in the continuum of a person for whom a flesh-eater is a supersensory object." The nonobservation by prime (that is, valid) cognition of flesh-eater does not prove the nonexistence *of the flesh-eater*; what it *does* prove is the nonexistence of the *effect* of such a prime cognition. (The effect of a prime cognition is a factually concordant subsequent cognition.) The absence of the cause proves the absence of the effect: just as, for example, there does not exist a memory of the taste of mangos in someone who has never eaten a mango.

All Pur-bu-jok's examples of nonobservation of the nonappearing involve one supersensory object, a flesh-eater, but he makes it clear that the study of this type of sign has a deeper purpose. Just as nonobservation by valid cognition does not prove the nonexistence of a particular supersensory being, so the nonobservation by ordinary beings of liberation or omniscience or any other spiritual quality in another being does not prove that those qualities are not there.

The emphasis on this topic shows how important it is that students understand how little one can know about certain phenomena, including the deepest spiritual qualities of others. Pur-bu-jok quotes from a sūtra, "A person cannot estimate the measure of [another] person. [If one does so,] one will degenerate," and comments, "By the mere fact of their not appearing to oneself, it is not reasonable to say that another does not have such-and-such good qualities."[598]

Study of this topic is intended to help the student understand that we as ordinary beings are easily mistaken in our judgments of other beings; their deepest spiritual attainments are necessarily beyond one's ken, and therefore it is wiser to reserve judgments about their qualities. One gradually becomes less likely to jump to invalid conclusions about others and—more fundamentally—gradually abandons the mistaken idea that what one does not perceive does not exist.

Nonobservation Signs of the Suitable to Appear

A nonobservation sign is eliminating (proving the absence of) something. In this second type of nonobservation sign, the object (x) designated as the predicate of the negandum is not a supersensory object but one that would generally be apprehendable by the opponent. The Ge-luk-pa analysis of nonobservation of the suitable to appear presents

the concepts of (1) relatedness and (2) contradiction in some detail. One of Pur-bu-jok's examples is, "The subject, on a lake at night, smoke does not exist because fire does not exist." Smoke, the object designated as the predicate of the negandum, is normally accessible to an opponent's valid cognition—but it is not accessible to direct perception in the specified context. Being unable to see an object that is usually visible, one may be uncertain whether it is present or not. In that case, its absence can be logically established by (1) the absence (nonobservation) of something else (fire—to which the object, smoke, is *related*) that *is* suitable to appear in that context.

The predicate (the absence of the object) can also be established by (2) the presence of something *contradictory* with the object. One of Pur-bu-jok's examples is, "With respect to the subject, in a place in the east covered by strongly billowing smoke, continuous goose bumps that are an effect of cold do not exist, because of being a place covered by strongly billowing smoke." Smoke is related with fire; fire is contradictory with cold and with whatever is related with cold; and whatever is related with fire is contradictory with cold as well as with whatever is related with cold. Therefore smoke (which is related with fire, being its effect) is contradictory with cold and also is contradictory with whatever is related with cold, such as goose bumps.

Pur-bu-jok's discussion of nonobservation signs of the suitable to appear is the longest section in the text, showing in detail what can be known about phenomena and how it can be known. He presents a number of syllogisms involving the three different kinds of impermanent phenomena: forms, consciousnesses, and nonassociated compositional factors. An example proving the absence of x by the presence of something contradictory to x is: "The subject, a noninterrupted path of a Hearer path of meditation that is an actual antidote to the conception of a self of persons, does not abide harmlessly together with the conception of a self of persons because of being an actual antidote to the conception of a self of persons." Here, two consciousnesses are directly contradictory: if one is present, the other must be absent. "The conception of a self of persons" refers to a conception of the inherent existence of a person.[a] The consciousness that is directly contradictory with that (and therefore a direct antidote) is a wisdom consciousness realizing the emptiness of inherent existence of a person. If such a wisdom is present, the conception of inherent existence is necessarily absent.

[a] This discussion of the conception of a self of persons reflects the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka presentation of selflessness.

Nonobservation signs in general and nonobservation signs of the suitable to appear in particular are presented to help the student understand the reasons proving emptiness. The true nature of reality—its emptiness of inherent (or true) existence—is something that can be ascertained by valid cognition through the use of reasoning (and thus depending on correct signs). The text does not explicitly treat the difficult topic of emptiness, and Pur-bu-jok's examples are simple, not profound. However, he does point to the deeper purpose of nonobservation signs when he writes:

> In the Madhyamaka system, all correct signs proving nontrue existence are [signs that are an] observation of a contradictory object in the proof of that; they are mainly nonobservation signs of the suitable to appear....[For example,] one can state, "The subject, a sprout, is empty of true existence because of being a dependent-arising." The sign in that is a correct sign that is an observation of a contradictory object.[599]

Beyond this, his introductory manual makes little mention of emptiness and the reasonings proving emptiness. The beginner will hardly be ready to apply the principles of reasoning to this profound purpose—but that is the ultimate aim of this study.

Other Divisions

Besides the main division into effect, nature, and nonobservation signs, Pur-bu-jok discusses five other divisions, which focus attention on other facets of correct signs. Of these, the first three depend on the type of phenomenon being proved:

- Is the predicate of the probandum a positive phenomenon or a negative phenomenon?
- Is the probandum a very hidden phenomenon, a slightly hidden phenomenon, or a terminological suitability?
- Is the explicit predicate of the probandum a definition or a definiendum?

The fourth division concerns the relationship between the sign and the predicate (whether the sign pervades the predicate or not), and the fifth concerns the opponent—whether the reasoning is being used by one person in solitary analysis or by two persons in debate.

It was noted in the discussion of what constitutes validity that Pur-bu-jok's manual focuses on two things: content (the phenomena

involved and their relationship) and consciousness (the ascertainment by a correct opponent). The same twofold concern can be observed in the ways of dividing correct signs. The main division and four of the five others are concerned with the type of phenomenon being proved and the relationship between the sign and the predicate. The fifth, the division by way of the opponent, focuses on the use to which the reasoning is being put.

Division by Way of the Predicate of the Probandum

Is the predicate a positive or a negative phenomenon? This criterion is already present in the main division of correct signs; positing it as a separate criterion is a way of emphasizing the fact that in any correct proof, the predicate of the probandum is necessarily one or the other. For a sign to be valid, it must be capable of producing inferential valid cognition in the mind of an opponent concerning the thesis that is being proved. That which is ascertainable by inferential valid cognition is necessarily an existent (a phenomenon); and phenomena may be divided into two types, positive and negative.

This "other" division is subsumed within the main division, but it does not duplicate it. In the main division, the positive/negative criterion is combined with the criterion of the relationship between the sign and predicate.

Division by Way of the Probandum

A correct sign must be capable of producing inferential valid cognition of the probandum in the consciousness of the opponent. That which is ascertained by inferential valid cognition is necessarily a hidden phenomenon, one that the opponent cannot initially ascertain by direct perception. (If the predicate of the probandum is not a hidden phenomenon, there is no need of proof for the opponent in question.) Objects of comprehension of inferential valid cognition are said to be either very hidden phenomena or slightly hidden phenomena, but within slightly hidden phenomena a distinction is made between those that are terminological suitabilities and those that are not—giving us three types of signs in this division. These can be ascertained in three ways:

- A slightly hidden phenomenon through a correct sign by the power of the fact.
- A terminological suitability through a correct sign of renown.
- A very hidden phenomenon through a correct sign of belief.

Study of this division "by way of the probandum" leads the student to consider three types of cognition: inferential valid cognition by the power of the fact, inferential valid cognition of renown, and inferential valid cognition of belief. Each type has a separate object of comprehension; the first ascertains a slightly hidden phenomenon, the second a terminological suitability, and the third a very hidden phenomenon. Generation of any of these types of inference depends on a correct sign.

This division of correct signs is presented in a way that brings home to the student the fact that hidden phenomena are of different types, differently ascertained. The first step is to analyze the two types of slightly hidden phenomena.

Slightly Hidden Phenomena

Correct Sign by the Power of the Fact

In the syllogism, "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," product is a sign proving a hidden phenomenon (sound's impermanence). Impermanence is not something attributed to sound by convention, as a name might be. Sound is by its very nature impermanent; impermanence is a quality of sound. The quality of impermanence is found to be there by the power of the thing itself, or "by the power of the fact."

Correct Sign of Renown

In contrast, the name "sound" (or the word for any phenomenon in any language) is arbitrary; it does not inhere in the object. An example might be: "The subject, a fragrant flower with many petals, is suitable to be expressed by the term 'rose' because of existing among objects of thought." The *suitability* of calling a certain flower by a certain name is proved though a "sign of renown."

Such terminological suitabilities (if they need proof at all) are slightly hidden phenomena. What is hidden for one person may not be hidden for another. It can be proved by valid cognition "by the power of renown" that it is suitable to call x anything at all. The introductory logic manuals do not dwell on the relationship between terms and the phenomena they refer to, but the topic is introduced here, if only lightly.

Studying these two types of slightly hidden phenomena, the student learns to differentiate between phenomena that are established (proved) through realizing something fundamental about their very

nature and phenomena that are proved through renown. The impermanence of sound is one example of slightly hidden phenomena ascertainable by reasoning. Another is the fact that fire exists on a smoky mountain pass. The fire is hidden in that context—is not ascertainable by direct perception. If the opponent is wondering about it, a correct sign by the power of the fact can prove that the fire is there: "The subject, on a smoky pass, fire exists because smoke exists."

Very Hidden Phenomena

Correct Sign of Belief

Very hidden phenomena are not ascertained in the same way as slightly hidden phenomena and terminological suitabilities, but through correct signs of belief. This does not mean that one can acquire valid knowledge concerning very hidden phenomena by simply accepting what one hears from teachers and reads in scriptures—through mere worldly renown; *that* only works with terminological suitabilities. One must investigate these phenomena carefully and develop one's own inferential valid cognition of belief in regard to them.

An example of very hidden phenomena is the specific cause-and-effect of actions. Buddhist scripture teaches that specific results arise from specific actions: through being generous one acquires good resources (wealth), and through engaging in ethics one achieves a good rebirth. These teachings on specific causes and effects of actions are considered to be very hidden phenomena. Students cannot confirm their truth either through direct perception or through inference by the power of the fact. They must rely on inferential valid cognition of belief, which is produced through a correct sign of belief.

Practically speaking, this involves studying all of a scripture's teachings and ascertaining that they are accurate when they touch on manifest phenomena (ascertainable by direct perception) and on slightly hidden phenomena (impermanence and emptiness, for example—ascertainable by inferential valid cognition by the power of the fact). Then, if there is no internal contradiction when the scripture touches on very hidden phenomena, one can develop inferential valid cognition of belief in regard to them.

Division by Way of the Mode of Proof

This division focuses on the explicit predicate of the probandum—whether it is a definition, a definiendum, or both. Not every correct

sign is included in this division, for not every valid reasoning will contain a predicate that is either a definition or a definiendum. Study of this way of dividing signs introduces beginners to the relationship between definition and definiendum and how they are ascertained. Detailed study of these issues is beyond the scope of beginners in logic, but they are introduced.

Ge-luk-pa scholars apparently agree that ascertainment of a definition must precede ascertainment of its definiendum. In other words, a specific order of ascertainment is recognized: knowing the name of an object without knowing the meaning is useless and cannot be called knowledge at all. One cannot be said to have understood "thing," for example, until one has ascertained its definition ("that which is able to perform a function") and has attached that meaning to the definiendum "thing." Thus, ascertainment of the meaning is said to necessarily precede ascertainment of the object defined. To understand the expression "impermanent" (the definiendum), one must first understand its meaning, "momentary" (the definition). Furthermore, realization of "impermanent" must be accompanied by realization of "momentary," but realization of "momentary" *need not* be accompanied by realization of "impermanent."

Pur-bu-jok describes three types of correct signs, when divided by way of the mode of proof, though some Ge-luk-pa scholars disagree with the third type.[a]

Correct Signs Proving Only a Definition

In "The subject, sound, is momentary because of being a product," the sign is proving "momentary," the explicit predicate of the probandum. As the definition of impermanent, momentary must be ascertained first. When momentary is newly ascertained by inferential valid cognition by means of a correct sign, product, the opponent has not yet ascertained impermanent. With this opponent, therefore, product is a correct sign proving only one phenomenon, momentary. That which is being proved explicitly for this opponent is a definition.

Correct Signs Proving Only a Definiendum

In "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being momentary,"

[a] Pur-bu-jok posits five types, discussed in chapter eight. According to some Ge-luk-pa scholars, these are more clearly understandable if condensed into three; I have done that here for the sake of clarity.

the sign (momentary) is being used as proof of sound's impermanence. A correct opponent in this case is someone who, having ascertained that sound is momentary, is wondering whether it is impermanent. With such an opponent, momentary is a correct sign proving only a definiendum.

Correct Signs Proving Both

In Pur-bu-jok's view, when a definiendum is ascertained, its definition is also explicitly ascertained at the same time. Thus, in "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," if the opponent has not already ascertained sound's momentariness, then the sign, product, is at the same time proving *both* the impermanence and the momentariness of sound.

If momentary has already been ascertained, then this proof is newly proving only impermanent (because there is no need to prove momentary; and the explicit predicate in any proof is that which is being explicitly proved newly to the opponent). But an opponent who has *not* already ascertained momentary will need to ascertain both momentary and impermanent in reliance on this proof. Thus, according to Pur-bu-jok, for that opponent, the explicit predicate includes both a definition and a definiendum (both are being ascertained newly; both need to be proved; there is no way for the opponent to ascertain impermanent without also ascertaining momentary).

Not all Ge-luk-pa scholars agree with this, but Pur-bu-jok holds that in this proof and for this opponent there are two explicit predicates of the probandum; the sign is proving *both* a definiendum and a definition, because when the expression "impermanent" is understood, the meaning ("momentary") is also understood.

Thus, Pur-bu-jok's division of correct signs by way of the probandum is introducing students to such questions as: Once one has ascertained the meaning of impermanent—then, when "momentary" appears to one's mind, does "impermanent" automatically appear at the same time?

Division by Way of the Sign's Relationship to the Similar Class

From this point of view, there are two types of correct signs, those that pervade the similar class and those that do not. This analysis highlights certain aspects of the relationship between the sign and the predicate

in a valid proof. (A valid proof is one in which the three modes have been established.) In order for the pervasions to be established, the sign and the predicate must be in a very specific relationship, which is discussed, in the study of *Signs and Reasonings*, in terms of the relationship between the sign and the similar and dissimilar classes. The sign must be existent in *only* the similar class and *just* nonexistent in the dissimilar class.

This means that the sign is pervaded by the similar class. For example, in "The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product," the sign (product) is necessarily pervaded by the similar class (impermanent). If there were any instances of the sign (that is, any products) that were *not* impermanent, then product would not be pervaded by impermanent and would not be a correct sign in that proof. In a correct proof, the similar class (the predicate) necessarily pervades the sign, while the sign may or *may not* pervade the similar class.

If the sign pervades the predicate, the sign and the similar class are categories of the same size; they are mutually inclusive. In the example syllogism, impermanent and product are mutually pervasive; whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent and whatever is impermanent is necessarily a product.

But the similar class and the sign in a correct proof need not be mutually inclusive; the sign does not always pervade the similar class. The sign must be completely contained within the similar class, but the similar class may be a broader category than the sign. A syllogism in which this is the case is, "The subject, the sound of a conch, is impermanent because of being arisen from [a person's] exertion." Arisen from exertion is pervaded by impermanent, but impermanent is not pervaded by arisen from exertion. The similar class is a broader category than the sign. Whatever is arisen from exertion is necessarily impermanent, but whatever is impermanent is not necessarily arisen from a person's exertion: a rock, lightning, a mountain—these are impermanent but not arisen from exertion. In this case, the sign is said to "relate to the similar class in two ways," because whatever is impermanent (1) is not necessarily arisen from exertion and (2) is not necessarily not arisen from exertion.

Study of this division of signs draws one's attention to the fact that, while the sign must exist in the similar class (and must not exist at all in the dissimilar class), the sign need not exist in all members of the similar class in order to function as a correct sign. Pervasion need not go both ways for a sign to be valid; to think so would be to eliminate a great many correct signs. This study thus enhances the students'

awareness that relationships are something to be examined thoroughly.

Division by Way of the Opponent

Pur-bu-jok's final "other division" depends on whether the reasoning is being employed to bring understanding to another person (that is, in the context of debate) or to bring understanding to oneself (that is, in the context of solitary analysis or meditation). Whether a person is using a sign for the benefit of another or for his or her own benefit, it is a correct sign (the reasoning is valid) if it is able to produce new understanding of the thesis in the mind of the "opponent."

The term "opponent" (*rgol ba*), used to describe the person for whom a reasoning is employed, implies an exchange between two people, but it is important to note that the principles of logic are not limited to use in the context of debate. A very important purpose of reasoning is to overcome mistaken ideas in one's own mind through the use of correct signs. In either case, debate or meditation, there must be a correct opponent, a prepared opponent who can benefit from the reasoning: someone for whom the sign will serve as proof of the thesis.

Summation

Beginners learn the principles of logic by studying this and other texts, listening to their teachers, thinking, and debating; these are their tools. The lively sessions of challenge and response in the debate courtyard provide an intense reciprocal reinforcement of the study of *Signs and Reasonings*, as they look for complications and contradictions. Both the curriculum and the activities of the monastic community are geared to helping the students develop a strong path of reasoning; the deepest purpose is that they shall know for themselves how to cultivate spiritual paths.

It is fundamental to Ge-luk-pa thought that true knowledge is practical, useful, and ultimately transforming and liberating. Such knowledge is hidden—far from obvious—but it can be attained through correct reasoning. In his presentation, Pur-bu-jok emphasizes:

- The importance of understanding the concepts of cause and effect, impermanence, and emptiness. To achieve the good qualities of kindness, compassion, *bodhicitta*, and omniscience, one must cultivate their causes; to eliminate that which is invalid and harmful (for example, mistaken conceptions), one must cultivate their antidotes.
- The importance of understanding that one's perception and judgment of others can easily be mistaken. Here, logic strengthens the students' efforts to develop *bodhicitta*; how can this deep and spontaneous compassionate concern for all beings be achieved if one is jumping to conclusions about people on the basis of one's limited perceptions?

Thus logic is an important tool, a part of the spiritual path, leading ultimately to complete self-transformation. Pur-bu-jok writes:

> In dependence on nonperverse realization—by way of reasons—of what to adopt and what to discard and practicing such, one easily enters the path progressing to liberation and omniscience.[600]

Knowing, Naming and Negation

A Sourcebook on Tibetan Sautrāntika

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It is just as he said.

Presentation of Valid Cognizers Which Are Comprehenders
(118.11)

Due to objects of comprehension being definite as the two, specifically characterized phenomena (*rang mthsan, svalakṣāna*) and generally characterized phenomena (*spyi mtshan, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) or as the two, manifest (*mngon gyur, abhimukhī*) and hidden (*lkog gyur, parokṣa*) phenomena, valid cognizers (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*) are definite as the two, direct (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) and inferential (*rjes dpag, anumāna*). Furthermore, these are asserted as necessarily eliminating a third possibility both negatively and positively.

> A third possibility—a valid cognizer that is neither direct nor inferential—is eliminated from both negative and positive viewpoints. For example, from the negative side, "It follows that there are definitely two valid cognizers because there is no third type of valid cognizer which is neither a direct valid cognizer nor an inferential cognizer."
>
> On the positive side, "It follows that there are definitely two valid cognizers because whatever is a final illustration (*mtshan gzhi mthar thug pa*) of a valid cognizer is necessarily either direct or inferential."
>
> The thesis itself can also be either negative or positive: (1) there is no third [valid cognizer] which is neither direct not inferential and (2) there is no third [valid cognizer] which is both [direct and inferential].[47]

All [tenet systems] from Sautrāntika through Svātantrika concur [in these assertions].

> Prāsaṅgikas are not included here because they do not assert specifically characterized phenomena. Vaibhāṣikas are not included because they do not assert non-affirming negatives and thus have a different perspective on generally characterized phenomena.

The definition of a valid cognizer is: A new undeceived knower.

A direct valid cognizer is a non-conceptual and non-mistaken consciousness which is a prime cognizer. [Valid cognizers] are of two types, other-knowers and self-knowers.

The divisions of other-knowers by way of their empowering condition (*bdag rkyen, adhipatipratyaya*) are: sense, mental, and yogic direct perceivers. The first type depends on a physical sense power to be its empowering condition, the second on mere mind to be its empowering condition, and the third on a union of calm abiding and special insight to be its empowering condition.

A mental direct perceiver is produced for only one moment at the end of a continuum of sense direct perception. Furthermore, the omniscient Gyel-tsap follows Pan-chen Gyel-nga-dun-ba (*rGyal-rnga-bdun-pa*) in saying that for common beings [a mental direct perceiver] is a very hidden phenomenon. Even though this assertion is widely renowned nowadays, the omniscient Kay-drup explains it just a little differently, but I will not elaborate on this here.

A self-knower is: That which (1) solely has the aspect of the apprehender, (2) is directed inward, and (3) for which the dualistic appearance of subject and object has vanished.

The great scholar Dharmottara explains that the continuation of a direct perceiver is a subsequent cognizer (*bcad shes, *pariccinnajñāna*), and for the most part our own scholars assert subsequent cognizers similarly. However, there does not appear to be a clear explanation of a presentation of self-knowers by the Sautrāntikas Following Scripture.

An inference is: a consciousness which (1) arises in dependence on its own base, a sign having the three modes, and which (2) thoroughly infers the object being proved.[48]

A correct reason *has* the three modes in the sense of *being* them. For example, a syllogism proving that sound is impermanent because of being a product is analyzed as follows:

THE SUBJECT, SOUND, IS IMPERMANENT BECAUSE OF BEING A PRODUCT.

subject — predicate — reason

thesis or probandum

Generally speaking, the three modes of the reason to be ascertained are:

1. Property of the subject (*phyogs chos, pakṣadharma*). One ascertains that the reason is a quality of the subject "sound."
2. Pervasion (*rjes khyab, anvayavyāpti*). One ascertains that the reason exists only among phenomena of the same class as the predicate. Roughly speaking, for example, whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent.
3. Counter-pervasion (*ldog khyab, vyatirekavyāpti*). One ascertains that whatever is not of the same class as the predicate is necessarily not the reason; for example, whatever is not impermanent is necessarily not a product.

There are three types of valid inferences: (1) inferential valid cognizer by the power of the fact, (2) inferential valid cognizer through renown, and (3) inferential valid cognizer through belief.

An inferential valid cognizer by the power of the fact is one that understands an object by the power of the thing itself. For example, an inference realizing sound to be impermanent comprehends this fact through the force of the sound's being established in its own actuality as impermanent.

An inferential valid cognizer through renown is one recognizing that any name is suitable to be applied to any object of knowledge. For example, the "rabbit possessor" (the lunar orb in which the shape of a rabbit is said to appear) is suitable to be called "the moon."

An inferential valid cognizer through belief is a consciousness which, on the basis of correct reasonings, ascertains a phenomenon that is very hidden and which, therefore, is inaccessible either to direct perception or to other types of inference. An example is the inferential consciousness which realizes the validity of the passage which indicates the causes and effects of actions by stating that "From giving (arise) resources, from ethics (arise) happiness."[49]

The Sautrāntika System's Explanation of the Three Empowering Conditions of Sense Direct Perceivers (119.12).

An empowering condition (*bdag rkyen, adhipatipratyaya*) [of a sense direct perceiver] is a sense power that empowers the uncommon feature of the sense consciousness which is its own effect. [For example, the empowering condition of an eye consciousness, the physical eye sense, gives its power with respect

to colors and shapes, not with respect to sounds, odors, tastes, or objects of touch.]

An object-condition (*dmigs rkyen, ālaṃbanapratyaya*) is any object which directly generates the consciousness apprehending it into having its aspect. [For example, the object blue causes an eye consciousness to be generated into having the aspect of blue.]

An immediately preceding condition (*de ma thag rkyen, samanantarpratyaya*), is a consciousness (1) which precedes [a sense or mental consciousness] without any other consciousness intervening between them and (2) which produces [the sense or mental consciousness] into an experiencing entity. [For example, a consciousness which arises immediately prior to a sense direct perceiver apprehending form gives the latter its quality of being able to *experience* its object.]

In this system the two—object-condition and apprehended object (*gzung don*)—are co-extensive [i.e. synonymous].

CHAPTER SIX
REASONING (119.18)

Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compendium on Valid Cognition"* says:

> [A correct reason] which is a quality of the subject
> And is pervaded by the predicate is of just three types.

Accordingly that which is the three modes (see p. 164) is the entity [or definition] of a correct sign.

If correct signs are divided, there are the three:

1. Correct effect sign (*bras rtags yang dag, samyak-kārya-liṅga*),
2. Correct nature sign (*rang bzhin kyi rtags yang dag, samkyak-svabhāva-liṅga*),
3. Correct non-observation sign (*ma dmigs pa'i rtags yang dag, samyak-anupalabdhi-liṅga*).

Correct effect signs [which prove the existence of a cause by the sign of an effect] have five divisions:

1. Proving an actual cause.
   Example: With respect to the subject, on a smokey pass, fire exists because smoke exists.[50]
2. Proving a preceding cause.
   Example: The subject, the bluish rising smoke in the intermediate space, is preceded by its own former cause, fire, because of being smoke.
3. Proving a general cause.
   Example: The subjects, the appropriated aggregates, have their own causes because of being occasionally produced things.
4. Proving a particular cause.
   Example: The subject, a sense consciousness perceiving blue, has its own object-condition because of being a thing which is not produced without the existence of its object-condition.
5. Effect sign which is a means of inferring causal attributes.[51]
   Example: With respect to the subject, possession of a lump of molasses in the mouth, there exists the capacity of the former taste of molasses to generate the later form of molasses because the present taste of molasses exists.

Nature signs [in which the reason and predicate are of one nature] are of two types:

1. Nature sign that is free of qualification.
   Example: The subject, a sound, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a thing.
2. Nature sign involving a qualification.

The latter is of two types:

a) That which implies a qualification [or agent] which is another substantial entity [from the subject].
   Example: The subject, the sound of a conch, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a created phenomenon.

b) That which implies [a qualification or agent which] is not another substantial entity [from the subject].

Example: The subject, sound, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a product.[52]

Non-observation signs [which are synonymous with signs of negative phenomena] are of two types:

1. Sign which is a non-observation of the non-appearing [such as an invisible spirit].

   Example: With respect to the subject, here in this place in front, there does not exist a factually concordant subsequent cognizer—one that ascertains a flesh eater—in the continuum of a person for whom a flesh-eater is a supersensory object because there does not exist a valid cognizer—one that observes a flesh-eater—in the continuum of a person for whom a flesh-eater is a supersensory object.

2. Sign which is a non-observation of the suitable to appear. The latter is of two types:

   a) Non-observation of a related object.
   b) Observation of a contradictory object.

Signs which are a non-observation of a related object are of four types [depending on whether the related object is a]:

1. Cause.

   Example: With respect to the subject, on a lake at night, smoke does not exist because of the non-existence of fire.

2. Pervader.

   Example: With respect to the subject, on a craggy cliff where trees are not observed by valid cognition, an aśoka tree does not exist because of the non-existence of trees.

3. Nature [or definition].

   Example: With respect to the subject, on a place where a pot is not observed by valid cognition, a pot does not exist because of the non-observation of a pot by valid cognition.

4. Direct effect [of the predicate of the negandum i.e., that which is negated].

Example: With respect to the subject, the inside of a walled circle devoid of smoke, the direct cause of smoke does not exist because of the non-existence of the direct effect, smoke.

Non-observation signs which are an observation of a contradictory object are of six types, [signifying the] observation of what is:

1. Contradictory with the nature [of the designated predicate of the probandum].

   Example: With respect to the subject, on a place in the east covered by a large powerful fire, the continuous tangible object, cold, does not exist because of being a placed covered by a large powerful fire.

2. A contradictory effect [i.e., an effect contradictory with the nature of the designated predicate of the negandum].

   Example: With respect to the subject, on a place in the east covered by strongly billowing smoke, the continuous tangible object, cold, does not exist because of being a placed covered by strongly billowing smoke.

3. Contradictory with a cause [of the designated predicate of the probandum].

   Example: With respect to the subject, a place in the east covered by a large powerful fire, continuous goose bumps which are an effect of the cold do not exist because of being a place covered by a large powerful fire.

4. An effect of that which is contradictory with the cause [of the designated predicate of the probandum].

   Example: With respect to the subject, on a place in the east covered by strongly billowing smoke, continuous goose bumps which are an effect of cold do not exist because of being a place covered by strongly billowing smoke.

5. Contradictory with a pervader [of the designated predicate of the negandum].

   Example: With respect to the subject, on a place in the east covered by a large powerful fire, the continu-

ous tangible object, snow, does not exist because of being a place covered by a large powerful fire.

6. An effect of an object which is contradictory [with the predicate of the probandum].[53]

   Example: The subject, a place in the east covered by strongly billowing smoke, does not abide harmlessly together with goose bumps which are an effect of cold because of there being strongly billowing smoke.

   These are contradictory in the sense of not abiding together with the predicate of the negandum. For example, heat cannot abide together with goose bumps, which are an effect of cold, without interference.

Gyel-tsap, Kay-drup, and the venerable Gen-dun-drup (*dGe-'dun-grub*) very extensively set forth and give a final analysis of the definite enumeration of signs [proving] that there are ten negative phenomena. [They interpret this] as the meaning of Dharmakīrti's *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* which says, "Thus, this non-observation is of ten types by way of syllogistic differences." Therefore, other explanations of a greater number are simply pointless.

Furthermore, the ways of asserting the [five] aggregates, [eighteen] constituents, [twelve] sources, and five basic objects of knowledge (*shes bya, jñeya*) are for the most part similar to the [Vaibhāṣika assertions] explained earlier.

The five aggregates are: form, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and conciousnesses. The eighteen constituents are: the six objects—forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena—the six sense powers which are the empowering conditions for the six consciousnesses perceiving these objects—body and mental sense powers; and the six consciousnesses.

The six objects and six sense powers are the twelve sources.[54] The five basic objects of knowledge as presented in the Vaibhāṣika system are the appearing form base, main mind base, accompanying mental factor base, non-associated compositional factor base, and non-product base.[55]

The differences in the mode of asserting fifty-one mental factors and twenty-three non-associated compositional factors as

well as the divisions of uncaused [phenomena] and so forth should be looked into elsewhere.[56]

CHAPTER SEVEN
PATHS (120.19)

The presentations of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, the nine successive meditative absorptions, the six perfections, the eight Enterers and Abiders[57] and so forth are also asserted by this [Sautrāntika system]. With respect to the difference between the three paths of the Hearer, Solitary Realizer and Bodhisattva, it is asserted that although there is no difference in their mode of realizing selflessness, their paths can be differentiated by factors of method such as [the presence or absence of] great compassion and so forth.

Solitary Realizers spend more time accumulating merit on the path of accumulation than Hearers; only Bodhisattvas generate great compassion.[58]

An ascertainment of the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths—impermanence and so forth—which are the objects of the path is indispensably the very essence of the path; therefore, I will explain the mode [of this ascertainment] a little.[59]

How to Settle the Selflessness of Persons (121.5)

Whatever is neither one in nature with nor different in nature from its own aggregates is necessarily without inherent existence (*rang bzhin, svabhāva*). For example, the horns of a rabbit [are without inherent existence because they are neither one with nor different from their own aggregates]. A self-sufficient person which is not merely imputed to the collection or continuum [of the aggregates] is not established as either one in nature with or different in nature from its own aggregates. This is a sign of non-observation of a pervader.

The format here is that of a proof statement having two branches—the pervasion and the reason—as a property of the subject. The thesis or conclusion—that a self-sufficient person which

MUSASHI TACHIKAWA

A SIXTH-CENTURY MANUAL OF INDIAN LOGIC*

(A Translation of the NYĀYAPRAVEŚA)

INTRODUCTION

1. *The Text of The NYĀYAPRAVEŚA*

The history of Indian logic may be divided into three periods, old Nyāya, Buddhist logic, and new Nyāya. The sixth century A.D., the efflorescence of the second period, was characterized by the establishment of the doctrine of Dignāga (circa A.D. 480–540).[1] Śaṅkarasvāmin, who is said to have been a disciple of Dignāga,[2] composed the *Nyāyapraveśa* as an introduction to Dignāga's doctrine.[3] This work seems to have been popular even among the Jains, for Haribhadra, a Jain, wrote a commentary on it in the eleventh century or slightly earlier.[4]

Hsüan Tsang (A.D. 602–664) made a Chinese translation of the *Nyāyapraveśa*,[5] and his disciple K'uei Chi[6] and others commented on it. Hsüan Tsang's translation has been one of the most important textbooks for the science of Buddhist logic in China as well as in Japan. We have two Tibetan translations, one from the Sanskrit,[7] and the other from Hsüan Tsang's Chinese translation.[8]

The Sanskrit text was published by B. Dhruva for the first time in 1930 (G.O.S. ed. No. 38).[9] N. D. Mironov had another edition printed in *T'oung Pao* the next year.[10] Having compared these Sanskrit texts with the Chinese translation, H. Ui concluded that the Chinese translation represents the form closest to the original, and that there should be some later interpolations in those Sanskrit editions which have been published so far. Thus realizing the value of the Chinese translation, he published another edition in 1944.[11]

I will use Dhruva's edition (D) as the basic text of the following translation, and point out differences between the Sanskrit text and the Chinese translation in the notes.

2. *The Contents of The Nyāyapraveśa*

The *Nyāyapraveśa* deals with the following topics:

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Means of proof (*sādhana*): The statements comprising a correct syllogism, capable of convincing others.

Fallacious means of proof (*sādhanābhāsa*): The defective statements incapable of convincing others;

Means of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*).

Fallacious means of refutation (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*).

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).

Fallacious perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) and fallacious inference (*anumānābhāsa*).

The first two topics are the main concern of our treatise.

3. *Property (Dharma) and Property-possessor (Dharmin)*

The relation between *dharma* and *dharmin* plays a fundamental role in the Indian system of inference. Indian logicians conducted their inference on the basis of the *dharma-dharmin* relation. Here the word '*dharma*' means a property while '*dharmin*' designates a property-possessor. The concepts of property and property-possessor are complementary to each other. The *dharma-dharmin* relation may be formulated as follows:

> When x occurs in y, x is the property (*dharma*) and y is the property-possessor (*dharmin*).

The property-possessor may be regarded as the locus or the substratum in or upon which the property rests. For instance, when there is smoke on a mountain, the smoke is the property; the mountain, the property-possessor.

The statements comprising Indian syllogism have the fundamental form: there is a property in a property-possessor. The statement "There is fire on the mountain" has that form, for instance. Of course, other forms are also used, but in Sanskrit they can be smoothly transformed into the form: There is a property in a property-possessor. For example, the meaning of "Sound is impermanent" is expressed by "*anityaḥ śabdaḥ.*" ('*Anityaḥ*' is nom. sg., meaning 'impermanent', *śabdaḥ*' is also nom. sg., meaning sound. Usually a copula is not written in Sanskrit.) This Sanskrit sentence can be rewritten as "*śabdasya anityatvam.*" (The suffix '*-tva*' is attached to the stem '*anitya*' while '*śabdaḥ*' is replaced by its genitive '*śabdasya*'. The suffix '*-tva*' has the function of making an ab-

stract noun, hence '*anityatva*' means 'impermanence'.) A literal translation of "*śabdasya anityatvam*" may be "There is impermanence in sound." This rewriting makes one see clearly that the property, impermanence, resides in the property-possessor, sound.

The concepts of property and property-possessor become clearer when compared with the concepts of subject and predicate. The terms 'subject' and 'predicate' refer to words in a sentence, while the terms 'property' and 'property-possessor' to objects which may be denoted by words in a sentence. The *dharma-dharmin* relation is independent of the syntactic connection. For instance, in the sentence "Sound is impermanent" the subject is the word 'sound' while in the sentence "Impermanence resides in sound" the subject has shifted to the word 'impermanence'. In both cases, however, sound remains the property-possessor. The predicate and the property can be understood in an analogous way.

4. *The Basic Structure of Indian Syllogism*

There are two kinds of Indian Syllogisms – five-membered[12] and three-membered. The latter may be exemplified by the following:

(a) There is fire on the mountain,

(b) because of smoke.

(c) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a fireplace.

In (a), fire is the property and the mountain is the property-possessor or locus; (b) points out that the property, smoke, rests upon the locus, the mountain. (c) can be rewritten as: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as for instance, there are smoke and fire in a fireplace. Thus in each of the sentences (a), (b), and (c), a *dharma-dharmin* relation or the combination of *dharma-dharmin* relations is expressed. We may, therefore, understand the meaning of (a), (b), and (c) in the following way:

(a) The arguer wishes to prove that there is fire on the mountain.

(b) By pointing out smoke on the same mountain, he gives the inferential mark by which one can infer that there is fire on the mountain.

(c) He shows that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and he gives as an example a fireplace where there are both fire and smoke.

The existence of fire on the mountain is proved by the existence of smoke on the same mountain and by the fact that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. To generalize, the existence of a property in its locus is proved by the existence of another property in the same locus, and by the fact that wherever there is the latter property, there is the former property.

Another instance of the three-membered Indian syllogism is given by:

(a) Sound is impermanent,

(b) because of 'produced-ness' (or because of [its] property of being produced).

(c) Whatever is produced is impermanent, like a pot.

Though (a) may not seem to express in a direct manner the *dharma-dharmin* relation, the relation is surely implied in (a), which will become explicit if we transform (a) into "There is impermanence in sound." (b) is to be regarded as a shortened form of "because of 'produced-ness' in sound," or "because there is 'produced-ness' in sound." (c) may be rewritten as "Wherever there is 'produced-ness', there is impermanence; as for instance, there are 'produced-ness' and impermanence in a pot." Like the previous case, in each of the sentences (a), (b) and (c), a *dharma-dharmin* relation or the combination of *dharma-dharmin* relations is expressed. We may, therefore, understand the meaning of (a), (b) and (c) in the following manner:

(a) The arguer wishes to prove that there is impermanence in sound.

(b) By pointing out 'produced-ness' in sound, he gives the inferential mark by which he can infer that there is impermanence in sound.

(c) He shows that wherever there is 'produced-ness', there is impermanence, and he gives as an example a pot, where there are both 'produced-ness' and impermanence.

Here, also, the essential point is that the existence of impermanence in sound is proved by the existence of 'produced-ness' in sound.

When, in these two syllogisms, we substitute

'Locus *l*' for 'mountain' or 'sound',
'Property *p*' for 'fire' or 'impermanence',
'Property *q*' for 'smoke' or 'produced-ness',
'Locus *w*' for 'fireplace' or 'pot',

we get the following schema of the three-membered Indian syllogism:

(a) There is Property *p* in Locus *l*,

(b) because there is Property *q* (in Locus *l*).

(c) Wherever there is Property *q*, there is Property *p*, as in Locus *w*.

I will call this Schema 1.

The terminology of Indian logic has been arranged in such a way as to refer to factors such as Property *p*, Property *q*, Locus *w*, etc., but not to the subject, the predicate, etc., of a sentence. Property *p* is called the *sādhya*; Property *q*, the *hetu* or the mark; and Locus *w*, the example.

5. *The Pakṣa*

Roughly speaking, the *pakṣa* is the subject or the locus of inference. It is defined in our text as follows:

> The *pakṣa* is a recognized property-possessor which the arguer wishes to prove to be qualified by a recognized qualifier. (Cf. translation p. 120)

In Schema 1, the *pakṣa* is Locus *l* which the arguer wishes to prove to be qualified by Property *p*. When one wants to prove that there is fire on the mountain, the *pakṣa* is the mountain where fire must be proved to exist. To give another example, in the case of proving that sound is impermanent, the *pakṣa* is sound which must be proved to be qualified by impermanence. Thus a *pakṣa* has to fulfill two conditions: It must be a property-possessor, and it must be qualified by a property.

In the definition of the *pakṣa* our author, Śaṅkarasvāmin, adds the adjective 'recognized' (*prasiddha*) to both 'qualifier' and 'property-possessor'. This modification is intended to show that one must admit

the existence of both the qualifier (i.e., the property) and the property-possessor. For instance, the existence of a mountain is universally admitted. The horn of a rabbit, however, is not admitted to be existent. Whenever the existence of the horn of a rabbit is subject to dispute, it would be implausible, our author thinks, to argue whether the color white resides in the horn of a rabbit. The existence of a unicorn is not admitted, either. Therefore, it would be impossible to argue whether a unicorn is on a mountain or not. A unicorn, the horn of a rabbit, etc., thus cannot play the role of the property or the property-possessor in this system.

6. *The Inferable Property (Sādhya-dharma) and the Reason (Sādhana-dharma)*

The property the arguer wishes to prove to exist in the *pakṣa* is called a *sādhya*, such as Property *p* in Schema 1. The property to be referred to when one wishes to prove the *sādhya* to exist in the *pakṣa* is called a *sādhana* or *hetu*, such as Property *q* in Schema 1. Therefore, the relation between a *sādhya* and a *hetu* can be expressed as follows: The existence of a *sādhya* in its locus is proved by the existence of the *hetu* in the same locus.

7. *The Mark (hetu)*

The *hetu* (*sādhana-dharma*) is also called a mark. (Although '*hetu*' primarily means 'reason', I translate it by 'mark' to avoid giving the impression that the *hetu* is a proposition rather than a property. In other texts '*liṅga*' (literally meaning 'mark') is also used for the *hetu*.) For instance, smoke rising from a mountain is given as the mark by which one can infer that there is fire on the mountain.

A correct mark must possess the following three aspects.

8. *The First Aspect of a Correct Mark*

The first aspect of a correct mark is that *it be a property of the pakṣa (pakṣadharmatva)*. For instance, when smoke is given as the mark of fire's belonging to the mountain, the *pakṣa*, the smoke, must be a property of the same mountain. Smoke rising from a place other than that mountain cannot be accepted as a correct mark. Likewise, when one wants

to prove that sound is impermanent, the mark, 'produced-ness', must be seen in the sound.

9. *The Second Aspect of a Correct Mark*

The second aspect of a correct mark is that *it be present in the sapakṣa* (*sapakṣe sattvam*). The '*sapakṣa*' means anything which is similar to the *pakṣa* insofar as it possesses the *sādhya*. When one wishes to prove that there is fire on the mountain, a fireplace is an instance of the *sapakṣa*, because it possesses fire.

It is not yet known for certain whether the mountain, the *pakṣa*, possesses fire, but it is certain that a fireplace possesses fire. Even though there is such a difference between the way the *pakṣa* possesses the *sādhya* and the way the *sapakṣa* possesses the *sādhya*, this difference is to be put aside when the *sapakṣa* is said to be similar to the *pakṣa*.

The term '*sapakṣa*' refers to an individual member of a class, not to a class considered as a single collective entity. For example, the fireplace mentioned as an instance of the *sapakṣa* is a member of the class Fireplace, not the class Fireplace. Smoke or fire can upon a fireplace, but not upon the class Fireplace taken as an abstract entity.

To possess the second aspect, a mark need not be present in all the *sapakṣa*. Let us consider, for instance, an iron ball red-hot by heat. When the *pakṣa* is the mountain where the existence of fire is to be proved, the red-hot ball is a *sapakṣa*, since it has fire. Smoke, which can obviously be accepted as a correct mark, however, is not present in the ball. Hence, the second aspect of a correct mark could be more precisely expressed as follows: The mark must be present in all or some *sapakṣa*.

10. *The Third Aspect of a Correct Mark*

The third aspect of a correct mark is that *it not be present in the vipakṣa* (*vipakṣe 'sattvam*). The '*vipakṣa*' means anything dissimilar to the *pakṣa*, insofar as it does not possessess the *sādhya*. When the *pakṣa* is the mountain to be qualified by fire, a lake can be given as an instance of the *vipakṣa*, for it is well-known that there is no fire in a lake. As in the case of the '*sapakṣa*', the '*vipakṣa*' refers to an individual member of a class.

When the existence of fire is proved by means of smoke, the latter, being a correct mark, is absent not only from the lake, but also from anything which lacks fire. Although a correct mark does not have to be present in all the *sapakṣa*, it does have to be absent from all the *vipakṣa*.

11. *The Example (Dṛṣṭānta)*

There are two kinds of examples according to whether they are given through similarity or through dissimilarity to the *pakṣa*.

When one infers the existence of the *sādhya* by the existence of the mark, one must know by experience that wherever the mark exists the *sādhya* exists. When one infers the existence of fire by the existence of smoke, for instance, one must know that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. The relation expressed by "Wherever the mark exists, the *sādhya* exists" is called positive concomitance (*anvaya*). Any locus for which positive concomitance holds true can be given as an example. This kind of example is called an example through similarity. It is similar to the *pakṣa*, since both it and the *pakṣa* possess the *sādhya* and the mark. An example through similarity is chosen from any *sapakṣa* that are at the same time loci of the mark. A red-hot ball, being a *sapakṣa* but not a locus of smoke, cannot be chosen as an example through similarity, for it has to be the locus of Property *p* and Property *q*.

The other kind of example is called 'an example through dissimilarity'. Just as we know that wherever the mark exists, the *sādhya* exists, we also know that wherever there is no *sādhya*, there is no mark. The relation expressed by "Wherever there is no *sādhya*, there is no mark" is called negative concomitance (*vyatireka*). A locus for which negative concomitance holds true can be given as the second kind of example. For instance, a lake, where there is neither fire nor smoke, can be given as an example of the second type. This type of example is dissimilar to the *pakṣa*, since the example possesses neither the *sādhya* nor the mark while the *pakṣa* does. A *vipakṣa* can be given as an example through dissimilarity, for it lacks the *sādhya*.

12. *Fallacious Means of Proof*

Fallacious means of proof are classified according to fallacies of the *pakṣa*, of the mark, and of the example. Our text enumerates nine sorts of

fallacious *pakṣa*, according as they are contradicted by perception, inference, etc.

A fallacious mark is one which does not possess all the three aspects of a correct mark. There are three kinds of fallacious marks: unrecognized (*asiddha*), which lack the first aspect of a correct mark; inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), which lack either the second aspect or the third aspect; and contradicted (*viruddha*), which lack both the second and the third aspects.

There are two kinds of fallacious examples: one is given through similarity; the other, through dissimilarity.

We have outlined the means of proof and its fallacies and, in the notes to the translation, will explain perception, inference, the means of refutation, and their various possible fallacies.

NOTES

[1] Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*, H. O. S. 47, 1968, p.v.

[2] *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* (T) (Tokyo: 1924–1929), Vol. 44, p. 91.c.

[3] Disputes arose among scholars as to who was the author of this text. Some scholars claimed that Dignāga was the author; some ascribed it to Śaṅkarasvāmin. Today, the latter view seems to be commonly accepted. This problem is dealt with in the articles below (listed in chronological order):

S. C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic*, Calcutta 1909 pp. 89–100.

H. Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosphy*, London 1917, p. 68.

S. C. Vidyabhusana, *History of Indian Logic*, Calcutta 1921, p. 300.

M. I. Tubjanski, 'On the Authorship of Nyāyapraveśa', *Bulletin de L'Académie des Sciences de L'U.R.S.S.* (1926) 975–982.

V. Bhattacharyya, 'The Nyāyapraveśa of Diṅnāga', *Indian Historical Quarterly* **3** (1927) 132–160.

N. D. Mironov, 'Dignāga's Nyāyapraveśa and Haribhadra's ṭīkā on it', *Festausgabe für Richard von Garbe*, 1927.

H. Jacobi, 'Über das Alter der Maṇimekhalai', *Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik* **5**, No. 3, Leipzig 1927. A. B. Keith, 'Authorship of the Nyāyapraveśa', *Indian Historical Quarterly* **IV** (1928) 14–22.

G. Tucci, 'Is the Nyāyapraveśa by Diṅnāga?', *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1928) 7–13.

H. Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* **5** (1929) 522–542.

[4] *Nyāyapraveśavṛtti*, included in Gaekward Oriental Series (G.O.S.) No. 38.

[5] *Yin ming ju cheng li lun* T. No. 1630, **32**, 11–13.

[6] *Yin ming ju cheng li lun shu* T. No. 1840, **44**, 91–143.

[7] Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking edition, Reprint, ed. by D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo 1962, No. 5706, **130**, 74–76; V. Bharracharyya (ed.), *Nyāyapraveśa*, Part II, G.O.S. No. 39, Baroda 1927.

[8] Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking edition, No. 5706; Tibetan tripitaka, Tohoku Catalogue, Sendai 1934, No. 4208.
[9] B. Dhruva (ed.), *The Nyāyapraveśaka*, Part I, Sanskrit text with Commentaries, G.O.S. No. 38, Baroda 1930.
[10] N. D. Mironov, *Nyāyapraveśa* I. Sanskrit Text, edited and reconstructed, *T'oung Pao* 28 (1931) 1–24.
[11] H. Ui, *Bukkyō Ronrigaku*, Tokyo 1944, pp. 363–376.
[12] An instance of the five-membered syllogism is given by:
(a) The statement of the *pakṣa*: The mountain possesses fire,
(b) The statement of the mark: because of smoke.
(c) The statement of positive concomitance: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a fireplace.
(d) Application: So in the case of that mountain.
(e) Conclusion: Therefore, the mountain possesses fire.
It is asserted by (e), not by (a), that the mountain possesses fire. In (d) positive concomitance between smoke and fire is shown to be true in the case of the mountain, too. When (d) and (e) are omitted from these five members, the three remaining members comprise a three-membered syllogism.

TRANSLATION

1. *Summary*

Means of proof (*sādhana*) and means of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) together with their fallacies (*ābhāsa*) are pertinent for [bringing] understanding to others.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) together with their fallacies are pertinent for one's own understanding.[1]

This is a summary of the doctrine.[2]

2. *Means of Proof*

Of these [two branches of our doctrine], the means of proof is the statement of the *pakṣa* and the other [members of a syllogism], because a matter unknown to questioners is transmitted by statements of the *pakṣa*, the mark (*hetu*), and the example (*dṛṣṭānta*).[3]

2.1. *The Pakṣa (The Subject Matter of Inference)*

Of these, the *pakṣa* is a recognized property-possessor which the arguer[4] wishes to prove to be qualified[5] by a recognized qualifier. It is tacitly

Tibetan Logic

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Glossary

English	*Tibetan*	*Sanskrit*
A		
actual cause	dngos rgyu	sākṣāt-kāraṇa
actual indefinite reason	dngos kyi ma nge pa'i gtan tshigs	
affirming negative phenomenon	ma yin dgag	paryudāsa-pratiṣedha
another's purpose	gzhan don	parārtha
application of connection	mtshon sbyor	
ascertain/ascertainment	nges pa	niścaya
awareness	blo	buddhi
B		
basis-isolate	gzhi ldog	
basis of debate	rtsod gzhi	
basis of inference	dpag gzhi	*anumāna-āśraya
basis of relation	ltos gzhi	
belief	mos pa	adhimokṣa
C		
causal relationship/ relationship of provenance	de byung 'brel	tadutpatti-saṃbandha
cause	rgyu	hetu/kārana
class	phyogs	pakṣa
common indefinite reason	mthun mong pa'i ma nges pa'i gtan tshigs	
common locus	gzhi mthun pa	samāna-adhikaraṇa
condition	rkyen	pratyaya
consciousness	shes pa	jñāna/vijñāna
consequence	thal 'gyur	prasaṅga
contradictory	'gal ba	virodha
contradictory in the sense of mutually exclusive	phan tshun spang 'gal	*anyonya-parihāra-virodha
contradictory in the sense of not abiding together	lhan cig mi gnas 'gal	*sahana-vastha-virodha
contradictory object	'gal zla	
contradictory reason	'gal ba'i gtan tshigs	viruddha-hetu

English	Tibetan	Sanskrit
correct opponent	phyi rgol yang dag	*samyak-purva-pakṣa
correct sign	rtags yang dag	*samyak-liṅga
correct similar example	mthun pa'i yang dag	*samyak sadṛṣtānta
counterpervasion	ldog khyab	vyatireka-vyāpti
created phenomenon	skyes pa	utpanna
D		
definiendum	mtshon bya	lakṣya
definite/definiteness	nges pa	niścaya
definition	mtshan nyid	lakṣaṇa
dependence	ltos pa	
dependent-arising	rten 'byung	pratītyasamutpāda
direct effect	dngos 'bras	*sākṣāt-phala
direct perception	mngon sum	pratyakṣa
dissimilar class	mi mthun phyogs	vipakṣa
dissimilar example	mi mthun dpe	*vidṛṣtānta
E		
effect contradictory with a cause	rang bzhin tang 'gal ba'i 'bras bu	*hetu-viruddha-kārya
effect contradictory with the nature	rgyu tang 'gal ba'i 'bras bu	*svabhāva-viruddha-kārya
effect sign	'bras rtags	kārya-hetu
emptiness	stong pa nyid	śunyatā
empty	stong pa	śūnya
entity	ngo bo	vastu
established base	gzhi grub	
etymology	sgra bshad	
example	dpe	dṛṣtānta
existent	yod pa	sat
existing in the similar class	mthun phyogs la yod pa	sapakṣa-sattva
explicit/actual	dngos	sākṣāt
explicit predicate of the probandum	dngos kyi bsgrub bya'i chos	sākṣāt-sādhyo-dharma
explicitly contradictory	dngos 'gal	sākṣāt-virodha
F		
fact	don	artha

English	Tibetan	Sanskrit
factually concordant subsequent cognition	bcad shes don mthun	*anvartha-paricchinna-jñāna
flawless subject sought to be known	shes 'dod chos can skyon med	
former party/former opponent	snga rgol	uttara-pakṣa
forward pervasion	rjes khyab	anvaya-vyāpti
free of qualification	khyad par dag pa	
G		
general cause	rgyu spyi	*sāmānya-hetu
general-isolate	spyi ldog	
generally characterized phenomenon	spyi mtshan	sāmānya-lakṣaṇa
H		
having remainder	lhag ldan	
hidden phenomenon	lkog gyur	parokṣa
I		
impermanent	mi rtag pa	anitya dharma
implicit predicate of the probandum	shugs kyi bsgrub bya'i chos	
indefinite reason	ma nges pa'i gtan tshigs	anaikāntika-hetu
indefinite reason having remainder	lhag ldan gyi ma nges pa'i gtan tshigs	
inference/inferential cognition	rjes dpag	anumāna
inference of causal attributes	rgyu chos rjes dpog	
inference through renown	grags pa'i rjes dpag	*prasiddha-anumāna
inference through the power of the fact	dngos stobs rjes dpag	*vastu-bala-anumāna
inferential cognition of belief	yid ches rjes dpag	*āpta-anumāna
inherent existence	rang bzhin gyis grub pa	svabhāvasiddhi
involving a qualification	khyad por ltos pa	
isolate	ldog pa	vyatireka
K		
knowledge	rig	saṃvedana

English	Tibetan	Sanskrit
L		
latter opponent/second party	phyi rgol	pūrva-pakṣa
logic	rtog ge	tarka
M		
manifest phenomenon	mngon gyur	abhimukhī
material phenomenon	bem po	kanthā
meaning/fact, object, welfare, purpose	don	artha
meaning generality	don spyi	artha-sāmānya
meaning isolate	don ldog	*artha-vyatireka
mind	sems	citta
mode	tshul	rūpa
mode of statement	'god tshul	
momentary	skad cig ma	kṣaṇika
mutual exclusion	phan tshun spang 'gal	*anyonya-parihāra
N		
nature contradictory with a cause	rgyu tang 'gal pa'i rang bzhin	*hetu-viruddha-svabhāva
nature contradictory with a pervader	khyab byed tang 'gal ba'i rang bzhin	*vyāpaka-viruddha-svabhāva
nature sign	rang bzhin gyi rtags	svabhāva-hetu
negandum/object of negation	dgag bya	pratiṣedhya
negative/negative phenomenon	dgag pa	pratiṣedha
nonaffirming negative phenomenon	med dgag	prasajya-pratiṣedha
nonassociated compositional factor	ldan min 'du byed	viprayukta-saṃskāra
nonestablished reason	ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs	asiddha-hetu
nonexistent	med pa	asat
nonobservation of a cause	rgyu ma dmigs pa	kāraṇa-anupalabdhi
nonobservation of a direct effect	dngos 'bras ma dmigs pa	*sākṣāt-kārya-anupalabdhi
nonobservation of a nature	rang bzhin ma dmigs pa	svabhāva-anupalabdhi
nonobservation of a pervader	khyab byed ma dmigs pa	vyāpaka-anupalabdhi

English	Tibetan	Sanskrit
nonobservation of an effect	'bras ma dmigs pa	kārya-anupalabdhi
nonobservation sign	ma dmigs pa'i rtags	anupalabdhi-hetu
nonobservation sign of the nonappearing	mi snang ba ma dmigs pa'i rtags	*apratibhāsa-anupalabdhi
nonobservation sign of the suitable to appear	snang rung ma dmigs pa'i rtags	
not abiding together	lhan cig mi gnas 'gal	*sahāna-vasthā-virodha
O		
object	yul/don	viṣaya/artha
object of apprehension	gzung bya/bzung bya	
object of comprehension	gzhal bya	prameya
object of indication	bstan bya	
object of knowledge	shes bya	jñeya
object of relation	'brel yul	*saṃbandha-viṣaya
object of thought	rtog yul	*kalpanā-viṣaya
object pervaded	khyab bya	vyāpya
object to be inferred	rjes su dpag bya	anumeya
one's own purpose	rang don	svārtha
opponent/party	rgol ba	pakṣa
P		
particular cause	rgyu khyad par	asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa
particularity	bye brag	viśeṣa
party/opponent	rgol ba	pakṣa
permanent phenomenon	rtag pa	nitya
pervader	khyab byed	vyāpaka
perverse forward pervasion	khyab pa phyin ci log	
phenomenon/attribute	chos	dharma
place/object	yul	viṣaya
position/class, subject, party	phyogs	pakṣa
positive/positive phenomenon	sgrub pa	vidhi
possibility	mu	
preceding cause	rgyu sngon song	*samanantara-hetu
predicate of the negandum	dgag bya'i chos	*pratiṣedhya-dharma

English	Tibetan	Sanskrit
predicate of the proban-dum	bsgrub bya'i chos	sādhyadharma
probandum	bsgrub bya	sādhya
probans	bsgrub byed	sādhana
product	byas pa	kṛta
proof statement	sgrub ngag	sādhana-vākya
proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity	chos mi mthun sbyor gyi sgrub ngag	*vaidharmya-prayoga-sādhana-vākya
proof statement using a qualitative similarity	chos mthun sbyor gyi sgrub ngag	*sādharmya-prayoga-sādhana-vākya
property of the subject	phyogs chos	pakṣadharma
Q		
qualification	khyad par	viśeṣa
quasi-reason	gtan tshigs ltar snang	hetu-ābhāsa
R		
reason	gtan tshigs	hetu
reasoning	rigs	nyāya
related object	'brel zla	
relationship	'brel ba	saṃbandha
relationship of prove-nance		tadutpatti-saṃbandha
relationship of sameness of nature	bdag gcig 'brel	tādātmya-saṃbandha
renown	grags pa	prasiddha
S		
second party/latter oppo-nent	phyi rgol	pūrva-pakṣa
self-isolate	rang ldog	
selfless	bdag med	nairātmya
sign	rtags	liṅga
sign of belief	yid ches kyi rtags	*āpta-liṅga
sign of renown	grags pa'i rtags	*prasiddha-liṅga
sign proving the expres-sion	tha snyad sgrub kyi rtags	
sign proving the meaning	ton sgrub kyi rtags	
sign that appears to the mind	song tshod kyi rtags	

English	Tibetan	Sanskrit
sign through the power of the fact	dngos stobs kyi rtags	*vastu-bala-liṅga
similar class	mthun phyogs	sapakṣa
similar example	mthun dpe	*sadṛṣtānta
slightly hidden phenome-non	cung zad lkog gyur	*kimcid-parokṣa
sound	sgra	śabda
specifically characterized phenomenon	rang mtshan	svalakṣaṇa
stated sign	bkod tshod gyi rtags	
subject	chos can	dharma
subject sought to be known	shes 'dod chos can	
subsequent cognition	bcad shes	*paricchinna-jñāna
substantial entity	rdzas	dravya
supersensory object	skal don	adṛṣya-anupalabdhi
syllogism	sbyor ba	prayoga
T		
tangible object	reg bya	spraṣṭavya
terminological suitability	sgra byung grags pa	
thesis	dam bca'	pratijñā
thing/actual, explicit	dngos po	bhāva
thought	rtog pa	kalpanā
three modes	tshul gsum	trirūpa
time	dus	kāla
U		
uncommon indefinite reason	thun mong ma yin pa'i ma nges pa'i gtan tshigs	
V		
valid cognition	tshad ma	pramāna
very hidden phenomenon	shin tu lkog gyur	*atyarta-parokṣa

RECOGNIZING REALITY

Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations

Georges B. J. Dreyfus

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GLOSSARY
SANSKRIT - TIBETAN - ENGLISH

Sanskrit	*Tibetan*	*English*
atyantaparokṣa	shin tu lkog gyur	thoroughly hidden
advayaśūnyatā	gnyis su med pa'i stong pa nyid	emptiness of absence of duality [between subject and object]
adhigam	rtogs	to realize; identify; understand
adhipati-pratyaya	bdag rkyen	empowering condition
adhyavasaya	nges pa	certainty
adhyāropa	sgro 'dogs	superimposition
anavayin	yan lag can	whole
anātma	bdag med	selfless
anitya	mi rtag pa	impermanent
anubhava	myong ba	experience; presentational apprehension
anumāna	rjes dpag	inference
anyāpoha	gzhan sel	elimination of other
anvaya	rjes 'gro	positive concomitance
anvayavyāpti	rjes khyab	forward pervasion
apavāda	skur 'debs	nihilism; denial
apoha	sel ba	elimination
apoha-pravṛtti	sel 'jug	eliminative engagement
abhinna	gcig	one; oneness
abhimukī	mngon gyur	evident
abhyākhyāna	skur 'debs	nihilism; denial
abhrānta	ma 'khrul ba	non-mistaken
aṃśa	cha	part; factors
artha	don	object
arthakriyāsamartham	don byed nus pa	able to perform a function
arthasāmānya	don spyi	object-universal
arthātmakasvalakṣaṇān yāpoha	dong rang mtshan gyi gzhan gsel	objective elimination
arthāpati	don gyis rtogs pa	to realize by implication
arthāṃśa	don gyi cha	objective factor in the object
alīkārāvādin	rnam par rdzun pa smra ba	False Aspectarian

Sanskrit	*Tibetan*	*English*
avidyā	ma rig pa	ignorance
avisaṃvādi	mi slu ba	nondeceptive
avaiparītya	phyin ci ma log pa	non-mistaken
asadṛśa	mi 'dra ba	dissimilar; specific
asādhāraṇa	thun mong ma yin pa	uncommon
ākāra	rnam pa	aspect
ākāraniyata	ngo bo nges pa	determinate with respect to its entity
āgama	lung	scripture
ātma	bdag	self
āyatana	skye mched	sense sphere
ārya	'phags pa	noble beings
ālambana	dmigs pa	observation
ālambanapratyaya	dmigs rkyen	object-condition
upamāna	dpe nyer 'jal	analogy; comparison
ūrdhvatālakṣaṇa	gong ma'i spyi	horizontal universal
indriya	dbang po	sense-basis
eka	gcig	one; oneness
ekātman	bdag nyid gcig	identity of being
ekārtha	don gcig	equivalent
ekarūpatā	ngo bo gcig	identical entity
karma	las	action
kalpanā	rtog pa	conceptual cognition
kalpanāpoḍha	rtog pa dang bral ba	free from conception
kārya	'bras bu	effect; result
kālaniyata	dus nges pa; dus ma 'dres pa	temporally determinate
kṣaṇika	skad cig ma	momentary; evanescent
guṇa	yon tan	quality
grāhakākāra	'dzin rnam	subjective aspect
grāhyākāra	bzung rnam	objective aspect
cārvāka	rgyang phan	materialist
cittamātra	sems tsam	Mind-Only
jāti	rigs	type
jātisāmānya	rigs spyi	type-universal
jñāna	shes pa	cognition, consciousness, awareness; mental episode
jñeya	shes bya	knowable
tādātmya-saḥbandha	bdag gcig 'brel	relation of identical nature
tadutpatti	de byung 'brel	relation of origination
tiryaglakṣana	thad ka'i spyi	vertical universal
trairūpya	tshul gsum	three-fold criteria
deśaniyata	yul nges pa	spatially determinate
dravya	rdzas	substance
dravyasat	rdzas yod	substantially existent
dharma	chos	phenomenon; predicate

Sanskrit	*Tibetan*	*English*
dharmin	chos can	subject; substratum
dhātu	khams	elements
dhī	blo	mind; mental episode
nāma	ming	name; term
nitya	rtag pa	permanence
nimitta	rgyu mtshan gtan tshigs	reason; sign
nirākāravāda	rnam (pa) med (par) smra ba	proponent of no-aspect
nirvikalpakapratyaksa	mngon sum rtog med	non-determinate perception
niṣedha	med dgag	non-implicative negation; verbally bound negation
niścita	nges pa	certainty
niścayajñāna	nges shes	ascertaining consciousness
nītārtha	nges don	definitive
neyārtha	drang don	interpretable
nyāya	rigs pa	reasoning
pakṣa	phyogs	thesis
pakṣa-dharmatā	phyogs chos	property of the position
padārtha	tshig don	category
parataḥprāmāṇya	gzhan las nges	externally valid cognition
parataḥpramāṇa	tshad ma gzhan gyis grub pa	external (or extrinsic) validity
paramaṇu	rdul phran	atom
paramārthasat	don dam du yod pa	ultimately existing
paramārthasatya	don dam bden pa	ultimate truth
parāvṛtti	bzlog pa	exclusion
parināma	rnam 'gyur	manifestation
parokṣa	lkog gyur	hidden; hidden objects
paryudāsa	ma yin dgag	implicative negation; nominally bound negation
pudgala	gang zag	person
pudgalanairātmya	gang zag gyi bdag med	selflessness of persons
puruśa	gang zag	person; self
prakṛti	rang bzhin; spyi gtso bo	essence; own nature; Primordial Nature
pratijñā	dam bca'	thesis
pratibimba	gzugs brnyan	reflection
pratibhā	snang ba	appearance; intuitional meaning
pratiṣedha	dgag pa	negation
pratītyasamutpāda	rten 'byung	dependent arising
pratyakṣa	mngon sum	perception
pratyakṣābhāsa	mngon sum ltar snang	pseudo-perception
pratyaya	rkyen	condition
pramāṇa	tshad ma	valid cognition

Sanskrit	*Tibetan*	*English*
pramāṇaphala	tshad 'bras	result of valid cognition
pramāṇabhūta	tshad mar 'gyur pa	serving as valid cognition
prameya	gzhal bya	object of comprehension; object of valid cognition
prayoga	sbyor ba	formal argument
prasajyapratiṣedha	med dgag	non-implicative negation; verbally bound negation
prāpana	thob pa	to obtain
prāsaṅga	thal 'gyur	consequence
phala	'bras bu	effect; result
bādhaka	gnod byed	refuter
bīja	sa bon	seed
buddhi	blo	mind; mental episode
buddhyātmakānyāpoha	blo'i gzhan sel	mental elimination
bhāda	gnad po	to refute
bhāva	yod pa; dngos po	to exist; existence; thing
bhūta	'byung ba	element
bhautika	'byung 'gyur	[phenomena] arising from elements
bhinna	tha dad	distinct
bheda	khyad par	distinction
manas	yid	mind
mānasa-pratyakṣa	yid mngon	mental perception
yathārtha	don mthun	factual
yukti	rigs pa	reasoning
yogi pratyakṣa	rnal 'byor mngon sum	yogic perception
yogyatā	rung ba	fitness
rūpa	gzugs; ngo bo	matter; entity
rūpāyatana	gzugs kyi skye mched	form-sphere
liṅga	rtags	evidence
loka-prasiddha	'jig rten la grags pa	reknown to the world
vastu	dngos po	thing
vastubalapravṛttanumana	dngos po stobs skugs kyi rigs pa	operating by the power of facts
vāc	rjod	to signify
vācaka	rjod byed	signifier
vācya	brjod bya	signified
vāsanā	bag chags	trace; propensity; latency
vikalpakapratyakṣa	mngon sum rtog pa can	determinate perception
vijñaptisat	btags yod	nominally existent
viddhi	sgrub pa	affirmation
vidhipravṛtti	sgrub 'jug	full (or affirmative) engagement
vināśa	'jig pa	disintegration
vināśahetu	'jig rgyu	causes of destruction
vipāka	rnam smin	[karmic] effect

Sanskrit	*Tibetan*	*English*
vipaśyanā	lhag mthong	special insight
viprayuktasaṃskāra	ldan min 'du byed	non-associated compositional factor
viruddha-hetu	'gal ba'i gtan tshigs	contradictory evidence
virodha	'gal ba	exclusive
viṣaya	yul	object
viśeṣa	bye brag	individuation
vyakti	gsal ba	individual
vyatirekavyāpti	ldog khyab	negative pervasion
vyatireka	ldog pa	distinguisher; negative concomittance
vyatirekadharma	ldog pa'i chos	phenomena that exist as distinguisher
vyavaccheda	rnam gcod	preclusion
vyavahāra	tha snyad	convention
vyāpti	khyab pa	pervasion; entailment
vyāvṛtti	ldog pa	distinguisher; negative concomittance
śaktiḥ	nus pa	capacity; ability
śabda	sgra	verbal testimony, language, sound
śabdārtha	sgra don	object indicated by words
śabda-sāmānya	sgra spyi	term-universal
śabdasyāviśayaḥ	sgra'i yul ma yin	not directly denotable by language
śamatha	zhi gnas	tranquility
sat	yod pa	to exist; existence
satyākāravādin	rnam par bden par smra ba	True Aspectarian
samanantara-pratyaya	de ma thag pa'i rkyen	preceding condition
samavāya	'du ba	inherence
samāropa	sgro btags	superimposition
samudāya	tshogs pa	collection
saṃketa	brda	agreed upon convention; sign
saṃghāta	'dus pa	aggregate; collection
saṃcita	bsags pa	aggregate
saṃtāna	rgyun	continuum
saṃbhandha	'brel ba	relation
samyakliṅga	rtags yang dag	correct evidence
saṃvṛti	kun rdzob	relative (literally, "concealer")
saṃvṛtisat	kun rdzob tu yod pa	conventionally existent
saṃvṛti-satya	kun rdzob bden pa	relative truth (literally, "truth for a concealer")
saṃskṛta	'dus byas	conditioned; compounded phenomenon

Sanskrit	*Tibetan*	*English*
savikalpaka	rtog pa can	conceptual; determinate
savikalpakapratyakṣa	rtog pa can gyi mngon sum	determinate perception
sākāravāda	rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba	proponent of Aspect
sādhāraṇa	thun mong	common
sādhya	bsgrub bya	probandum
sādṛśya	'dra ba	similar
sādhyadharma	sgrub bya'i chos; bsgrub bya'i chos	property of the probandum
sāmānya	spyi	universal
sāmānyalakṣaṇa	spyi mtshan	generally characterized phenomenon
siddhānta	grub mtha'	tenets; tenet systems
sthūla	rags pa	coarse [objects]
svataḥpramāṇa	tshad ma rang nyid kyis grub pa	internal (or intrinsic) validity
svajāti	rigs mthun pa	similar type
svayamprakāśa	rang nyid gsal ba	self-presenting; self-luminous
svalakṣaṇa	rang mtshan	specifically characterized phenomenon
svasaṃvitti	rang rig	self-cognition; apperception
svabhāva	rang bzhin	essence; own nature; Nature
svārthānumāna	rang don rjes dpag	inference for oneself
svarūpasthitayaḥ	rang gi ngo bo la gnas pa	abiding within their own entity
hetu	gtan tshigs; rgyu mtshan	reason; sign
hetusāmagrī	rgyu tshogs	causal complex, aggregate of causes

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