


# A HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC

*Ancient, Mediaeval and  
Modern Schools*

Mahāmahopādhyāya  
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the Pramāna-vārtika-kārikā of Śrī Dharmakīrti who was born in a family of the Deccan, who exposed largely the errors of all the vicious texts (of the Tīrthikas), whose fame filled the entire earth, and who as a great sage had no rival”

108. Pramāna-vārtika-vṛtti.

There was a sub-commentary on the Pramāna-vārtika-kārikā called Pramāna vārtika-vṛti by Dharmakīrti himself. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost. There exists, however, a Tibetan translation<sup>1</sup> of it in the Bstan-kyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 420-535. In Tibetan the work is named Tshad-ma-rnam hgral-gyi-hgral-wa. In the concluding lines of the work Dharmakīrti is described as “a great teacher and dialectician, whose fame filled all quarters of the earth and who was, as it were, a lion, pressing down the head of elephant-like debaters.”<sup>2</sup>

109. Pramāna vinīcāya.

Pramāna-vinīcāya, quoted<sup>3</sup> by Mādhavācārya, is another work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this

<sup>1</sup> I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work embodied in the Bstan-kyur of the India Office, London.

<sup>2</sup> རྒྱལ་པོ་འཕེར་པོ་སེའི་རྩེད་མ་གུས་པ་ན་སྤྱུ་པའི་མྱེད་པ་ཆེད་ལྷོ་པོ་ལོ་སྐོན་པོ་ལོ་སེད་པོ་སེད་པོ་

(Pramāna-vārtika-vṛti opening lines).

<sup>3</sup> The following verses of Pramāna-vinīcāya were quoted in the Sarvaśāstrasāmagraha, chapter on Bauddha darśana, by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the 14th century A.D. :—

गान्धोद्गुनाच्चो वृत्तालि तस्या गान्धुनाद्यः ।  
पाञ्चनारकवेधुर्थात् स्वयं चैव यत्रायाते ॥ (क)  
चरिषामनोभिषु वृत्तात्मा विषयावितरदन्तैः ।  
याज्ञायाहृक्चरिविनिर्देयानिव खल्यते ॥ (ख)

(Pramāna-vinīcāya, chap. I).

ལྷོ་ལོ་སེའི་རྩེད་མ་གུས་པ་ན་སྤྱུ་པའི་མྱེད་པ་ཆེད་ལྷོ་པོ་ལོ་སྐོན་པོ་ལོ་སེད་པོ་སེད་པོ་སེད་པོ་  
གུར་དང་འཛིན་པ་འདི་ལྷུང་ ॥  
རྩོམ་དཀྱིལ་པོ་ལྷོ་ལོ་སེད་པོ་སེད་པོ་སེད་པོ་ (ཀ)  
ལྷོ་ལོ་སེའི་རྩེད་མ་གུས་པ་ན་སྤྱུ་པའི་མྱེད་པོ་སེད་པོ་ (ཁ)

Prof. Louis de la Vallée Poussin in his “Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques,” pp. 32 and 34, identifies the above verses with their Tibetan versions as follows :—

work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation<sup>1</sup> of it in the Bstan-kyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 259—347. The translation was prepared by the Kāśmīrian Paṇḍita Parahita Bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter Blo-ldan-śes-rab in the matchless city of Kāśmīra. The work in Tibetan is called Tshad-ma rnam-par-hes-pa signifying “Determination of Pramāna or Sources of Knowledge.” The work is divided into three chapters as follows :—(1) System of Perception (in Tibetan : Mhon-sum-gtan-la-dwab-pa, in Sanskrit : *Pratyakṣa-nyāyasthā*); (2) Inference for one’s own self (in Tibetan : Ran-gi-don-gyi-rjes-su-dpag-pa, in Sanskrit : *Sāttvānumāna*); and (3) Inference for the sake of others (in Tibetan : Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rjes-su-dpag-pa, in Sanskrit : *Parānnumāna*). In the concluding lines Dharmakīrti is described as a great sage of unrivalled fame born in Southern India.

110. Nyāya-bindu.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NYĀYA-BINDU.

Nyāya-bindu is another excellent work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work

was discovered among the palm-leaf manuscripts preserved in the Jaina temple of Sāntiātha, Camboy, and has been published in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta by Professor Peterson. There exists a Tibetan translation<sup>2</sup> of the work in the Bstan-kyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 347—355. The work in Tibetan is called Riggs-palṁ-thigs-pa signifying “A Drop of Logic.” It is divided into three chapters as follows : (1) Perception (in Tibetan : Mhon-sum, in Sanskrit : *Pratyakṣa*); (2) Inference for one’s own self (in Tibetan : Bdag-gi-don gyi-rjes-su-dpag-pa, in Sanskrit : *Sāttvānumāna*); and (3) Inference for the sake of others (in Tibetan : Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rjes-su-dpag-pa, in Sans-

སྤྱེད་པོ་ལོ་སེད་པོ་སེད་པོ་སེད་པོ་  
སེར་པ་ལྷོ་པོ་ལོ་སེད་པོ་སེད་པོ་  
གུར་དང་འཛིན་པ་འདི་ལྷུང་ ॥  
རྩོམ་ཅན་དང་འཛོལ་བཞུགས་པ་ལྷུང་ ॥ (ག)

(Pramāna-vinīcāya, chap. I, embodied in the Tibetan Bstan-kyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 272, 274 and 273 respectively).

<sup>1</sup> I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work embodied in the Bstan-kyur of the India Office, London.

<sup>2</sup> I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of the Nyāya-bindu embodied in the Bstan-kyur of the India Office, London, as also the excellent edition of F. J. Sher-batski. The Sanskrit edition of the Nyāya-bindu and Tika (by F. J. Sher-batski) is also available now. Compare a “Bilingual Index of Nyāya-bindu” by Dr. Savit Chandra Vidyābhāṣa in the Bibliotheca Indica series.

krit: *Parārthānumāna*). Some of the subjects discussed in the work are noted below.

### Perception.

In chapter I, it is stated that all objects of man are accomplished by perfect or valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is of two kinds: (1) Perception (in Sanskrit: *Pratyakṣa*) and (2) In-

ference (in Sanskrit: *Anumāna*). Perception, which is knowledge derived through the senses, etc., is described as that which is free from preconception (*kalpanā*) and devoid of error (*abhrāna*). Preconception refers to the experiences of false images which appear real as if they were capable of being addressed and touched, e.g. the shadow of a tree may appear as the tree itself or a rope may appear as a snake. Error is caused by such causes as darkness, quick motion, journey by boat, shaking, etc.; for instance, to a man journeying by boat, trees on both banks appear to move. Perception is of four kinds: (1) perception by the five senses; (2) perception by the mind; (3) self-consciousness; and (4) knowledge of a contemplative saint. An object of perception is like itself (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) while an object of inference is like any one of its class (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*); for instance, a cow which I see is a peculiar one possessing an infinite number of qualities which distinguish it from all cows, whereas a cow which I infer is a general one possessing certain qualities in common with other cows: that is, perception is individual knowledge while inference is general knowledge. According to the proximity or remoteness of an object, perception of it varies. This is the peculiar characteristic of an object of perception, and this characteristic proves that the object to be absolutely real (*paramārtha-sat*), as it shows that it possesses some practical efficiency, and this characteristic also shows that perception is a source of valid knowledge for it exactly corresponds to the object perceived.

### Inference for one's self.

In chapter II, Inference for one's own self (*Svārthānumāna*) is defined as the knowledge of the inferable derived through the reason or middle term bearing its three forms or characteristics. In the instance 'this hill has fire, because it has smoke,' the knowledge of the hill as having fire is derived through smoke which is the reason or middle term.

The three forms or characteristics of the reason or middle term are the following:—

- (1) The middle term must abide in the minor term, e.g.

The hill has fire,  
Because it has smoke,  
Like a kitchen, but unlike a lake.

In this reasoning there must be 'smoke' on the 'hill'

(2) The middle term must abide only in cases which are homologous with the major term, e.g. in the above reasoning 'smoke' abides in a kitchen which is homologous with things that contain fire

(3) The middle term must never abide in cases which are heterogeneous from the major term, e.g. in the above reasoning 'smoke' does not abide in a lake which is heterogeneous from things that contain fire.

The middle term is of three kinds according to the relation which it bears to the major term, thus:—

- (1) Identity (in Tibetan: *Ran-ḥshin*, in Sanskrit: *Swabhāva*),

e.g.  
This is a tree,  
Because it is śinśapā.

- (2) Effect (in Tibetan: *Hras-bu*, in Sanskrit: *Kārya*), e.g.

Here there is fire, because there is smoke.

(3) Non-perception (in Tibetan: *Mi-dmigs pa*, in Sanskrit: *Anupalabdhi*), which is of 11 kinds as follows:—

- (i) Non-perception of identity (*Srabhāvānupalabdhi*), e.g.

Here is no smoke, because it is not perceived (though smoke is of such a nature that it is perceptible if existent).

- (ii) Non-perception of effect (*Kāryānupalabdhi*), e.g.

Here there are no causes of smoke of unobstructed capacity, because there is no smoke here.

- (iii) Non-perception of the pervader or container (*Vyāpakānupalabdhi*), e.g.

Here there is no Śinśapā, because there is no tree at all.

- (iv) Perception contrary to identity (*Srabhāvā-viruddhopalabdhi*), e.g.

There is no cold sensation here, because there is fire.

- (v) Perception of the opposite effect (*Viruddha-kāryopalabdhi*), e.g.

Here there is no cold sensation, because there is smoke.

- (vi) Perception of contrary connection (*Viruddha-vyāpṛtopalabdhi*), e.g.

Even the destruction of the past entity is not certain, because it is dependent on other causes.

- (vii) Perception contrary to the effect (*Kārya-viruddhopalabdhi*), e.g.

Here there are no causes of cold of unobstructed capacity, because there is fire.

(viii) Perception contrary to the container (vyāpakaviruddho-palabdhi), *e.g.*

Here there is no icy sensation, because there is fire.

(ix) Non-perception of the cause (Kāraṇānpalabdhi), *e.g.*

There is no smoke, because there is no fire.

(x) Perception contrary to the cause (Kāraṇa-viruddhopa-labdhi), *e.g.*

Hair on his body does not stand erect, because he sits near a fire.

(xi) Perception of effect contrary to its cause (Kāraṇa-viruddha-kāryopalabdhi), *e.g.*

This place does not contain any person on whose body hair stands erect, because there is smoke here.

Inference for the sake of others.

In chapter III, Inference for the sake of others (*Parārhā-numāna*) is defined as the declaration of the three-formed middle term in words: that is, when the reason is set forth in words with a view to producing a conviction in others, it is said to be an inference for the sake of others.

Inference is a kind of knowledge; and words are here called inference by the attributing of effect to cause, for, though they are not themselves knowledge, they produce it. Inference for the sake of others is of two kinds: (1) positive or homogeneous (in Sanskrit: *Sādharmyavat*); and (2) negative or heterogeneous (in Sanskrit: *Vaidharmyavat*), as follows:—

(a) Sound is non-eternal.

Because it is a product,

All products are non-eternal as a pot (positive).

(b) Sound is non-eternal.

Because it is a product,

No non-eternal, *i.e.* eternal (thing) is a product as ether (negative).

The minor term (*Pakṣa*) is that to which the relation of the major term is to be proved, as—'This hill has fire, because it has smoke. In this

Thesis:

reasoning 'hill' is the minor term which is to be proved as having 'fire' which is the major term. A minor term and its corresponding major term combined together, constitute a proposition which, when offered for proof, is called a thesis.

Fallacies of the thesis or Pakṣabhāsa.

There are four fallacies of the thesis (*Pakṣābhāsa*).

A thesis is fallacious if it is incompatible with—

- (1) Perception, *e.g.* Sound is inaudible;
- (2) Inference, *e.g.* Sound is eternal;
- (3) Conception, *e.g.* The moon is not *luna* (*Śasi a-candra*); or

(4) One's own statement, *e.g.* Inference is not a source of knowledge.

It has already been stated that the middle term must possess three characteristics. Fallacies of the middle term (*Hetvābhāsa*) occur even if one of the characteristics is unproved, or certain or contradictory, thus—

A. Unproved (*asiddha*).

(1) Sound is eternal, because it is visible.

(Visibility of sound is admitted by neither party).

(2) Trees are conscious, because they die if their bark is taken off.

(This peculiar kind of death of trees is not admitted by the opponent).

(3) The hill has fire, because it has vapour.

(Vapour as an effect of fire is questioned).

(4) The soul is all-pervading, because it is perceived everywhere.

(It is a matter of doubt whether the soul is perceived everywhere).

B. Uncertain (*anvikāntika*).

(1) Sound is non-eternal,

Because it is knowable.

(The knowable is too general, because it includes the eternal as well as the non-eternal).

(6) A certain man is omniscient,

Because he is a speaker.

(The reason is not general enough, for speakers are not necessarily either omniscient or non-omniscient).

C. Contradictory (*viruddha*).

(7) Sound is eternal,

Because it is a product.

(Here 'product' is not homogeneous with 'eternal', that is, the middle term is opposed to the major term).

(8) Sound is eternal,

Because it is a product.

(Here 'product' is not heterogeneous from 'non-eternal').

Example is of two kinds: (1) homogeneous and (2) heterogeneous. Fallacies of the homogeneous example occur as follows:—

- (1) Sound is eternal,  
Because it is incorporeal,  
Like action.

(Action cannot serve as an example, because it is not eternal, that is, because it is excluded from the major term).

- (2) Sound is eternal,  
Because it is incorporeal,  
Like atoms.

(Atoms cannot serve as an example, because they are not incorporeal, that is, because they are excluded from the middle term).

- (3) Sound is eternal,  
Because it is incorporeal,  
Like a pot.

(Pot cannot serve as an example, because it is neither eternal nor incorporeal, that is, because it is excluded from both major and middle terms).

- (4) This man is passionate.  
Because he is a speaker,  
Like the person in the street.

(The person in the street cannot serve as an example, as it is questionable whether he is passionate, that is, it involves doubt as to the validity of the major term).

- (5) This man is mortal,  
Because he is passionate,  
Like the person in the street.

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, that is, it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate).

- (6) This man is non-omniscient,  
Because he is passionate,  
Like the person in the street.

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, that is, it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate and non-omniscient).

- (7) This man is passionate,  
Because he is a speaker,  
Like a certain person.

(This example is unconnected (*amanṅga*), for there is no inseparable connection between being 'passionate' and being a 'speaker').

- (8) Sound is non-eternal,  
Because it is a product,  
Like a pot.

(This example involves the fallacy of 'connection unshown,' *vyapadāśītānṅga*: the connection should be shown as follows: All products are non-eternal like a pot).

- (9) Sound is a product,  
Because it is non-eternal,  
All non-eternal things are products like a pot.

(The example involves the fallacy of inverted connection, *viparītānṅga*: the real connection should be shown as follows: All products are non-eternal like a pot).

Similarly there are nine fallacies of the heterogeneous example.

*Refutation* (*Dūṣaṇa*) consists in pointing out in the reasoning of an opponent any one of the fallacies mentioned above. The fallacies or sem-

blances of refutation are the analogues or futilities called in Sanskrit *Jati*.<sup>1</sup>

In the concluding lines of the Nyāyabindu it is stated by the translators that "Dharmakīrti vanquished

the entire Tīrthikas as Sākyaṃni had subdued the large army of Māra; and as the sun dispels darkness, the Nyāyabindu has exterminated the Ātmaka theory (that is, the Tīrthika doctrine)—"wonderful!"<sup>2</sup>

#### Dharmakīrti criticises Dignāga.

The opposition of the middle term to the major term is a kind of fallacy called contradiction which is admitted by both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Opposition of the middle term to the implied major term

(in the event of the major term being ambiguous) is noted by Dignāga in his Nyāya-pravēśa<sup>3</sup> as another kind of fallacy called implied contradiction (in Sanskrit: *īkṣa-vigṛhāta-kr̥t-virvādhā*, and in Tibetan: chos-kyi-khyad-par-phyin-ci-log-tu-sgrub-par-byed-

<sup>1</sup> For *Jāti* vide Nyāya-sūtra, Book I, aphorism 58.

<sup>2</sup> ननु सुतरां यथा ननु ननु ननु ॥

इति ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु ॥

इति ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु ॥

ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु ॥

(Nyāya-bindu).

<sup>3</sup> Vide Nyāya-pravēśa, Fallacies of the Middle Term, concluding lines.

pa). Dharmakīrti in his Nyāya-bindu rejects this view saying that this second contradiction is included in the first kind.<sup>1</sup>

An illustration of the second or implied contradiction is given thus :—

The eyes, etc., are for the use of another,  
Because they are composite things,  
Like a bed, seat, etc.

Here the major term "another" is ambiguous, inasmuch as it may signify either a composite thing (e.g. the body) or a non-composite thing (e.g. the soul). There would be a contradiction between the middle term and the major term if the word "another" were used by the speaker in the sense of a non-composite thing, but understood by the listener in the sense of a composite thing. The reasoning would then involve a contradiction of the middle term to the desired or implied major term.

Dharmakīrti<sup>2</sup> in his Nyāya-bindu considers this case as an illustration of the first or natural contradiction. A word, which is the major term of a proposition, can, as such, admit of only one meaning, and if there is ambiguity between the meaning expressed and the meaning implied the real meaning is to be ascertained from the context. If the meaning implied is the real one, there is a natural contradiction between the middle term and the major term.

Dignāga<sup>3</sup> mentions yet another fallacy called the "non-erroneous contra-erroneous contradiction" (*viruddhā vyabhīcārī*, called in Tibetan: *hgal-wa-la-mi-ñkhrul-pa*) which he includes among the

1 नव च बलीशोक्तिरुपनिषत्सु विरचः ।... स द्रव कथाशोकोः अनशोक्तिरुपनिषत् ।  
(Nyāya-bindu, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, chapter III, p. 413.)

२ अयं च विरच आचार्यो दिग्-ज्ञानेन उक्तः । स कथायुक्तोऽपि सतः कथा शोकोः ।  
(Nyāya-bindu-śikṣā, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, chapter III, p. 78.)

Compare K. B. Pathak's "On the authorship of the Nyāya-bindu" in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. XIX, p. 51.

3 *Vide* Nyāya-pravēṣa in the *Ēstān-hgyur*, Mdo. Ce, leaf 185.  
See also Nyāya-pravēṣa, fallacy of the middle term.

विद्वत्प्रतिपत्तिरिति संशयवृत्तयः । स द्रव कथाशोकोः अनुमानविरचोऽप्युक्तः ।  
ननु आचार्योऽपि विद्वत्प्रतिपत्तिरिति संशयवृत्तयः । अतस्मिन् आचार्यो दिग्-ज्ञानेन अयं वृत्तविरच उक्तः कथाशोकोः ।... तथादिवाक्यात्संशयवृत्तयः विद्वत्प्रतिपत्तिरिति ।  
(Nyāya-bindu-śikṣā, p. 84)

Compare also Journal, Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. XIX, p. 40.

"fallacies of uncertainty." It takes place when two contradictory conclusions are supported by what appear to be valid reasons, e.g. :

A Vaiśeṣika philosopher says :—  
Sound is non-eternal,  
Because it is a product.

A Mīmāṃsaka replies :—  
Sound is eternal,  
Because it is audible.

The reasons employed in the above cases are supposed both to be correct according, respectively, to the tenets of the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā Schools, but as they lead to contradictory conclusions they are uncertain and, as such, fallacious.

Dharmakīrti<sup>1</sup> in the Nyāya-bindu rejects this fallacy of "non-erroneous contradiction," on the ground that it does not arise in connection with inference and is not based even on the scripture. A reason or middle term, which is valid, must stand to the major term in the relation of identity, casualty or non-perception, and must lead to a correct conclusion.

Two conclusions which are contradictory can not be supported by reasons which are valid. Two different sets of scripture too can not be of any help in the establishment of two contradictory conclusions inasmuch as a scripture can not override perception and inference, and is authoritative only in the ascertainment of supersensuous objects. The non-erroneous contradiction is therefore impossible.

In opposition to Dignāga, Dharmakīrti<sup>2</sup> maintains that 'example' is not a part of a syllogism, as it is included in the middle term, e.g.

1 Nyāya-bindu, chap. III, p. 115.

2 विद्वदोऽपि उक्तः । तानन्तरं अयं प्रतिपत्तिरिति न उच्यते इत्येतो नाम अतः अतः अतः कश्चिद् विवादात् उच्यते पृथग्न [न] उच्यते अतः अतः ।  
(Nyāya-bindu, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, pp. 115-116.)

The omission of न is perhaps an oversight. The न or negation appears in the Tibetan version which runs as follows :—

ननु तेषामपि उक्तं नैतन्नियमं नैतन्नियमं नैतन्नियमं नैतन्नियमं ।  
ननु तेषामपि उक्तं नैतन्नियमं नैतन्नियमं नैतन्नियमं नैतन्नियमं ॥  
ननु तेषामपि उक्तं नैतन्नियमं नैतन्नियमं नैतन्नियमं नैतन्नियमं ॥

(Nyāya-bindu, Sherabatsaki's edition; St. Petersburg, p. 193.)

The hill is fiery,  
Because it is smoky,  
Like a kitchen.

In this reasoning the term 'smoky' includes a 'kitchen,' as well as other similar things, hence it is almost unnecessary to cite the example 'kitchen.' Nevertheless, says Dharmakīrti, the example has this much value<sup>1</sup> that it points out in a particular way what has been expressed in a general form by the middle term: thus, the general expression "all smoky things are fiery" is made more impressive by the particular example 'kitchen' which is smoky as well as fiery.

#### 111. Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa.

The Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa is another excellent work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation<sup>2</sup> in the Bṣtan-hgyur, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 355—375. The work in Tibetan is called *Gtan-tshigs-kyi-tshigs-pa* signifying "A Drop of Reason." The work is divided into three chapters as follows:—

(1) Relation of identity between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan: Rañ-bshin-gyri-gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit: *Sambhāva-hetu*); (2) Relation of effect and cause between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan: Hbras-buñi-gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit: *Kārya-hetu*); and (3) Relation of negation between the middle term and the heterogeneous major term (in Tibetan: Mi-dmigs-pañi-gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit: *Anupalabdhi-hetu*).

#### 112. Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya.

The Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya is another treatise on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation<sup>3</sup> in the Bṣtan-hgyur, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 384—416. The work in Tibetan is called *Ḥsod-pañi-rigs-pa*, signifying the "Method of Discussion." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the great Indian sage Jñāna-śrī-bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Dge-wañi-blo-gros. The translation was retouched by the great Pañḍita Dipaṅkara (of Vikramaṅpura in Bengal, born in 980 A.D. and started for Tibet in 1040 A.D.) and the interpreter-monk Dar-ma-grags.

<sup>1</sup> ... *འགྲུབ་ལ་འདྲིའི་འགྲུབ་པ་ལྟོགས་པ་ལྟོགས་པ་*

(Nyāya-bindu, p. 116).

<sup>2</sup> I have consulted the copy embodied in the Bṣtan-hgyur of the India Office, London.

<sup>3</sup> I have consulted the work embodied in the Bṣtan-hgyur of the India Office, London.

#### 113. Santānāntara-siddhi.

The Santānāntara-siddhi, also called Tantrāntara-siddhi, is a philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan version<sup>1</sup> in the Bṣtan-hgyur, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 416—420. The work in Tibetan is called *Rgyud-gshan-grub-pa* signifying "Proof of the Continuity of Succession." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the Indian sage Viśuddha Simhā and the Tibetan official interpreter Dpal-tsegs.

#### 114. Sambandha-parikṣā.

The Sambandha-parikṣā is another philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation<sup>2</sup> in the Bṣtan-hgyur, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 376—377. The work in Tibetan is called *Hbrel-wa-ñtag-pa* signifying "Examination of Connection." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the Indian teacher Jñāna-garba and the interpreter Vande-nam-mkhas.

#### 115. Sambandha-parikṣā-vṛtti.

The Sambandha-parikṣā-vṛtti<sup>3</sup> is a commentary on the Sambandha-parikṣā by Dharmakīrti himself. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bṣtan-hgyur, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 377—384. The work in Tibetan is called *Hbrel-wa-ñtag-pañi-hgrel-wa*.

#### 116. DEVENDRABODHI

(ABOUT 650 A.D.).

Devendrābodhi, called in Tibetan *Lha-dwan-blo*, was a contemporary of Dharmakīrti,<sup>4</sup> and so lived about 650 A.D. He wrote the following work on Logic:—

The *Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā*, called in Tibetan *Tshad-ma-nam-hgrel-gyri-dkahl-grel*, signifying "An Explanation of Difficulties in the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti." The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation<sup>5</sup> in the Bṣtan-hgyur, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 1—380. The translation was

<sup>1</sup> I have consulted the Tibetan version embodied in the Bṣtan-hgyur of the India Office, London.

<sup>2</sup> I have consulted the copy embodied in the Bṣtan-hgyur of the India Office, London.

<sup>3</sup> I have consulted the copy of this work embodied in the Bṣtan-hgyur of the India Office, London.

<sup>4</sup> *Vida* Taranātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 186—187.

<sup>5</sup> I consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim in 1907.